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ABSTRACT 
Pre-Trial Evaluations in Massachusetts: 
A Training Proposal 
February 1987 
Howard M. Lester 
B.A. , University of Rhode Island 
M.Ed., Springfield College 
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: John W. Wideman, Ed.D. 
This work chronicles the development of a proposal 
to the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health (D.M.H.) 
for a training program designed to prepare practicing 
mental health professionals to perform pre-trial 
evaluations of competency to stand trial and criminal 
responsibility in Massachusetts. 
According to the literature, there appears to be a 
gap between the presumed forensic expertise of the average 
clinician providing these evaluations, and the level of 
forensic skill and knowledge actually attained. Further, 
specialty training programs are generally unavailable to 
the busy practicing clinicians to whom the courts usually 
turn. Recent developments in Massachusetts, paving the 
vi 11 
way for the introduction of a training program which 
addresses this problem, are described. 
This project proceeded with the agreement of D.M.H. 
in three stages. In Stage I a training manual and a 
curriculum were developed. These materials are presented 
in Chapter IV. In Stage II ratings and comments were 
elicited from a group "key individuals", whose opinions 
are valued by D.M.H. This group consisted of eleven (11) 
legal professionals, sixteen (16) forensic mental health 
professionals, and five (5) prospective trainees; a total 
of thirty-two (32) out of fifty-three (53) professionals, 
from whom review of the training program was originally 
sought. A seventeen (17) item, five point rating scale 
was used by twenty (20) reviewers; twelve (12) others 
responded through letters and interviews. 
In Stage III, a "Report to D.M.H." presented and 
discussed the results from Stage II. The reviewers 
consistently rated this training proposal as quite 
adequately addressing its content, and quite adequate in 
its comprehensiveness, format, and training methods. 
Comments were mostly supportive and often enthusiastic; 
yet they provided a good deal of constructive criticism. 
The "report" concluded: 1) the methodology 
successfully elicited ratings and comment, on which D.M.H. 
could confidently rely; (2) the ratings and comments 
provide a basis for D.M.H. to make decisions about the 
IX 
acceptability and further revision of the training 
program; and, 3) the training program could serve as a 
basis for training clinicians to perform pre-trial 
evaluations in Massachusetts. 
Finally, implementation strategies and implications 
of the project were discussed. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM 
This dissertation chronicles the development of a 
proposal to the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health 
(D.M.H.), for a training program designed to prepare 
practicing mental health professionals to perform 
court-ordered pre-trial evaluations of competency to stand 
trial and criminal responsibility in Massachusetts. 
The proposal includes a training program and a 
report to D.M.H. The program (presented in Chapter IV), 
which includes a training manual and an accompanying 
curriculum, is being proposed to meet an immediate need, 
described in this chapter, for a training program which 
could be endorsed by D.M.H. The report (presented in 
Chapters V through VIII) presents and analyzes the results 
of a review of the proposed training program by a group of 
forensic mental health professionals, judges, attorneys, 
and prospective trainees. 
Overview of The Project 
In this chapter, after introducing the pre-trial 
evaluation task, I describe the present "situation in 
Massachusetts", with regard to forensic mental health 
evaluation services. Then I focus on the need, both 
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nationally and in this state, for forensic evaluation 
training opportunities for practicing mental health 
professionals, who are not forensic specialists. 
According to the literature cited in this 
introductory chapter, there appears to be a gap between 
the "presumed" (by the legal profession) forensic 
expertise of the average mental health professional who 
performs pre-trial evaluations, and the level of forensic 
skill and knowledge actually attained. Further, specialty 
training programs are generally unavailable to the busy 
practicing clinicians, to whom the courts usually turn. 
Recent developments in Massachusetts, which will also be 
described here, have paved the way for the introduction of 
a training program which will address this problem. Thus, 
the project described in this dissertation is my response 
to the perceived need for training, and to the fact that 
the time appears to be "ripe" for the introduction of a 
pre-trial evaluation training program in Massachusetts. 
Since Massachusetts mental health law now calls for 
court—ordered pre-trial evaluations to be completed by 
"qualified psychiatrists" or "qualified psychologists , I 
present a review of the topic of training in these two 
professions, in Chapter II. Here I provide an historical 
perspective, tracing the development of each profession 
from its roots to its current status. Forensic training 
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programs in each profession, both past and present, are 
described. This review ends with a description of 
Virginia's forensic evaluation training program, the first 
formal training program designed specifically for 
practicing mental health professionals. 
I describe the project and its methodology in detail 
in Chapter III. Since its conception, the project has 
proceeded with the knowledge, cooperation, and support of 
the D.M.H.'s Division of Forensic Mental Health Services. 
Specifically, the Assistant Commissioner for Forensic 
Mental Health Services, Dr. Robert A. Fein, understood 
that upon completion of this project, he would receive a 
proposal which would include: 1) a training manual and 
curriculum for the training program; 2) review and comment 
by key individuals (identified by Dr. Fein) from the 
mental health and judicial systems in Massachusetts, and 
by prospective trainees; and 3) an analysis of that review 
and comment. Should the proposal be accepted by D.M.H., 
further modification of the training materials, and 
decisions regarding implementation (including trial runs), 
would be made at some future point, after the completion 
of the project. 
This project proceeded then, with the agreement of 
D.M.H., in three stages. In Stage I a training manual and 
for the training program were developed. These 
curriculum 
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materials, modeled after those used in Virginia's program, 
are presented in Chapter IV. 
In Stage II ratings and comments on these materials 
were elicited from a group "key individuals", whose 
opinions are valued by D.M.H. Members of this group, 
consisting of legal professionals, forensic mental health 
professionals, and prospective trainees, reviewed the 
training materials and provided ratings and comments. 
Stage III, a "Report to D.M.H." is presented in the 
last four chapters of this dissertation. Chapter V begins 
with a discussion of the decisions and events involved in 
Stage II, and concludes by looking at the strengths and 
limits of the methodology and its implementation in this 
project. Chapters VI and VII present the results from 
Stage II - the ratings and comments of the reviewers. 
Keeping in mind that upon its completion, this project 
will be subject to approval and further revision by 
D.M.H., I provide discussion and conclusions about the 
ratings, and the specific comments, criticism and 
recommendations of the reviewers. 
Finally, Stage III (and this project) concludes with 
a discussion of "next steps" - implementation of the 
training program, and implications of the methodology for 
future projects. 
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Pre Trial—Evaluations_in Massachusetts 
The Task 
As used here, the term "pre-trial evaluation" is 
limited to the court-ordered evaluation, performed by 
mental health professionals, of the competency to stand 
trial and/or the criminal responsibility of defendants in 
a criminal cases, and to the related assessment of the 
need for involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hospital 
in these cases. 
Massachusetts statute (Massachusetts General Laws, 
Chapter 123, Section 15a) and case law ( Commonwealth v. 
Hill. 1978), call for a judge to order an initial 
screening by a mental health professional (in a court, 
jail, or at a court clinic) of a defendant's competency to 
stand trial, if there is any doubt about the issue. If 
the insanity defense is likely to be raised as a defense 
the judge can also order a screening of the defendant’s 
criminal responsibility, under the same statute. In 
practice the two are often combined into one court order. 
Based on the mental health professional's 
"screening" recommendations, the judge may then choose to 
order further assessment of these issues via an 
involuntary commitment to a psychiatric facility (Section 
state hospital. This commitment can last 15b), usually a 
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up to 40 days. 
After the assessments are completed, both the 
defendant and the reports of the clinical findings are 
then sent back to the court and the legal proceedings 
continue. These evaluations and reports are now prepared 
by psychiatrists or psychologist designated as "qualified" 
to perform these evaluations. According to the statute 
(Section 15c), the reports should: 
1. inform the judge about whether or not the 
defendant has a mental illness, or a mental defect 
(mental retardation); 
2. offer an opinion, supported with clinical 
findings, on the questions of the defendant's 
competency to stand trial and/or criminal 
responsibility; 
3. offer an opinion, supported with clinical 
findings, regarding the need for further 
treatment, including involuntary commitment (up to 
six months) if the defendant is both mentally ill 
and likely to cause serious harm to self or 
others, if released. 
Defendants found incompetent to stand trial by the 
be committed to a psychiatric hospital trial judge, may 
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for treatment by the same judge. The same is true for 
defendants who are found competent, but then adjudicated 
Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity. In both cases the 
commitment must meet the criteria for a civil commitment: 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is both 
mentally ill and dangerous. 
The_Sj/buation in Massachusetts 
For at least 120 years, court-ordered pre-trial 
evaluations in Massachusetts have been performed by 
psychiatrists (Strickman, 1970). In the mid-1970's, after 
the current mental health statute (M.G.L. Chapter 123) 
went into effect, the D.M.H. developed the current 
regulations (104 CMR 3:07) which describe the eligibility 
criteria for psychiatrists to become "qualified 
physicians" for the purpose of pre-trial evaluations. The 
qualified physician must: 
1. be fully licensed to practice medicine under 
Massachusetts law; 
2. have completed a formal course of training in 
forensic psychiatry as approved by D.M.H. 
3. be certified or qualify for certification by the 
American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc. , 
or have at least five years experience practicing 
medicine, a substantial part of which has been in 
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psychiatry. 
Until recently, the "formal course of training in 
forensic psychiatry" was presented by the D.M.H. in a one 
day workshop format. No other training or experience in 
forensic evaluations is required. Currently there is no 
formal course or training program offered at all by the 
D.M.H. 
In 1981, a statutory change enabled doctoral level 
psychologists at Bridgewater State Hospital, (the 
Massachusetts Department of Correction's maximum security 
psychiatric facility) to perform court-ordered pre-trial 
evaluations. The criteria for psychologists described in 
subsequent departmental regulations were much more 
rigorous, with heavy emphasis on experience (1000 hours in 
a forensic setting). However, again this change only 
applied to pre-trial evaluations done at Bridgewater State 
Hospital. 
Recent developments have paved the way for the 
establishment by the D.M.H. of new criteria for 
designation of mental health professionals qualified to 
perform these evaluations. First, in mid—1985, the D.M.H. 
created the new position of Assistant Commissioner for 
Forensic Services. With Dr. Fein's appointment, the 
Commissioner of Mental Health announced his intention to 
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revamp and improve the quality of forensic services in the 
state. 
Second, in December, 1985, the Massachussets 
legislature passed a new law (Chapter 617 of the Acts of 
1985) allowing the D.M.H. to designate "qualified 
psychologists" to perform pre-trial evaluations throughout 
the state. This development presented the D.M.H. with a 
new opportunity to reconsider the criteria for designation 
of "qualified" clinicians. Dr. Fein convened a workgroup 
of forensic psychologists and psychiatrists, charged with 
the task of formulating new regulations for psychologists. 
In contrast to the "qualified physician" requirements 
described above (currently being considered for 
modification), the D.M.H. has developed new regulations 
for "qualified psychologists," who must meet the following 
criteria: 
1. be licensed by the Massachusetts Board of 
Registration of Psychologists; 
2. possess a doctoral degree in psychology; 
3. have completed at least two years, full-time, 
post-doctoral work as a psychologist doing 
clinical work (five years post master's degree 
experience substitutes for one of these years); 
have completed 1000 hours work, supervised by a 4. 
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licensed mental health professional, in an 
inpatient unit which accepts involuntary patients; 
5. have completed training visits to: 
a. Bridgewater State Hospital 
b. a D.M.H. inpatient facility 
c. a District Court which has D.M.H. forensic 
services 
d. a County Jail 
6. have completed a reasonable number of section 15a 
and 15b reports; 
7. have successfully completed a written examination. 
These temporary regulations also provide for 
Forensic Mental Health Supervisors, designated by the 
Assistant Commissioner, to supervise and examine 
applicants. While the regulations do not specifically 
call for a training program, the workgroup emphasized the 
need for a D.M.H. endorsed training program. 
The Need for Training 
Over the last 15 to 20 years, public opinion and the 
legal and mental health literature have become 
increasingly concerned with the matter of mental health 
professionals * involvement in the process of determining 
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the competency to stand trial, criminal responsibility and 
future dangerousness (and related involuntary commitment) 
of accused offenders. 
Concerns range from the public's fear that culpable 
offenders will "beat a rap," (Steadman, 1979) and that 
"dangerous" criminals will be released to the streets; 
through civil rights advocates' concern over the 
curtailment of liberty and other rights (Commentary, 
Mental and Physical Disabilities Law Reporter, June 1984) 
to the worry expressed by lawyers (Huckabee, 1980) and 
mental health professionals (Fersch, 1980; Morse, 1978; 
Winslade, 1983) themselves that psychiatrists and 
psychologists participation as experts in this process may 
be both invalid and even harmful. 
Proponents (Bonnie & Slobogin, 1980; Gutheil &. 
Appelbaum, 1982; Melton, Weithorn & Slobogin, 1985; 
Rubenstein, 1982) of participation by mental health 
professionals point out that our system of law goes to 
great lengths to avoid bringing people who cannot defend 
themselves to trial, and to avoid punishing those who are 
not considered to be criminally responsible for illegal 
acts they have committed. 
Advocates for a role for mental health professionals 
insist that for justice to be as thorough as possible the 
trier of fact (judge and/or jury) must have relevant data 
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and adequate explanation and interpretation of the data. 
Absolute scientific sureness is not always necessary. 
Given that the mental health professions are known to be 
inexact, ethical professionals who are experienced in 
forensic issues can still make a contribution by offering 
descriptive, evaluative comments (Clements & Ciccone, 
1984). 
Critics believe that judges and lawyers may be 
better able to answer the question of competency to stand 
trial (Elwork, 1984; Stone, 1984). They view criminal 
responsibility as a moral issue which belongs in the hands 
of judges and juries; they doubt the validity of 
clinicians' assessment of states of mind which occurred 
some time in the past; and they fear the societal 
consequences of the legal/moral construct of exculpability 
due to mental illness with its reliance on the notion of 
determinism and lack of free will (Morris, 1982; Winslade, 
1983). 
Further, opponents note that the added question 
addressed in pre-trial evaluations, regarding future 
dangerousness of defendants found incompetent to stand 
or not guilty by reason of insanity, is 
inappropriately posed to mental health professionals, 
given the evidence (considered questionable by proponents) 
that they have no special expertise in this pursuit 
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(Monahan, 1981, 1984). 
In cases in which the pre-trial evaluation involves 
an involuntary commitment to a psychiatric facility, 
critics note the financial cost to the public (the typical 
pre-trial evaluation commitment to Northampton State 
Hospital costs $4000). They also note the personal cost 
to defendants in terras of: 
1. stigma 
2. loss of personal freedom 
3. potential denial of civil rights 
4. denial of right to a speedy trial 
5. risk of subsequent long institutionalization: 
a. without a trial; or 
b. after being found not guilty 
6. risk of self-incrimination 
Criticism of Mental Health Professionals'_Performance 
It is from critics of clinicians' performance that 
we learn about the crucial areas which need to be 
addressed in a training program. 
The criticism of mental health professionals' 
performance in the pre-trial evaluation process appears to 
fall into three categories: 1) the concern that 
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professionals take or are given the decision-making 
prerogative which belongs with the court; 2) ethical 
ooncerns; and 3) concern about the adequacy of mental 
health professionals’ skills. A brief examination of 
these issues here provides a partial outline of the issues 
to be addressed in the training program. 
The anxiety over clinicians’ taking on the 
decision-making prerogative of the court appears to be the 
major controversy in the literature on forensic 
evaluation, today. The concern here, is over forensic 
evaluation reports and expert witness testimony in which 
the clinician answers the psycho-legal questions posed by 
the court in a conclusory fashion (e.g., "the defendant is 
criminally responsible"). The position taken by higher 
court justices (Bazelon, 1975), and by most 
clinician-authors (Bonnie & Slobogin, 1980; Morse, 1978; 
Pollack, 1982), is that the practice of offering such 
conclusions is inappropriate. 
The judge, in referring the defendant for pre-trial 
evaluation, is asking (in Massachusetts) about the the 
effect of a "mental illness or defect" on the defendant’s 
abilities relative to the issues of competency to stand 
trial or criminal responsibility. High court justices and 
the professional literature insist that the judge or jury, 
not the clinician, should draw conclusions about legal 
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issues, from the clinician's data (Bazelon, 1975; Morse, 
1978). The major worry seems to be that some judges and 
juries, uncomfortable with cases involving mentally ill 
defendants, appear to abdicate their decision making role 
to clinicians, by rubber stamping'1 clinicians’ 
conclusions. 
However, Melton et al (1985) note that lower court 
judges quite often insist on conclusory language; and 
Pollack (1982) notes, that the use of conclusory language 
by clinicians is common practice. Which way to go? How 
should a training program counsel clinicians? In 
Chapter’s VI and VIII, I provide in depth discussions of 
this dilemma. 
Concern over ethical issues are expressed by 
virtually all writers on the topic of pre-trial 
evaluations, proponents and opponents alike. Alan A. 
Stone, a leading philosopher on issues in law and 
psychiatry, states (1984) that he has never become a 
forensic psychiatrist because of ethical "risks". He sees 
the forensic clinician as being in a position of power, in 
which s/he is "at risk" of "twisting the rules of justice 
and fairness to help the patient" (p. 58). Stone also 
cites the opposite risk: "deceiving the patient in order 
to serve justice and fairness" (p. 58). Finally, he is 
concerned that the forensic clinician is at risk of 
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"prostituting the profession". 
Gutheil and Appelbaum (1982) clarify Stone's 
concerns. As a mental health professional performing a 
Pre_^ria^ evaluation, the clinician is likely to encounter 
defendants who view him/her as a "helper", regardless of 
the clinician's explanation of the purpose of the 
assessment. In the assessment interview the clinician 
needs to be aware of potential "transference" issues, 
which might lead the defendant to a false sense of 
reassurance, brought on by the relationship with the 
clinician, resulting in the defendant's willingness to 
speak more freely than s/he would have wished. 
On the other hand, the mental health professional 
needs to also be acutely aware of "counter-transference" 
issues, which may influence his/her findings. Here the 
clinician's personal feelings about the defendant can 
interfere with, or at least affect, professional judgment 
on the psycho-legal issues at hand. Then, there is the 
more blatant ethical concern regarding the mental health 
professional whose clinical opinions appear to be 
determined by the "side" that hired him/her. Fortunately 
court-ordered assessments in Massachusetts rarely involve 
this "opinion-for-hire" issue, since they are ordered by 
the judge (supposedly neutral), and since 90% of these 
evaluations are performed by public employees, who are not 
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paid on a per case basis. 
Criticism of mental health professionals' 
performance in the pre-trial evaluation process is 
generally focused on clinicians' psycho-legal report 
writing, and on their expert witness testimony. 
Gross and Weinberger (1982) describe three major 
problem areas in report writing. First is the use of 
technical jargon, without any explanation of terms. Next 
they cite reports which offer opinions in "conclusory 
language , and then fail to support these "conclusions" 
with clinical data and/or a statement of their rationale. 
Such reports leave judges and juries with no basis on 
which to judge the issue for themselves. They are placed 
in the position of blindly accepting or rejecting the 
clinician's conclusions. Finally, they cite reports which 
include extraneous information, or opinions on questions 
which were not asked by the courts. 
Four separate studies of clinicians' pre-trial 
evaluation reports supported Gross and Weinberger’s 
problem list (Geller & Lister, 1978; McGarry, 1969,1965; 
Roesch & Golding, 1980). A common conclusion in these 
studies, one supported by Poythress (1979) in his 
examination of the need for forensic training, was that 
mental health professionals often misunderstand or lack 
familiarity with legal concepts and tests related to the 
18 
questions they are asked to address. They often confuse 
legal concepts such as "competency to stand trial" and 
criminal responsibility, and terms such as "psychosis" 
(a clinical term) and "insanity" (a legal terra). 
Poythress (1979) goes on to cite three other 
problems in mental health professionals' performance in 
the forensic evaluation process. He sees these as 
deficits in professional preparation, which can be 
remedied through training. 
Poythress cites inappropriate assessment (1979, p. 
615) - wherein the clinician, unaware of the legal 
criteria for a given forensic question, utilizes 
traditional clinical assessment techniques which are 
inappropriate (e.g., a standard battery of psychological 
tests which were not designed or validated for use in 
addressing legal questions). Poythress cites anecdotal 
data which suggest that many clinicians "may be naively 
applying their clinical skills with little appreciation of 
the legal questions they are asked to address" (1979, p. 
613). 
"Lack of familiarity with relevant literature" 
(1979, P- 616) is another problem, noted by Poythress. 
This "lack" becomes evident in the courtroom setting in 
which the clinician-expert witness comes under 
cross-examination. The courts expect reports and 
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testimony which is consistent with the best scientific 
knowledge. While subjective clinical judgments are 
commonplace and generally acceptable, should they run 
counter to an established body of knowledge, the clinician 
should be ready to defend his/her position. While lack of 
awareness of relevant research does not necessarily lead 
to poor clinical assessments, it does tend to undermine 
judicial confidence in the clinicians opinions. 
Finally, Poythress raises the issue of clinicians’ 
lack of orientation to courtroom procedure. The issue of 
coping on the witness stand" has become a major concern 
for mental health professionals, as they find themselves 
called into court more frequently (Bank & Poythress, 1983; 
Brodsky & Robey, 1972; and Poythress, 1980). Gutheil and 
Appelbaum (1982) describe the courtroom as a "foreign 
land" for the mental health professional. The direct and 
sometimes aggressive confrontational nature of 
cross-examination is disconcerting, and often destructive 
to the testimony of the unprepared clinician, who is 
likely to be used to comparatively mild, 
non-confrontational interactions. 
These faults and criticisms fuel the argument by 
opponents of clinicians’ participation in the pre-trial 
evaluation process - that clinicians should stop or 
severely limit their involvement (Morse, 1978). I 
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disagree. As long as the courts want to hear about 
defendants * cognitive and affective functioning, properly 
prepared clinicians have something to offer. I believe 
that most of the criticisms of mental health 
professionals performance can be addressed through 
training, and concerns about clinicians undue influence in 
the courtroom can be lessened through better communication 
between clinicians and legal professionals (see my 
discussion of program implementation in Chapter VIII). 
Thus the criticisms of mental health professionals' 
performance described here, provide focus for a pre-trial 
evaluation training program which would address: 
1. Controversies regarding mental health 
professionals participation 
2. Ethical issues and dilemmas 
3. Legal questions addressed in pre-trial evaluations 
4. Clinical assessment techniques involved in 
pre-trial evaluations 
5. Relevant literature 
6. Report writing 
7. Expert witness testimony 
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Increasing Demand 
"In a stagnant psychiatric economy, forensic 
psychiatry is one of the few growth stocks. The 
sudden boom in forensic psychology gives further 
evidence of the strength and attractiveness of 
the market." (Stone, 1984, p. 58) 
Against a backdrop of skepticism and doubt, at a 
time when some authors (Morse, 1982) suggest that mental 
health professionals get out of the business of answering 
legal questions altogether, lies the curious reality that 
the demand for psycho-legal assessment and testimony of 
all kinds, including the issues of competency to stand 
trial and criminal responsibility, is on the increase 
(Elwork, 1984; Stone, 1984). Further, the mental health 
professionals are there to meet the demand. Why? 
The answer seems to be a mix of serious advocacy for 
a continuing role for mental health professionals on the 
one hand, and a practical accommodation by judges, D.A.’s 
and defense lawyers on the other hand. 
At the level of the higher courts there is ample 
evidence (Appelbaum, 1984; Bazelon, 1975) that the judges 
understand the limits of mental health witness expertise, 
and accept it. While the contributions of mental health 
professionals appear to be viewed by the Supreme Court as 
"irrelevant" and perhaps not to be trusted, it backs away 
from eliminating them from participation (Appelbaum, 
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1984), and even gets involved in defendants rights to have 
a psychiatric evaluation ( Ake.v^klahQma^ 1985). 
If the performance of mental health professionals 
has been shown time and again to be embarrassingly 
inadequate or faulty, the authors making this claim 
usually acknowledge that some of these professionals are 
helpful and do a good job. Advocates of participation 
urge that the whole not be judged by the errors of its 
parts. A useful contribution can be made. Positive 
energy should be directed toward training and high 
standards of "certainty" for mental health experts 
(Diamond, 1985). 
While critics are concerned with professionals 
having undue influence (judges simply rubber stamping 
their findings) in decisions best left to the judiciary 
(Stone, 1975), judges practicing at the level of overtaxed 
criminal courts are reluctant to draw ultimate conclusions 
based on clinical data without a clear opinion from a 
professional trained to collect, assess and interpret that 
data. 
Prosecution and defense attorneys, both of whom may 
harbor "ulterior motives," also contribute to the 
continuing and growing use of mental health professionals 
in the courts. For instance, on a practical basis, 
prosecuting attorneys prefer to have clinicians evaluating 
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competency to stand trial, to avoid the possibility of 
future appeals, and to avoid release on bail of defendants 
they consider to be dangerous. Defense attorneys often 
prefer the initial delays involved in the assessment 
process. They see advantages to the involvement of mental 
health professionals, with their potential for casting 
doubt on defendants' mental health, should this become an 
issue. 
Then there is the fact that most states have 
statutes which call for the participation of state 
employed psychiatrists and psychologists in criminal 
cases, in which the questions of competency to stand trial 
or criminal responsibility are raised. Such laws give 
little flexibility to courts or public employees who may 
be concerned about the validity or relevance of their 
participation. 
Finally, there are three recent developments in 
social policy and law which have contributed, or soon will 
contribute to the ongoing role of clinicians: 
1. Deinstitutionalization. For a variety of reasons 
(Stone, 1978; Valdeserri, Carroll & Hartl 1986) 
the social policy which keeps an increasing number 
of mentally ill people out of psychiatric 
hospitals has increased the representation of the 
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mentally ill among defendants in minor criminal 
cases. Mentally ill defendants of course, are 
likely to face pre-trial evaluations when they 
come to court. 
2. Tightened standards for civil commitment. The 
legal companion to the social policy of 
deinstitutionalization, this phenomenon has 
apparently forced a "back door" approach to 
commitment of the mentally ill: arrest for 
misdemeanors, with subsequent commitment for 
pre-trial evaluation, substituted for civil 
commitment (Stone, 1978). 
3. Ake v._Oklahoma,_(1985): In this important 
decision the U.S. Supreme Court has required 
states to provide a psychiatrist to indigent 
defendants who request an independent evaluation. 
Filling the Gap: Supply and Level of Expertise 
Poythress (1979) notes that the courts have come to 
assume that a level of "bona fide expertise" follows 
simply from the attainment of a doctorate in psychology. 
This type of assumption appears even stronger with regard 
to psychiatrists (Petrella & Poythress, 1983). While 
there is no question that a high level of forensic 
expertise is possessed by some clinicians, there appears 
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to be a gap between the presumed forensic expertise of the 
average clinician and the level of skill and knowledge 
actually attained. Many mental health professionals who 
mean well may be naively applying their clinical skills to 
complex forensic issues. 
While both the American Board of Forensic Psychiatry 
(Rappeport & Halpern, 1985) and the American Board of 
Forensic Psychology (Poythress, 1979) share the goals of 
limiting involvement within their professions to those who 
possess the expertise, the demand by the courts for 
involvement apparently exceeds the current availability of 
mental health professionals, trained to perform forensic 
assessments and provide expert witness testimony (Melton 
et al, 1985). 
Aside from recent efforts by some states to develop 
training in forensic issues for professionals in the field 
(the focus of this project), formal training in forensic 
mental health issues can be obtained in one of the 
following settings (presented in more depth in Chapter 
II) : 
1. Special facilities appropriate for advanced 
training. These include forensic hospitals•and 
specialty programs based in academic settings 
which offer internships, practicums and 
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post doctoral specialty training. 
Psychology-Law, J.D./Ph.D. combined programs which 
turn out students qualified for careers in both 
law and psychology. While such programs probably 
provide the most rigorous training, only a small 
percentage of the professionals providing forensic 
services can be expected to come from such highly 
demanding programs. Further, in 1985, Melton et 
al. noted that there are only six such programs 
available in the United States. 
3. Some graduate programs and psychiatric residencies 
offer forensic courses and training as an area of 
concentration, or as part of a core curriculum. 
i i 
It appears that in the 1980’s we are at a crossroads 
or transition period with regard to meeting the demand for 
trained forensic specialists. While the above settings 
may provide excellent opportunities for training, they 
share two major drawbacks: they are too new and far too 
few. While there has been a recent increase in 
opportunities for this training, the training for the most 
part is focused at professional entry points and is itself 
a response to the increased demand. 
The fact that the gap between presumed and attained 
expertise described earlier continues, can be traced to 
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.es 
;e 
in 
the developing gap between the training opportunity 
available to today's new graduate students and thos< 
available to the vast majority of professionals already 
the field. 
In most cases, today's practicing mental health 
professionals received little or no forensic training as 
part of their original professional training. Those who 
do become involved with forensic evaluations have, for the 
most part, had to rely on occasional professional 
workshops, on—the—job—experience and the professional 
literature. Rosner(1983) and Blau (1984) note that the 
average forensic mental health professional today received 
his/her forensic training “ad lib" (see Chapter II). 
Ironically, it is these "experienced" professionals to 
whom the courts usually must turn. 
Given the supply and demand situation, some states, 
notably Virginia, have decided to expand their influence 
over the pre-trial evaluation process by developing a 
system of forensic services provided by certified 
clinicians who have received brief, but intensive training 
and have the benefit of ongoing consultation from forensic 
mental health experts. 
Virginia (Melton et al, 1985) initiated its training 
program in 1977. Faculty from the University of 
Virginia's Forensic Evaluation Training and Research 
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Center developed a program which provides six days of 
training for clinicians, including masters and doctoral 
level psychologists and psychiatrists. The training, a 
mix of didactic and practical learning experiences, is 
complemented with required readings and supervised 
practice. Evaluative research (Melton et al, 1985) 
discussed in the next chapter, shows the Virginia model to 
be effective in providing clinicians with specialty 
knowledge on par with forensic experts, and skills 
producing forensic reports of higher quality than their 
untrained counterparts. 
The situation, in Massachussets, described above, 
seems ripe for the application of a training program 
similar to the Virginia approach. Here forensic 
evaluations are already being done throughout the state, 
in both hospital and community-based settings. Until 
recently, the state has demanded only the briefest of 
forensic training qualifications for psychiatrists, who 
were the only mental health professionals allowed to 
perform court-ordered forensic evaluations. While the 
new regulations permit more thoroughly prepared 
psychologists, and while the requirements for 
psychiatrists can soon be expected to match those for 
psychologists, we cannot expect that very many of those 
psychologists and psychiatrists currently interested in 
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performing forensic assessments will meet these new 
requirements. 
For instance, there are five court clinics and five 
state hospital units in Western Massachusetts, which 
together carry the responsibility for performing roughly 
90% of the court-ordered pre-trial evaluations. At the 
time of this writing, there are only two psychologists who 
have been identified as "qualified forensic psychologists" 
within this catchment area. Of the 15 psychiatrists 
practicing in these settings, only two report significant 
forensic training and experience", two others have had 
little formal training, but a great deal of practical 
experience. 
Goals of This Pro.iect 
This project then, was designed to address this 
immediate need for a training program which can prepare 
the existing pool of practicing mental health 
professionals in Massachusetts who are interested in 
performing pre-trial evaluations of competency to stand 
trial and criminal responsibility, as well as assessments 
for related commitments. More specifically, the goals of 
the project are: 
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1. To develop a draft training program which could 
serve as a basis for training practicing mental 
health professionals to perform forensic 
evaluations as described in M.G.L. Chapter 123, 
Sections 15 and 16. The curriculum for the 
program would be aimed at training qualified 
applicants for certification in the following 
content areas: 
a. Legal concepts and criteria for issues which 
are to be addressed clinically. 
b. Clinical assessment of defendants' 
competency to stand trial, criminal 
responsibility and "commitability." 
c. Written reports to court which are in 
keeping with accepted clinical standards and 
meet the requirements of law. 
d. Defendants' rights in the forensic 
evaluation process. 
e. Relevant research and literature. 
f. Courtroom and legal system orientation. 
g. Expert witness testimony for competency 
hearings, criminal trials, and commitment 
hearings. 
h. Issues and controversies regarding mental 
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health professionals' participation in 
forensic evaluations. 
To elicit review and comment from key individuals 
in the mental health and judicial systems in 
Massachusetts, for the purpose of: 
a. providing a basis for the Department of 
Mental Health to assess the adequacy and 
acceptability of the proposed training 
program. 
b. providing a basis for revision or redesign 
of the program. 
CHAPTER II 
TRAINING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY AND FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: 
A REVIEW 
In this chapter, I review the literature related to 
the problem addressed in this project: training mental 
health professionals, namely psychiatrists and 
psychologists, to perform pre-trial evaluations. Aside 
from the training program developed at the University of 
Virginia, which is presented at the end of this chapter, 
there appears to be no literature specific to the issue of 
training on pre-trial evaluations. However, it is clear 
that training in "forensic psychiatry" (Barr & Suarez, 
1965) and "forensic psychology" (Blau,I 1984V include these 
skills. Therefore, most of this chapter is focused on the 
more general issue of the training offered in these 
closely related professions, forensic psychiatry and 
forensic psychology. 
In order to appreciate the current status of 
professional training in these fields, an introduction to 
the historical and developmental issues which molded the 
forensic mental health professions is necessary. This 
chapter is structured then, to provide a selected review 
of first the literature on the evolution, and then the 
literature on the training, in each field, respectively. 
I have chosen not to review, here, the voluminous 
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literature covering the actual legal and clinical content 
of the training program. The specific sources and 
references on which that content is based, are cited in 
the training manual itself (see Chapter IV). 
Forensic Psynhi, pit.r-i gf.g 
"The legal question of what should be done with 
a person who commits an offense when he is 
mentally ill and seemingly out of control of his 
actions has perplexed and fascinated the 
civilized world for centuries." (Halleck, 1980, 
P. 207). 
In his historical perspective on the Anglo/American 
concept of criminal insanity, Quen (1974) notes that the 
question of criminal responsibility has been characterized 
by a consistent focusing on the same issues for at least 
two thousand years. He notes that the Greeks and Romans 
accepted the notion that individuals must have free choice 
in order to be held morally and legally responsible for 
his/her actions. 
Bromberg (1979) and Quen (1974) trace the origins of 
the Anglo-American tradition of pre-trial evaluations to 
England in the 13th Century. In the Middle Ages these 
issues were decided in ecclesiastical courts presided over 
by bishops. Bromberg, noting that the current definitions 
of insanity are based in canon law, cites the first 
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available test of insanity enunciated in 1265 by Bracton, 
archdeacon of Barnstable: 'An insane person is one who 
does not know what he is doing, is lacking in mind and 
reason and is not far removed from brutes' (Bromberg, 
1979, p. 5). 
By the 17th Century secular courts and lay witnesses 
had taken over these functions. Bromberg (1979) credits 
Sir Matthew Hale with first recording the general 
principle that an insane person might not be competent to 
stand trial in the late 17th Century. 
It is unclear just when professionals first became 
involved in the questions of competency to stand trial and 
criminal responsibility. However, by the end of the 18th 
Century, physicians were being recognized as having 
special knowledge regarding madness. Freedman (1983) 
attributes American courts' present reliance on mental 
health professionals to the founders of modern psychiatry, 
Pinel in France, and Rush in America. Pinel's early 
efforts at categorizing "madness" into defined clinical 
syndromes, and Rush's thesis that deviant behavior had 
medical causes, both helped thrust psychiatry into the 
courtroom (Halleek, 1965) as experts to assist courts in 
distinguishing the "insane" from criminals. 
Issac Ray, a general practitioner in New England, is 
generally considered the founder of forensic psychiatry 
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(Bromberg, 1979; Curran, 1974; Quen, 1974; and Freedman, 
1983). In 1838 he published the first textbook in the 
field, _A—Treatise—on_Medical Jurisprudence of InH«nj_ty_ 
This work was cited in the MifclaughtQQ trial in England, in 
1843, on which most current tests for legal insanity are 
based. 
Curran (1974), who documents forensic psychiatry's 
growth in the 19th Century, notes that psychiatry's 
recognition as a medical specialty by the mid-19th Century 
is closely tied to psychiatrists' increasing involvement 
at that time in forensic issues. He refers to this period 
as psychiatry's "romance with the law" (p. 10). 
Robitscher (1978) suggests that the growing reliance on 
psychiatrists by judges was an important boost to the new 
profession. Halleck (1965) notes that psychiatry's major 
focus was on the mentally ill in mental hospitals and in 
court until the rise of psychoanalytic doctrine in the 
1940's, when psychiatry shifted its focus to 
psychotherapy. 
By the end of the 19th Century, psychiatry was 
firmly entrenched in the role of expert witness in aiding 
judges and juries in their determination of the pre-trial 
issues of compstency to stand trial and criminal 
responsibility. Curran (1974) cites the famous trial of 
Guiteau for the assassination of President Garfield as 
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illustrative of the state of art of forensic psychiatry 
during that period. This trial saw seven defense 
psychiatrists who testified only on hypothetical questions 
presented by the defense. An eighth defense expert 
witness characterized Guiteau as insane without ever 
evaluating him. This witness based his view on physical 
characteristics seen in a picture of Guiteau and 
historical information. Curran describes the 
prosecution's "most formidable array of psychiatric 
talent, " which was led by John P. Gray. Dr. Gray worked 
closely with the government lawyers throughout the case. 
"Dr. Gray's first official act was to carry out 
the court-ordered, pre-trial examination to 
determine whether the defendant was fit to stand 
trial. Dr. Gray conducted a two day examination 
of Guiteau and pronounced him mentally competent 
and fully sane. At the trial, he was the 
concluding witness in the case, saved by the 
prosecution as their most important witness, and 
intended to summarize the entire case and rebut 
the expert evidence for the defense. This task 
he performed comprehensively and well. He gave 
it as his opinion that the defendant was sane 
now and at the time of the assassination. In 
very telling fashion he described his interview 
and Guiteau's detailed explanation of the crime 
and its motivation. He pointed out that Guiteau 
did not claim at the time, any delusions about 
acting on a specific command of God and that he 
would not have killed the president if he had 
been given the government job he wanted and felt 
he deserved. Gray found no symptoms of mental 
or physical disease." (Curran, 1974, p. 13) 
Ironically, it was the professionally prepared 
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testimony of Gray, which was greeted with disdain by the 
public and in the professional literature for many years 
following Guiteau's execution, while defense expert 
witness testimony based on a picture and history, was 
popularly accepted. 
In his historical review of psychiatry's 
relationship with the law, Halleck (1965) describes the 
parade of psychiatrists in the Guiteau case, and 
subsequently in the spectacular Leopold and Loeb trial in 
Chicago, as not appreciably affecting the verdicts, but 
providing the public with an interesting but confusing 
battle of the psychiatric experts." 
This public display of disagreement by psychiatrists 
in major trials, while leaving an impression of confusion 
and ineptness, did not dissuade the legal profession, 
regarding the value of psychiatric testimony, when it came 
to separating the criminal from the insane. Halleck 
(1965) traces the continuing involvement of psychiatry in 
pre-trial evaluations during the 20th Century. In 1921, 
the Massachusetts legislature passed Brigg's Law which was 
then heralded as an "enlightened approach" in its 
provision for impartial experts providing pre-trial 
evaluation reports directly to judges. The hope was that 
this approach would eliminate the battle of the experts. 
However, as we've seen recently, in the trials of Jack 
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Ruby and John Hinckley, once "impartial" expert witnesses 
complete their evaluations, confusing disagreements among 
expert witnesses are still to be expected. 
The romance between law and psychiatry continued 
throughout the first half of this century. Halleck notes 
that during this period forensic psychiatrists reached a 
comparatively high level of respect and honor" (1965, p. 
viii). He reports that in 1929 the American Bar 
Association approved a recommendation made by Karl 
Menninger, a psychiatrist, that called for: 
1. a psychiatrist available to every court, 2. 
psychiatric report made available before 
sentencing any felon, 3. a psychiatric service 
in every correctional institution, 4. a 
psychiatric report on every felon before 
release, 5. a psychiatric report before any 
parole or transfer between institutions." 
(Halleck, 1965, p. ix) 
Halleck's review takes us up to the mid-1960's when 
he reports that forensic psychiatry was continuing to 
flourish due to increasing demands for its contributions. 
However, the next two decades have represented a period of 
identity crisis for forensic psychiatry as it struggled 
with definitions and limits applied from within the 
profession, and by the courts. By the 1970's, the scope 
of psychiatrists' involvement with legal matters had 
broadened to the point that the various roles required 
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definition and delineation. 
Pollack (1974), calling for recognition of forensic 
psychiatry as a specialty, noted that differentiating 
forensic psychiatry from both clinical psychiatry and from 
other law-psychiatry relationships, would help to clarify 
goals and address ethical concerns. He defined forensic 
psychiatry as the application of psychiatric expertise for 
legal ends , whereas clinical psychiatry applies 
psychiatric expertise for "therapeutic ends." Pollack 
further differentiated forensic psychiatry from 
"psychiatry and law, " by emphasizing the hands-on nature 
of the former. Psychiatrists may focus on the ideas, 
philosophical issues, and societal benefits and 
consequences associated with the interface of law and 
psychiatry, without ever applying these interests to 
individuals. Thus Alan A. Stone, a prolific writer on 
mental health and the law for twenty years, clarifies that 
he is not a forensic psychiatrist (1984). 
A decade later, Rosner clarifies further: 
"A forensic psychiatrist is not merely a clinical 
psychiatrist who has learned something about the 
law. Rather, forensic psychiatry has its own 
specialized body of data, its own conceptual 
framework for the organization ^ of 
psychiatric-legal information, and its own 
specialized methods and procedures." (Rosner, 
1983, p. 590) 
While arguing for specialization, Pollack (1982), 
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Rosner (1983), and Gutheil and Appelbaum (1982) have 
acknowledged that there are not enough forensic 
specialists to meet the demand, especially with regard to 
pre-trial evaluations, and that psychiatrists in general 
practice can learn to perform pre-trial evaluations and 
testify as expert witnesses. 
The period since the mid 1960's has also been a time 
of professional and legal assault on forensic psychiatry, 
especially with regard to their performance in the area of 
pre-trial evaluations. Robitscher (1978) and Stone (1984) 
point out that until the legal reforms in mental health 
law beginning in the 1960's, psychiatrists were given a 
great deal of discretion with regard to questions posed to 
them by judges. Judges often abdicated their 
decision-making authority to psychiatrists on the issues 
of competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility, 
by rubber-stamping their conclusions. Stone (1984) 
reports that by the 1980's the courts were reclaiming 
their discretion. 
The professional attack began with a series of 
studies done by McGarry (1965, 1969, Rosenberg and 
McGarry, 1972) on the quality of psychiatrists' pre-trial 
evaluation reports to court. From McGarry's work it 
appeared that psychiatrists did not understand the legal 
issues at hand, rarely addressed the questions asked in 
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their reports, and rarely bothered to explain how they 
drew their conclusions. Geller and Lister (1978) and 
Roesch and Golding (1980) reported similar findings. 
Petrella and Poythress (1983) found that legal 
professionals rated pre-trial evaluation reports by 
psychologists and social workers to be of higher quality 
than psychiatrists * reports. Calls for abolition of the 
pleas of incompetency to stand trial (Burtt & Morris, 
1972) and the insanity defense (Morris, 1982) included 
demands for psychiatrists to get out of the business 
completely. 
The most notable assaults from the legal profession 
have come from the U.S. Supreme Court and from Judge David 
Bazelon, of the District of Columbia, U.S. Circuit Court 
of Appeals, the author of several important decisions on 
mental health law. Judge Bazelon (1975) criticizes 
psychiatrists for drawing ultimate conclusions on legal 
issues and for failing to explain and justify their 
findings in their reports and court testimony. He points 
out that the psychiatrist should be addressing the mental 
health issues raised in the legal process, but refrain 
from answering the “ultimate question," which is the 
province of the judge and jury. He urges psychiatrists to 
carefully present the data and reasoning which leads them 
to their opinions regarding questions of defendants' 
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mental status and capacities. 
Appelbaum (1984) examines the U.S. Supreme Court's 
attitude toward psychiatry. He reports that since 1975 
the court has been highly critical of psychiatry, raising 
doubt about the "uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis 
and therapy" (p. 828). However he points out that the 
court has stopped short of limiting psychiatrists 
involvement in the legal process. Appelbaum attributes 
the inconsistency of the court's rhetoric with its actions 
to the justices' aversion to judicial involvement with 
mental health issues. 
Appelbaum's analysis is consistent with Stone's 
observation (1984) that despite the public outcry after 
Hinckley acquittal, and the professional and legal 
criticism, forensic psychiatry is "paradoxically stronger 
than ever before" (p. 57). Stone explains that the attack 
on forensic psychiatry over the last two decades has had 
one consistent result: more responsibility has been given 
back to the courts, which in turn require more, not less 
(but clearer) assistance from psychiatrists. He notes 
that this period of stress has produced ten professional 
forensic mental health journals, two national 
organizations of forensic psychiatrists, and a specialty 
certification board, the American Board of Forensic 
Psychiatry. 
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Training in Forensic Psychiatry 
According to Rosner (1983) and Sadoff (1974), the 
great majority of forensic psychiatrists today are 
probably self-taught through on—the—job training. Prior 
to the mid-1960's there were no specialty training 
programs in forensic psychiatry. 
"Traditionally the forensic psychiatrist either 
trained himself through experience or learned 
through a preceptorship with an experienced 
forensic psychiatrist. Psychiatrists interested 
in legal psychiatry worked primarily in court 
psychiatric clinics, evaluating defendants for 
competency to stand trial; some have served as 
consultants to private attorneys, public 
defenders, or district attorneys in evaluating 
specific individuals for their competency and 
degree of criminal responsibility. The training 
was informal and primarily 'on-the-job.' Until 
recently, very few psychiatrists took courses in 
law schools, and only a handful have degrees in 
both law and psychiatry." (Sadoff, 1974, p. 223) 
However, while formal training in forensic 
psychiatry was not available, it appears that by the 
1950's, many psychiatrists had received at least some 
exposure to these issues, if not in medical school, then 
during their psychiatric residencies. 
Stoller (1956) presented the first study of the 
opportunity for psychiatrists to learn about forensic 
psychiatry in their initial training. He surveyed the 
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teaching of forensic psychiatry in medical schools and 
psychiatric residency programs in the United States and 
Canada. He reported that two-thirds of the medical 
schools had plans to offer formal lectures, less than half 
had seminars, and about three-quarters had some form of 
practical work. Two-thirds of the psychiatric residency 
programs planned to give lectures, two-thirds had 
conferences/and or seminars, and almost all had some form 
of practical work. 
A decade after Stoller's study, Barr and Suarez 
(1965) found no significant change in the percentage of 
medical schools and psychiatric residency programs which 
offered some type of coverage on the topic of forensic 
psychiatry. Further, they reported that three-fourths of 
the medical schools felt their programs did not adequately 
cover the subject matter. A slightly higher percentage of 
the psychiatric residency programs expressed 
dissatisfaction with their programs. They described the 
residency program at New York University at the time as an 
example of a good program. It offered residents five 
lectures in forensic psychiatry, and a three month 
rotation on a prison ward during their third year. The 
authors reported that the future looked more hopeful, in 
that some schools were planning more intensive training 
programs for residents, and specialized post-graduate 
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programs were also being developed. 
Sadoff (1974) reported that formal specialty 
programs in forensic psychiatry began to develop in the 
United States after 1960. These were mostly post-graduate 
specialty programs funded by the National Institute of 
Mental Health, which trained two to six psychiatrists 
annually. However, by the mid-1970's funding cutbacks led 
to the closing of many of these programs. Sadoff 
describes the posture in Washington" that "money spent 
for training one elite forensic psychiatrist for one year 
would be better spent in teaching a number of 
psychiatrists various principles of law and psychiatry for 
use in their regular psychiatric practices" (p. 223). The 
focus seemed to be shifting back to psychiatric residency 
programs. 
But, 15 years after Barr and Suarez' study (1965), 
Halleck (1980) commenting on forensic training in 
psychiatric residency programs, reported that with few 
exceptions (below) changes had not occurred: 
"With all the new demands made by recent legal 
changes and with all the new interest in legal 
aspects of psychiatry, teaching about law in the 
practice of psychiatry remains surprisingly 
antiquated. Very few psychiatric residency 
programs have expanded or changed their basic 
educational format in this area in the past 
decade. The majority of the programs still 
continue to give a brief course in forensic 
psychiatry in the last year of training. 
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Usually the content focuses on expert witness 
o ©s. The resident learns about issues 
involving malpractice and the treatment of 
severely disturbed patients largely through 
on-the-job training. Even departments of 
psychiatry with skilled forensic psychiatrists 
on their faculties do not provide residents with 
a ffeat deal of teaching about legal issues. " 
(Halleek, 1980, p. 281). 
An exception to the situation described by Halleek 
is reported by Bloom, Kinzie and Shore (1980), who 
describe the forensic psychiatry curriculum used within 
the University of Oregon's psychiatric residency program. 
Their goal statement describes residents attaining the 
skills to perform clinical evaluations for civil 
commitment, competency to stand trial, criminal 
responsibility, and family law proceedings; to prepare 
properly written reports to court; and to participate as 
expert witnesses. 
During the first two years of the Oregon program, 
psychiatric residents attend a weekly seminar on forensic 
psychiatry, which includes a mix of didactic presentation 
and discussion on civil commitment, informed consent, and 
patients' rights. These residents receive practical 
experience as they rotate through inpatient units and 
emergency rooms. Third year residents receive a block of 
eight lectures on forensic psychiatry, which include 
pre-trial evaluations. These are presented by a mixed 
faculty of forensic psychiatrists and attorneys. Third 
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year residents receive training as court examiners on 
pre-trial issues. Fourth year residents attend a monthly 
seminar on forensic issues and may elect a six-month 
placement in a court or correctional setting. 
Post-Graduate Specialty Tr^jn^ng 
Rosner (1983) describes "the two principal 
approaches to education and training in psychiatry and law 
in the United States today' (p. 585) as self-training (the 
dominant mode) and formal, full-time fellowship training 
under the auspices of a medical school. 
Rosner describes the traditional route into the 
specialty of forensic psychiatry as "more a matter of 
chance and opportunity than design. " He then presents a 
refinement of this "traditional route" which he calls 
"Systematic Independent Study," a coordinated plan of 
reading and supervised practical experience. 
He suggests beginning with a group of "core 
readings" which include three classes of books: (1) the 
discussion of issues, (2) "how to" manuals, and (3) 
collections of cases and materials. These readings are 
supplemented with articles from journals related to 
psychiatry and law. Rosner then suggests a carefully 
planned course of approximately six years of supervised 
practical experience. He suggests taking on a series of 
jobs in settings which provide the desired experiences. 
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Finally, Rosner stresses the importance of strong, 
competent supervision throughout the period of study, of 
taking advantage of specialty courses when available, and 
of ongoing reading. 
Despite Sadoff's concern (1974) about the loss of 
funding for specialty programs, several have survived. 
Rosner, chair of the committee of the American Academy of 
Psychiatry and the Law which developed standards for 
fellowship programs in forensic psychiatry, presents those 
standards (1983). 
Summarizing: A one-year fellowship program should 
be based in a medical school and directed by a member of 
the American Board of Forensic Psychiatry. The program 
faculty should include at least one other forensic 
psychiatrist, a forensic psychologist, a child 
psychiatrist, a family systems therapist, and an attorney. 
Half of a fellow's standard 40-hour work week should be 
devoted to on-the-job training, which minimally should 
include 30 cases during the year of which at least ten 
involve criminal law. A didactic core curriculum is the 
focus of the other 20 hours per week. This includes 
training in basic issues in criminal and civil law, 
landmark cases in forensic psychiatry, and special topics 
related to the clinical, methodologic and historical 
aspects of forensic psychiatry. 
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Eorerisic_Psychologists 
The American Board of Forensic Psychology defines 
forensic psychology as the "application of the science and 
profession of psychology to legal questions and issues" 
(Kurke, 1980, p. 75). The scope of forensic psychology 
spans a wide range of involvements for both research and 
applied psychologists. Blau (1984) has listed 16 legal 
issues with which psychologists become involved. Examples 
include pre-trial issues in criminal cases, civil 
commitment, child custody, civil issues such as product 
liability and workers' compensation, and even consulting 
on public policy. 
Unlike psychiatry, which firmly established its 
expert witness role on the matters of competency to stand 
trial and criminal responsibility in the nineteenth 
century, psychologists did not take on that role until 
professional psychology emerged after World War II. 
Psychology's initial concern with the law focused on the 
application of psychological principles to the issues of 
testimony and jury decision-making, rather than clinical 
applications to individual defendants (Blau, 1984; 
Louisell, 1955). 
Tapp (1977), Blau (1984) and Kolasa (1972) trace 
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psychology's earliest involvement with the law back to the 
turn of the century, in Europe. Kolasa describes the 
development of the field of •'psychology and law" during 
the first half of this century as proceeding in "spurts" 
at widely separated points in time "with some remarkable 
continuity in spite of it all" (p. 1). 
According to Tapp, the earliest reference is 
Be it nags—Zur—Esychologie—der_Aussage^ written in Germany 
m 1903 by Wilhelm Stern, who suggested that psychology 
had a great deal to offer the law in the field of 
testimony. In 1906 Freud (1959) suggested that psychology 
could provide useful information to judges. 
The first substantive work was produced by Hugo 
Munsterberg, whose _0n _ the_Witness_Stand (1908), was a 
collection of essays on testimony which discussed 
illusions, witnesses' memory, detection of crime, and 
untrue confessions. Munsterberg claimed that "modern 
psychology" was being "absurdly neglected" by the field of 
law. Apparently Munsterberg's claims regarding the 
utility of psychology were more prophetic than accurate 
for their time. Blau (1984) describes John Wigmore's 
"scathing parody,"  Professor_Munsterberg and_the 
Psychology_of Testimony, written in 1909. Noting the lack 
of empirical evidence to back up Munsterberg's claims, 
Wigmore presented a mythical suit against Munsterberg for 
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misrepresenting psychology as being "ready for the law. " 
Then in 1913, J.B. Watson suggested to jurists that they 
could ' utilize empirical data in a practical way as soon 
as psychologists could obtain relevant data!' (Tapp, 1977, 
p. 1). 
A quarter of a century after Munsterberg, Hutchins 
and Slesinger (1928) wrote the first of a series of 
articles which would span a decade, on testimony and 
evidence (Kolasa, 1972). This was followed, in 1931, by 
Burtt's _LgSaI—ESYPholQgZu- which mapped out the substantive 
areas in which psychologists might contribute to the field 
of law. While focusing again on testimony, Burtt also 
discussed the mentally ill criminal, predelinquency, 
punishment, trademark infringement, eugenics and drugs. 
Louisell (1955) and Gaines (1956) presented reviews 
of the psychologist as an expert witness through the 
mid-1950's. Louisell noted that by the end of World War 
II psychology had seen an enormous growth of research 
findings in behavioral science, personality assessment and 
training. Now applied psychology came into its own, and 
with it, psychologists began serving as expert witnesses 
on a variety of issues involving human behavior. 
In an earlier work, Blau (1959) noted that by the 
mid-1950's psychologists were sometimes qualified as 
expert witnesses on "clinical" questions and then 
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dismissed by the judge. Pacht, Kuehn, Bassett and Nash 
(1973) reviewed cases in which psychologists had been 
rejected as expert witnesses. They noted that lack of 
medical training was a major obstacle to psychologists. 
Medical, or psychiatric, dominance in this area had been 
firmly established. 
Schulman (1966) reviewed the 1962 decision by U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge, David Bazelon, described 
by Blau (1984) as the "landmark" case with regard to 
psychologists testifying as expert witnesses. In Jenkins 
-United—States (1962), the defendant in a rape case was 
found incompetent to stand trial and committed to a 
psychiatric hospital until his competency was restored. 
There, three psychologists assessed Mr. Jenkins and later 
testified that he was schizophrenic. Two psychiatrists 
testified that there was no evidence of mental illness. 
The trial judge then instructed the jury to disregard the 
psychologists’ testimony. 
When this case was appealed, the American 
Psychiatric Association filed a brief urging the court not 
to allow psychologists to qualify as experts. Judge 
Bazelon reversed the lower court’s ruling, and his 
position was backed by Judge Burger of the Supreme Court. 
Judge Bazelon clarified that titles or degrees are not 
sufficient to qualify an expert witness. He described two 
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criteria. (1) that the expert witness have knowledge, by 
training and experience, beyond the knowledge or 
understanding of the average juror; and (2) that the 
expert's opinion or inference is likely to aid the judge 
or jury in determining truth ( Jenkins_v^_United_StateS^ 
1962). 
Since —in most jurisdictions rejection of 
psychologists as expert witnesses in their field of 
specialization is considered a reversible trial error. 
Blau (1984) points out that after Jenkins^. psychologists 
began to invade ‘the province of psychiatry" (p. 6). A 
new "turf" battle had begun. 
However, while psychologists had overcome the legal 
barrier, there remained the practical question of the 
status of psychologists in court when it comes to 
persuading a judge or jury, especially when psychiatric 
testimony was available. In 1980 Kurke noted: 
"...forensic psychologists still lack status and 
recognition in many circles" (p. 72). 
Dix and Poythress (1981) carefully documented the 
issue of "medical dominance" in the area of expert 
testimony on diagnosis, treatment and other issues related 
to the mentally ill. Common manifestations of the 
dominance of psychiatrists include: statutes which call 
for the participation of "physicians," only, to answer 
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psycho-legal questions; rigorous certification 
requirements for psychologists without analogous 
requirements for psychiatrists; and most effectively, the 
subtle depreciation of psychological testimony as “second 
rate" and of questionable credibility. 
Petrella and Poythress (1983) noted that 
"conventional wisdom in mental health law holds that 
psychiatrists perform forensic evaluations that are 
superior to those conducted by non—medical clinicians" (p. 
76). They report two studies which compared 
psychiatrists' competency to stand trial reports (Study I) 
and criminal responsibility reports (Study II) with those 
written by psychologists. They asked judges and lawyers 
to rate these reports on a variety of measures of 
thoroughness and quality. Their results strongly 
contradicted the "conventional wisdom." Psychologists' 
reports were rated as significantly more thorough, and as 
high in quality as the psychiatrists' reports, with some 
indexes suggesting higher quality for he psychologists' 
reports. 
Earlier, Perlin (1980) reported three similar 
studies including ratings of the quality of reports and 
trial testimony. They found that psychologists were 
consistently rated equal to or higher than psychiatrists. 
Still the view that the psychiatrist is the "real 
55 
expert" persists within the legal profession. Melton, 
Weithorn and Slobogin (1985) report the following views 
expressed by leading judges, prosecutors and defense 
attorneys in Virginia: 
"Many were not convinced that persons other than 
psychiatrists were competent to conduct forensic 
examinations; others felt that even if they 
were, their credibility as experts could not 
compare with that of a psychiatrist and that 
they would then be of small aid to lawyers whose 
opposition had obtained one." 
A recent issue of the American Psychological 
Association's _lhe_AEA_MQQitQE (September, 1986) describes 
a case in North Carolina which is now on appeal, in which 
a licensed neuropsychologist's 10 hour assessment and 
subsequent 16 page report was disregarded and the 
neuropsychologist not accepted as competent or credible. 
The ruling was based on the fact that the 
neuropsychologist's testimony conflicted with the medical 
testimony of a competent and credible neurologist. The 
neurologist' findings were based on his review of an 
X-ray, a CAT scan and a 15 minute examination. 
In an attempt to gain parity with psychiatrists, in 
1979 a committee of forensic psychologists formed the 
American Board of Forensic Psychology (Kurke, 1980), an 
organization based on the following rationale: 
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*1* There is an expressed need among forensic 
psychologists for recognition of their 
specialty both within and by psychology and 
the legal profession. Such recognition must 
have as its objective the protection of the 
interests and welfare of the clientele of 
both professions by encouraging the use of 
qualified psychologists in the processes and 
settings of the law.* 
K2. The establishment of board status for 
forensic psychiatry meets a similar need for 
that profession. However, unless forensic 
psychology follows suit, the end result is 
liable to be a devaluation of forensic 
psychology in those areas where it overlaps 
or coincides with psychiatry.* 
'3. The establishment of the American Board of 
Forensic Psychology (ABFP), a body dedicated 
to the development and maintenance of high 
standards for psychologists, will enable 
those specialists to maintain a parity with 
those other forensic professions that have 
established certification procedures to 
qualify and help establish the credibility 
of expert witnesses.' (Kurke, 1980, p. 76). 
Through this organization forensic psychologists 
who meet the following requirements can now obtain 
"diplomate" status: 
1. possess a doctoral degree in psychology 
2. be licensed to practice psychology 
3. be a member of either the American 
Psychological Association, the American 
Psychology-law Society, or the Canadian 
Psychological Association 
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4. have a minimum of 1000 hours experience in 
forensic psychology spread out over a five year 
period 
5. submit a written work sample for review 
6. pass an oral examination 
Outside of the political arena, psychologists 
have been making important contributions to the field 
of forensic mental health, especially in the area of 
pre-trial evaluation. Psychologists, sometimes in 
collaboration with psychiatrists and lawyers, are 
responsible for the assessment tools used in 
competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility 
evaluations today: _The_Competency_Screening_lest 
(Lipsitt, Lelos & McGarry, 1971); _lhe_indiYidual 
Eitness_InYentory (Roesch & Golding, 1980); and, The 
Rogers_Criminal_Responsibility_Assessment_Scale 
(Rogers & Cavanaugh, 1980). 
Trainiog_ErQgrams_in_Eorensic_EsychQlQgy 
"[Alt present, forensic patients and legal 
agencies may be getting serviced by 
psychologists who intend well but who may be 
deficient in the application of clinical (or 
other psychological) skills to forensic 
problems." (Poythress, 1979, p. 620). 
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In 1959 Blau, noting the lack of formal training 
programs in forensic psychology, suggested that 
psychologists would do well to prepare themselves if they 
were going to take on the role of expert witness. He 
presented court transcripts of direct and 
cross-examination of psychologists, as a self-training 
aid. 
Two articles written in the 1970's propose models 
for training forensic psychologists. Both are focus on 
doctoral training. 
Fenster, Litwack and Symonds (1975) described the 
need for doctoral training of forensic psychologists to 
work in the criminal and civil justice systems. They 
noted that psychologists working in these settings may not 
have the appropriate training. They reported that in 1975 
there was only one doctoral program in forensic psychology 
in the world, at the University of Puerto Rico Law School. 
The only training available in the United States at that 
time was through post-graduate training at a handful of 
court clinics and forensic hospitals, and through 
on-the-job-training. 
Fenster et al ( 1975) went on to present a model 
doctoral program. They proposed a four year program in 
forensic psychology which would emphasize the delivery of 
psychological services within the criminal and civil 
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justice systems. Students would receive a Ph.D. or 
Psy.D., depending on whether their graduate work 
emphasized research or practical application. The 
curriculum would cover a mixture of psycho-legal issues, 
clinical assessment and treatment modalities appropriate 
to forensic settings, and research. The "psycho-legal 
issues" courses would focus on: (1) law, psychology and 
mental health systems; (2) constitutional rights; (3) the 
American legal system; and (4) the process of legal 
research. Their proposal specifically mentions the issue 
of pre-trial evaluations only briefly. They do not 
discuss preparing psychologists for the role of expert 
witness. 
In 1979, Poythress noted that although psychologists 
were becoming involved in every phase of criminal and 
civil law, "nevertheless, graduate psychology training 
programs are lagging far behind in developing courses to 
prepare psychologists to function with a high degree of 
expertise in forensic matters" (p. 612). He refers to the 
combined J.D.-Ph.D. programs which were emerging in the 
late 1970's (three had developed by 1979), as likely to 
never meet the needs of most psychologists who plan to 
practice in the forensic area. These rigorous programs 
require students to apply separately to the psychology 
graduate programs and law schools, and then pursue both 
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degrees simultaneously. Further, Poythress predicts that 
many graduates of such courses will then pursue careers as 
lawyers. He argues for the development of law-psychology 
courses leading to a minor or even a doctorate, along the 
lines of Fenster et al (1975), in forensic psychology. 
Poythress then proposes a graduate sequence with 
three stages: 
1 • An introductory "content" course taught by 
faculty from psychology departments and law 
schools, which covers psychology's interface 
with the main topical divisions of criminal, 
civil and chiId/juvenile law. 
2. A series of topical seminars in forensic 
psychology aimed at more in depth 
understanding, practical application and skill 
development (e.g., pre-trial evaluation, expert 
witness testimony), and development of research 
ideas. 
3. Field placement in a forensic psychology 
setting matching the student's special area of 
interest. 
As noted in Chapter I, as recently as 1984, Blau 
reports that too few graduate schools prepare 
psychologists to perform pre-trial evaluations and 
function as expert witnesses in court, and that in spite 
of the ABFP's efforts to set standards, many psychologists 
still obtain their training "ad lib." 
"...psychologists must take the initiative to 
become aware of the many areas in which expert 
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witness 
engineer 
to become 
witnesses. 
testimony can be offered and must 
their own study and training programs 
„ competent, effective, ethical expert 
(Blau, 1984, p. 6) 
Blau provides a listing of American training 
opportunities in forensic psychology. These include 21 
institutions offering eight joint J.D.-Ph.D. programs, 
four Ph.D. specialty programs, eight Ph.D. minor programs, 
one masters degree program, seven post-doctoral 
internships, and four post-doctoral research programs. 
All of the Ph.D. specialty and minor programs were 
established in the early 1980’s. 
^i£giniala-l3^ining_£rQgram_iD_FQrensic Evaluation 
Melton et al (1985) describe the development, 
implementation, and evaluation of the Forensic Evaluation 
Training Program of the University of Virginia's Forensic 
Evaluation Training and Research Center. While Florida, 
Tennessee and Massachusetts are in various stages of 
developing similar training programs, the program 
described here is the first program of its kind, 
specifically aimed at training practicing mental health 
professionals to perform forensic evaluations and provide 
expert witness testimony. It is also the only such 
program to report on its efforts. 
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This program came about as a result of the state of 
Virginia"s decision to provide pre-trial evaluations and 
pre-sentencing mental health evaluations in 
community-based settings rather than in centralized state 
institutions. As an implementation strategy, the Virginia 
Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 
working closely with the University of Virginia, 
established forensic evaluation "teams" in selected 
community mental health centers. In a pilot project begun 
in 1977, staff from these sites went through this training 
program, after which their knowledge of forensic issues, 
and the quality of their reports was evaluated and 
compared with that of other professionals who had not 
received the training. 
Trainees were psychiatrists and psychologists (both 
doctoral and masters level). Mental health centers were 
induced to send their staff to this training by the 
state"s decision to compensate these agencies for forensic 
evaluations performed by graduates of the training 
program. 
The training program was presented by faculty from 
the University of Virginia's Institute of Law, Psychiatry 
and Public Policy, a mix of forensic mental health 
professionals and attorneys. The program, initially took 
eight days, but was soon pared down to six days. The 
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content and time allotted per subject are described in 
Table 1. Teaching methods included didactic 
presentations, observation of forensic evaluations (live 
and/or video-taped), trainee participation and critique, 
and mock trials. The training program was coordinated 
with readings from a 350 page training manual containing 
outlines and relevant training materials. Trainees who 
completed the course were given an 80-item test of their 
knowledge of forensic issues. Training was followed up by 
consultation to the trainees by faculty. 
To assess the impact of the training program on 
knowledge of relevant forensic issues, the results of 
graduate trainees' performance on the 80-item test were 
compared with results from three other groups who also 
took the test: mental health professionals who did not 
receive the training; diplomates of the American Board of 
Forensic Psychology; and trial judges. Results suggested 
that program trainees had acquired a level of forensic 
knowledge significantly superior to that of their 
non-forensically trained counterparts and trial judges, 
and commensurate with that of a nationally recognized 
criterion group, the ABFP. A comparison of doctoral level 
and masters level trainees showed no significant 
differences. 
To assess the impact of the training on the quality 
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of forensic evaluation reports written by the trainees 
were compared with reports written by psychiatrists from a 
state hospital forensic unit, prior to the training. 
Three groups of raters made up of judges, prosecutors, and 
defense attorneys, used rating forms designed to judge the 
reports on: (1) separation of fact from opinion; (2) 
presentation of factual bases for opinions; (3) focus on 
relevant and appropriate legal issues; and (4) clarity of 
writing. 
Results revealed that all three groups of raters 
considered the trainees' reports as superior in overall 
quality to the state hospital reports. Judges and defense 
attorneys rated all reports higher than did prosecutors. 
The authors, noting that the major strength of the 
trainees' reports was emphasis on providing data, suggest 
that this difference may be due to prosecutors' being less 
positively disposed to reports that provide detailed 
explanations of a defendant's psychological functioning. 
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Table 1 
Virginia's Six Day Training Program 
(Adapted from Melton et al, 1985) 
Subject Time 
Sources of law and legal procedures 2 
Application of the Fifth Amendment 1 
The imprecision of the behavioral sciences 1 
Competency to stand trial: 
Legal and clinical issues 6 
Evaluation of mental state at the time 
of the offense : 
- screening evaluation 2 
- comprehensive evaluation 3 
Pre-sentencing evaluations: legal issues 1 
Amenability to treatment and dangerousness 
evaluations 2 
Juvenile courts: Legal and clinical issues 3 
Report writing 1 
Expert testimony and court consultation 3 
allotted 
hours 
hour 
hour 
hours 
hours 
hours 
hour 
hours 
hours 
hour 
hours 
CHAPTER III 
THE PROJECT 
As described in Chapter I, the time is ripe in 
Massachusetts for the implementation of a training program 
in forensic evaluation. 
The Massachusetts Department of Mental Health has 
announced its intention to revamp forensic mental health 
services. Its Division of Forensic Mental Health Services 
has taken on the task of upgrading the qualifications 
required of the mental health professionals who perform 
forensic evaluations. The Massachusetts legislature has 
decided that in addition to psychiatrists, who already 
provide these evaluations, qualified psychologists should 
be designated to perform these tasks. Since the pool of 
forensic mental health professionals who meet the upgraded 
requirements is small, a program is needed now to train 
those who are interested and available, but currently not 
qualified. Finally, the need for such a program has been 
acknowledged by the Division of Forensic Mental Health 
Services. 
Given the clear need, in February, 1986, the 
following three staged project was proposed to Robert A. 
Fein, the Department of Mental Health's Assistant 
Commissioner for Forensic Services, as a first step, or 
foundation upon which a Department of Mental Health 
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sponsored training program could be based. Dr. Fein 
expressed an interest and willingness to participate in 
the project. 
The first stage would involve the development of a 
training program, which would include a training manual 
and curriculum. Drawing from the promising results from 
Virginia's Forensic Evaluation Training and Research 
Center's efforts to train practicing mental health 
professionals, a proposal for a similar program tailored 
to Massachusetts law and practice would be prepared with a 
more narrow focus than the Virginia program: assessments 
of competency to stand trial, criminal responsibility, and 
related commitments.. This program would be presented to 
Dr. Fein for his approval to move to the next stage. 
Moving to the second stage. Dr. Fein would then 
develop a list of forensic mental health professionals, 
lawyers, and judges, whose opinions he values. He would 
send the training program to each individual on this list, 
along with a cover letter requesting his/her review and 
comment. A group of potential trainees, practicing mental 
health professionals who have not received training, would 
also be asked to review the program. Each reviewer would 
fill out a review form (see Chapter IV). 
Finally, in the third stage, the reviewers' ratings 
and comment would be presented and discussed in a report 
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to Dr. Fein. At this point the project would be turned 
over to D.M.H. Further modification and adoption of the 
training package, based on the report or other input, 
would be at the discretion of D.M.H. 
The complete package, which was eventually sent to 
the reviewers, is presented in Chapter IV. This includes 
the letter from Dr. Fein, instructions to the reviewers, 
the training manual, the curriculum, and the review form. 
S£afie_LL 
DeYeiQpmeQt_Qf_Ihg_Training_Program 
The creative stage of this project consisted of 
three major activities: 1) a series of meetings and 
interviews with forensic mental health trainers in 
Massachusetts, in which I sought advice about content and 
format; 2) the collection of legal sources; and 3) the 
selection and organization of professional literature and 
legal sources into a training manual and curriculum. 
Early in the project, I had determined to model the 
training program after Virginia’s program (see Chapter 
II), which has the same focus and purpose as this project 
- preparing practicing mental health professionals to 
perform court-ordered pre-trial evaluations. Thus my 
first step was to contact the Forensic Evaluation and 
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Research Training Center at the University of Virginia. 
Aside from sending me a copy of their training materials, 
the Training Center graciously provided me with phone 
consultation regarding content and format. Their training 
manual was in its eighteenth edition, so their advice, 
being the product of a great deal of trial and error, was 
certainly valuable. Their consultation boiled down to two 
points. 1) that the structure and methods used in their 
program had been shown to be effective, and should be 
easily applied in other settings; and 2) that the two 
states were sufficiently different in their laws and in 
the structure of their forensic mental health services, 
that the content of the Virginia program's manual could 
not be modified to fit Massachusetts - a completely new 
manual, tailored to this state was needed. 
This led to a series of meetings with forensic 
mental health professionals at Bridgewater State Hospital, 
the only setting in which Massachusetts-specific forensic 
training was occurring. The Bridgewater training program 
focused on forensic psychology interns and new 
professional staff. It was a one year, full-time 
internship program, and thus not geared to the busy, 
practicing mental health professional. However, these 
meetings were invaluable in that they provided a wealth of 
material on Massachusetts case law covering pre-trial 
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evaluations, and they provided feedback and advice with 
regard to my plans for the content of the training manual. 
The collection, selection and organization of the 
sources for the manual was a straightforward task when it 
came to clinical material - the professional literature on 
pre-trial evaluations is finite and easily accessed. 
However, the task of compiling the legal material, 
especially case law, was arduous. 
Prior to the writing of the training manual for this 
project, there was no single source dealing with the legal 
issues and procedures involved in pre-trial evaluations in 
Massachusetts. While I was quite familiar with the 
procedures, I was unaware of the authority for them. 
Consultation from attorneys was useful, but almost always 
contradictory. The mental health statute only provided an 
outline of the procedure to be followed. In the sixteen 
years the statute had been in effect, hundreds of higher 
court decisions had shaped the law on pre-trial 
evaluations. I quickly found that the law was open to 
interpretation, and attorneys could choose from a variety 
of cases to argue their position regarding proper legal 
procedure. 
Ultimately, by sifting through the case law package 
provided by the clinicians at Bridgewater State Hospital, 
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supplemented by information collected during days spent in 
law libraries, and by the advice of several attorneys, I 
was able to identify and cite the legal authority, the 
"controlling cases", for the multitude of steps and issues 
which together make up the legal procedure for pre-trial 
evaluations in Massachusetts. 
Xhfi.Trainiog^anyai 
The training manual is designed to be used in 
conjunction with the proposed curriculum. As such, it is 
written in outline form to assist in didactic 
presentation, and it is presented in a looseleaf format, 
to allow for modification and updating. The manual 
consists of eleven chapters covering the following subject 
areas: 
1. An overview of pre-trial evaluations in 
Massachusetts 
2. Privileged communications/protection from 
self-incrimination 
3. Mental health professionals' participation 
4. Competency to stand trial - legal issues 
5. Competency to stand trial - clinical assessment 
6. Criminal responsibility - legal issues 
7. Criminal responsibility - clinical assessment 
8. Related commitments/prediction of dangerousness 
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9. Report writing 
10. Expert witness testimony 
11. Issues related to mental health professionals' 
participation 
Note that this outline closely follows the list of 
topics (developed in Chapter I), based on the criticism of 
0110101303' performance, in the professional literature. 
As I pointed out earlier, that criticism provides focus 
for a training program. The specific problem areas, 
pointing up the need for training were: 
1. Controversies regarding mental health 
professionals participation (Chapter II of the 
manual) 
2. Ethical issues and dilemmas (covered in the 
manual's Chapters II and III) 
3. Legal questions addressed in pre-trial 
evaluations (Chapters IV, VI and IX) 
4. Clinical assessment techniques involved in 
pre-trial evaluations (Chapters V, VII, and 
VIII) 
5. Relevant literature (cited throughout the 
manual, and emphasized in the "supplementary 
materials" sections) 
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6. Report writing (Chapter X) 
7. Expert witness testimony (Chapter XI) 
With some variation, the chapters are presented in 
the following format, which is modeled after Virginia's 
training manual. 
1* General introductory comments and historical 
perspective 
2. Outline of critical issues 
3. Outline of procedures 
4. Model assessments, forms, sample reports 
5. Summaries of supplementary materials 
recommended for inclusion in the manual (e.g., 
important articles, copies of laws, 
regulations) 
lbe_Curriculum 
The curriculum is presented as an outline of an 
intensive eight day "training program," presented by a 
faculty of legal and forensic mental health professionals. 
The format, again based on the effective model used in 
Virginia, includes classroom presentations (31 hours), and 
trainee participation in case conferences, mock trials and 
a practical forensic report-writing session. 
The program is described as a "basic course" which, 
taken alone, does not qualify an individual to be 
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designated as a "qualified psychologist" or "qualified 
psychiatrist". The curriculum is based in part on 
Massachusetts’ temporary regulations pertaining to the 
designation of qualified psychologists, and on the 
training model developed by Virginia. 
At the end of "Stage I", a final draft of the 
training program was presented to Dr. Fein for his 
approval to move to "Stage II". Dr. Fein reviewed the 
package in detail, addressing writing style, correcting 
inaccuracies, and suggesting additions and deletions. 
Overall, he stated that he was "very pleased" with the 
training package, that he was concerned about the length 
of the training program, and that he was anxious to 
proceed with the project. In his letter introducing this 
project to potential reviewers, Dr. Fein described the 
program as "informative and useful," and "a project that 
may improve substantially, forensic mental health 
assessments in Massachusetts" (see Appendix A). 
Stag£_Ui_lhe_EvaluatlQri 
The evaluation process was designed to collect 
judgments and comments from key individuals, which can 
used by the Department of Mental Health as an aid then be 
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in deciding whether and how to proceed with the training 
program. If the decision is to try to make use of it, 
then the review data should also be useful as a basis for 
further revisions. 
Dr. Fein developed a list of reviewers - 
individuals, whose feedback he would value. This list 
included fifty-three (53) individuals, including: twenty 
(20) forensic mental health professionals; ten (10) 
judges; four (4) district attorneys; seven (7) defense 
attorneys; four (4) D.M.H. attorneys; and eight (8) 
prospective trainees, practicing mental health 
professionals with no formal forensic training. 
Each reviewer was then sent a copy of the curriculum 
guide, the training manual, and a review form (see Chapter 
IV). These materials were covered by a letter from Dr. 
Fein requesting the reviewer's participation, and an 
introductory "note to the reviewer". 
The reviewers' names appear on the review forms. 
While the names of the reviewers are available to Dr. Fein 
to allow for selected follow-up, for purposes of this 
dissertation they are replaced by identifying numbers and 
professional background identification (see Appendix B). 
Review_Form: In Part I of the review form, the 
reviewers were asked to judge how adequately the manual 
addresses the content areas by rating each of eleven (11) 
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items (see Tabie 3), through the use of the five 
rating scale. Further, the reviewers were 
comment after each rating. The rating scale is 
(5) point 
asked to 
presented 
in Table 2. 
In Part II of the review form, the reviewers were 
asked to address six (6) items (See Table 4) regarding the 
style and structure of the manual and curriculum using the 
same rating and comment format as in Part I. In their 
comments the reviewers were asked to explain what changes 
they would recommend. In both Part I and Part II the 
reviewers were asked to provide further comment and 
recommendations on extra sheets. 
£fcagg_Ih£gei_lhe_BePort to D.M.H. 
The report to be submitted to the Department of 
Mental Health is presented in Chapters V through VIII. 
Chapter V describes the decisions and events which made up 
Stage II. It also critiques the methodology employed in 
that stage. Chapters VI and VII present and analyze the 
results of the reviewers' ratings and comments, on the 
manual and curriculum, respectively. 
The reviewers' ratings and comments are described in 
these chapters as follows. For each of the 17 items on 
the review form, mean scores and a summary of the comments 
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are presented and compared for the three professional 
groups of reviewers: legal professionals, forensic mental 
health professionals, and mental health professionals 
thout formal forensic training (prospective trainees). 
Mean scores are also presented for the manual as a whole, 
the training curriculum, and the complete package. 
Additional comments are also reported. 
Finally, Chapter VIII concludes with: (1) final 
conclusions; (2) recommendations for further modification 
and implementation of the training package; (3) a 
discussion of implementation strategies; (4) a 
consideration of the implications drawn for other 
projects; and (5) a summary of this project. 
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Table 2 
Reviewers' Rating Scale 
Eleas e_Circlej_ 
"1" for "INADEQUATELY"- Thp ^ 
addressing this issue. ®S 3 P°°r Job of 
2" addresfthls^ ADEQUATELY" : The manual attempts to 
important^points"6' ^ faUS Sh°rt: ib »*—« 
"3" for "ADEQUATELY": The manual addresses the 
^Sr^nt p°lnt® Pertaining to this issue, but is 
lacking m depth and/or breadth. 
"4" for "QUITE ADEQUATELY": The manual does a good job 
of addressing this issue. 
f°r ''THOROUGHLY": The manual does an excellent job 
of addressing this issue. 
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T ab1e 3 
Rating Form: Part I 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Pre trial evaluations in 
case law, and Department 
regulations 
Massachusetts: statutes, 
of Mental Health 
Mental health professionals' 
Pre—trial evaluations participation in 
Legai concepts and criteria involved in the 
determination of competency to stand trial 
Clinical issues and methods involved in the 
assessment of competency to stand trial 
Legal concepts and criteria involved in the 
determination of criminal responsibility 
Clinical 
criminal 
issues and assessment methods related to 
responsibility 
Legal issues involved in involuntary commitment 
Clinical assessment of "likelihood of serious harm" 
Report writing 
Expert witness testimony 
Rights of defendants in the pre-trial evaluation 
process. 
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Table 4 
Rating Form: Part II 
1. Format of the training program (curriculum) 
2. Time allotted for the training program 
3. Training methods described in the training program 
4. Comprehensiveness of the training manual 
5. Format of the training manual 
6. Materials provided in the training manual. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE TRAINING PROGRAM 
Chapter IV contains the materials which were mailed 
to the fifty-three (53) reviewers on June 30, 1986. Each 
reviewer received these materials in a looseleaf binder, 
which included: 
1. A Note to The Reviewer" 
2. A table of contents for the training manual 
3. The Training Manual for Pre-Trial Evaluations and 
Related Commitments in Massachusetts 
4. The curriculum for the training program 
5. The review form 
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A NOTE TO THE REVIEWER 
Fein has°Srequested1^urPrevilw1^dacomra ?hiCh R°bert 
MentIISPHel!tht°ofttte D^t °' the Div^n/Censfc 
mental h^Jth *° brai" 
qualified" to condno-t- ^ ^ 1 be designated as 
Massachusetts. d court-ordered evaluations in 
The enclosed materials 
training program model 
form for your ratings 
envelope is provided for 
include: (1) a training manual and 
tor your review; and (2) a review 
and comments. A postage paid 
return of the review form. 
ssr js s?.£“ “,2ss-> *frr 
interested “l^V* Psy°hol°Sist= and psychiatrists who are 
evaluations under 
Sections 15, 16 and 17. ^ ^naP^er 
Virginia°s°Sment 1® u m°^®led after the format used in 
u “?"tal health system over the last six years 
training Sow™' • “d Slobogin’ 1985>- Although this 
program8 Wh® 1S narrower in scope than the Virginia 
„ botb , are Resigned_to_train experienced 
P————-c 1 hg mental_health profftssinnaic: 
Evaluative research (Melton et 
Virginia training program at the 
Institute of Law, Psychiatry and 
the effectiveness of the model: 
al, 1985) done on the 
University of Virginia's 
Public Policy, suggests 
Graduates of the Virginia program were found to 
possess a level of knowledge of forensic issues on 
par with forensic "experts," and significantly 
greater than their untrained colleagues. 
Graduates were found to write reports to court which 
were of significantly higher quality than those 
written by clinicians who had not been through this 
program. 
The_Training_ManuaJj. The_Training_Manual_for_Preztrial 
Evaluations._and_Related_Commitments in Massachusetts, is 
an "how to" manual, designed to be used in conjunction 
with the proposed training program (see below). As such, 
it is written in outline form to assist in didactic 
presentation, and it is presented in a looseleaf format, 
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s?ructireW of?“this^raanual ^^ ppdatipg- The 
^giSli^Ts^SS?^^1 d™^VtE^jJ£™5g“£ 
provide”*^ overvieideof the°Dre-t Ch?pterT Chapter I 
in Massachusetts. Chapter II covers ^he^role PT?uS 
See^altheei^riri:?eaL^t°.ri°grsLthtrthevalua^°^e 
IoveratiegalP^dec?inicaldreSSed- ' Chaptersl"V through^?! 
3ritingnaLri e Cdapt®rs oover related commitments, report 
writing, and expert witness testimony, respectively! 
At the end of each chapter, a description is provided of 
supplementary materials which are proposed for inclusion 
™ *he mapual- These materials include copies of 
courts ’anri^a0^1! dec^slons by Federal and Massachusetts 
Aft ’ . d articles from the professional literature. 
„ 1 th® ruV1uW Pr°cess is completed, decisions will be 
made as to which of these, and any other materials, should 
included. At that point, permission will be requested 
from the authors and publishers. 
^—training—PEQgram_£yrricLilumi The proposed training 
program is an intensive, eight day program, presented by a 
acuity of legal and forensic mental health professionals 
The format includes classroom presentations (31 hours) and 
trainee participation in case conferences, mock trials and 
a practical forensic report-writing session. 
Please note that the proposed training package does not 
address the following forensic mental health issues: (1) 
juvenile justice; (2) aid to sentencing evaluations 
(Section 15e); (3) transfer of mentally ill prisoners to 
D.M.H. facilities or Bridgewater State Hospital (Section 
18); (4) mentally retarded defendants; (5) treatment 
issues in forensic settings; and (6) civil and probate 
court evaluations. 
Finally, I'd like to personally thank you for your time, 
effort, and candid ratings and comments. 
Howard M. Lester 
June 30, 1986 
TRAINING MANUAL FOR PRE-TRIAL EVALUATIONS 
COMMITMENTS IN MASSACHUSETTS 
AND RELATED 
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training manual for pre-trial evaluations AND 
RELATED COMMITMENTS IN MASSACHUSETTS 
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COURT ORDERED PRE-TRIAL EVALUATIONS IN MASSACHUSETTS: 
Sources in lav: 
Pr?-?rial evaluations, and subsequent 
pr? ,an<? Post-trial commitments of defendants in 
cnmina1 trials to Department of Mental Health 
facilities or Bridgewater State Hospital are 
governed by: 
1. statutory law 
2. administrative law (state regulations), and 
3. case law (judicial decisions). 
In Massachusetts, no one source deals 
comprehensively with pre-trial evaluations and 
related commitments. 
Statute! Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 123 
(M.G.L. c. 123), which governs the care and treatment 
of mentally ill persons in Massachusetts. 
A. This statute provides procedures for court-ordered 
pre-trial evaluations and for related commitments 
for evaluation and treatment. 
1. It does not provide definitions or criteria for 
key terms such as "competency to stand trial, " 
"criminal responsibility," or "mental illness." 
B. Section 15 (s. 15) provides procedures for judges 
to order pre-trial assessments by "qualified 
physicians" or "qualified psychologists" of the 
issues of competency to stand trial (see Chapters 
IV and V of this manual) and criminal 
responsibility (see Chapters VI and VII). 
1. The issue being addressed in these assessments 
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is the effect of mental illness on the 
competenoy to stand trial and/or Criminal 
responsibility of defendants in or^naf oases. 
2. 
Sdi“iIIifialPnnei^e? ? Pr°?edure for judges to 
(i e ?n ihi pre_^lal evaluations on site 
ln courthouse or jail). 
a. Thus commitment for pre-trial 
should occur only when "doubt 
questions remains. 
evaluations 
about these 
when^thd^ allo^s judges to commit defendants 
when there is continuing doubt about their 
competency to stand trial and/or criminal 
responsibility. 
a. These commitments are for up to 20 days, and 
they can be extended for one added 20 dav 
period. 
b. Regardless of the defendant's condition, 
once the pre-trial evaluation is completed 
and a written report submitted by a 
"qualified psychologist" or "physician," the 
commitment ends and the defendant returns to 
court. 
C. For defendants whose competency was evaluated, the 
judge now rules on the issue of competency to 
stand trial. 
1. A competency hearing may be held if either 
party requests a hearing, or if the court is in 
doubt about the issue. 
2. If the defendant is found to be competent by 
the court, the case proceeds. 
3. If the finding is incompetent to stand trial 
(1ST) common outcomes include: 
a. commitment for treatment (i.e., restoration 
of competency); 
b. commitment for treatment with charges being 
dropped; 
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d. 
SuhoCI °f comPetency, 
release with charges being dropped. 
evalufted“tdefenseh°f not^^l /e®ponsibility was 
insanity (NGRI) may be presfnie^ y reaS°n °f 
1- The insanity defense" may be nrespntoj 
-J-S-5S a 
2. Common outcomes of a finding of NGKI include: 
a. commitment 
16a); 
for further evaluation (Section 
b. commitment for treatment (Section 16b) ; 
c. release (less likely). 
E. 
Provides procedures for th 
Of 1ST defendants and NGRI acquittees 
commitment 
S£ction_16a provides a commitment for 
observation (up to 40 days) to determine the 
treatment needs and "commitability" of the 1ST 
defendant or NGRI acquittee. 
2. Seeiioos_16b_arid_c provide procedures for an 
initial up-to-six month commitment, and 
subsequent up-to-one year commitments. 
A commitment hearing, utilizing civil 
commitment standards must be held. To 
commit the person it must be proven that: 
1) the person is mentally ill; 
2) release would create a likelihood of 
serious harm to self or others; 
3) there is no less restrictive alternative 
available. 
b. For 1ST defendants this commitment can end 
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3. 
defendant^ SiX m°nth period if the 
efendant becomes competent to stand trial. 
fSItriStiinS'^H-2 provide Procedures regarding 
ess s n?e 
InedCOSr:":uSteesiSCharge °f IST de^ndknts 
F. Sectioo_17 calls for: 
1. the periodic review of the IST defendant's 
competency; 
new competency hearings; 
"provisional" trials for IST defendants who 
believe they can establish a defense of "not 
guilty"; and 
2 
3. 
4. release of IST defendants. 
—included in this manual are: 
1- SectioQ_15g_gvaluatiQnsj_ This section allows 
for a clinical assessment as an aid to 
sentencing after a guilty finding. 
a. This assessment may be done in the 
courthouse or jail, or through a forty day 
commitment. 
2. Sfictxco—LSi. Allows for the transfer of 
mentally ill prisoners to and from D.M.H. 
facilities or Bridgewater State Hospital. 
III. Mmini£t]^£iY£_lawi M.G.L c. 123, s. 2, empowers 
the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health 
(D.M.H.) to establish definitions and procedures 
consistent with this statute through departmental 
regulations. 
D.M.H. regulations governing pre-trial evaluations 
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are found in 104 CMR 3:00. 
Of interest here are: 
A. 
as used m criminal 
\r-irlu*tioas- s~~ «* 
i. 
Iri srana trial assessments. 
B' |S^-SMR 3:07 (§1 - Designation of Qualified 
Physicians: This regulation lists the current 
requirements for a physician to be qualified to 
perform pre-trial evaluations in Massachusetts 
1. Fully licensed to practice 
Massachusetts law. 
medicine under 
2. Completed a fQ£mai_eourse_of_tralriiQg in 
forensic psychiatry as approved by D.M.H. 
3. Certified or eligible to be certified by the 
American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, 
Inc. , Q£ shall have had five years' experience 
in medical practice, a substantial portion of 
which has been in the specialty field of 
psychiatry. 
0. 104_£MB_2l£Ql Designation of Qualified Forensic 
Psychologists 
1. In Chapter 617 of the Acts of 1985, the 
Massachusetts legislature amended M.G.L. c. 
123, authorizing psychologists to qualify, 
pursuant to D.M.H. regulations, to perform 
court-ordered assessments and to submit 
reports to trial courts regarding defendants 
in criminal cases. 
a. D.M.H. has developed proposed changes in 
its regulations, 104 CMR 3:20, to reflect 
the amended law (see pages 1-18 to 1-26). 
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2. Critej:ia_fQr_desigiiatiQQ (104 cmr 3:20 m>- 
ApFiic^ts for designation furnish evidence to 
the Assistant Commissioner for Forensic Mental 
Health that they: 
a' are licensed by the Massachusetts Board of 
Registration of Psychologists; 
b. possess a doctoral degree; 
c. have completed at least two years, 
full-time, post-doctoral work, as a 
psychologist doing clinical work (five 
years post master's degree experience 
substitutes for one of these years); 
d. have completed 1000 hours work supervised 
by a licensed mental health professional, 
in an inpatient unit which accepts 
involuntary patients, 
e. have completed training visits to: 
1) Bridgewater State Hospital 
2) a D.M.H. inpatient facility 
3) a District Court which has D.M.H. 
forensic services 
4) a County Jail or House of Correction 
f. have completed a reasonable number of 
section 15a and 15b reports; 
g. have successfully completed an examination. 
3. Forensic Mental Health Supervisors: The 
proposed regulations provide for Forensic 
Mental Health Supervisors, designated by the 
Assistant Commissioner, to supervise and 
examine applicants. 
4. Appointment: Qualified Forensic psychologists 
are appointed for three years. 
a. To maintain the appointment they must: 
1) have copies of forensic reports, 
completed after appointment, available 
for review; 
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2) 
3) 
her/hi^P?tS ina yearly review of 
1 v• iludlsial Deoi • 
A. 
F±r!1.°°Vrt decisions concerning the federal 
constitution or statutes supercede state «+-,i+- 
regulations or court decisions statutes, 
B. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (S.J.C.): 
1* interprets the state constitution; 
2. 
3. 
interprets, changes or invalidates statutes and 
administrative regulations; and 
utilizes the principle of stare decisis (i.e., 
precedent) to develop standards and procedures 
where constitutional, statutory or 
administrative law do not apply. 
C. The bulk of the standards, criteria and procedures 
governing pre-trial evaluations, reports to court 
and expert witness testimony in Massachusetts are 
the product of decisions made by the S.J.C. 
1. Descriptions of these decisions can be found in 
Chapters III, IV and VII. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
The following materials will be provided at the end n-P 
this chapter, pending author and/or publisher approval 
Page numbers continuous with the manual’s pagination iill 
be assigned to each article or document included 
Pages 1-8 to T-14 
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 123 
and 17. Sections 15, 16 
These three sections of the Massachusetts statute on the 
care and treatment of the mentally ill, govern 
court-ordered pre-trial evaluations and related 
commitments. 
Eafie_I-l£ 
104 CMR 3:01 
Department of Mental Health Regulations 
Section 3:01 defines "mental illness" for the purposes of 
involuntary commitment and the determination of criminal 
responsibility. 
Eags_X-l£ 
104 CMR 3:07 (6) 
Department of Mental Health Regulations - Designation of 
Qualified Physicians 
Paragraph (6) describes the criteria for physicians to be 
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designated as "qualified" for the 
assessments of competency to stand 
responsibility. 
purpose 
trial 
of 
and 
performing 
criminal 
Eag££_I^ia_£Q_l-££ 
Murphy, EM. 4/4/86 Memo to Interested Parties- 
proposefregu^ationsK RegUlations copy of 
This memo introduces the proposed 
designation of "Qualified Forensic regulations for Psychologists." 
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS ' PARTICIPATION 
IN PRE-TRIAL EVALUATIONS 
I. Clinicians performing pre-trial 
traditional clinical roles evaluations versus 
The role of the clinician involved in pre-trial 
evaluations differs markedly from that of clinicians 
performing traditional therapeutic evaluations 
A. Evaluations done in traditional mental health 
treatment settings are non-adversarial. Pre-trial 
evaluations on the other hand always present the 
potential for clinicians and defendants to find 
themselves in adversarial positions. 
B. In traditional treatment settings, the competent 
patient ultimately calls the shots. In pre-trial 
evaluation situations, the defendant can refuse to 
be interviewed, but otherwise has little control. 
Traditional evaluations are often patient 
initiated. The patient" or "client" is approached 
in a supportive, non-threatening manner by the 
mental health professional. In pre-trial 
evaluations, the "patient" is a "defendant," who 
may have been ordered by a judge to undergo the 
evaluation, and who may perceive the evaluation as 
a threatening and consequential endeavor. 
In the traditional evaluation the clinician's role 
is focused on assisting the patient. In the case 
of pre-trial evaluations, the clinician is 
assisting the court. 
E. While traditional clinical evaluations may involve 
data collection from third parties, this activity 
is limited. The clinician involved in pre-trial 
evaluations takes on the role of "clinical 
investigator," assertively gathering as much 
relevant data as is possible, often interviewing 
witnesses, victims, family and significant others, 
besides the patient/defendant. 
F. In traditional treatment settings, clients' 
statements and presentation are generally taken at 
98 
99 
II. 
™Ce^aiUe- In Pre"trial evaluations the 
distort1 7 °f raalin^erin^ or at least some 
distortion or misrepresentation is always 
considered. 
In treatment settings clients' 
considered to be confidential, 
exceptions. The statements of 
Pre—trial evaluations are not 
statements 
with rare 
defendants 
confidential 
are 
in 
1. While in treatment settings clinicians can 
reassure that confidentiality is required; in 
pre trial evaluations clinicians must warn about 
the lack of confidentiality. 
The argument against mental health professionals' 
participation: Two contexts 
The_cl3,nj,c_ian^idefendant_relationship context: 
Fersch (1980) and Gutheil and Appelbaum (1982) 
summarize concerns raised about the adverse 
effects on patient/defendants of the participation 
of mental health professionals in the pre-trial 
evaluation process. 
1- Potgoti^l fQ£_exploitation: The powerful 
effects of the transference or 
misinterpretation of the professional's role in 
the pre-trial evaluation can lead to the 
"seduction'' of an otherwise reluctant 
patient/defendant into a cooperative position. 
a. Even careful "warnings" (see Chapter III) by 
the clinician may not prevent this 
phenomenon in some cases. 
2. EQt£CLtiai_lQr_YiQlaJiii2a_Ql_£QD£iitutiQaal 
rights: A corollary to the above concern is 
that the patient/defendant's right against 
self-incrimination (see Chapter III) may be 
violated. 
Potential for contamination of the clinician's 
opinion due to countertransference. 
3. 
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B. 
Perhaes the most 
controversial issue in forensic psychology and 
psych.atry is that of the mental healSh 
professionai offering opinions in reports to court 
Morse" 1978rtqrtneS?Q^Stim°ny (APPelbaum, 1985; 
1988?’ 19 8’ ^one’ 1975' Bazelon, 1975; Suarez, 
ChaPter XI, Expert Witness Testimony 
regarding the role of the expert witness. 
1. The stance against addressing the ultimate 
issue: 
a. Competency to stand trial is a legal issue, 
and criminal responsibility is a legal/moral 
issue. The mental health professions offer 
no special training or expertise which 
qualifies clinicians to make legal or moral 
decisions for society. 
b. The responsibility for reaching conclusions 
on these issues lies squarely with the judge 
and/or jury. When clinicians offer 
conclusions here, they may usurp the 
judicial role. 
c. The American Bar Association takes the 
stance that expert witnesses "should not 
express, or be permitted to express, an 
opinion on any question requiring a 
conclusion of law or a moral or social value 
judgment properly reserved for the court or 
the jury" (1984, Standard 7:3.9). 
2. The probative value of clinicians' expertise: 
a. Criminal law focuses on proof and certainty. 
b. Ziskin (1975) and Morse (1978), representing 
the stance that expert witness testimony on 
legal issues should be based on hard 
scientific data, cite the imprecision and 
speculative nature of clinical assessment. 
1) They note the poor reliability of 
diagnostic and forensic assessment. 
c. The bafrble_.of-.the experts: This well known 
phenomenon has brought public discredit to 
forensic clinicians (i.e., the Hinckley 
trial). It plays out the unreliability of 
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III. 
expert witness testimony on issues such as 
diagnosis and criminal responsibility. 
Ihe_propQnentsi_nespQri£ei 
Thg_eljniglaQZ:defeQdant_relationshi p nnntpvf • 
1. Informed consent regarding the agency of the 
clinician and the potential use of the 
information is required by law (see Chapter 
2. Proceeding only when the defendant has 
demonstrated understanding of the warning and 
consent, should minimize the risk of 
"seduction. " 
B ■ The_expert_witQess_£QQteKtl 
1- lbe_ultimate_igsuei Diamond (1985) argues 
that the objects of pre-trial evaluations, 
competency to stand trial and criminal 
responsibility, are not "ultimate issues." 
The verdict is the ultimate issue. The 
expert witness addresses component issues. 
a* LefialZmoralj_ELQt_clinical issues: While 
the average mental health professional may 
not be qualified to report or testify on 
these issues, training and experience in 
the forensic subspecialties does prepare 
clinicians to offer opinions on competency 
to stand trial and criminal responsibility. 
b. Usurping the judicial function: The court 
is responsible for its own objectivity and 
autonomy. 
c. Practically speaking, most judges and 
attorneys want to hear or read an opinion 
on these issues from a qualified mental 
health professional and will press the 
witness for an opinion (Melton, Weithorn 
and Slobogin, 1985). 
2. lhe_nrQt>atiYe_YalLie_Qf_£liaician£i_fiXEerti£ei 
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s a 
iatric 
b. Clinical -, . 
1) This does not justify the exclusion of 
mental health professionals from the 
courtroom as long as their evidence 
rises above speculation and conjecture 
(Bonnie and Slobogin, 1980); 
c. The notion that for expert witness 
testimony to have probative value it must 
be based on "hard science" is erroneous 
(Clements and Ciccone, 1984). Reasonable 
expectations may include, that the expert: 
1) be knowledgeable, experienced and in good 
professional standing; 
2) control for investigator bias, noting the 
potential effect of a particular 
theoretical perspective. 
3) offer conclusions and reasoning based on 
thorough clinical investigations, 
comprehensive and honest presentation of 
clinical data. 
d. Diagooatic_reiiabilityi The reliability of 
diagnosis is affected by variations in 
professional orientation, variations in the 
stance and condition of individual 
defendants, and variations in the 
availability and quality of information. 
1) These variations, where they exist, 
should be clarified. 
C. Qnrealistie_expectationsi Much of the criticism 
aimed at the participation of mental health 
professionals is based in unrealistic 
expectations. 
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1. Clements and Ciccone (1984) note that expert 
witness testimony may be characterized as 
requiring certainty and complete consensus. 
a. Such a standard is impossible even for the 
most rigorous of the physical sciences 
(i* e-» testimony on the shuttle disaster). 
2. Gutheil and Appelbaum (1982) point out that 
mental health professionals are expected to 
function as human lie detectors and 
"retrospectoscopes. " 
a. Lack of understanding of the dilemmas of 
the psychodiagnostician, human factors such 
as ambivalence, and the role of the 
unconscious lead to the expectation that 
clinicians can offer absolute unequivocal 
answers. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Eagga_Il-6 to it-i^ 
witnesses • °The trou^T' (R- (1984K Ethics and expert 
Bulletin nf Thetrubled r°le of psychiatrists in court. ^^t^fJ^^BeEi2aa_Asadei!fi:_2f_pgi:abiflti.x_aD£LIhs 
"Uth°rS.addreSS attaoks on the mental health expert 
witness as unscientific," and argue for the 
participation of these experts. They "contend that many 
°x the positions taken on the ethical problems of 
psychiatric expert witnesses are based on two major 
errors: (1) using a narrow concept of justice that does 
not accurately describe the legal reality; and (2) 
employing a nineteenth century rationalist view of science 
that assumes the expert ideally deduces, from scientific 
laws, with certainty and complete consensus, the data and 
conclusions of testimony. The culminating error is to 
use^these misconceptions to develop standards for the role 
of scientific expert" in legal efforts to achieve 
"justice." (p. 127) 
E2g£s_II-17_ko_II-6Q 
From Chapter II, pages 452-495 of: 
Bonnie, R. & Slobogin, C. (1980). The role of mental 
health professionals in the criminal process: The case for 
informed speculation. £6 Virginia Law Review 4£7^ 
The authors discuss opposition to opinion testimony 
(Morse, 1978); describe their view of the proper scope and 
necessary qualifications for expert witness testimony; and 
then present their rationale for supporting the 
participation of mental health professionals. 
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND PROTFOTTHm acatmoo, 
self-incrimination in court ORDERED^EVALUATIONS 
EifttLAmgndmsajtjxQteotioQi Protection against 
;s‘l=fSi j;.™, 
(U.b.C.A. Constitutional Amendment 5). 
A. Relevance to the court ordered evaluati on : 
1* ^ defendant in a criminal case may reveal 
inculpatory, or incriminating information to a 
clinician in a court ordered evaluation which 
points to his/her guilt or amounts to a 
confession to this or other crimes. 
a. Defendants who would choose not to make any 
statements in court, may nonetheless reveal 
this information to a clinician in a 
court—ordered evaluation, because of: 
1) misinterpretation of the role of the 
clinician; or 
2) the powerful effect of transference. 
2. The end-product of the court ordered evaluation 
is a mental health professional’s written 
report, and sometimes courtroom testimony, based 
on and possibly including statements made by a 
defendant. 
3. If these statements were to become evidence in 
the criminal case: 
a. the court ordered evaluation could be 
considered a form of “compelled" 
self-incrimination; and 
b. defendants would be hesitant to participate 
in court ordered evaluations. 
B. The following sections describe Fifth Amendment 
protection in court ordered evaluations in 
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Massachusetts. 
II. Incriminating statements made during 
evaluations e court ordered 
A. According to M.G.L. c. 233, section 23B: 
1. No statement made by a defendant while 
undergoing assessments under M.G.L. c. 123 
sections 15 or 16 which may constitute a 
confession of guilt can be admitted as 
Statements made in these assessments can be 
admitted qqIy on the issue of the defendant's 
m KN T“ A I A .—. U U _ 1 * _ _ 
mental condition. 
III. 
Testimonial privilege is the application of 
clinician-patient confidentiality to the legal 
arena. 
A. In Massachusetts, M.G.L. c. 233, s. 20B, and 
M.G.L. c. 112, s. 135 cover the issue of 
"psychotherapists" revealing the contents of 
communications with patients. 
... a patient shall have the privilege of 
refusing to disclose, and of preventing a 
witness from disclosing, any 
communication, wherever made, between said 
patient and a psychotherapist relative to 
the diagnosis or treatment of the 
patient's mental or emotional condition" 
(M.G.L. c 233, section 20B). 
1. This statute covers court ordered evaluations 
(Schwartz and Stern, 1979). Therefore for 
the purposes of these evaluations "defendants" 
can be considered "patients." 
a. The "privilege" belongs to the 
defendant/patient. 
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"Psychotherapists" here include: 
a* Licensed physicians who spend a 
Psychiatry31" °f time praotioin« 
b. Licensed, doctoral level psychologists. 
c. Licensed social workers. 
d. Certified psychiatric nurse mental health 
clinical specialists. 
"Communications" here include "conversation, 
correspondence, actions and occurrences 
relating to diagnosis or treatment... and any 
records... or notes of the foregoing" (M.G.L. 
c. 233, s. 20B). 
a. Note that this privilege includes all, not 
just incriminating, communications. 
Exsgptiensi For the purpose of court ordered 
evaluations, under the following exceptions 
these communications may be conditionally 
admissible, according to M.G.L. c. 233, 
section 20B. 
a. When the defendant raises the the issue of 
his/her mental condition &s an element of 
his/her claim (e.g,, incorapetency) or 
defense (e.g., insanity defense), the 
statute states that the privilege may be 
considered to have been waived. 
1) On condition that the judge finds that 
the value of disclosing the information 
outweighs the need to protect the 
privileged relationship. 
2) NOTE the S.J.C.'s limits on this 
exception in Blaisdell v. Commonwealth , 
1977, described in III. B. below. 
b. When the communications were made after a 
warning by the clinician to the defendant 
that the information would not be 
privileged (see pages III-6 and III-7). 
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1) On condition that the information is 
admissible only on the issue of the 
,fendant s mental condition, not as an 
admission of guilt. 
2) ln(1974) the 
• .0. noted that this exception is a 
mechanism which addresses privileged 
communication in a way that allows the 
courts to use expert's evidence, while 
preserving procedural protection. 
3) These warnings' are commonly referred 
to as "Lamb warnings." 
B‘ |lai^eli_v^_CQnmoQweaithl In this 1977 case the 
b.J.L. clarified procedures related to privileged 
communication and protection against 
self-incrimination. 
1. Regarding criminal responsibility assessments: 
a. Reports on criminal responsibility 
assessments should be sent only to the 
court for review by the judge. 
1) The judge may release reports, or parts 
of reports, which do not contain 
information based on the defendant's 
statements, to either the prosecution of 
the defense. 
2) The judge may release data based on the 
defendant's statements to either party 
once the defendant announces that: 
a) s/he will testify on her/his own 
behalf; or 
b) defense psychiatric witnesses will 
testify to opinions based on the 
defendant's statements. 
b. If the defense intends to introduce 
"psychiatric evidence" at the trial which 
include the defendant's own statements, the 
defendant's refusal to "submit" to an 
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IV. 
c. 
2. 
leadrtoSth«n 3 ?°Urt ordered evaluation may lead to the exclusion of the defense 
expert s testimony. 
Defendants can be required to participate 
related^ <-kX<T and Philological tests 
related to the determination of mental 
capacity at the time of an alleged crime. 
Regarding competency to stand trial 
assessments, the S.J.C. noted that the 
«^hni lHmS +* , pr elf-incrimination 
should not become a problem because the 
criteria do not usually relate to potentially 
incriminating information. 
fuj4slinaa_for_cUnisiansi Note that 
oasR1?f 1 standar?s ln Massachusetts' statutes and 
case law on privilege and protection against 
stanHa^lmi"aK n,1are also refl®°ted in the ethical 
standards which apply to the mental health 
1982?SSi°nS (M°nahan’ 1980; Gutheil and Appelbaum, 
^—informed—consent: Prior to initiating 
clinical interviews in court ordered evaluations 
under M.G.L. c. 123, sections 15 and 16, 
clinicians should: 
1. Make a clear statement to the defendant 
regarding: 
a. the purpose and nature of the assessment; 
b. the fact that the clinician may reveal the 
contents of the interview in a report to 
court or in testimony at a future hearing or 
trial; and 
c. the fact that the defendant can refuse to 
answer specific questions and that without 
his/her permission the interview will not 
proceed. 
2. Record the defendant's stated understanding of 
the "warning." 
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B. 
a. Do not proceed with patients who do not 
appear to understand the warning * 
3. Record the defendant's response regarding 
permission to proceed. g 
4. See pages X-4 and X-5. 
Reports: 
i23~X5S5?SX ,?e” the oourt' under M.G.L c 
rnLt 4 ? 15 requests assessments of both' 
resoons?M! t Stand trial and "iminal 
responsibility, provide two separate reports 
2. Competency to stand trial reports: 
a. should not contain incriminating 
information; 
b. 
da made available to either the defense 
or prosecuting attorney. 
c. NOTE: Care must be taken to avoid 
12C»1lm1ln?t:ing information when the question 
likelihood of harm" comes up in these 
reports in answer to the related question 
(section 15c) of need for treatment at a DMH 
faci1lty. 
1) Incriminating information" here refers 
only to statements related to the current 
charges. 
Criminal responsibility reports should sent 
only to the judge who ordered the assessment, 
because incriminating information based on the 
defendant’s statements may be unavoidable. 
The judge will determine what portions of 
and to whom the reports will be revealed. 
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SAMPLE "LAMB" TYPE WARNINGS 
Gutheil and Appelbaum (1982) offer the following warning: 
We are talking today because I have been asked by the 
court to write a letter evaluating your ability to stand 
J L ,Tou ou?ht to be aware, therefore, that the purpose 
of our discussion is for me to be able to give my opinion 
to the court, not to decide how you will be treated YoC 
vnu lha> to talk with me if you don't want to, but if 
you do, it will make it easier for me to give the court an 
accurate picture of your ability to stand trial. You 
ought to keep in mind that anything you tell me will not 
necessarily be confidential, so you shouldn't tell me 
anything that you would not want the court to find out 
Do you have any questions? Can I go ahead and ask you' 
some questions?" (pp. 298-299) 
The University of Virginia's Forensic Evaluation Tra-ininf* 
M&QJJ&X offers the following version which informs the 
defendant of what happens if incriminating information 
reaches the court. 
I will be asking you questions concerning your 
relationship with your attorney and your understanding of 
the legal system and the charges against you. I will also 
ask questions concerning certain aspects of your past 
life, and in particular concerning the time period 
surrounding the alleged offense. Nothing that you say 
about the offense can be used against you at trial, unless 
you or your attorney decide to raise the insanity defense 
or a similar defense. If you do decide to raise such a 
defense, what you say during this evaluation can only be 
used to address the issue of your mental state at the time 
of the offense. Under no circumstances may the 
prosecution use what you say here to prove you committed 
the crime your charged with. 
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and written warning: 
Notification of Rights 
I am a clinician at the Center for Forensic P 
You have been ordered by the court to undergo 
PYftrrn i J ^j_• _ 
examination to determine your: 
ic Psychiatry, 
ergo an 
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL and/or CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
(NGRI) 
My purpose for talking with you is to complete an 
evaluation to determine your mental state and answer the 
question raised by the court. I will be required to send 
a report to the court, detailing my clinical findings and 
stating my opinion. Additional testimony might be 
necessary and I might be required to tell the court what I 
observe and what you tell me. As a result of the 
interview, it might be indicated to request psychological 
testing, the results of which also might be disclosed in 
the report to the court or in the course of testimony. 
Do you understand what I have told you and is it alright 
to proceed with the interview? 
Patient's Response: 
Date: 
Patient's Signature 
Witness 
CFP 
10-1-75 
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS 
Eages.III-g^^ll-^ 
Blaisdel1 v. Commonwealth, Mass., 
Reporter, 2d Series (1977). 364 North Eastern 
Pages_III-23_tQ_III-29 
Privileged communications; 
exceptions" patients and psychotherapists; 
Massachusetts General Laws Annotated, 
20B, pp. 150-156. Chapter 233, Section 
Page IIT-31 
’’Disclosure of Information by Social Workers" 
Massachusetts General Laws Annotated, Chapter 112, section 
135, p. 497. 
Page III-32 
Accused; statements made while undergoing psychiatric 
examination; admissibility. 
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 233, Section 23B. 
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL: LEGAL ISSUES 
1 • Background 
A. 
Slovenko E??97?v Law; Ad^ed from 
(1974) (1977); Stone- (1975); and G.A.P. 
1. 
2. 
Preservation of 
integrity, dignity and goals of legal process: 
a. 
b. 
untilBthetd ?en^Ur^ trials could not proceed 
until the defendant made a plea. There were 
no procedural alternatives. 
1) For defendants who would not or could not 
enter a plea, "peine forte et dure" forced 
the issue - progressively heavier weights 
Placed on the chest until the defendant 
uttered a plea, or died. 
In 17th century standards for proceeding with 
trial emphasized comprehension and memory, 
the lack of which led to imprisonment until 
the defendant had sufficient understanding. 
Eaim|ss^unctioni That the defendant be able 
to defend himself within the context of the 
legal system. 
i. By the mid-19th century the standard 
included: comprehension of the course of the 
proceedings, capacity to challenge witnesses, 
and comprehension of the details of evidence. 
Present day functions of competency to stand trial 
determinations 
1. Safeguarding the accuracy of criminal 
proceedings 
2. Guaranteeing a fair trial 
a. Drope v. Missouri (1975) adds that it is a 
violation of due process to require a person 
to stand trial while incompetent. 
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dignity of legal Preserving the integrity and proceedings 
Assuring that defendants found 
the basis for their punishment guilty understand 
a. Without this understanding there 
lesson learned" (deterrence) and 
meaningful societal retribution. 
can be no 
no 
Saising the question of competency to stand trial 
"[Competency to stand trial] is, in fact, 
the most significant mental health inquiry 
pursued m the system of criminal law. Its 
significance derives from the number of 
persons to whom it is applied, the many 
points m the criminal process at which it 
can be applied, the ease of its being 
invoked and the consequences of its 
application." (Stone, 1975, p. 200) 
T1?® C-s- Supreme Court, in Eate_v^_Eobioson 
<l9bb), required judges to raise the question of 
competency to stand trial, at any point in the 
criminal process that the evidence raises a 
bona fide doubt" regarding a defendant's 
competency. 
Ig-Jfassachusettsi The Supreme Judicial Court 
(SJC), m Commonwealth v. Hill (1978) found that 
where there exists "a substantial question of 
possible doubt" about a defendant's competency, 
the judge must on his own initiative, conduct a 
full hearing on the issue" (p. 1170). This 
court described the kind of information the 
judge might use to gauge this "doubt" (p. 1173): 
a. Judge's own observations of the defendant's 
behavior and demeanor in court; 
b. Statements to the judge regarding the 
defendant's behavior and mental condition; 
c. Reports of psychiatric evaluations; 
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d. Expert 
dSjttnSSS tSStim0ny reSarding the 
3. While "bona fide doubt" 
reason the question is 
might include (Halleck, 
may be the primary 
ri98ot’ °ther motivations 
For judges: 
1) 
2) 
appeain?nrhe °hance.°f being overruled on 
PPeal for not raising the question. 
Avoiding a trial 
issues. involving difficult moral 
a) 
Convenient disposition (commitment for 
pre trial evaluation) when the court does 
on bail? t0 release a dangerous defendant 
convenient u^posrnon, when the court’s 
u mentally ill defendants with 
minor charges to receive treatment. 
a) and Lifter (1978), note that 72% 
or oj competency to stand trial 
evaluations in their study were 
dismissed when the defendants returned 
to court. 
b) Deinstitutionalization and increasingly 
restrictive civil commitment standards 
have closed other avenues to the 
involuntary commitment of mentally ill 
individuals who may not be dangerous 
but may break the law. 
b. For defense attorneys: 
1) A means of "beating a rap." 
2) A means of delaying trial when public 
outrage is a concern. 
3) A means of casting doubt on the 
defendant's mental health when the 
insanity defense may become an issue. 
c. For prosecutors: 
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1) 
2) 
Avoiding overrule on appeal. 
Delay of trial while 
gathered. 
evidence is being 
3) 
Alternative disposition (commitment) when 
the case against a defendant believed to 
be dangerous is weak. 
II. Determining competency to 
standard stand trial: The "Dusky" 
A. 
^h?. 1?62^_U* S‘ Supreme Court decision in Dusky v 
^TT-fir—fl960) cites the standard applied'in 
all federal courts and in most states. To reach a 
indmg on the issue of competency to stand trial 
the court must determine if the defendant has: 
^uTticient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding — and 
whether he has a rational as well as 
factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him" (p. 403). 
NOTE: the standard is not an absolute, all or 
nothing standard. "Reasonable degree" allows 
for flexibility and a minimum capacity 
threshold for competency, although actual 
limits are not spelled out. 
in_Massachusettsj_ The SJC, in Commonwealth v 
Yailes (1971), adopted the exact wording of 
Dusky" for the state's test for competency to 
stand trial. 
III. Determining competency to stand trial under 
Massachusetts Law 
A. When the question is raised: M.G.L. c. 123, s. 
I-- 
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"any^tage of'Jtbf%roCerH*r "examinati°n" at 
about a defendants edings, when a doubt 
reason of mental ni P "7 to stand trial "by 
or mental illness or defect" is raised. 
1. The section 15a screening 
Conducted by a "qualified 
qualified psychologist." 
©valuation: 
physician" or 
a. See pages 1-4 to 1-6 regarding 
Massachusetts DMH Regulations on 
qualifications to perform these 
evaluations. 
Site^ place at the courthouse or a 
place of detention." 
Taski. To determine 
competency to stand 
illness. " 
if there is a doubt about 
trial "by reason of mental 
a. NOTE: Although the "Dusky" or "Vailes" 
standards present a functional test for 
competency which can stand on its own, here 
the statute links incompetency to mental 
illness or defect. 
The section 15b commitment for further 
evaluation: After the section 15a evaluation, if 
the judge "has reason to believe" that further 
examination is necessary, then under M.G.L. c. 
123, s. 15b the judge can order the defendant 
committed to a DMH facility for this purpose. 
1- Strjgt_securityj_ If the defendant is a male 
and requires "strict security," then the 
commitment can be at Bridgewater State 
Hospital. 
2. EeriQd-of ..QOffimitmgrrbj. The commitment can last 
up to 20 days and be extended once for another 
20 days upon written request from the 
examining psychologist or physician 
(psychiatrist). 
3. Taskl To "determine whether mental illness or 
defect have so affected a person that he is 
not competent to stand trial." 
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co^aY5i?!HQQr The defendant returns to 
Defendants can request to remain 
awaiting1 the 1°?™ “>d treat»f while 
tf iui f the completion of legal proceedings 
orders h°Spital agrees and the judge so 
C. 
Ihe^e£grt_t^_courti Upon completing the 
a !Jatl01?' the qualified forensic psychologist 
or physician sends a written report of his/her 
findings to the court (see Chapter X, Reports) 
According to section 15c, the report contains:’ 
Clinical findings bearing on the issue of 
competency to stand trial"; 
a. N°te: This language leaves an opening for 
clinicians who are wary of offering 
"ultimate conclusions." It appears to ask 
for no more than specific clinical data 
( bearing on competency"). 
Treatment recommendations: An "opinion, 
supported by clinical findings" as to the 
defendant's need for "treatment and care" from 
DMH. 
a. In the case of a defendant described as 
incompetent, the potential for treatment to 
lead to the restoration of competency 
should be addressed. 
b. Regardless of the opinion on competency to 
stand trial, if the defendant is believed 
by the report writer to present a 
"likelihood of serious harm to self or 
others by reason of mental illness," then 
the issue of commitment under M.G.L. c. 
123, s. 16b should be raised. 
c. NOTE that in the case of a defendant with a 
history suggestive of future violence, but 
who is not considered to be mentally ill, 
the report should indicate that any harm 
the person might cause would not be related 
to mental illness. 
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D. 
«£*5»S!f?SS«.S £\S25\xr 
the criminal case follows its normal course. ' 
E. ComEetency_hearingi If the defendant's 
competency to stand trial is still in doubt the 
judge must hold a competency hearing. 
A competency hearing can be requested at any 
£hoe-d!£lne t5e Proceedings, by any party; but 
jU nee<^ actually hold a hearing only if 
Hiil!Ul978)n ^ ^ d°Ubt ( 
1. 
2. gsfmdant_found_in£ompetenti If the judge 
finds the defendant to be incompetent to stand 
trial the criminal proceedings are 
discontinued, until competency is restored or 
the charges are dismissed. 
3. §tandand_of_proofj_ The finding of 
incompetence requires a "preponderance of the 
evidence", according to Section 15d. 
a. The legal term "standard of proof" refers 
to the "measure of certainty" or how sure 
the trier of fact has to be, when deciding 
a legal question. 
b. Frederick (1978) assigns percentages 
reflecting levels of certainty to the three 
common standards of proof. 
1) Preponderance of evidence: 
certainty 
51% 
2) Clear and convincing evidence: 75% 
certainty 
3) Beyond a reasonable doubt: 
certainty 
90% 
4. Burden of proof: The SJC clarified in 1984, 
in Commonwealth v. Crowley that the 
prosecution bears the burden of proving 
competency to stand trial in a competency 
hearing. 
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F. Merit al _I il nes s : While irk i 
the effect oFmental i?ln»== 15b asks about 
“^srss .2- „ 
“fc-ssr- * 
1. 
2. 
See page VII-12 to VII-14 
discussions regarding this 
and VIII-10 and for 
issue. 
Massachusetts’ DMH regulations do offer the 
following definition for purposes of civil 
commitment and the determination of criminal 
responsibility. 
A substantial disorder of thought, 
mood, perception, orientation, or 
memory which grossly impairs judgment, 
behavior or capacity to meet the 
ordinary demands of life, but shall not 
include alcoholism..." (DMH 104 CMR 
3:01). 
G- Mental Defect: No exclusive definition is 
provided in the statute, but it appears to be 
referring to the intellectual and cognitive 
deficits seen in mental retardation and dementia. 
NOTE: The mere existence of a mental illness or 
defect does not call for a finding of 
incompetence (see Competency to Stand Trial: 
Clinical Issues, page V-3). The task is to 
clarify what detrimental affect, if any, mental 
illness has on competency to stand trial. 
IV. Amnesia and competency to stand trial 
A. According to the U.S. Court of Appeals decision in 
Wilson v. United States (1968) amnesia is not an 
automatic bar to competency to stand trial. Even 
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surround in^fh”dan^may 00t reme[nber the facts 
ssir«zszsr- 
1. 
2. 
f°J thS amnesia’ the defendant is 
idered presently competent to stand trial 
The defense has enough extrinsi 
that the defendant's version is 
c evidence, so 
not necessary. 
a. But, if the defendant's version 
necessary for a fair trial, the 
amnesiac-defendant may be found 
is clearly 
incompetent. 
B. 
(1979)SathpSq<rrtS’ /h 
•f79!' the.SJC noted that amnesia per se does not 
interfere with competency to stand trial, which is 
a test of present capacity. Further, the SJC 
found: 
When amnesia is assessed to be temporary, a 
delay (i.e., finding of incompetence) in’the 
trial to see if the amnesia will improve, is 
appropriate. 
If the amnesia is believed to be permanent, 
then the question of fairness arises. Factors 
in assessing fairness include (p. 612): 
a. the nature of the crime; 
b. the extent of the prosecution's disclosure 
of its case; 
c. the degree to which evidence establishes 
guilt; 
d. the likelihood that, but for the amnesia, an 
alibi or other defense could be established. 
C. See page VIII-6 for discussion of the assessment 
and treatment of amnesia. 
V. Drug-induced competency and drug-induced demeanor 
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A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
Drug induced competency" is a sensitive and 
medlilnd^St00d issue‘ Hhile Psychotropic 
medications are understood to restore capacitv fnr 
functioning1^1^’ ^ t0 facilitate symptom-free 
runctioning, some persons mistakenly believe that 
these mediation3 control thinking and create 
xalse competency. 
£ha£ifnrismw ?? ^ SU^SC*' Winiok (1977> noted that m 1977, 13 states had 'automatic bar" rules 
which prohibited defendants from standing trial 
while on psychotropic medications. 
While medications probably assist psychotic 
defendants in becoming competent to stand trial it 
is possible that overly sedated defendants would be 
incompetent. e 
The court should be informed about the nature and 
effect of any psychotropic medications being used 
by a defendant during the legal proceedings. 
Judicial concern over the effect of "Drug-induced 
demeanor" on juries in insanity defense cases can 
have serious consequences with regard to 
competency. 
1. Drug-induced demeanor refers to the concern of 
defendants pleading lack of criminal 
responsibility that juries get to see them at 
their worst. 
2. In Massachusetts: The SJC, in Commonwea1th_v_ 
Louraine (1983) found: 
a. Since the defendant was unmedicated at the 
time of the offense, he had the right to 
present himself in an unmedicated state 
during the trial. 
b. Since the defendant was making the choice to 
go to trial unmedicated, where he might 
become incompetent without the aid of the 
medication s/he would waive his/her "right" 
to be tried while competent. 
3. In criticizing this decision, Geller and 
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the defendant's 
competency. 
VI. Defendants found incompetent to stand trial 
B. 
Tbe_risks to the defendant of being found 1ST 
include the risk of long term 
institutionalization related to as yet unproven 
charges, and denial of a speedy trial. 
2. The_beoe£i£s to the defendant include 
preserving the right to a fair trial and, 
perhaps, the opportunity to “beat a rap". 
a. But Steadman, in Beating a Rap? (1979), 
found that this frequently invoked suspicion 
was not justified in the case of 1ST 
defendants he studied. 
Approximately 25% of those defendants whose 
competency to stand trial is questioned are found 
to be incompetent (Steadman, 1979; Roesch and 
Golding, 1980). According to Winick (1983) on any 
given day in 1978, 3,400 defendants were in mental 
health or correctional facilities in the U.S., 
adjudicated 1ST. 
In Massachusetts, prior to 1970, defendants found 
1ST faced indeterminate commitments, which 
terminated only when they were assessed to be 
competent. 
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1. 
2S1^.TE»l--Siaf 
D. In 1970 two 
commitments 
events eliminated thes 
of 1ST defendants, in 
e "indeterminate 
Massachusetts: 
In Caamanvteaith-y^Eruken the SJC ruled that 
• i--? dVe ?roc®S£f safeguards available to 
ndividuais in civil commitments should also be 
available to 1ST defendants. 
2. The mental health statute was revised into a 
(se® VII*» D; * below) which incorporated 
legal safeguards including: 
a. The application of civil commitment 
standards to the commitment process 
involving 1ST defendants. 
b. The periodic review of 1ST defendants, with 
the immediate return to court of defendants 
who become competent to stand trial. 
c. The mandated dismissal of charges against 
1ST defendants after a period of time, 
approximately equal to parole eligibility 
has elapsed. 
"Provisional trials" for 1ST defendants who 
wish to present a defense against their 
charges. 
E. The (J.S. Supreme Court, citing the "Druken" case 
in JaeksoQ_v^_Indiaoa (1972), held that the 
indefinite confinement of 1ST defendants is 
unconstitutional. 
1. The commitment process for 1ST defendants 
should involve the same due process protections 
available to individuals involved in civil 
commitment. 
2. An 1ST defendant "...cannot be held more than a 
reasonable period of time necessary to 
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3. 
probIbiHtvhShrhtherT is a substantial 
[competency] in the fv,11 attajn the capacity 
^kLnJ^ndiana6 ISgT*1' ^ ' < 
Continued commitment can only be ius-Mfi^ k 
sssr'4 “• «-*> " ™»SS«'‘3 by 
VII. 
ThS^i^no ^LIST H-s^daatS-in-Has£aehusetts: 
based sole^thel*° 3 ^^oSpital 
trial Tho o * , finding of incompetence to stand 
mentally ill f°Und IST' must be f°und to be 
l11 and to Present a likelihood of sariou- 
in-order l?**? &t th® time of the commitment hearing 
16b d tC> bS committed under M.G.L. c. 123, s. § 
A. Under M.G L e 123, s. 15d, if a defendant is 
ound to be 1ST the trial is continued until 
competence is restored. 
If there is reason to be concerned that failure 
hospitalize the defendant would create a 
likelihood of serious harm, by reason of mental 
illness, this statute provides two pathways for 
the commitment of the 1ST defendant to a DMH 
facility or to Bridgewater State Hospital. 
1* Egtition after 15b evaluation: Once a person 
has been assessed to be 1ST (and for 60 days 
thereafter) the superintendent of a DMH 
facility, medical director of Bridgewater or 
the District Attorney may submit a petition 
for a commitment (up to six months) as 
described in section 16b (see below) to the 
trial court; or 
2. Trial judge requests evaluation of 
"commitability”: The trial judge, under 
section 16a, can first initiate a 40 day 
commitment for examination of the 1ST 
defendant's "commitability." (The total period 
of the section 15b and 16a commitments cannot 
exceed 50 days.) 
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a. 
thatS^htinSu1!a comraitraent order requires 
evaluate DM? facility (or Bridgewater) 
de^nd^t" Whether the IST 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
is mentally ill; and 
is dangerous - must be committed to 
av°1 e likelihood of serious harm; 
and when appropriate, 
is in need of the strict security of 
Bridgewater. 
is now competent to stand trial (see 
. review of competency to stand 
trial" D. 5. below) 
c. Depending on the results of this 
evaluation, the superintendent may petition 
the court at this point for a section 16b 
commitment. 
D. Section 16b commitment of IST defendants: This 
is a commitment for treatment to a DMH facility 
or Bridgewater for up to six months. The goal of 
this commitment is the restoration, if possible, 
of competency to stand trial. 
1. A petition for a section 16b commitment leads 
to a commitment hearing which incorporates the 
standards for civil commitment (M.G.L. c. 123, 
sections 7 and 8). These standards include 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
a. the IST defendant is mentally ill; and 
b. the IST defendant must be committed to 
avoid the likelihood of serious harm to 
others or self. 
2. Leas£_£g££rictive alternative : The 
Massachusetts District Court's Standards of 
Jjidicial_Eracticg (1979, Civil Commitment 
Standard 1:02) include the requirement that it 
be proven that there is no less restrictive 
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3. 
4. 
alternative to the commitment 
available. 
a. 
Districl^Cour-t-^A ba??d on the Massachusetts district Court Appellate Division's 
ecision m QalluE_v^_AideQ (1975). 
The burden of proof is on the Commonwealth. 
tS^^dSi20^ In °rderin^ this commitment, 
®ay restrict the 1ST defendant's 
groinds^of^he^Icmt^0 ^ "buildinSs and 
Court_retains_controli While the 1ST 
defendant is emitted, the trial judge must 
iT i day2 notice by the facility about 
any plans to modify restrictions set by the 
??Ur a ^ ™ritten objection is received at 
the end of that period, the modifications can 
occur. 
6‘ ?S:iSdic ^eview of competency to stand trial: 
lb I defendants committed under this section 
have the right to periodic reviews of their 
competency to stand trial (M.G.L. c. 123 
section 17a). 
a. At any point that a committed 1ST defendant 
is believed to be competent to stand trial, 
the court must be notified and a new 
competency hearing is held, without delay. 
7. Rg-commitmentj_ If, at the end of an initial 
six month commitment period, the 1ST defendant 
is still believed to (a) incompetent, (b) 
mentally ill and (c) dangerous to self or 
others, the superintendent may petition the 
court for a one year (maximum) commitment, 
under M.G.L. c. 123, section 16c. The 
standards remain the same as for section 16b. 
8- PgcjLs_ion_to discharge: If the superintendent 
decides to discharge an 1ST defendant 
committed under sections 16b or 16c, or 
decides not to petition for further 
commitment, the District Attorney must be 
given 30 days advance notice. This gives the 
the D.A. opportunity to submit a petition. 
129 
c. 123, sections 7 and 8 
The trial court has no 
commitment status 
puj.hu alter a 
if the charges 
a. MariHaP.orl i n>»4_1 j* . 
b' ?^S!rh„an<? GoldinS (1979) point out that 
ibl defendant's have not had the 
opportunity to plea bargain, leaving them 
subject to a mandated dismissal formula 
based on more serious charges than they 
might have faced in court if they had been 
found competent to stand trial. 
10. Provisiond1_triajj_ According to M.G.L. c. 
123, section 17b, an 1ST defendant may reques 
the opportunity to present a defense, other 
than an insanity defense. If the judge finds 
that there is a "lack of substantial evidence 
to support a conviction," charges may be 
dismissed. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Eagfi-I¥=14_tQ_IY:_2i 
The Dusky and Pate Standards in Massachusetts" 
CoBmonwealth_y^_Hili Mass. 375 N.E.2d 1168 
determining^competency3to1 stand trial In^he^edeLi 
sSplemeWjCdiciaieCountMdSSaChUSettS in the Massachusetts 
1971. r ecision. Commonwealth v. Vailpg in 
(1978? d?hiSi°nr *res°nted here- Commoowsalt^jin 
tackles ^he dlSOUfes the"Dusky"standard a^d'also 
when to ra?=» rhes ralf?d ln Eats_i^_Raiinsan (1966) - 
when to raise the question of competency to stand trial 
and when to hold a competency hearing. 
Page IV-23 
Ja£kgon_vJ_Indiana^ 406 U.S. 715 (1972) 
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Indiana 
This is a one page summary of the "Jackson" case, the 
landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision establishing the 
rights of defendants found incompetent to stand trial who 
are subsequently committed to psychiatric hospitals. 
Pages_IV-25 to IV-60 
Slovenko, R. 1977. The developing law on competency to 
stand trial. The Journal of Psvchiat.rv and Law. 5:2. 
165-200. 
"The plea of competency to stand trial has become one of 
the more controversial issues in the administration of 
criminal justice. The definition of triability is 
nebulous, and its practical application leaves much to be 
desired. At the same time the plea makes possible a 
needed flexibility in the administration of the law. In 
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recent years, as a result r>-F • 
restriction have been placed on the^' iVarious. 
Plea. The developing law and sunH mPlementation of the 
under the plea are discuss^ . » ^ Tet) * SrlSing 
£agea_IV-62_to_IV-81 
Standards, procedures, 
Massachusetts" commitment, and review in 
Eeqe pages VIII-4 to VIII-23 of 
Schwartz, S.J. & Stern, D.K. (1979) 
eiYil_commitmeni^ Mental Health Legal 
A-trjal manual fnr 
Advisors Committee 
The authors discuss the developing 
stand trial and related commitments 
law on competency to 
in Massachusetts. 
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL: CLINICAL ISSUES 
T* hegal_Con£extL A brief review 
A. 
Aether the defendant has 
ufficient present ability to consult with his 
undent H • h a reasonable degree of rational 
d!£standing and whether he has a rational as well 
as factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him ( Commonwealth v. Vai1»g 1971) & against 
B lackst6d: A defendant is incompetent if s/he 
1* an ability to cooperate with his attorney in his 
own defense. 
2. an awareness and understanding of the nature and 
object of the proceedings against him. 
3. an understanding of the potential consequences 
of the proceedings. 
When is a clinical assessment called for under 
Massachusetts law? 
1* Ssction—15aj_ when a screening is ordered by a 
judge, who has reason to doubt a defendant's 
competency to stand trial. 
2. Segtign,, 15b: when commitment to a DMH facility 
or Bridgewater State Hospital for further 
assessment of competency to stand trial is 
ordered by a judge. 
3. Sgstjon,16a: competency to stand trial should 
be re-assessed when a defendant is committed for 
evaluation of need for treatment (commitment), 
after a finding of incompetence. 
4. Section 16b: after a defendant who has been 
found to be incompetent to stand trial, mentally 
ill and dangerous, has been committed for six 
months or one year, periodic reviews of 
competency to stand trial are required. 
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II. Parameters of the clinical 
assessment 
A. QuestiQQs_addj1e§Lsed1 The focus 
test of capacity to understand 
assist in one's own defense, 
does not address: 
is 
the 
This 
on a functional 
proceedings and 
assessment 
1. 
2. 
Competency to plead guilty (to 
a trial, to confront witnesses) waive rights to 
Competency to confess (comprehension 
Miranda” rights. ) of 
B. Temporal focus: Focus 
and future functioning. 
is on current functioning 
at the time of the trial. 
1. The clinician's focus is not on past 
functioning (as in the question of criminal 
responsibility). 
2. Here the focus is on capacities at the time of 
the assessment and the possibility that changes 
in mental status or events occurring in 
connection with the trial may affect these 
capacities in the future (e.g., how will the 
stress of the upcoming trial affect 
competency?) 
III. The nature of competency to stand trial 
Competency to stand trial is relative, variable, 
and context-dependent (Roesch and Golding, 1980). 
As such, it may require repeated evaluation over 
time. 
1. Defendants can be competent for some trials 
and not others. 
a. A defendant who is competent for a trial in 
which he only has to listen to the 
proceedings and consult with a lawyer, may 
be incompetent for a trial in which he 
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Should testify in his own defenS0 
becoSTc^petS^P* ^ “d u»“a^ do. 
called fc' Periodic reassessment is 
spontanf uV^I^ S? 5^ - 
defendants regaining competency (Davis, 1985) 
Competency to stand trial can vary over time. 
unn?»^inf the effects of planned and 
unplanned intervening variables (e g 
oan1^1”8’ trfatment’ stress), defendants 
?“ °omPetfnt at one point in time, and 
incompetent at another. 
a. 
b. As a predictive problem then, the 
assessment of a defendant's future 
competency to stand trial can never be be 
completely accurate. 
4. The standard for competency to stand trial, to 
be able to understand and assist, is not an 
absolute, all or nothing standard. The 
evaluator seeks to learn if the individual can 
be an effective defendant (Halleck, 1980). 
a. To be competent to stand trial, defendants 
are expected to perform like the "average" 
defendant. Probably everyone has at least 
some deficits in competency. 
b. Defendants are not expected to be amateur 
lawyers, nor paragons of mental health, nor 
champions of the criminal justice system." 
(Golding, Roesch and Schreiber, 1984, p 
322) 
It is possible to be mentally ill or retarded and 
competent to stand trial. 
Do not presume that a defendant is incompetent 
because s/he is psychotic or mentally 
retarded. There is no empirical basis for 
such an assumption (Roesch and Golding, 1980). 
a. Psychotic or mentally retarded defendants 
can be competent to stand trial. 
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IV. 
b' dSnosif fc!?e relati°nship between 
and comPetency to stand trial 
show a range of from 25% to 37% of 
psychotic defendants who are found 
defendants f “T™’ At iS true that -st etendants found incompetent are labeled 
psychotic or mentally retarded (Roesch and 
Golding, 1980; Roescb, Eaves, SoUner 
Normandm, amd Glackman, 1981). 
Mental status and psychopathology are relevant 
to competency to stand trial, but only when a 
fpecificanrohiatl°nShiPubetWeen coraP®tency and 
cL bf estabUsSed1" behaVi0r °r "ental state 
Range from very brief 
ninb? disturbances to long term chronic 
problems. Typical barriers include: 
A- Djlusionsj. Delusional defendants often have 
adequate cognitive grasp of the charges, 
consequences and proceedings. However, due to 
deluslonal ideation they distort the reality of 
the situation confronting them. 
B. Ejychstic_confusion! Disorientation, disorganized 
thinking, preoccupation, lack of emotional control 
lead to deficits in understanding and 
communication. 
C. LQw_ievel_intellectual_funotioriing! Mentally 
retarded defendants and those suffering from 
Organic Brain Syndromes often have difficulty 
understanding or retaining information crucial to 
their participation in their own defense. 
D- Disruptive_behaYiori Impulsive, hyperactive, 
belligerent, and attention seeking behavior 
interfere with court decorum and capacity to 
attend to the proceedings. 
E. DeprgsslQQ! Preoccupation and self-defeating 
behaviors interfere with capacity to attend to the 
proceedings and to assist in the defense. 
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V. Clinical Techniques 
A. Overview 
1. 
anHS?r£h by Roesoh and Golding (1980) 
and Schreiber (1982) has shown the value of 
wh?^hSment? baSSd on sen)i“Structured interviews 
which are focused on both the legal and clinical 
aspects of competency to stand trial. 
a. Assessments of competency based on the 
traditional clinical evaluations usually 
provided in psychiatric hospitals are 
criticized as resulting in the equating of 
psychopathology with incompetency (Schreiber, 
1982). 
Assessment interviews and guidelines 
developed over the last 15 years to address 
this problem by primarily examining the legal 
criteria are criticized for going "too far in 
the other direction" by leaving out 
psychopathological issues (Golding, Roesch 
and Schreiber, 1984). 
Brief, "focused" approaches aimed at both 
legal and clinical issues yield outcomes 
which agree with the conclusions of (1) 
comprehensive inpatient assessments, (2) 
panels of experts, and (3) competency 
hearings in 75% to 90% of the cases. 
A brief, focused competency interview format 
1. The model interview described here and presented 
on pages V-ll to V-17 was adapted from interview 
formats presented in Roesch, Webster and Eaves 
(1984); in Gutheil and Appelbaum (1982); in 
McGarry et al (1973); and in the Forensic 
Evaluation Training Manual of The University of 
Virginia's Institute of Law, Psychiatry and 
Public Policy. 
2. This format assesses defendants' functioning 
with respect to: 
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a. 
c. 
d. 
ssas'is nt“rs«^:,ru 
:;ss-;?‘3.?bS:s;‘- •»< 
t^JfStanding of courtroora procedures (e g 
testimony, cross-examination, appropriate ' 
courtroom behavior by defendant) 
understanding of the roles of courtroom 
personnel (i.e., defense attorney 
prosecuting attorney/D.A., judge, jury 
witnesses, defendant) ’ 
e. 
f. 
capacity to relate to attorney and 
participate in courtroom procedures 
mental status examination (modified to 
address this issue). 
The format is flexible, 
clinicians include: 
Some alternatives for 
a. using the specific questions provided (in any 
order). 
b. varying the interview according to the 
clinician's own style and according to the 
needs of the particular defendant or 
situation. 
c. ascertaining answers to the questions by 
engaging defendants in conversation about 
personal or hypothetical courtroom 
experiences or problems. 
d. ascertaining the defendant's present mental 
status from the context of the interview, 
saving formal questioning for specific 
problem areas detected. 
C. Supplemental assessment techniques 
1. Comprehensive psychiatric or psychosocial 
assessments, while not necessary in the 
assessment of the formal aspects of competency 
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differential diagnostic problems. QliriCuit 
Psychological testing can be helpful when 
needed (e% the^i0? °f “ i-^ession is 
retarded-'5/' tha^, the, defendant is mentally 
malingering^at * th°Ught disorder is P—nt; 
s kh™:-.? is itss-t-i°- 
completion test, can be useful as a supplement 
to an interview. eraenL 
a. This tool has been criticized (Roesch and 
Golding, 1980) for problems in reliability 
and validity, and favoring defendants who 
play the game." However, for some 
defendants it can be helpful in gathering 
data. 
VI. Treatment of incompetent defendants 
Appropriate treatment planning and interventions 
can restore competency to most defendants found 
incompetent (Davis, 1985). Treatment planning 
and interventions to address specific problems 
contributing to incompetency can be initiated: 
1* During Section 15a or 15b evaluations, prior to 
submitting clinical findings to the court. 
a. Some incompetent defendants can be restored 
to competency within a matter of hours. 
2. At the beginning of Section 16a or 16b 
commitments. 
a. As soon as defendants are restored to 
competency, they can return to court. 
3. In the cases of incompetent defendants who are 
not committed. Here treatment planning and 
interventions may involve: 
a. Court instructions to participate in 
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b. 
c. 
treatment 
Referral to a community mental health center 
Case management services 
B. Treatment 
; Why- spe°ifi°ally was the 
erendant found to be incompetent? What are 
the barriers to competency? List individually. 
More^pecifically? ^ defend^ to competency. 
a. 
defenseble t0 rationally Participate in own 
b. To develop a factual and rational 
understanding of the proceedings. 
c. To develop a factual and rational 
understanding of the charges and potential 
consequences. 
^ ^e°tives.j- Elimination of symptoms, 
development or restoration of specific 
capacities, or simply learning new information. 
4. Intervention^!. Typical interventions include: 
a. Psychotropic_medieation: Aimed at confused 
thinking, depression, anxiety and behavioral 
disorders, psychotropic medications can help 
restore capacity and facilitate symptom free 
functioning. 
1) See pages IV-8 and IV-9 for discussion of 
"drug induced competency" and "drug 
induced demeanor". 
b. EgYChotherapy: Cognitive, behavioral or 
supportive approaches to develop situational 
coping skills, adequate reality testing, 
stress reduction and behavior control. 
Group approaches can be effective here. 
c. Trainio&l Didactic, remedial educational 
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approaches focusing on charge? 
and proceedings. TM. mig^t Lnclud'q”*g=®B 
VII. 
A. 
Implications for competency to stand trial: 
1. A defendant’s inability to recall events 
leading up to an alleged offense or his/her 
him/hpb°UtSk?t the til!le’ aPPears to render him/her unable to assist counsel. 
2. Both United Statpg v. r --™=-™-^_Wilson (1966), and 
CammonHealtti.v^Lombardi (1979) decisions (see 
page IV-/) are concerned with reversibility 
versus permanence of amnesia. 
«?'a5?osls of Permanent amnesia may lead to 
rinding of competency when defendants are 
otherwise competent to stand trial. 
Diagnosis of temporary, reversible amnesia 
may lead to finding of incompetency until 
memory is restored. 
See "The Assessment and Treatment of 
Amnesia" on pages VIII-6 to VIII-9. 
VIII. Special assessment problems: Malingering 
A. Malingering should always be ruled out in 
pre-trial evaluations. 
B. The post-arrest, pre-trial situation presents 
defendants with clear motives and opportunity to 
fake or exaggerate a mental illness or 
disability. 
1. Motives: avoidance of a trial or its 
potential consequences. 
2. Opportunity: Competency to stand trial 
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C. 
evaluations and 
See "Detection of 
to VIII-5. 
the insanity defense. 
Malingering" on pages VIII-2 
olEPS IN THE ASSESSMENT OF 
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL UNDER SECTION 15 
I. Prior to assessment interview^s): 
A' questioned!^ C°mpetency to ^and triai is being 
B. Obtain and review arrest report. 
C. Contact defense attorney 
1- a desutiption of attorney's interactions 
with the defendant (e.g., communication, 
understanding, cooperation); 
2. Request a description of the specific capacities 
the attorney sees as crucial in this specific 
case. What are the special issues which may 
confront the defendant in the trial (e.g., Will 
defendant testify? Will there be witnesses to 
challenge?). 
D. Review available medical records from hospitals, 
c^ln*cs or schools (may be limited in Section 15a 
screenings). 
II. Assessment interview(s) 
A. Informed consent: See pages III-6 and III-7. 
1. Give warning and assess defendant's 
understanding. 
2. Obtain consent. 
a. Do not proceed with interview if defendant 
refuses or does not appear to understand the 
nature of the warning and consequences of 
waiving right to refuse. 
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f defendant refuses interview other data 
such as observations made by third parties 
medical records and other documentation can 
be utilized. 
B. Overview of psychosocial history (limited in 
Section 15a screening). 
C. Diagnostic/mental status assessment (may be 
integrated with other aspects of the interview). 
D. Assessment of functional aspects of competency to 
stand trial, utilizing focused interview or other 
techniques. 
III. After assessment interview(s): 
A. Written report sent to court on issue of 
competency to stand trial. The defense attorney 
can receive a copy. 
1. The report should not address the issue of 
criminal responsibility. 
2. The report should not include or be based on 
self-incriminating statements made by the 
defendant. 
3. In the case of defendants who refuse to 
participate in a competency to stand trial 
interview, a report should still be written. 
a. Opinions regarding competency to stand 
trial may be reasonably based on the 
, behavioral descriptions of seriously 
disordered defendants. 
4. Section 15b reports should include a statement 
regarding "need for further care and 
treatment." This should include a rationale 
for petition for Section 16b commitment if 
this is being pursued. 
B. Contact the defense attorney regarding: 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
defendant ?eeded to assist now competent 
tr^al711 remaining competent during a 
between s^ionsK* 0"’ t0 hospital 
Potential barriers to competency which can be 
overcome through specific coping mechanisms 
managinf stress through planned 
recesses, speaking slowly). 
Specific difficulties in the defendant-attorney 
cno=M°nS51P’ When th® defendant is otherwise 
considered competent, which need to be addressed 
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COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL INTERVIEW 
AND ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES 
from1?ntervfewgformat"eDrPreSr^ed here Were adapted 
and Eaves (1984); in Guth"”S Appe?b^’(1982)"' 
McGarry et al (1973)- onri i ^ +-u pPeiDfum (1982), m 
lraining_Manua of The^niversitv^^?^^^00 
Institute of Law, 
I. Informed Consent: See pages II1-6 and II1-7. 
II Knowledge and comprehension of the charges- A 
literal understanding of the specific charges is 
char* ^ .Appreciation the seriousness of the 
charges is important in the assessment of 
self protective capacity - that the defendant not 
minimize the seriousness for his/her own sake. 
A. NOTE: While the defendant may make incriminating 
statements here such statements should not be 
repeated or referred to in the report to court. 
B. Suggested questions: 
What are the charges against you? 
What does [ state charges ] mean? 
Is that a major or minor crime? 
Can you tell me what it is they are accusing 
you of having done? 
Understanding of potential and likely penalties: A 
simplistic understanding of the conditions and 
duration of possible penalties is adequate. 
A. Suggested questions: 
1. What can happen if they find you guilty? 
2. What are the possible sentences the judge 
could give you? 
Where would you serve a sentence? How long 
might it be? 
3. 
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4. What would it mean 
probation? if the judge put you on 
IV. 
appraisal of thel^f ITZL/tT U"realistic 
defendant's motivation lo prote^ her/h&f^ 
A. Suggested questions: 
1. 
2. 
What do you think will 
chance you'll be found 
How strong a case does 
have against you? 
happen? What's the 
guilty? 
the District Attorney 
V. 
pleasSta?henL?e defenses and alternative 
he defendant needs to be aware of his/her 
possible defenses and alternatives. 
A. Suggested questions: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
What can you say in your defense? 
How do you think you can be defended against 
these charges? 
mean?d°eS "guilty" mean? What does "innocent" 
What's the difference between pleading guilty 
and going to trial? 
What does it mean to plead guilty to a lesser 
charge? 
H°w do you intend to plead when they ask if 
you re innocent or guilty? 
Understanding the roles of courtroom personnel: 
Calls for minimal understanding of the adversarial 
process. The defendant should understand who's role 
is foe, friend, or neutral. 
A. Have you ever been in court before? (Provides 
background for interpreting further responses.) 
B. For each of the following ask: "In the court 
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room, during a trial, what i- 
"What is h is/her job’? iS“’ SUpposed to do?' 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Defense attorney - also ask about: 
a. Who is s/he? 
b' nn«orS^ding attorney-client privilege* 
With client?y t0 rePOrt conversations 
C. Magical expectations of attorney 
Jury — also ask about: 
a. Who is on the jury? 
Witnesses 
a. Who are they likely to be? 
b. What are they likely to say? 
VII. 
Understanding of courtroom procedure: A basic 
events S nefded. Sequenoes “d eposes of 
A. Suggested questions: 
1. Which side presents its case first? What 
happens next? 
2. What does it mean for someone to testify? 
3. Who asks the questions? 
4. Do you have to testify? What is the "right to 
remain silent"? 
5. What does it mean for a witness to be 
cross-examined in court? 
6. If you testify, will you be cross-examined? 
By whom? 
7. ,What would the District Attorney be trying to 
accomplish? 
VIII. Capacity to challenge prosecution witnesses: The 
defendants ability to attend to testimony and 
apprise his/her attorney of inaccuracies is 
important. Concentration, attention and memory 
are relevant to this issue. 
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Suggested questions: 
1. 
2. 
What would you do if a witness 
court? 
Is there anyone who might lie 
stand in this case? 
told a lie in 
on the witness 
IX. 
assessed relevantly: This issue can be 
assessed from the interview as a whole or mental 
import^ahere. °°h“ relevance are 
A. Suggested question: Do you think you will be able 
to tell your story in a crowded courtroom, with 
e judge staring at you and the District Attorney 
asking sharp questions? 
X. Capacity to disclose pertinent facts to the attorney: 
Ihis calls for an assessment of the defendant's 
capacity to provide an account of the motivational and 
external facts, which is consistent, rational and 
relevant. Intelligence, memory and honesty are 
important factors here. 
A. NOTE: Again, incriminating statements should not 
be included or referred to in the report to court. 
B. There may be a disparity between what a defendant 
will tell the clinician and what s/he will tell 
her/his attorney. 
C. Suggested questions: 
1. Can you tell me exactly what happened that led 
to your arrest? 
2. What were you doing and thinking just before you 
were supposed to have committed the crime? 
During? After? 
3. If the defendant refuses to answer: Do you think 
you could answer these questions for your 
attorney? 
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XI. Quality of relating to attorney: The defendant's 
interpersonal capacity to relate to the average 
-?UTi0n here- MaJor i»u~ are 
rust and ability to communicate relevantly. 
A' Sf !uUS^ and relevancy of communication 
manifested by the defendant in contacts with the 
examining clinician may be applicable. 
B. Suggested questions: 
1* D° y°u think you will be able to work with your 
attorney? 
2. If the defendant has met his/her attorney: 
a. Do you think s/he's trying to do a good job 
for you? 
b. Do you agree with the way s/he is handling 
the case? 
Ability to plan a legal strategy: The defendant's 
ability to cooperate and participate with his/her 
attorney in planning a reasonable defense strategy 
is crucial. Of concern here is the defendant who 
insists on an irrational strategy or on defending 
his/herself. 
A. Suggested questions: 
1. If your lawyer told you that you did not stand 
much chance of being found innocent, and 
advised you that if you plead guilty to a 
lesser charge he can make a deal to get you 
off with a lighter sentence, would you agree? 
Why? 
2. If your lawyer advised you not to testify, 
would you agree? Why? 
3. Is there anything you disagree with your 
lawyer about? What will you do about it? 
XIII. Level of manageable behavior: The appropriateness 
of the defendant's current motor and verbal 
behavior to the courtroom - the potential for 
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disruptive behavior. The clininian'r. v. 
de?en^st0 ^ efendant s answers to questions. 
A. Suggested questions: 
1. 
2. 
*^r|y -hthl!?k yOU Can contr°l your behavior 
no interrupt the proceedings in court? 
When can you speak out in the courtroom? 
XIV- defeating motivation: At issue here is the 
him/herself.motivation to adequately defend 
A. 
B. 
Of concern here is the active, self-destructive 
manipulation of the legal process, based in 
psychopathology as opposed to self-serving ends 
Passivity or indifference are not of concern 
here. 
C. Is the defendant willing to take the necessary 
measures to defend his/herself, regardless of the 
belief that s/he should be punished? 
D. Suggested questions: 
1. If you could pick the result you wanted, how 
would you choose to have this case end? 
2. Allowing for how badly you feel about what 
happened, would you accept your lawyer getting 
you off? 
XV. Mental status: 
A. In assessing mental status in competency to stand 
trial evaluations, clinicians should keep in mind 
the following considerations: 
1. Psychopathology, taken alone, does not 
necessarily reflect incompetency. 
2. Mental status, here, should be assessed along a 
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B. 
continuum reflecting the degree nf . 
caused in the person's understanding and? ^ 
participation in his/her own defense. 
3. The amount of impairment, relative to the 
conSdered.thS defendant in court, should be 
defendant during the interview, the examining 
following arias? addrSSS impairraent the 
Orientation: Impairment of a defendant's 
re^^StanKlng °f temporal, Personal and spatial 
! t°nShlf llkely to impair both factual 
and rational understanding of the proceedings 
and contribution to his/her defense. 
Thinking: Of concern here is the ability to 
integrate thoughts and communicate coherently. 
3. Concentration: How well can the defendant 
stick to relevant issues and focus attention 
over a period of time? 
4. Abstract versus concrete thinking: In planning 
a defense strategy with an attorney, the 
ability to conceptualize behavioral 
alternatives and consequences and to plan a 
course of action. 
5. Memory: Two issues here: 
a. Amnesia for events at the time of the crime 
b. Global memory deficits: The defendant's 
general ability to acquire, store, and 
recall information can affect his/her 
ability to follow the course of a trial, 
testify, challenge witnesses, and aid 
his/her attorney. 
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6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
associated with I depression is 
mani a wi-t-K rn seif defeating motivation: 
W1\h-Unmana^eable behavior and 
uncooperativeness) 
IntrusioQ^Qf-hallusiriatlons or delusions- n-p 
concern here is the degrit to ^iSh^^ °f 
a H^C1:;ati?nS ?? delusions intrude and impair 
communicate. S “ lUty t0 attend- c°“Prehend and 
SQcifrl .iudgmeatl Impaired social judgment can 
ecome a barrier to adequate communication with 
an attorney, courtroom demeanor, and the 
decision-making required of defendants. 
Depending on the 
degree of impairment, mental retardation or 
dementia can present a barrier to competency 
due to the defendant's impaired comprehension. 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
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Page_Y-18 
The Nature of Competency" 
Erom page 73 of: 
National Institute of Mental Health (1973). 
atand_trial_and_mental_illness^ Washington 
Government Printing Office. g n' 
Competency to 
D. C. : U. S. 
In their introduction to the Competency Screening Test 
developed by Lipsitt and Lelos (1970), the authors present 
a concise statement of the key issues related to the 
assessment of competency to stand trial: The legal 
focis ?hand Criteria *°Z the —sment; the temporal 
^ ^^reraent that the assessments be done by 
individual considered expert in the task; and the 
differentiation of competency to stand trial from criminal 
responsibility and psychopathology. 
Eages_V-19 to V-91 
"Competency as a Construct" 
Etom Pages 11 - 13 of: 
Roesch, R. & Golding, S.L. (1980). Competency to st^nH 
trialUrbana: University of Illinois Press. 
The authors describe competency to stand trial as a 
context-bound construct with an "open-textured quality. 
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Eages_Vz;22_to_V=25 
Immediate 
From pages 188-191 of: 
Roesch, 
trials 
R. & Golding, S. L. 
Urbana: University If 9t?i : ?smpatsDCj'_ta_s±an£i Illinois Press. 
Of agreement with hospitaJ 90* ~te 
Eages_V^a6_to_V=a3 
Standa?ds"tlng Psyohiatric Information into Competency 
From Chapter 5, pages 893-900 of: 
Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (1974). Misuse 
_—Bsychiatry_jn_,the courts; Competencv to -t-rial 
New York: Mental Health Materials CervEeET-SLana-SiJ^^ 
theScr?ter?r%addreSS the aPPUcati°n Of clinical data to 
tne criteria for competency to stand trial. Emphasis is 
placed on the effect of mental illness on defendants' 
capacities to meet the legal criteria. The issue of 
clinical safeguards to assist the defendant in remaining 
competency to stand trial is also raised. 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: LEGAL ISSUES 
I. Overview 
B 
the^"insanity'defense" 
trials oLim a lack'of h-dSfendantS in 
on J-ac^c °f criminal responsibility for 
an offense, by reason of mental illness. 
In most jurisdictions 
(including Massachusetts), criminal responsibility 
^ * ^gal/moral (not clinical) issue concerned 
h only convicting and punishing offenders who 
are blameworthy or culpable. Who 
When the insanity defense is raised, legal 
tests of criminal responsibility or "insanity' 
are applied (see below). insanity 
Offenders who are found to be "not criminally 
responsible due to "mental illness or defect", 
?MCDT?Und n0t guilty by reason of insanity" (NGKI). 
Foundations in Criminal Law 
A. Presuppositions: 
1- EEee_Wilii A central philosophical premise of 
Anglo-American criminal law is the reality of 
"a significant degree of free choice to act" 
(Pollack, 1982, p. 56). 
2. Justification for punishment: By virtue of the 
free choice to behave criminally or not, a 
person can be considered morally blameworthy 
and criminally liable. 
3- ExculEatlQELL If it can be shown that the 
"actor" did not "know" what s/he was doing, or 
did not have the capacity to control the 
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Of criminal ^doL^^r^h/lf fT 
is exculpable. ppiy' The defendant 
B. 
Anglo-AmeriSan1criminIieiawrdoSeSt°f punishment in 
to the defendants who not appear to apply 
due to mental"?llness 
likelv8??8^ Tllreats of punishment are not 
who lack 'suW3 ^?t®rrent effeot on offenders 
conduoAn thf lal capacity to conform their 
of tnsaniA bAow)UlrementS °f W' <SSe tests 
2. Setribufeionj. Anglo-American society 
repulsed by the notion of retribution 
those whom it considers blameless and 
exculpable. 
is 
against 
3. SghabilitatioQi Prisons do not rehabilitate 
the mentally ill. 
^ Protection of the public: Ironically, the 
disposition usually associated with the 
insanity defense is commitment to a psychiatric 
facility with release being contingent upon the 
issue of "dangerousness"; whereas the release 
of sentenced convicts is determined by time, no 
matter how dangerous they might be. 
III. Proving guilt 
Requirements for guilty verdict: In 
Anglo-American law, a guilty verdict requires: 
1. proof that the defendant did the act ("actus 
reus " ); and 
2. proof of a mental element of intent ("mens 
rea"). 
a. The level of intent (e.g., negligently, 
recklessly, knowingly, purposely) needed to 
prove guilt differs depending on the 
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IV. 
specific offense. 
B. 
Intent gives meaning to a criminal ao-t- t 
defenses which prove a lack- n-f • • i 
mens rea was absent (i.e., 
self defense, insanity defense). 
a. 
intPntnhk\0t!!er defenses of lack of 
intent m which the accused is set free 
the NGRI6!!!^1J;nsanity defense may involve 
bRI acquittee in subsequent 
faci1ity)°naliZati°n (in a Psychiatric 
Diminished responsibility: In some 
jurisdictions, the effect of mental illness on 
a defendant s ability to form a criminal 
intent, while inadequate to meet the test of 
insanity, can lead to a finding of "diminished 
responsibility" (see Massachusetts stance 
below, page VI-15). 
Objections to the insanity defense: 
A. Free will versus determinism (Hermann, 1983- 
Pollack, 1982; Morris, 1982). 
1* While criminal law is based on the judgmental 
notion of free will, the mental health 
professions come from the opposite, 
non-judgmental perspective - determinism - in 
which the causes of human behavior are examined 
(Hermann, 1983). 
2. In the insanity defense we have a legalistic 
concept, measured (assessed) by clinical means. 
From the mix of these differing philosophical 
foundations flow conceptual difficulties long 
associated with the insanity defense - the 
confusion manifested in court by jurors. 
157 
lawyers. judges 
and expert witnesses alike. 
B. 
arePplaced&in Clinician, 
moralists when they are asked to^13*3 °r- • 
responsibility. Ked to assess criminal 
C. The legal tests of insanity: 
criticized for being too: The tests are 
cSSSiiti^ termS SUCh as "substantial 
are crmcireHPteC1Kte" and "mental illness" 
tr, =.?T fu d f°r belnS sufficiently vague as 
not firthee'lnClU^°n °f ind^iduals who do 
not frt the spirit’ of the insanity defense; 
2. exclusive 
lead to the 
technically 
some versions are too rigid, 
exclusion of people who do not 
fit, but should be exculpated. 
and 
D. The insanity defense is unnecessary: 
the insanity defense suggest its eli 
relying instead on: 
Opponents 
mination. 
of 
1. a defense of lack of "mens rea" (Morris, 
or 
1982); 
ignoring the issue of mental illness completely 
until after the trial (Winslade, 1983). 
The clinician's task: Psychodiagnosis is 
notoriously unreliable (Ziskin, 1975). The 
diagnostic process involved in the assessment of 
resP°nsibility, is made all the more 
C^1:^:^1CUH: by its retrospective nature. 
Procedure and Disposition: Most proponents of 
abolition of the insanity defense, argue on 
practical grounds. The trial procedures and post 
verdict dispositions are both subject to flagrant 
abuse or errors, and at times appear unmanageable 
(Winslade, 1983). 
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V. Incidence: 
is rarely 
The insanity defense, 
raised or successful. although notorious, 
A. Various studies (Pasewark iqri \ u , . 
being raised in from 0 31% nf™ ?lea 
cases. to 6-3% of all criminal 
B. 
C. 
Rates of successful pleas am low k +. 
depending on jurisdiction. ' bUt Vary 
1' elevei °f thS 196°'s' there were only 
Yorrstite\Hin^ySrity defenses in ^ 
For Massachusetts statistics see page VI-9. 
There may be a preference on the part of potential 
plea^bargaining3"^3 t0 Pi"k th@ —fences of 
1- Approximately 90% of all criminal cases 
Malmquist, 1977) involve a guilty plea to a 
lesser charge. 
2. This factor varies depending on the harshness 
versus possible disposition after 
a NGRI finding (Halleck, 1980). 
VI. Testing for Insanity: Historical context 
Western civilization has been focusing on 
virtually the same issues regarding questions of 
the culpability and punishment of the mentally ill 
for centuries (Quen, 1974). The notion that a 
person must have had a free choice in order to be 
held responsible for his/her actions, was held by 
Greeks and Romans 2000 years ago (Halleck, 1980) 
Most modern day approaches to the insanity defense 
are influenced by the outcome of the M'Naughton case 
in England in 1843, which produced a test for lack of 
criminal responsibility with the following elements 
(Quen, 1974): 
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reSon^f^ali^Lrof0^ f?°? 3 defect of bease ot the mmd; and 
2. That at the time of the act he did not know: 
the nature and quality of the act; or 
t>. that the act was wrong. 
C. 
teset“’becSusenofeitsiSfodeS°rib^ 33 3 "ooftitiv. 
called the^ighVor wrong It<s 
1. 
2. 
ahsoStrSS whiSJSdidfn^a^rSiVe’ 
^ ncoateth:hie°tht:rofdt^ ?:r - 
Thdr:sdr?orfa^oKSbn:neSstw-ng 
D. 
In 1844 Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v Rogers 
heJ R°gerS TUle" ich~Tncorpor^ted~both^the 
Naughton test and a companion, volitional clause: 
"One whose mental condition is such that he 
cannot distinguish between right and wrong 
is not responsible for his conduct, and 
neither is one who has the capacity to 
discriminate between right and wrong but 
whose mind is in such a diseased condition 
that his reason, conscience and judgment 
are overwhelmed by the disease and render 
him incapable of resisting and controlling 
an impulse..." (quoted in Feinberg, 1967 
P- 160). 
This pairing of M'Naughton and an "irresistible 
impulse" clause became popular in the U.S. during 
the 19th century. 
Criticism again is focused on the restrictiveness 
of language, but this time because this 
"irresistible impulse" clause appeared to be 
2. 
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limited to "sudden spontaneous acts as 
distinguished from insane propulsions%h„t 
accompanied by brooding or refleltion" ( ^ 
_ommonwealth_v^_McHoul^ 1967, p. 552) 
E' cSurftstem^te^^^ Federal 
tffthe“rimriereeshfrdtn°b 
mental dis^or de?™t ^ Pr°dUOt’ °f * 
1. 
I-uenoe? criminal'responsibility'as'^fully £ ^ 
possible to expert psychiatric testimonyy was 
Fed^t?dr’ln Massachus©tts in 1958, and in the 
it llfl X ln 1972 ( ^^Brawner ) because it ieft the jury with no standard f^Tjudsine 
criminal responsibility (Cosgrove, 1983K g 
F. 
_Model Penal Code’ in IQ^ j.u_ a • t 
r, wln iy;)5’ the American Law 
wh!foitute grafted the Model Penal Code (A. L I test) 
Physical3!)10 26_ states in 1984 (Mental and 
It ninSid0 bl1 1SS LaW Reporter- September, 1984) 
It provides cognitive and volitional clauses: 
A person is not responsible for criminal 
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a 
result of mental disease or defect he lacks 
substantial capacity either to appreciate 
the criminality (wrongfulness) of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law." (Commonwealth v 
McHoul, 1967, p. 546). 
This "substantial capacity" test specifically 
excludes diagnoses based solely on criminal 
behavior, sociopathy. 
Current Massachusetts standard: The SJC in 
Massachusetts replaced the Rogers rule with the 
A.L.I. test in Commonwealth v._McHoul in 1967. 
In Massachusetts this standard is referred to as 
the McHoul Test. 
The A.L.I. test: improvements 
1- 5ubsiantlal_i2aEacijtiLL The addition of 
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2. 
3. 
cognitive tests (i.e., "know," "distinguish " 
=m ) ’ brings the test beyond a 
per lcial intellectual awareness, to a deeper 
understanding of the moral and legal important. 
These terms expand the 
volitional clause to include less immediate 
behavior, such as brought about by sustained 
compulsions or delusional beliefs. 
H. The A.L.I. test: Criticisms 
1. "Mental 
led to 
confusi 
disease" or "defect": lack of clarity has 
battles of the experts" (see XI-11) and 
on among participants in court. 
2. Substantial capacity: 
to satisfy the test?” 
Just how impaired is enough 
YqIitiQnal_clausei Science has not progressed to 
the point where clinicians can tell the difference 
between an impulse that can not be resisted and an 
impulse which is simply not resisted. 
4. This last criticism has led the federal government 
and courts to follow the advice of the American 
Bar Association and American Psychiatric 
Association in dropping the volitional clause. 
VII. Mental Illness in the insanity defense: The 
clinical issues 
A. Regardless of which test is applied, clinical 
involvement in the insanity defense centers 
around two questions related to mental status at 
the time of the offense (Slovenko, 1984): 
1- The threshold question: The first task is to 
determine whether or not the defendant 
suffered from a mental illness ("disease") or 
mental retardation ("defect") at the time of 
the offense. 
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C 
VIII. 
2. 
1 TreUabuSv °f flUX Snd questionable ©liability of psychiatric diagnosis nan 
over theCthreshtl'Hg °r confusin^ testimony 
over the threshold question: "Is the 
defendant mentally ill or not"? 
b. Even when there is claritv +. j- 
there is lj i / ,y as to dlagnosis, 
ere is the legal/moral issue of deciding 
aua?i‘t°f thS multitude of psychodiagnosesg 
nf -HKfy*aS mental illnesses for the purpose 
of the insanity defense. Purpose 
S!® Pa?eS V]1"12 to VI1-14 and VIII-10 
usin^dtng dft®rminin^ "mental illness" and 
using formal diagnostic labels. 
ImS^?£^£?f^-aUSa±iaCLL Was the effect of the 
mental lilness or defect sufficient to meet 
applied’eria ° particular test being 
a. This question focuses more on mental status 
and symptomatology, than on diagnostic 
labels (e.g, a paranoid delusion which 
prevented a defendant from appreciating 
wrongfulness). 
The clinician's taski To assist the court by 
retrospectively assessing the mental state of the 
defendant at the time of the offense, and to 
determine the degree of impairment (see Chapter 
VII, Criminal Responsibility: Clinical Issues) 
—v—££>urts_taski To determine whether the degree 
impairment of the defendant's capacity was 
su:fficient to meet the standard for lack of 
criminal responsibility. 
NGRI Acquittees in Massachusetts: Phillips and 
Hornik (1984) studied the dispositions and related 
factors of NGRI acquittees in Massachusetts during 
the years 1978, 1980 and 1982. They found: 
A. An average of 55 defendants per year were found 
163 
NGRI. The three year total was 166. 
InlaHrrr -I4? °t People incarcerated 
iP jails or hospitals for crimes during the 
years (does not figure in those with 
probation or suspended sentences). 
B. 
vioient^crimesCent <104) had bee" charged 
°^yKe^eho (4'8%) were charged with murder 
1Sh2 4%i°f th® the total incarcerated in a 
oaii or hospital after being tried for murder 
Massachusetts ranks lowest among states in which 
was studied°e ^ findings in “urder cases 
1. The typical insanity acquittee during those 
years was not a "crazed murderer"; the 
typical murderer was not legally "insane." 
D. NGRI acquittees in assault and battery cases 
were institutionalized twice as long as those 
convicted of the charges (i.e., NGRI's: 351 5 
days; prisoners: 168 days). 
E. Ninety two percent of the NGRI acquittees 
carried diagnoses of serious mental disorders. 
Seventy percent had histories of previous 
hospitalization. Thirty-two percent of those 
released from hospitals were subsequently 
rehospitalized. 
Just under half of the sample had histories of 
previous arrests on violent charges. 
While pre-trial assessments of criminal 
responsibility are commonly requested, the 
insanity defense is rarely raised as a defense 
in Massachusetts. 
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IX. The Federal Statute 
A. " 
Test, for '‘insanity11 
'volitional 
and applies the insanity defens 
instances where: 
2. 
3. 
4. 
"...the defendant suffered from a mental 
disease or defect that grossly and 
demonstrably impaired the defendant's 
perception and understanding of 
reality, and, as a result of that 
impairment, the defendant did not 
appreciate the wrongfulness of that 
conduct. (Mental and Physical 
Disability Law Reporter, 1984, p. 560). 
Burden of proofi The new law shifted the 
burden of proof from the prosecution to the 
defense. See page IV-6. 
Standard_of_proofj_ The standard of proof was 
reduced from "beyond a reasonable doubt" to 
"clear and convincing evidence." See page 
IV-6. 
Expert witness testimony: Expert witness 
opinion testimony on the defendant's mental 
state at the time of the offense, is now 
excluded under this new federal statute. 
X. Determining criminal responsibility under 
Massachusetts Law 
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A. Raising the question of criminal responsibility: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
raisedSbeforeCrilTal resP°n^ibility can be 
defendant's forma^no^c^L^f^^r^d^6 
^?L%T^ef„rLefo'ConrneL°? 
~sSsSif?S“S"d*h“°q““*i“ °?°r^™iess 
or on ?herp;osecu^r?™aynord:riVe 
?«?toal eval— 
Expert witness testimony is not 
issue. required on this 
4- E£esumption_of_sanityj. There is no burden on 
the court or prosecution to raise the question 
ot.criminal responsibility, because, absent 
evidence to the contrary, in Massachusetts 
criminal trials there is a "presumption" that 
1976tefendant iS SanS ( £fimmQQ)tfgal:^_yJ!__KQ£tka1 
The statutory procedures for court ordered clinical 
evaluations are covered in the same section and 
paragraphs of the statute, M.G.L. c. 123, s. 15, 
which cover court ordered evaluations of’competency 
to stand trial. 
Section 15a allows a judge to order an 
"examination" at "any stage of the proceedings, 
when the question of a defendant's criminal 
responsibility "by reason of mental illness or 
defect" is raised. 
D. The 15a screening evaluation is conducted by a 
"qualified physician" or "qualified psychologist" 
(See pages 1-4 to 1-6 for DMH Regulations on 
qualifications to perform these evaluations). 
1. Sitej. Takes place at the courthouse or a "place 
of detention." 
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2 JSSSt2"t£*iiSSjhSSr or psyohol°^- 
Mentai illness or defect at the time of the 
relative^o the wffeCt, °n the "capacities" lative to the Massachusetts standard for 
'•MoHouinTe?tC“lminal resp°nsibili^. the 
a. 
1) Exclusions! However there are certain 
conditions which the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court has ruled do not qua ™ 
mental illnesses for the purpose of 
determining criminal responsibility See 
pages VI-15 and VI-16. bSe 
E. 
Afterethe°= ^ °°““itment for further evaluation: 
rter the section 15a evaluation, if the judge "has 
^SOn to b®?;leve" that further examination is 
necessary, then under M.G.L. c. 123 s. 15b the 
judge can order the defendant committed to a DMH 
facility for this purpose. 
lm ^ri?t_seuurityi If the defendant is a male and 
requires strict security," then the commitment 
can be at Bridgewater State Hospital. 
Period- of.commitment! The commitment can last 
up to 20 days and be extended once for another 
20 days upon written request from the examining 
forensic psychologist or physician. 
The same as in the 15a screening 
described above - the clinical assessment of 
criteria relevant to criminal responsibility. 
4- After evaluation! The defendant returns to 
court. However, defendants can request to 
remain hospitalized for "care and treatment" 
while awaiting the completion of legal 
proceedings, if the hospital agrees and the 
judge so orders. 
F. The report to court: Upon completing the 
evaluation, the qualified forensic psychologist or 
physician sends a report to court. See Chapter X, 
Report Writing. According to section 15(c), the 
report contains: 
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bindings bearing 
criminal responsibility"; 
on the issue of. 
a. Note: Th-ic? i __i_ 
care" from 
a. Concerns that the _ 
b. NOTE that in the case of a defendant with a 
history suggestive of future violence, but 
who is not considered to be mentally ill, the 
report should indicate that any harm the 
person might cause would not be related to 
mental illness. 
G. The report is sealed and delivered to the judge. 
Only the judge can release the report to the 
parties, and only after assuring that there is no 
information based on the defendant's statements 
which may violate the privilege against 
se1f-iccrimination ( Blaisdell v Commonwealth. 
1977; see Chapter III). 
Burden_of_proofj_ Once the defense has introduced 
the question of the defendant's criminal 
responsibility, the burden falls to the prosecution 
to prove that the defendant is criminally 
responsible for the offense ( Commonwealth v. 
McHouJU 1967). 
1. Since the prosecution can rely on the 
"presumption of sanity," there is a burden left 
to the defense to produce evidence of mental 
illness or mental defect (Cosgrove, 1983). 
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thatPth«e^i0n'" tUrden appears b° b® to prove that the defense s evidence does not meet th» 
standard of the McHoul Test. * the 
Standard_of_Eroofx The standard of proof in th^ 
insanity defense is "beyond a reasonable doCbt"( 
Common weal^h_v^_Kostka^ 1976). 
XI. Disposition of NGRI acquittees in Massachusetts 
A. here is no automatic commitment to 
based solely on the finding of not 
reason of insanity in Massachusetts 
a DMH facility 
guilty by 
B. 
lentaU^nf NGRI' mUSt be found b° be b°bb mentally ill and dangerous at the time of a 
commitment hearing in order to be committed under 
M.b.L c 123. s. 16b (as in the case of 
aerendants found incompetent to stand trial). 
Trial judge requests evaluation of 
■comraitability": The trial judge, under 
section 16a, can first order a 40 day 
commitment for examination of the NGRI 
acquittee's ^ "commitabiUty. " (The total period 
of the section 15b and 16a commitments cannot 
exceed 50 days.) 
a. The section 16a commitment order requires 
that the DMH facility (or Bridgewater) 
evaluate and report whether the NGRI 
acquittee meets the standards for commitment 
under section 16b (see standards below, D. 
b. Depending on the results of this evaluation, 
the superintendent of the DMH facility, or 
the District Attorney may petition the court 
at this point for a section 16b commitment. 
D. Section 16b commitment of NGRI acquittees: This 
is a commitment for treatment to a DMH facility or 
Bridgewater for up to six (6) months. The goal 
of this commitment is treatment of the mental 
169 
i1lnsss. 
toPatoom^i-f0r^auSection 16b commitment leads 
standards forna wl"g Whi°h in°°rP°rates the 
7 ®nd 8>- These standards include 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
a. 
b. 
the NGRI acquittee is mentally ill; 
there would be a likelihood of 
to self or others if the NGRI 
released; 
serious harm 
acquittee were 
c. there is no less 
available to the 
see page IV-12). 
restrictive alternative 
commitment (not statutory; 
d. in 
is 
cases 
being 
in which commitment to Bridgewater 
considered: 
1) there is a need for strict security. 
2. The burden of proof is on the Commonwealth 
(Commonwealth v. Thompson, 1982). 
Sest^lctionsi The judge may restrict the NGRI 
acquittee's activities and movement to the 
buildings and grounds" of the facility. 
4. Court_retains_controli While the NGRI 
acquittee is committed, the trial judge must be 
given 14 days notice by the facility about any 
plans to modify restrictions set by the court. 
If no written objection is received at the end 
of that period, the modifications can occur. 
5- RezCQmmitmenti if, at the end Qf a section 16b 
commitment period, the NGRI acquittee is still 
believed to be (a) mentally ill and (b) 
dangerous to self or others, and if there is no 
less restrictive alternative available, the 
superintendent may submit a petition for a one 
year (maximum) commitment, under M.G.L. c. 123, 
section 16c. 
6. Decision to discharge: The District Attorney 
must be given 30 days advance notice if: 
a. the superintendent decides to discharge an 
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b. 
orRlIefatianyetimrditt-d Under seoti°"s 
any tlme during a commitment; 
16b 
or 
the superintendent decides 
tor further commitment. not to petition 
c. In either case the District 
submit a new petition. Attorney may 
XII. Related issues 
purposes of the insanity . lllnesses for 
ue insanity defense include: 
1. 
Drugs—and_Aj.Qoh.o2j_ According to the Sir ir. 
Commonwealth_v^_Sheehan (1978)? SJ° 
a. 
Intoxication due to the effects of the 
in an?ar? ?°ns?mption of drugs or alcohol, 
of mpnt-??elf cannot meet the threshold 
f mental illness in the insanity defense. 
H iUness' but not drug addiction 
alcoholism, is triggered by the effects 
of drugs or alcohol (i.e., acute toxic 
psychosis), there may be a basis for the 
insanity defense - as long as the defendant 
was unaware that the mental illness might 
result. 
c. Alcoholism and drug addiction, are not 
accepted as mental illnesses here. 
d. Intoxication at the time of the offense may 
justify a claim of "diminished 
responsibility" in first degree murder 
trials ( Commonwealth v.Cnsta, 1971). 
Automatisms, or involuntary acts over which 
the individual has no voluntary control, are 
not viewed in Massachusetts courts as a mental 
or as a Justification for a 
diminished responsibility finding ( 
CommoQwealth v. Genius ). They may be viewed 
instead as "unconscious" and therefore not 
meeting the "conscious" requirement of "actus 
reus. 
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th^^Jc'olIrified^hJ^faSk^f2®691511 ‘1979) evpnf H * 7lea that lack °t memory for an 
crimen*? n SPtak to the issue of l^k of 
event responsibility at the time of the 
B 
defini^S^H?^^1^2^ In Massachusetts the 
!r® ®£Se uf dlminished responsibility- is limited 
to the charge of murder in the first degree. 
L' ttVSt de?ree murder defendant did not 
have the requisite intent due to mental 
illness or intoxication, the charge may be 
reduced to murder in the second degree^ but 
?^m^SlaUghter ( Commonwealth_v^_Gou Id, 
1 y « 0 : Common weal th_v^_CostaJ_ 1971). 
C. 
Drug_induced^gmjanor^ The SJC, in Commonwealth 
Y^oyrajne (1983), found that insanity defense 
defendants on antipsychotic medication may, on 
demand appear in front of the jury unmedicated. 
A defendant may wish to use this unmedicated 
demeanor to convince the jury of the presence of 
mental illness (see pages IV-8 and IV-9). 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Pages_VIz15_tg_VI-29 
"The Insanity Defense" 
Erom pages 218-232 of: 
The author traces th 
concept of criminal 
issues. 
e development of the legal/moral 
responsibility and contemporary 
Pages_VI-31 to VI-43 
tGf^Se: ABA and APA Proposals for change 
136-148 —Q^^-2i^abiIiiY_Law_Repgrter , 7 (2), 
The recommendations and reports of both the American Bar 
ssociation and the American Psychiatric Association on 
ne insanity defense are presented together, along with a 
cntique by Leonard Rubinstein, an attorney for the Mental 
Health Law Project. 
Rages_VIz45_tg_V1-54 
Phillips, B.F. & Hornik, J.A. (1984). The insanity 
defense_in_Massachusetts :_Executive summary . 
Massachusetts Department of Mental Health. 
The authors addressed proposed statutory changes in the 
insanity defense in Massachusetts aimed at preventing 
premature release of "potentially dangerous mental 
patients (p. 1). They studied the dispositions and 
related factors of NGRI acquittees in Massachusetts during 
the years 1978, 1980 and 1982. Their findings did not 
support the position that the proposed changes were 
needed. 
173 
E3giis_yi-56_to VI-Qfi 
Cammonwealth^MaHoui , 352 Mass. 544 (1967). 
Judicial^lurr^opL^the1^ tts Supreme 
Penal Code (The A. L I test) as^h" L?“ *nstltute's Model 
responsibility in Massachusetts courts ^ f°r criminal 
Eages_VI-69_to_VI-80 
Commonwealth_v^_Sheehan , 376 Mass. 765 (1978). 
addressed^heEffect oH™!r^tSrSUPreme Judicial Court 
criminal responsibility Thilctlon an^ intoxication on 
similar ruling 2^1?^ 
Eages_VI^82_to_VI^90 : 
“Standards and procedures in determining 
responsibility in Massachusetts" 
criminal 
From VI11-23 to VIII-31 of 
Schwartz, S. J. & 
civil commitment. 
Boston. 
Stern, D.K. (1979). A trial manual for 
Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, 
The authors discuss the developing law in Massachusetts on 
criminal responsibility and the commitment of NGRI 
acquittees. 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: CLINICAL ASSESSMENT 
I. Overview of clinical issues 
A. The setting 
• A defendant in a criminal trial intends to use 
the Insanity Defense, claiming lack of criminal 
responsibiUty due to the effects of mental 
2. The Massachusetts legal 
criminal responsibility 
the McHoul test states: 
standard for determining 
in the Insanity Defense, 
A person is not responsible for 
criminal conduct if at the time of 
such conduct as a result of mental 
disease or defect he lacks substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality (wrongfulness) of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of law. " 
(Commonwealth v. McHoul, 1967, p 
546). 
A mental health professional, operating out of a 
forensic mental health team, court clinic, 
mental health center, state hospital or private 
practice, accepts or is assigned the task of 
addressing the issue of criminal responsibility 
under G.L.C. c. 123, sections 15a or 15b). 
Ultimately this clinician will submit a report 
to the court which will reflect “clinical 
findings bearing on the issue of... criminal 
responsibility" (G.L.C. c. 123, section 15c). 
5. The process of developing these "clinical 
findings" is the focus of this section. 
B. The clinical assessment of criminal responsibility 
is often confused with the assessment of competency 
to stand trial. 
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II. 
2. 
"If competency to stand trial is a 
snapshot. criminal responsibility is 
t9820rip:-2;3<)GUtheil ^ ^lbaum?y 
st™dXtiiilfiiSLfnThe ®ssefsment of competency to 
. . la-‘- ls focused only on capacities ni- fhQ 
cr^inelthe trial; -while assessment/* **" 
criminal responsibility is completely focused on 
past capacities, at the time of the offense. 
a. In criminal responsibility assessments, 
-aSSeSSment data are useful only as a 
reflection of the past. 
^ta i? th® oompetency to stand trial assessment 
is gathered mainly from the clinician's 
interactions with the defendant. Data 
gathering in the criminal responsibility 
assessment often goes beyond the individual 
defendant, involving a variety of record reviews 
and interviews with third parties. 
Framing olinician's goals: As described in 
Chapter VI, legal tests of criminal responsibility 
center around two clinical questions: 
1 • The threshold question: Did the defendant 
suffer from a mental illness ("disease") or 
mental retardation ("defect") at the time of 
the offense? This question must be answered 
affirmatively for the process to continue. 
a. Soali Assess the presence of a mental 
illness at the time of the offense. 
2- The, criteria question: Was the effect of the 
mental illness or defect sufficient to meet the 
criteria for exculpation under the McHoul test? 
a. Goal: Assess the relationship between the 
mental illness and the offense. 
Assessing mental state at the time of the offense: 
Overview of a reconstructive assessment process. 
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1. 
then"?hresholdquestioned f”" °^n^°ns 
question " th<= r>iin; ■ na ' the criteria 
-oh as s/he can^^our^r^ate^r^" lear" 33 
defendant s mind at the time of the crime. 
P03?1^1® to infer from a good 
Echronic =£ — 
mentaitstS^enor1bfhr'Dati0n ab°Ut the *»«<>“’ = en-c i tat  r e avior at that time. 
However as accurate a picture as possible is 
ee e of the mental state and behavior at the 
time, m order to: 
a. diagnose other acute illnesses and 
syndromes, retrospectively; and 
b. offer an opinion as to the effect the mental 
illness had on cognitive and volitional 
capacities at the time of the crime. 
B. Overcoming the difficulty of retrospective 
assessments: Informed speculation 
1. Criminal responsibility standards are concerned 
only with mental state at a specific point in 
the past - the time of an offense. The 
offense in question may have taken place weeks 
or even several months prior to the assessment. 
2. Clinicians are not "retrospectoscopes" (Gutheil 
and Appelbaum, 1982). 
3. However, if adequate information is available, 
it is possible for experienced clinicians to 
reconstruct the psychological situation and to 
infer mental status, and subsequently, mental 
illness. 
4. Further, through this process of informed 
speculation, experienced clinicians can, with 
adequate data, make inferences about the effect 
of a defendant's mental state at the time of 
the crime on his/her capacities (Bonnie and 
Slobogin, 1980). "Adequate" data include: 
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b. 
feennfrd?ht,SKre°0lleCti0n.°f his/her j . ® ’ "thoughts and behaviors before 
during and after the offense: ’ 
1) as told to the clinician; 
as told to others (providing a basis for 
comparison). r 
rattetn^i0ns °f-the defendant's behavioral 
patterns, covering periods from several 
months or years prior to the offense, 
through the present. 
c. 
d. 
Descriptions of the defendant's behavior 
around the time of the offense from third 
parties (i.e., witnesses, victims, family) 
Descriptions of physical evidence for "fit" 
with the mental illness presented. 
5. High professional standards, thorough review 
and sifting through of all available data, 
staying as close as possible to the facts, and 
avoiding unwarranted inferential leaps, taken 
together help overcome the difficulties of the 
retrospective assessment, and lend credibility 
to the clinician's role. 
a. When adequate data is lacking and will not 
become available, clinicians have no basis 
for drawing conclusions. 
C. Barriers to data gathering: 
1. Referral sources may not provide adequate 
information. 
a. Remedyj. Improve communication between 
clinician and referral sources. Clinicians 
may need to educate referral sources 
regarding the type of data which would be 
necessary or helpful. 
Other agencies: Release of information 
requiring the defendant's approval and delays 
in processing requests for information are 
common problems. 
2. 
a. 
R§medyj_ Request assistance 
attorney and/or the D. A. from defendant's 
sxs” » 
a. Remedyj_ Again, 
help out. ask attorneys involved to 
EeUatiiliti; of defendant's version: 
host????1"8’ P°?r memory' guardedness, 
response ;.nPty tl° CSnfusion> delusions, 
response to trauma, and a variety of other 
psychic defenses contribute to defendants 
providing inaccurate and unreliable data. 
a. Remedies: 
1) See Chapter VIII regarding the detection 
or malingering and amnesia. 
2) Design an interview strategy which 
accounts for these problems (e.g. , 
developing rapport before touching on 
potentially traumatic offense-related 
material). 
3) In some cases a reliable version may not 
be possible. 
Clinician fastorsi. The following factors can 
have an effect on the objectivity of a 
clinician's observations and interpretations 
and on the responses of defendants in 
interviews (Bonnie and Slobogin 1980; Gutheil 
and Appelbaum, 1982): 
a. clinician's gender, cultural background, 
personal problems; 
b. clinician's professional orientation; 
c. transference and countertransference. 
d. Remedies: 
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III. 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
more than one interviewer. 
by a ?eLan? int° decision-making 
Dy a team of observer/clinicians. 
Exchange of clinical data between defense 
and prosecution. ense 
Clinician know thyself. 
Seek consultation. 
A. Here the clinician takes on the role of 
investigator and data gathering becomes 
clinical 
crucial. 
B. Clarifying the referral: Why was the question of 
criminal responsibility raised? This issue must 
be clear to the clinician before the assessment 
is undertaken. 
1. What behavior or symptoms prompted the 
referral? 
2. Was the referral prompted by issues other than 
the question of criminal responsibility (i e 
need for treatment; stall or "fishing ’ 
expedition by one of the parties)? 
Data from third parties: 
1. Offense -rej,ated_data_L Efforts should be made 
to obtain the following items, where they 
exist and can be made available. These data 
are necessary for the clinician to gain a 
clear understanding of the offense. 
a. arrest and other police reports; 
b. victims' and witnesses' accounts; 
c. confessions, or other recorded statements 
of the defendant about the crime; 
d. grand jury transcripts; 
e. previous assessments related to the case 
(i.e., section 15a reports; competency to 
stand trial reports). 
f. autopsy reports; 
g. newspaper accounts. 
t?
 
P) 
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3. 
offense•ment?1 Stat? at the tirae °f the orxense. Data sought here include 
affective0"3 HfK^e defendant’s cognitive, 
durfn^ '^and behavioral presentation before 
durmg, and just after the time of the crime 
Sources may include accounts from: 
witnesses and victims of the offense 
• family and significant others 
Police and jail personnel (in some cases) 
Psychosocial data obtained from reports and 
chnical summaries in the files of hospitals 
mental health clinics, social agencies ’ 
others10n* P°llCe’ faraily and significant 
specially valuable here are descriptions 
of the defendant's behavioral patterns 
particularly during acute phases of a 
mental illness and during previous 
antisocial acts, covering periods from 
several months or years prior to the 
offense through the present. 
The depth and breadth needed here will 
vary, depending on the individual case. 
1) Family statistics and history 
2) Developmental milestones 
3) Educational, vocational and military 
history 
4) Social relationships 
5) Marital history 
6) Sexual history 
7) Personal and family health 
8) Criminal record - juvenile and adult 
9) Personal and family psychiatric history 
a) Psychiatric problems, diagnoses, 
treatment 
b) Substance abuse 
D. Information from the defendant: 
1. Personal and family background: Defendant's 
own version of the issues covered under 
"psychosocial data," above. 
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Circumstances of the crime: Record direct 
quotes, as much as possible. 
alfeffeHnrSKUnde5Standing °f What S/h® is alleged to have done. 
c. 
d. 
E, 
b. Defendant's account of the situation 
leading up to, and immediately following 
the alleged crime. 
offense^'S attitude regarding the alleged 
Special circumstances which may be 
important (e.g., intoxication). 
3. Mental state at the time of the offense: 
Defendant s recollection of feelings, 
thoughts, and motivations, just before, during 
and just after the offense. 
Current mental status: 
1- Maiingeringi In considering any defendant's 
mental status the reliability of the person's 
presentation should always be questioned. In 
many cases, especially those in which the 
consequences of being found guilty outweigh 
those of an NGRI finding, defendants will have 
good reason to malinger. See Chapter VIII 
regarding the detection of malingering. 
2. If the mental status exam can be integrated 
into the general interview, a formal exam is 
probably not necessary. 
3. In considering mental status here, an outline 
should be followed which addresses: 
a. appearance and behavioral presentation 
b. attitude 
c. orientation to time, place, person and 
situation 
d. affective state - note anger, fear, 
elation, depression, irritability 
e. stream of thought - associations, flow of 
ideas 
f. thought content - especially delusions, 
preoccupations and hostile, aggressive and 
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IV. 
g- 
h. 
i. 
j - 
k. 
1. 
ra. 
n. 
o. 
themes 
insight 
irtf concluslo^ t0 aSS6SS alt-nativeS, 
“iJPeCUUy the -y 
speech - tone, rate and peculiarities 
memory short and long terra deficits or 
amnesia 
abstract thinking ability 
attention and concentration 
general intellectual functioning 
reliability of the defendant's presentation 
- malingering 
Brief assessment: While the assessment of criminal 
responsibility calls for thorough comprehensive 
assessments, the cost of such assessments in time and 
money is considerable. Therefore, at times an 
alternative, brief format may be more appropriate. 
A. Situations which may call for a brief assessment: 
1. Section 15a "screenings": 
a. Here clinicians are often under pressure to 
respond quickly to the court's question on 
criminal responsibility. 
b. Further, the clinician is often also being 
asked to assess competency to stand trial 
within the same time frame. 
2. Situations (sections 15a or 15b) in which it 
is clear that the goal of the referral or 
commitment is actually treatment, and the 
possibility of a trial is remote. 
a. This is frequently the case when when 
mentally ill defendants are charged with 
misdemeanors (i.e., disturbing the peace, 
trespassing). 
b. The clinician may be informed that the 
charges are likely to eventually be dropped. 
B. Brief assessment format: Slobogin, Melton and 
Showalter (1984) developed an interview guide and 
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t£l£°l£VJri insanity^defensQfendantS 
1IP™k;s h: h=~ s l. 
The data produced can then be applied to 
standards for criminal responsibility. 
The MSE looks at historical information, 
ffense related data and present mental state 
V' U985Vc5llelZmenV Melton' Weithorn and Slobogin (1985) cite the advantages of outpatient assessment 
over commitment to state hospitals for the purpose of 
assessing criminal responsibility. They suggest ?hat 
when inpatient assessment is necessary 
community-based or regional hospitals be used: 
1. Given the personal costs to defendants (i.e., loss 
of liberty, stigma) and financial cost the public 
ey suggest that criminal responsibility 
assessments be performed on an outpatient basis, 
whenever possible. 
2. Whether inpatient or outpatient, assessments 
performed in community-based settings may mean: 
a. greater accessibility to key informants and 
records; and 
b. greater potential for consultative 
relationship between legal and mental health 
professionals. 
In Massachusetts, when a clinician's 15a 
screening report is consistent with a finding of 
not criminally responsible, courts often commit the 
defendant under section 15b for further assessment. 
1. Courts' willingness to go along with more 
thorough, time-consuming assessments under 
section 15a (outpatient or in jail), probably 
varies according to their consultative 
relationships with court clinics, DMH forensic 
teams or court employed clinicians. 
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VI. 
Interviewing the defendant 
A. Dsf©ndsuit vulnsrsbi 1 i +-v* pi • 
forensic settings should b in 
L the court/°^ten.threatening atmosphere of 
. court/jail experience can leave the 
e^etoesnelkdefthdant reSressively °Pen and 
•? speak Wlth anyone who will listen 
(Gutheil and Appelbaum, 1982). This is 
especially true for mental health 
"helpers0"313’ Wh° ^ immediately viewed as 
2. 
3. 
In this situation defendants may disregard 
Lamb warnings" and readily give consent. 
This vulnerability is increased for defendants 
who are committed to state hospitals under 
section 15b for criminal responsibility 
assessments. 
a. Most state hospital "defendant-patients" 
find that they have been placed in a 
treatment setting, where they may be offered 
and may accept treatment. 
b. For constitutional (i.e., protection from 
self-incrimination), ethical-legal (i.e., 
confidentiality and privileged 
communications) and clinical reasons (i.e , 
rapport, trust), it is crucial that 
treatment and forensic assessment roles be 
kept separate. 
Preparation: The clinician should come to the 
interview(s) as prepared as possible. 
1. Minimally, arrest reports should have been read 
and the reasons for the referral clarified. 
2. Whenever possible, the bulk of the data 
gathering should be complete, and preliminary 
hypotheses formed. 
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°J tht in^erview: The interview 
out the tost useful In^ortSion. ^^neral iy”"® 
sksssv^T” " 
• ntroduction and informed consent: Very soon 
ShouldbKlngilntJoduced' the clinician's role 
should be clarified. In Massachusetts, a 
Lamb warning ' should be offered. The 
defendant^shouid clearly understand where the 
^ep°rt.wiU be sent. Only proceed 
if the defendant gives informed consent. 
2. Rapport: 
Some interviewees seem to establish 
immediate rapport (e.g., experienced 
defendants; "regressively open" defendants). 
b. Others who perceive grievous consequences 
stemming from the interview require a great 
deal of time and patience (e.g., 
malingerers; defendants for whom recounting 
the offense would be traumatic). 
Content: There are three content areas to be 
addressed. The order and flow of the 
interview will depend on the style of the 
interviewer and the needs of the defendant. 
a- Psychosocial historical information: 
Covering this relatively non-threatening 
area first, serves the dual functions of 
gathering important information and 
establishing rapport. 
b. Defendant's recollection: Here the 
differences between the "traditional" 
clinician and the forensic clinician 
"investigating" criminal responsibility 
become obvious. 
1) The defendant is closely questioned 
regarding thoughts, feelings and behavior 
during the period around the time of the 
offense. 
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2) Subsequent intervi 
inconsistencies or* 
hypotheses. 
ews may focus 
follow up on 
on 
“ithth^rM? eJa” 'Preferably integrated 
witn the rest of the interview) 
VII. Answering the questions 
A. 
Having completed the data gathering portion of 
he assessment (or nearly so), the clinician is 
in a position to apply the knnwi oHcra _* , , 
the defpnrl^ri-i- Y ? ■ Knowiedge gained about 
aerendant to the questions raised bv the 
legal standard for criminal responsibility. 
1. NOTE. I2,pr^ctlce the Processes of clinical 
data gathering, hypothesizing and 
decision-malting are probably more circular and 
interactive than sequential. 
2. Bonnie and Slobogin (1980) describe a clinical 
decision making process which involves a team 
°x clinicians in pre and post-interview 
conferences. Various interviewing strategies 
and clinical hypotheses are discussed. 
Reports are written after an exhaustive 
rehashing of all possible conclusions. 
Such approaches increase quality assurance 
and help overcome weaknesses inherent in 
retrospective assessments. 
B. The questions: 
1. An opinion regarding the "threshold question" 
can now be formed: 
a. Given the data collected, was the defendant 
mentally ill at the time of the offense 
(the threshold question)? What was the 
nature of the illness (diagnosis)? 
b. If the answer is "no mental illness" the 
clinician need proceed no further. 
c. The McHoul rule excludes "abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal or 
187 
otherwise anti-social conduct. •• 
. . -- i-iunu 
or criminal responsibility? 
C. 0 f f q ^ — — -• 
Fun 
See 
sig 
1. 
A substantial disorder of thought, 
mood, perception, orientation, or 
memory which grossly impairs 
judgment, behavior or capacity to 
meet the ordinary demands of life" 
(104 CMR 3:01). 
a. This functional definition provides 
parameters for determining which of the 
many, mental illnesses" or diagnoses are 
applicable to the insanity defense. 
b. The DMH functional definition appears to 
include only serious psychopathology (i.e., 
psychoses, organic brain syndrome, and 
possibly severe character disorders). 
c. It specifically excludes alcoholism. 
In Massachusetts neither the statute which 
uses the term "mental illness" (section 15), 
nor case law which uses "mental disease" ( 
CoQigiOQWgal.th_v^_McHoul , 1967), offer specific 
definitions for these terms with regard to 
criminal responsibility or competency to stand 
trial. 
a. The legislature and the courts apparently 
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!®?Ve the definition to the 
mental health professionals. 
Many authors warn against the use of specific 
198e”°Htl'C lab6!o ln the courtroom (Tanay, 
1986 Halpern, 1986; Morse, 1978; Ziskin, 
a. The more narrow the diagnosis, 
vulnerable it becomes: 
the more 
1) 
2) 
3) 
to error; 
t° being countered by another cli 
offering a different label; and 
to cross-examination on the issue 
diagnostic reliability. 
nician 
of 
In the forensic context accuracy is 
more important than precision. Rarely 
is there anything gained by increasing 
the level of precision at the risk of 
accuracy. Precision and accuracy are 
inversely proportional. A diagnostic 
formulation can be made so precise 
that it will be inevitably inaccurate" 
(Tanay, 1986). 
DSMIII adds its own warning: 
The use of this manual for 
non-clinical purposes such as 
determination of legal responsibility, 
competency or insanity... must be 
critically examined in each instance 
within the appropriate institutional 
context" (A.P.A., 1980, p. 12). 
4. However, diagnostic constructs can be helpful 
as tools to assist clinicians in dealing with 
the legal questions regarding mental 
i1lnesses. 
5. Practically speaking, given the limit of 
including only serious disorders, it appears 
unnecessary to offer specific diagnostic 
labels. 
6. Taking all this into account, the clinician's 
task appears to be to offer a "broad 
c
r 
p) 
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brushstroke" approach, 
but general descriptive 
psychosis, dissociative 
using well 
terms (i. 
state). 
supported 
e. , 
a. 
cl?nio^nPreCir labels when Possible, 
clinician can describe manifestations 
seriousness, origins and course of thi 
findings. °r baSiS f°r negative 
b. 
-CuU^S^there may be occasional cases 
which differential diagnosis is essenti 
not only to answer the "threshold 
question," but also the "criteria 
question." 
in 
al, 
D. Mental defect: 
offhapter VIII 
malingering. 
No exclusive 
regarding the 
definition is 
detection of 
2. If the mental status 
the general interview 
not necessary. 
exam can be integrated into 
, a formal exam is probably 
3. In considering mental status here, an outline 
should be followed which addresses: 
appearance and behavioral presentation 
attitude 
c. orientation to time, place, person and 
situation 
d. affective state - note anger, fear, elation, 
depression, irritability 
e. stream of thought - associations, flow of 
ideas 
f. thought content - especially delusions, 
preoccupations and hostile, aggressive and 
themes 
g. insight 
h. judgment - ability to assess alternatives, 
draw conclusions 
i. perception - especially the nature of any 
hallucinations. 
j. speech - tone, rate and peculiarities 
k. memory - short and long term deficits or 
amnesia 
l. abstract thinking ability 
m. attention and concentration 
n. general intellectual functioning 
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IV. 
o. 
reliability of 
malingering 
the defendant s presentation - 
responsibilityecailsWfor%hor a®j!essment of criminal 
assessments, the cost of snoh ® comprehensive 
money is consider the in time “d 
alternative brief , re’ at times an 
’ Drief format may be more appropriate. 
A. Situations which may call for a brief assessment: 
^‘ Section—15a "screenings": 
a. Here clinicians are often under pressure to 
respond quickly to the court's question on 
criminal responsibility. °n 
b" thS clinician is often also being 
sked to assess competency to stand trial 
within the same time frame. 
2. Situations (sections 15a or 15b) in which it 
is clear that the goal of the referral or 
commitment is actually treatment, and the 
possibility of a trial is remote. 
a. This is frequently the case when when 
mentally ill defendants are charged with 
misdemeanors (i.e., disturbing the peace, 
trespassing). 
b. The clinician may be informed that the 
charges are likely to eventually be dropped. 
Brief assessment format: Slobogin, Melton and 
Showalter (1984) developed sin interview guide and 
decision tree for use in screening out defendants 
who do not have a viable insanity defense. 
1. Their tool, the Mental State at the Time of the 
Offense Screening Evaluation (MSE), focuses on 
the defendant * s mental state at the time of the 
offense. 
2. The data produced can then be applied to 
standards for criminal responsibility. 
3. The MSE looks at historical information, 
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offense 
related data and present mental state. 
V. 
(1985°fciteetheeadvanta^t0n’-FWeith°rn and Sloh°Sin 
over commitment to state h °f.°U^patlent assessment 
assessing criminal n S '?£ the ™se °f 
when inpatient assessmentsessa ** SUggSSt that 
community-based or regional hosptt^be used: 
oftht per=onal costs to defendants (i e loss 
liberty, stigma) and financial cost the Duhlio 
they suggest that criminal responsibility ’ 
asrs^tr— - -w. 
perforLdn?atient °P outPatient, assessments 
performed in community-based settings may mean 
a. greater accessibility to key informants and 
records; and 
b. greater potential for consultative 
relationship between legal and mental health 
professionals. 
In Massachusetts, when a clinician's 15a 
screening" report is consistent with a finding of 
not criminally responsible, courts often commit the 
defendant under section 15b for further assessment. 
Courts willingness to go along with more 
thorough, time-consuming assessments under 
section 15a (outpatient or in jail), probably 
varies according to their consultative 
relationships with court clinics, DMH forensic 
teams or court employed clinicians. 
VI. Interviewing the defendant: 
A. Defendant vulnerability: Clinicians working in 
forensic settings should be sensitive to the 
potentially vulnerable situation of defendants, 
especially when being interviewed in jails or 
hospitals. See Chapter III. 
1. The stress and often threatening atmosphere of 
the court/jail experience can leave the 
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2. 
3. 
"helpers0"3 S’ Wh° ar® imraediately viewed as 
!E.:i‘™s?s^-S“s-,-s js~r 
sec-tiQn 15b for criminal responsibility 
assessments. y 
f?nd ?h^e*w°SPutal ''defendant-patients" 
md that they have been placed in a 
reatment setting, where they may be offered 
and may accept treatment. 
For constitutional (i.e., protection from 
self-incrimination), ethical-legal (i.e. 
coniidentiality and privileged 
communications) and clinical reasons (i.e 
rapport, trust), it is crucial that 
reatment and forensic assessment roles be 
kept separate. 
a. 
B. Preparation: The clinician should come to the 
mterview(s) as prepared as possible. 
1. Minimally, arrest reports should have been read 
and the reasons for the referral clarified. 
2. Whenever possible, the bulk of the data 
gathering should be complete, and preliminary 
hypotheses formed. 
C. General structure of the interview: The interview 
hopefully be structured in advance to bring 
out the most useful information. Generally, 
interviews or series of interviews cover the 
following ground: 
1. Introduction and informed consent: Very soon 
after being introduced, the clinician's role 
should be clarified. In Massachusetts, a 
“Lamb warning” should be offered. The 
defendant should clearly understand where the 
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2. 
clinician's report will 
if the defendant gives 
be sent, 
informed 
Only proceed 
consent. 
Rapport: 
interviewees seem to establish 
immediate rapport (e.g., experienced 
defendants; regressively open" defendants) 
b. 
2. 
Others who perceive grievous consequences 
stemming from the interview require a great 
deal of time and patience (e.g , g 
?uiinfrerS; de^endants for whom recounting 
the offense would be traumatic). 
Content: There are three content areas to be 
addressed. The order and flow of the 
interview will depend on the style of the 
interviewer and the needs of the defendant. 
a- Psychosocial historical information: 
Covering this relatively non—threatening 
area first, serves the dual functions of 
gathering important information and 
establishing rapport. 
b. Defendant's recollection: Here the 
differences between the "traditional" 
clinician and the forensic clinician 
investigating" criminal responsibility 
become obvious. 
1) The defendant is closely questioned 
regarding thoughts, feelings and behavior 
during the period around the time of the 
offense. 
2) Subsequent interviews may focus on 
inconsistencies or follow up on 
hypotheses. 
c. Mental status exam (preferably integrated 
with the rest of the interview) 
VII. Answering the questions 
A. Having completed the data gathering portion of 
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inYposmonV°r n?arly SO)’ the d^cian is 
the defendant to ?hS 7 *.knowledge gained about 
f J t the questions raised by the 
legal standard for criminal responsibility 
1 data ff=rhPraCtlCJ the processes of clinical data gathering, hypothesizing and 
interactive^th^ ar® probably m°re circular and interactive than sequential. 
Bonnie and Slobogin (1980) describe a clinical 
ofCIlini‘cmakln® process whioh involves a team 
Of clinicians m pre and post-interview 
conferences Various interviewing strategies 
and clinical hypotheses are discussed. 
Reports are written after an exhaustive 
rehashing of all possible conclusions. 
Such approaches increase quality assurance 
and help overcome weaknesses inherent in 
retrospective assessments. 
2. 
a. 
B. The questions: 
1. An opinion regarding the "threshold question" 
can now be formed: 
a. Given the data collected, was the defendant 
mentally ill at the time of the offense 
(the threshold question)? What was the 
nature of the illness (diagnosis)? 
b. If the answer is "no mental illness" the 
clinician need proceed no further. 
c. The McHoul rule excludes "abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal or 
otherwise anti—social conduct." 
2. If the opinion is that the defendant was 
mentally ill, then the clinician can turn to 
the "criteria question": 
a. If the defendant was mentally ill, was the 
effect of the mental illness on cognitive 
and volitional capacity sufficient to meet 
the criteria under the McHoul test for lack 
of criminal responsibility? 
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C. 
Functionarrf^ini?n °n mental ^“ess: junctional definitions and diagnostic 
See pages VIII-io to VII1-22, Clinical 
gnifleant to Forensic Assessments. 
labels. 
Conditions 
1. Massachusetts DMH regulations offer the 
illness"® functional definition of mental 
A substantial disorder of thought 
mood, perception, orientation, or 
memory which grossly impairs 
judgment, behavior or capacity to 
meet the ordinary demands of life1' 
(104 CMR 3:01). 
a. This functional definition provides 
parameters for determining which of the 
many mental illnesses" or diagnoses are 
applicable to the insanity defense. 
b. The DMH functional definition appears to 
include only serious psychopathology (i.e 
psychoses, organic brain syndrome, and 
possibly severe character disorders). 
'* It specifically excludes alcoholism. 
In Massachusetts neither the statute which 
uses the term "mental illness" (section 15), 
nor case law which uses "mental disease" ( 
£Q®agowealth_v^_McHoul , 1967), offer specific 
definitions for these terms with regard to 
criminal responsibility or competency to stand 
trial. 
a. The legislature and the courts apparently 
prefer to leave the definition to the 
mental health professionals. 
3. Many authors warn against the use of specific 
diagnostic labels in the courtroom (Tanay, 
1986; Halpern, 1986; Morse, 1978; Ziskin, ’ 
1975). 
a. The more narrow the diagnosis, the more 
vulnerable it becomes: 
1) to error; 
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2) 
3) 
to being countered by another clinician 
offering a different label; and 
to cross-examination on the issue of 
diagnostic reliability. 
"In the forensic context accuracy is 
more important than precision. Rarely 
is there anything gained by increasing 
the level of precision at the risk of 
accuracy. Precision and accuracy are 
inversely proportional. A diagnostic 
rormulation can be made so precise 
?££ 3lit*inevi— 
b. DSMIII adds its own warning: 
"The use of this manual for 
non-clinical purposes such as 
determination of legal responsibility 
competency or insanity... must be 
critically examined in each instance 
within the appropriate institutional 
context" (A.P.A., 1980, p 12) 
4. However, diagnostic constructs can be helpful 
as tools to assist clinicians in dealing with 
the legal questions regarding mental 
i1lnesses. 
5. Practically speaking, given the limit of 
including only serious disorders, it appears 
unnecessary to offer specific diagnostic 
labels. 
6. Taking all this into account, the clinician's 
task appears to be to offer a "broad 
brushstroke" approach, using well supported, 
but general descriptive terms (i.e., 
psychosis, dissociative state). 
a. Avoiding precise labels when possible, a 
clinician can describe manifestations, 
seriousness, origins and course of the 
illness; or the basis for negative 
findings. 
b. Of course there may be occasional cases in 
which differential diagnosis is essential, 
question," 
question." 
seen in mental retardation, 
and organic brain syndrome. 
cases. 
1. Common uses include: 
a. Confirmation of diagnostic impressions 
(e g. , the Rorschach may be helpful in the 
differential diagnosis of psychosis). 
b. Suspicion of malingering 
1) Here the MMPI is sensitive. 
c. Diagnosis of cognitive and neurological 
deficits 
1) The WAIS and neuropsychological 
assessment tools. 
Linking the disorder to the crime:. 
As one approaches the ultimate question for 
this assessment, having established that the 
defendant was mentally ill, it is helpful to 
first consider the relationship between the 
mental illness and the offense. 
a. The absence of any relationship between an 
existing mental illness and the crime 
itself rules out a claim of not criminally 
responsible due to the mental illness. If 
no relationship is found the assessment is 
complete. 
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all the passengers. 
variables. 
Similar to Stage 
Example! This time the same man feels 
compelled to get himself to Washington, 
JJ.C. Realizing that he can not afford the 
fare, he decides his mission is important 
enough to the world that he take over the 
bus. Here the link is still very close, 
but not quite as direct as above. Although 
he might not have hijacked the bus if he 
had the fare and the illegal act was more 
of a means to a delusional end, 
nevertheless the act appears to have had a 
completely delusional basis. 
Stage Three relationship: Here there's 
more distance between the offense and the 
mental illness. These cases are 
"borderline," difficult to determine. 
Exaaplei The same man hijacks the bus, 
again. Medication has had some effect, but 
he still wants to go to Washington to save 
the president. This time he robs the 
passengers because he knows that he will 
need the money to bribe the officials who 
will try to keep him away from the 
president. Here he may have technically 
met the criteria for a finding of 
criminally responsible, especially for the 
robbery. However, his acts still appear to 
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be linked to his delusions. 
mertalFill’n=elati°nShip: At best the 
the crime SSS 13 Penphera11^ elated to 
Example: Finally this man, still 
Sti11 feeling compelled to get 
rnh! fhingt°n f°r the President's sake, 
obs the passengers because he knows he 
will need money for food and shelter. 
G. Applying clinical data to the legal 
GiVe? thS existence of a serious 
mental iiiness (or defect) at the time of 
the offense, we can now turn to the 
criteria question. 
Did the mental illness or 
defect so affect the defendant 
that s/he lacked "substantial 
capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness... or to conform 
his conduct..."? 
1. Conceptually, this is the last step in 
the assessment, but in reality the data 
gathering, diagnosis and application to 
legal standards may well be repetitious 
and concurrent. 
2. The task here is to focus on the 
specific criteria of the McHoul test, 
legal criteria, and apply to them the 
findings of the assessment process, 
clinical data. 
3. Rogers, Wasyliw and Cavanaugh (1984) 
address the problem of applying 
clinically produced data and clinical 
decision-making to a legal construct, 
"insanity.“ 
a. They incorporated elements of the ALI 
Model Penal Code standard for 
criminal responsibility, adopted in 
Massachusetts as the McHoul test. 
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into "psychological constructs." 
1) The general construct: "a 
substantial impairment of an 
individual's cognitive and/or 
behavioral control." (p. 295) 
2) Capacity to appreciate" - 
cognitive control: The 
defendant's awareness, knowledge 
and comprehension of criminal 
conduct while it was occurring. 
3) "Conform conduct" - behavioral 
control: Defendant's 
deliberateness and self-control 
over the criminal behavior. 
Evaluating cognitive control: 
a. In forming an opinion on the 
defendant's cognitive control, the 
clinician tries to infer from the 
data how well the defendant 
appreciated," "understood," 
comprehended," "was aware of," or 
had knowledge of" the reality of: 
1) The situation 
2) The act 
3) The criminality or wrongfulness of 
the act 
b. What were the defendant's beliefs and 
attitudes about the act? 
c. What planning and preparation took 
place? 
d. What effect, if any, did the 
following have on the defendant's 
interpretation of the reality of the 
situation? 
1) confusion 
2) false belief (delusion) 
3) false perception (hallucination or 
illusion) 
4) intellectual deficit 
5) lack of information 
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5. 
e. 
6) lack of conscious awareness 
(automatism, intoxication) 
forSthr^St-°HS need tc be considered 
tor the periods just prior to during 
and just after the act. during 
Evaluating behavioral control: In 
forming an opinion regarding a 
defendant s cognitive control, the 
clinician tries to infer from the data 
how much control the defendant had over 
the criminal behavior. 
a. Here the clinician is concerned with 
internal and external factors which 
dismhibit, weaken or prevent 
control, or appear to "force" the 
criminal act. 
b. Behavioral self-descriptions, 
descriptions from witnesses, response 
patterns in similar situations are 
invaluable here. 
c. The difficulty of this task has 
caused this criterion to be dropped 
recently from legal standards used by 
the federal government: Judging 
whether a defendant was unwilling or 
unable to control behavior at a given 
moment. 
VIII. Special assessment issues: The following eight 
"special issues" are adapted in part from Shapiro 
(1984). 
Misleading delusions: Current delusions which 
appear to explain a past act can be misleading. 
The most convincing of current delusions may 
not have been functioning at the time of the 
crime. 
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B. Multiple_hypotheses 
hypothesis persists 
review, offer each 
If more than one clinical 
* even after exhaustive 
one. 
This comes up when: 
a. There are differing versions of the facts. 
Important information can not be known 
(e.g whether a current delusion was 
really a factor at the time). 
c. Differential diagnosis is inconclusive. 
2. Describe conditions or factors supporting 
each hypothesis. 
C. Staying close to the data!: Avoid large 
inferential leaps. If the data does not support 
an attractive hypothesis, do not force it to 
f it. 
Assessing criminal responsibility in 1ST 
defendants: 
In Massachusetts it is not uncommon for a 
court to order evaluations of both competency 
to stand trial and criminal responsibility to 
be completed at the same time. 
When both evaluations are requested, the 
competency to stand trial assessment should 
be completed first. 
If the defendant is believed to be 
incompetent, consider delaying the criminal 
responsibility assessment, at least the 
interview with the defendant, until 
competency is restored to increase the 
reliability of the defendant's version. 
E. Physical evidence: Comparing the clinical 
findings with the physical evidence may identify 
inconsistencies which may point to malingering. 
1. If the clinical findings do not "fit" with 
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™+a^letPhysical evidence, 
rectify the differences or 
to the court. 
either attempt to 
else report them 
F. 
G. 
Self_destructive_behavi 
behavioral control. SILL At issue here is 
2. 
3. 
orderdtotbeWc° S haVe committed crimes in 
Uiness ® ^ SUffer fr°“ a 
^iv^Sr^r?ts^b^ct?hL^^ S%Ur°tiVe punishment, may be clear. d/ 
The fact that the criminal behavior was a 
means to this end, on its face does not 
argue for a lack of behavioral’control 
currentfv^^nerhSS” Cases in which a defendant 
Perhaps usually, does not show 
evidence of serious mental illness. 
But historical data and perhaps psychological 
testing show: 
1. 
a* a fe^1C)us mental illness now in remission 
which might have been acute at the time of 
the offense; or 
b. a latent condition which becomes acute 
under certain stressful conditions. 
Here a clinician might characterize 
conditions under which the defendant would 
have met the threshold question; and then 
infer from the available data if, under such 
conditions the defendant might have lacked 
cognitive or behavioral control. 
Manic episodes are an example of a "latent" 
condition. 
H. Dual_diagnosesi The presence of both psychosis 
and antisocial personality disorder in the same 
individual presents a trying and not uncommon 
challenge to the forensic clinician. 
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1. 
a problem here is with individuals who drift 
frequently °bu^otil 
the^situatior^calls TolTt^ **” if 
Here the clinician searches for patterns nf 
ehavior which might support a hypothesis 
beSvaS " k istory of passive, no^criminai 
behavior while psychotic. 
2. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Bages_VII:i26__T0_VIIz50 
£EQD3 Chapter III, pages 496-420 of: 
Bonnie, R. & Slobogin 
health professionals 
informed speculation. 
, C (198?); The role of mental 
lnccw-CriDllnal process: The case 
bb Virginia Law Review 427. 
for 
exp 1 ore^bstac 1 es 
Pages_VII-52_to_yiI-62 
Rogers, R, Wasyliw, O.E. & Cavanaugh, J.L (1984) 
Evaiuatmg insanity: A study of construct validity 
aQd_Human_BehaviorJ_ 8 , 293-303. Law 
"In Place of the individualistic-subjective approaches to 
insanity evaluations, a specific criterion-based construct 
of insanity is proposed and examined. This construct 
entails the presence of a severe mental disorder which has 
substantially impaired the individual's cognitive and/or 
behavioral control." (p. 293). 
SPECIAL ISSUES IN PRE-TRIAL ASSESSMENTS 
The Detection of Malingering 
The Assessment and Treatment of Amnesia 
Clinical Conditions Significant to Forensic Assessments 
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THE DETECTION OF MALINGERING 
Malingering: According to the d^m-ttt , . . 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1980 t 
malingering requires a deceitful st^e o/mindf 
A' fir the v°lunLary production and presentatior. 
false or grossly exaggerated physical or 
psychological symptoms. ” °r 
B. . . . produced in pursuit of a goal that is 
pars^-^circumstances.With “ ^-standing of the 
f!rei=iSettingS: Malingering is much more likely in 
forensic assessments than in traditional clinical 
assessments. It should be considered whlnllll 
atmissueCy t0 Stand trial °r the insanity defense are 
A. A defendant in a criminal case may malinger mental 
illness or mental retardation (produce false or 
exaggerated symptoms) in order to avoid the 
consequences of facing a trial or its potential 
consequences (obviously recognizable goals). 
HI* Forms of malingering (from Resnick, 1984). 
A. Simulation! positive malingering - when symptoms 
which do not exist are feigned. 
Ey^S-fflaiingering! malingering when disability or 
disease does not exist at all. 
C. PaEtial_maiingering! exaggeration of symptoms 
which do exist 
D. Ealsg_imputation - ascribing causal relationship 
between actual symptoms and events or situations 
when there is clear understanding that no such 
relationship exists. 
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IV. Differential diagnosis: 
From Shapiro (1984). 
A. Psychogenic fugue/hysteria 
B. Somatoform disorder 
C. Factitious disorder (here goal 
patient role). is to assume the 
Organic amnestic disorders 
E. Self-serving 
court. 
irrational behavior due to stress in 
V. Clues to malingering (adapted from Resnick, 1984) 
A. Overacting the part 
bizarre the behavior 
psychosis). 
fe.g., believing that the 
the more convincing the 
more 
B. Eagerness to call attention to illness or symptoms. 
C. Symptoms often limited to the content (e.g., 
delusions, hallucinations) but not the form*(e.g. 
impaired relatedness, blunted affect, concrete or’ 
peculiar thinking) of serious mental illness. 
D. Symptoms fitting no diagnostic category. 
E. Claims of sudden onset of delusions, which usually 
develop over time. 
Auditory hallucinations described in a stilted, 
atypical fashion. 
Evasive stance during interview; unwilling to make 
definite statements. 
Sullen, ill-at-ease, suspicious, resentful or 
uncooperative. 
I. Contradictory accounts of crimes. 
J. Presenting self as blameless. 
K. Repeating questions, or answering questions slowly 
to buy time to make up answers. 
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A. Malingering should always be 
forensic evaluations. considered in 
ring may raise ethical 
rho feel they are seducing 
Be sure to obtain 
Look for inconsistencies: 
. Attempt to have as much i 
prior to first interview. 
information as possible 
2. Ask open ended questions. 
3. Carefully record the first interview. 
D. Pay particular attention to the nature of the 
symptom picture being presented. Be alerted to 
symptoms which seem exaggerated or unusual. 
Hallucination^! Knowledge about hallucinations 
is helpful in detecting faked hallucinations. 
a. Command hallucinations - even in those who 
have a history of responding to command 
hallucinations, these are usually 
successfully ignored. 
b. Hallucinations are usually associated with a 
delusion. 
c. They usually have some psychic purpose. 
d. In schizophrenics, "voices" are usually 
clear, often speaking to the person, 
commenting on his or her behavior, and 
usually experienced as being external. 
e. Schizophrenic hallucinations are 
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g. 
intermittent, not continuous. 
AlcohoUc hallucinosis produces vivid 
ertsrn^n 10ns\ °ften voices heard 
externally speaking with a third person. 
In alcoholic hallucinosis the individual’s 
ha^uc°na;ionarely * ^ 
E. Look for presence of typical secondary 
associated with the diagnostic picture 
?e!atnHEd affect, loss 
relatedness). 
symptoms 
being 
of 
F. Take a careful history of 
treatment. 
previous symptoms and 
G. 
lQ£jtient^eyaluation is helpful when malingering 
is suspected since it is difficult to fake g 
perCd^1C Sr"t0mS °r mental re"^ardation 24 hours 
per day. Interviews with jail personnel or 
significant others sometimes can give the similar 
information. 
H. £Qnfjogta^ion_L The clinician may wish to confront 
the defendant mildly with open ended statements 
(thus avoiding forcing a hardened stance): 
Perhaps you can help me understand these 
inconsistencies." 
Psychological testing 
1. The MMPI F-K score (F-K>0), and subtle-obvious 
item analysis are useful as confirmatory 
indication of malingering (Rogers, 1984). 
2. The WAIS is useful in detecting faked mental 
retardation. 
THE ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF AMNESIA 
Adapted from Rubinsky and Brandt (lqfifn- n u 
Suarez and Pittluck fl97^. q ’ Bromberg (1979); 
The complexity of the process called 
^hSlar" ,,suPP°rts notion of an 
admixture of organic and psychogenic 
factors. (Suarez and Pittluck, 1975, pfe" 
Memory - three processes 
A. Bggis.tratj.on (input) — recording 
depends on attention and level of 
of memory trace; 
consciousness. 
B. Betention or memory_formation (storage) 
adequate registration; includes: requires 
1* initial processing after registration 
2. short term retention - easily affected by 
interference, fragile 
3. long term retention 
C. Eegall (output) - requires adequate registration 
and retention 
Diagnostic and prognostic questions posed in forensic 
settings. Is the amnesia: 
A. Real or simulated? — detection of malingering 
B. Psychogenic or organic? — differential diagnosis 
C. Temporary or permanent? If temporary is it 
treatable? 
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III. Diagnosis 
'ought^o^e^recaner^har^3 that 
aStenSon® —P^T ^ —ani sumc^r^ 
forgetting" ,^athological or unwarranted 
forgetting (Koson and Robey, 1973, p. 589). 
SetrQgrmde_amnesiai The inability to recall 
events immediately preceding a critical event 
^ ^-Phy?1Cal °r Psychological trauma) 
extending back in time for variable periods 
2. 
^ntejog£ade_amriesiai Amnesia for events 
immediately following a critical even? 
Earamnesiai Distortions of recall; including: 
R|t£ospectiye—falsifisatioQ! Falsification 
o facts associated with a real memory (may 
be caused by emotional needs). 
Coafabu1atioru. Unconscious filling in 
memory gaps with false facts 
O- £.o.ia vous.. An illusion of recognition in 
which a new situation is incorrectly 
regarded as a repetition of a previous 
memory. 
State dependent memory - memory developed in 
one state of consciousness which is not 
accessible when a person is in another state 
of consciousness (seen in hysterical 
dissociative reactions and alcoholic 
blackouts). Comparable alteration in 
consciousness may be necessary to access 
memory. 
Etiology can be organic, psychogenic or both. 
Organic_amnesiaj_ Major causes include head 
trauma, acute intoxication, brain tumor, 
Korsakoff’s syndrome, vascular disease, 
fractures, seizures, familial illnesses, 
senile dementia, herpes encephalitis. 
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b. 
A key feature is that ^ 
has selective indent 
other cognitive processes reSn int^ 
May manifest anterograde or retrograde 
amnesia, or both. retrograde 
2‘ Hysteria, normal repression 
malmg^ng. Usually highly selective 
humi 1 iation"1"" ^ ^ ^ sh^ful ' 
a‘ 3oe^mem?r? 1035 is usually retrograde 
restricted to incidents occurring during or 
^ a cri"tical event. The loss can be 
temporary or permanent (A.P.A., 1980) 
See page VIII-12 regarding fugue states. 
Memory impairment and recovery 
1. 
2. 
Registration and retention can be impaired by 
alcohol, drugs, ECT, acute brain trauma, 
psychosis, depression, attentional deficits 
acute panic states. "Amnesia" in either case 
is not reversible - information which is not 
recorded or retained cannot be recalled. 
RecaH amnesia can be organic, psychogenic or 
both. Recall amnesia may be reversible to 
some extent, either spontaneously or with 
treatment. 
Mixed pictures are common in forensic 
settings. Alcoholic blackouts and head 
traumas may present amnesias with both 
organic and psychogenic etiology. 
D. Alcoholism: From Rubinsky and Brandt (1986). 
1. Agute_intojcicationj_ New information is 
inefficiently processed and stored during 
alcohol and possibly other drugs. Short-term 
retention is impaired; the severity being 
proportional to the alcohol blood level. 
a. Alcohol—tlackouti Anterograde amnesia for 
events occurring after a period of heavy 
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drinking. 
2. 
b' S® fases this “ay represent state 
dependent memory, and memories of events 
occurring during the blackout may retCrn 
during future periods of intoxication 
ant5rt»rmjalCOh°liSm leads to mostly 
anterograde memory deficits occurring durina 
periods when the person is sober In * 
retrSrfd 3 Syndrome- both anterograde and 
retrograde amnesia are present. 
IV. Evaluation 
A. Careful medical and developmental 
including defendant, significant 
medical records as sources. 
history, 
others, and 
B. Complete physical exam. 
Neuropsychological and neurological assessment. 
D' Psychodiagnostic interview covering psychodynamic 
coni1lets. 
reatment: While most organic amnesias do not respond 
to treatment, acute brain traumas can respond or 
spontaneously improve (during the first weeks 
following trauma). Psychogenic amnesias are more 
likely to be responsive. 
Recall exercises: Repetitive review of facts 
C. Confrontation with facts 
D. Hypnosis or sodium amytal interview: Potentially 
useful, but also produces questionable data (not 
admissible as evidence) and can cause further 
psychological trauma. 
E. Psychotherapy 
CLINICAL CONDITIONS SIGNIFICANT 
TO FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS 
and thetlegalfquestions thesrassessment^add^5635”^^’ 
points out when or how these J- address. It 
As such the outline i c nr->+- • +. ^onships might exist, 
of formal diagnostic labels^tended to encourage the use 
reports to court Please8 pr?ert Wlt?ess testimony or 
for a discussion of th?s issue Pag0S VI1"12 t0 VII~14 
The information here should be considered as 
approximations 1 and "suggest i nn?" »,04.u , ■ ~ 
The outline is not inclusive of all diagnoses or nf «n 
ml, ib d °n ^h® assumPfi°n that clinicians using this 
DsvohnH^ completely familiar and experienced with 
psychodiagnosis. 
Eisas£_Qotg that even in cases in which there does not 
appear to be a legally relevant mental illness present, if 
there appears to be serious cognitive or volitional 
impairment, the defendant may still be found not 
criminally responsible. 
^ terms "cognitive control" and "behavioral control" are 
used here in reference to the standards for criminal 
responsibility. Please refer to pages VII-16 to VII-18 
for an explanation of these terms. 
I. Schizophrenia: 
A. This is the archetypal "insanity" diagnosis. 
Symptoms of concern in forensic assessments might 
include: 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Excessively concrete 
Poor reality testing 
Autistic logic 
Delusions 
Hallucinations 
Flawed associational 
Poor judgment 
Bizarre behavior 
Incoherence 
Inappropriate affect 
or overly abstract thinking 
process 
B. 
Competency to stand trial: For schizophrenics who 
“ a°“te e?isode- the symptoms on the Urt 
Jt^d IrtlT T™S-barri6rS t0 coraPetency to 
stand, trial. Cognitive capacity or "rational 
understanding" and capacity to assist can be 
seriously impaired. 
Criminal responsibility: 
Cognitive control: Schizophrenia, primarily a 
disorder of the thinking process and a 
disturbance in reality testing, can account for 
substantial loss of the capacity to appreciate 
criminality. 
2. Behavioral control: Schizophrenics also 
manifest loss of control of feelings and 
impulses. 
II. Affective disorders Mania: 
A. Conditions characterized by extreme domination of 
elated mood, expansiveness, grandiosity leading to 
poor judgment and some loss of contact with 
reality. Hallucinations and delusions may be 
present. 
B. Competency to stand trial: A defendant in a 
manic episode may understand the general nature of 
the proceedings and participants in a trial, but: 
1. may not be able to attend to the proceedings of 
a trial; 
could have difficulty assisting an attorney; 2. 
217 
III. 
and 
might present unmanageable behavior in court 
C. Criminal responsibility: 
Cognitive and behavioral control: A "full 
blown mamo episode" can be characterized as 
he person s being "out of control" both 
cognitively and behaviorally. 
• The episodic or cyclical nature of this 
condition argues for careful history taking in 
criminal responsibility assessments 
In between episodes people suffering from 
this disorder may appear completely symptom 
^ this condition has previously gone 
undiagnosed, or if the crime for which the 
defendant is charged represents an initial 
e?lsode> the mental state at the time 
of the interview can be very misleading. 
a. 
b. 
Oissooiatiive disorders: "The essential feature of 
all dissociative disorders is the sudden, temporary 
alteration of the normally integrative functions of 
1980C1°USneSS’ identity or motor behavior" (APA, 
A. Depersonalization: "... an alteration in the 
perception or experience of the self so that the 
usual sense of one's own reality is temporarily 
lost or changed" (A.P.A., 1980, p. 259). 
1. Competency to stand trial: Depersonalization, 
a temporary phenomenon, is not likely to 
become a barrier to competency to stand trial. 
2. Criminal responsibility: 
a. Common in highly stressful situations. 
Defendants may claim they were not in 
behavioral control: "It didn't seem like 
it was me... like I was watching my body 
act. " 
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b. 
c. 
as a isolated 
2lgh^i_not be considered a mental 
ror the purposes of the insanity 
symptom, 
i1lness 
defense. 
ime of onset of the symptoms could be 
important. If this mental state occurred 
D? JUSt before the aor?very difficult to determine), it may not 
exculpate the defendant. 
B. Psychogenic Fugue states: Periods of altered 
consciousness about which there is usually 
complete amnesia. "The essential feature is 
sudden, unexpected travel away from home or 
customary work locale with assumption of a new 
identity and inability to recall one’s previous 
identity (A.P.A., 1980, p. 255) 
Competency to stand trial: 
l. A defendant would be incompetent to stand 
trial during a fugue state, but the 
condition would be very temporary. 
See page V-8 regarding the role of amnesia 
in competency to stand trial. 
Criminal responsibility: 
a. Accounts from witnesses of the defendant's 
behavior while in this state (including, 
but not limited to the crime), and of past 
occurrences are crucial. 
b. Amnesia regarding the events of a crime is 
not a justification for exculpability in 
Massachusetts ( Commonwealth v._Lombardi. 
1979). 
Multiple personality syndrome: "Characterized by 
the existence within the individual of two or 
more distinct personalities" (APA, 1980, p. 257). 
DSM-III refers to an "original personality" which 
usually is unaware of the other 
"subpersonalities. " 
1. Competency to stand trial: This condition. 
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per se, should not present a barrier to 
assessed^ Further, one of the personalities 
in this disorder might manifest deficits which 
could become barriers to competency h 
Criminal responsibility: 
a' mSk S valid’ existing condition. 
Multiple Personality Syndrome raises 
?°m^llS?teu questions the clinician 
(e.g. Which personality "did it"? Did the 
original personality know?). 
IV. Impulse control disorders: Defendants with th 
disorders claim lack of behavioral control. 
ese 
A. According to DSM-III the essential features 
include: 
1. "Failure to resist an impulse, drive or 
temptation to perform some act that is harmful 
to the individual or others. There may or may 
not be conscious resistance to the impulse. 
The act may or may not be premeditated or 
planned." 
2. An increasing sense of tension before 
committing the act. 
3. An experience of either pleasure, 
gratification or release at the time of 
committing the act" (A.P.A., 1980, p. 291) 
B. Impulse disorders of forensic significance 
include: 
1. pyromania 
2. kleptomania 
3. pathological gambling 
4. psychosexual disorders (see page VIII-21). 
C. Competency to stand trial: Taken alone this 
disorder should not present barriers to 
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competency. 
Criminal Responsibilty: 
1. These cases present the sticky 
an impulse could not have been 
simply was not resisted. 
issue of whether 
resisted, or 
2. 
3. 
Us® of term."failure to resist" places the 
judgment regarding "capacity to resist" in the 
hands of the individual clinician, and 
ultimately judge and jury (Ciccone, 1986) 
Clinicians should be wary about 
opinions in these cases. 
offering 
V. Mental disorders of organic etiology: 
Disorders of concern in forensic assessments may 
include: J 
1. Dementia: Impairment of previous intellectual 
functioning, judgment and memory serious enough 
to interfere with social and occupational 
functioning. 
2. Delerium: Acute condition characterized by 
clouding of consciousness, disorientation, 
hallucinations, illusions and incoherence. 
3. Organic personality syndrome: May involve 
impairment of impulse control, suspiciousness, 
paranoid ideation, and explosive outbursts. Due 
to a specific organic factor. Specific effect 
may depend on localization. 
4. Episodic dyscontrol syndrome (intermittent 
explosive disorder): Manifested by overresponse 
to minor provocations and explosive episodes. 
Organic etiology in this condition is subtle, 
and difficult to diagnose (Shapiro, 1984). 
5. Amnestic syndrome: Impairment in short and long 
term memory occurring in a normal state of 
consciousness - not clouded. 
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B. 
Essential features of these conditions 
i. antisocial, aggressive, violent, or 
behavior; and 
may include: 
bizarre 
2. delusions, 
confusion, 
deficits. 
hallucinations, disorientation, 
incoherence, intellectual and memory 
C. Competency to stand trial: Disorders of organic 
etiology are likely to present barriers to 
competency to stand trial. 
1. 
^^termi a5tJro^rade °r retrograde memory and 
AnH Hti°nal deflcltf’ disorientation, confusion 
^ d®lusions can affect a defendant's 
ability to adequately assist his/her attorney 
and maintain or develop a rational and factual 
understanding of the proceedings. 
2. Defendants with chronic or deteriorative 
organically based mental illness usually are a 
high risk for being chronically incompetent to 
stand trial. 
Criminal Responsibilty: 
Psychosis and cognitive deficits of organic 
etiology can lead to fairly straightforeward 
justifications for findings of not criminally 
responsible. 
a. However, the mere existence of a neurological 
condition should not lead to an assumption of 
lack of cognitive or behavioral control. 
VI. Automatisms: Involuntary, isolated or episodic 
behavior which is not directed by conscious thought. 
A. Automatisms occur in clinical states including 
(Rubinsky and Brandt, 1986; Virginia Forensic 
Training Manual): 
1. Ictal or post ictal periods of temporal lobe 
epilepsy. 
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VII. 
2. Sonambulism 
3. Hypoglycemia 
4. Head injury 
5. Cerebral anoxia 
B. 
^nHPK-^?y to1s*and trial: Automatisms are rare 
d highly unlikely to occur during a trial t-f 
his condition did present itself during a trial 
it should cause only a brief delay. Amnesia 1 
?lub?nsk wjjtk automatisms may affect^ompetency (Kubinsky and Brandt, 1986). P cy 
Criminal responsibility: Automatisms are not 
as a mental illness in Massachusetts for 
the purposes of the threshold question in criminal 
responsibility, nor are they accepted as aS 
argument for diminished responsibility ( 
CQmmonw|alt^Y^enius^ 1982; Nugent and 
Connell, 1983). An "automatism defense," 
invoked^ UnC°nScious or involuntary action, may be 
Alcohol or drug related psychoses: 
The following are psychotic conditions with 
substance abuse etiology. 
1. Acute conditions: 
a. Alcohol hallucinosis 
b. Delerium tremens 
c. Alcohol idiosyncratic intoxication 
d. Acute cocaine psychosis 
e. Acute amphetamine psychosis 
f. Phencyclidine (PCP) toxic psychosis 
g. Hallucinogen psychoses 
2. Chronic conditions: 
1. Korsakoff's syndrome (dementia) - chronic 
2. Alcohol Amnestic disorder 
B. Competency to stand trial: 
1. There should be no long lasting barriers to 
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VIII. 
competency to stand trial in the case of 
the acute Brief delays until 
acute state is over may be necessary. 
In the case of the chronic disorders 
arners to a "rational and factual 
understanding" might include short-term 
memory and attentional deficits, confusion, 
disorientation, and incoherence. Also 
delusions may become barriers to the 
defendant-attorney relationship. 
For defendants with chronic conditions, the 
chronicity is likely to extend to 
incompetency. 
C. Criminal responsibility: 
1' It a 22ri°US mental illness is triggered by 
the effects of alcohol or drugs the 
condition may satisfy the threshold 
question of mental illness, as long as the 
defendant was unaware that a mental illness 
result ( Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 
1978). 
2. Reality testing may be sufficiently 
distorted that the cognitive and behavioral 
control are substantially impaired. 
Alcohol or drug intoxication and addiction: 
Competency to stand trial: Intoxication or 
addiction should not be issues here. 
Criminal responsibility: Both cognitive and 
behavioral control are at issue. 
1. In Massachusetts, intoxication due to the 
effects of the voluntary consumption of 
alcohol or drugs, in and of itself is not 
exculpable. 
a. Intoxication at the time of the offense 
may be introduced as justification for a 
finding of diminished responsibility in 
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2. 
cases of first degree murder ( 
kQmmonwea1th_v^_CQst1971). 
Alcoholism and drug addiction, 
applicable as mental illnesses 
are not 
IX. Paranoid disorder: 
A' a persistent and unshakable 
persecutory delusions and delusional jealousy, in 
(A pT? I980?tperl95').maintains clear thinking 
1. Can be either acute or chroni< 
B. 
Competency to stand trial: Persecutory delusions, 
if they intrude into the relationship with the 
attorney or the court proceedings, may become a 
Darner to the competency to stand trial. 
Criminal responsibility: 
1. If the crime is linked to this condition, it is 
probably through lack of cognitive control - 
the delusion affecting the ability to 
"appreciate" although the defendant likely 
understands the fact that the act is illegal. 
2) Lack of adequate behavioral control probably 
becomes an offshoot of such a delusional system 
in that there may be no basis for controlling 
what is perceived to be "justifiable" action. 
X. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD): 
A. This is a syndrome which includes intrusive 
recollections of traumatic scenes, nightmares, 
guilt feelings, depression, psychic numbing and 
difficulties in marital, interpersonal and 
occupational adjustment. The impairment may be 
mild or pervasive (Slovenko, 1984). 
B. Competency to stand trial: Usually there should be 
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no bar to competency to stand trial by reason of 
this condition. Even a psychotic flashback 
caCsRkSl^ ^ the ^ime °f the trial sh°uld only cause a temporary delay. y 
Criminal responsibility: 
1. In most cases, the type of symptomatology 
present does not lead to findings of lack of 
cognitive or behavioral control, although the 
commission of an offense may be seen as a 
response to past trauma (Packer, 1983). 
2. In some cases, "flashbacks" to a traumatic event 
are experienced. Here the defendant may be in 
a temporary dissociated state, and consequently 
a finding of not criminally responsible may be 
justified. 
XI. Premenstrual syndrome (PMS): Severe cases are 
associated with depression and violent outbursts 
(Slovenko, 1984). 
A. Competency to stand trial: Associated depression 
might cause a temporary barrier to competency. 
B. Criminal responsibility: 
1. Without psychosis, PMS probably does not fit as 
a serious mental illness. 
2. However, Slovenko (1984) describes arguments 
and cases supporting the position that this 
condition, when severe, should be seen as a 
physiological excuse, which could lead to a 
defense of diminished responsibility (but not 
yet in Massachusetts). 
XII. Battered spouse syndrome: Condition of chronic 
domestic violence, which may lead to the victim 
killing or attempting to kill her/his spouse. 
A. Competency to stand trial: Strong self-punitive 
feelings could lead to self-defeating motivation. 
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XIII. 
leads to ^ ®SS thS Stress of this edition 
bl a factor Tn'tha Tf ^ ilJness, it should not 
stand trial. th defendant s competency to 
Criminal responsibility: 
1. 
2. 
Pleas of self-defense or guilty to a lesser 
charge are most likely. 
While the causal relationships may be clear 
won?H £* 1S m0Je llkely that this syndrome 
would be viewed as a sociological or 
socio-economic phenomenon, than as a mental 
lIlness. 
Personality disorders: These disorders are 
ua^?ute^12ed by Pers°nality traits developed in 
childhood or^adolescence, which are inflexible and 
maladaptive and cause either significant 
impairment in social or occupational function or 
subjective distress" (A.P.A., 1980, p. 305). 
Common to forensic evaluations are antisocial, 
schizoid, schizotypal, paranoid, borderline, and 
mixed personality disorders. 
Competency to stand trial: There should be no 
barrier to competency to stand trial here. A 
rare exception might be when borderline 
personality disordered defendants suffer 
psychotic episodes. 
1. Malingering may be present, however. 
C. Criminal responsibility: 
1. Generally, while people with these disorders 
show tenuous reality testing and behavioral 
control, for the purpose of assessing 
criminal responsibility the degree of 
impairment in cognitive or behavioral control 
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iQ«g0nerally not substantial 1981). (Rappeport, 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Some severe personality disorders may present 
an exception since transient psychotic 
episodes may occur. 
Assessments of criminal responsibility become 
even more difficult when personality 
ha5ero6ru arS present ^ defendants who also 
have a chronic psychosis (i.e., schizophrenia 
or an affective psychosis). 
Inen^tH0U^teStif0r crirainal responsibility 
specifically rules out "abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal or 
£!SSLa?967?Cial C°nduct" ( Samsaaolin 
a. But, antisocial personality disorder has 
been accepted as a mental illness in 
Massachusetts ( Commonwealth v. 
Westmoreland1983). 
XIV. Brief Reactive Psychosis: 
These are episodes of psychosis which occur 
immediately after am identified psychosocial 
stressor (A.P.A. , 1980, p. 200). 
1. This condition may be associated with other 
disorders cited here (i.e., PTSD, borderline 
personality disorder, battered spouse 
syndrome). 
2. Episodes range from a few hours to two weeks. 
3. Symptoms may include incoherence, delusions, 
hallucinations and bizarre behavior. 
Competency to stand trial: During the psychotic 
episode the defendant may not be competent (see 
schizophrenia above, page VIII-10). However, due 
to the brevity of the episodes, any delay due to 
incompetency should be short. 
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XV. 
C. 
(above)'aloapac!tvi$Uity: ■ As in schi2ophrenia 
capacity for cognitive and behavioral 
control can be seriously affected. enavloral 
Paraphilias: 
A. Paraphilias 
"unusual or 
for sexual 
are: 
psychosexual disorders 
bizarre imagery or acts are 
excitement" (A.P.A. , 1980). 
in which 
necessary 
Included 
1. pedophilia; 
2. exhibitionism; 
3. voyeurism; 
4. sexual sadism and masochism; 
5. atypical paraphilias. 
B. Competency to stand trial: There should be no 
barriers to competency to stand trial due to a 
psychosexual disorder. 
Criminal responsibility: 
Sexual offenders may claim "compulsions" or 
loss of impulse control." 
Psychosexual disorders are not likely to fit 
the category of serious mental illness. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Page_YHI-23_to_VIII^39 
illness’ behavioral detectlon of malingered mental 
mess. Behavioral_Scignees_and_the_LawJ_ Z^ 21-37. 
Clinical approaches to the detection of malingering 
examined from both the perspectives of the general 
practitioner and forensic clinician. Specific strategies 
for identifying malingering defendants is presented wi?h 
special attention paid to psychoses. Presented with 
Pages_YUI-41 to VITT^fifl 
Rogers, R. (1984) Towards an empirical model of 
malingering and deception. Behavioral_Sciences_and_the 
^ i 9 3 ~ 111. 
The author reviews studies which address the effectiveness 
or the MMPI in the detection of malingering. 
Pages_VIII-61 to VTTT-77 ; 
Rubinsky, E.W. & Brandt, J. 
law: A clinical overview. 
Law. 4j_ 27-43. 
(1986). Amnesia and criminal 
Behavioral Sciences and the 
The authors review recent neuropsychological research on 
amnesia and its implications for the judicial process. 
Emphasis is placed on describing the amnesic disorders 
that most often arise in criminal proceedings. 
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Eafiea_YIH-79_to_Vili-84 
Koson, D. & 
stand trial. 
587-592. 
Robey, A. (1973). Amnesia and competency 
American_Journal_of_Psychiatryi. 130,, 
to 
The authors review etiological, 
treatment issues. diagnostic, prognostic and 
Pages_VIII-86_to_VIIIr100 
"Overview" - pages 1-14 from: 
Slovenko, 
criminal 
5j_ 1-60. 
R. (1984). The 
responsibility. 
meaning of mental illness in 
The_Journal_of_Legal_Medicine. 
The author addresses the complicated issue of the 
thi^eshold_auestion for determination of criminal 
responsibility: Was the defendant mentally ill at the 
time of the offense. In this initial segment of this 
lengthy article, the history, rationale and problems with 
the application of formal diagnosis to the issue of 
criminal responsibility are discussed. 
Pages VI11-102 to VIII-109 
Defendant's memorandum on psychiatric diagnosis of mental 
illness" 
From pages B-l to B-7 of: 
Schwartz, S.J. & Stern, D. K. (1979). A trial manual for 
civil_commitment. Mental Health Legal Advisors 
Committee, Boston. 
The authors of this manual for defendants' lawyers in 
civil commitment hearings present a model brief on 
psychodiagnosis. They cite literature questioning the 
reliability and validity of psychodiagnosis; and the 
tendency to interpret all behavior, subsequent to a 
diagnosis being made, as conforming to that diagnosis. 
COMMITABILITY OF 1ST DEFENDANTS AND NGRI ACQUITTEES 
the need for commitment for 
come up in several contexts. 
the question of 
treatment" may 
or not 
earlier, during a section 15b observational 
commitment; or 
2. during a section 16a commitment (post 1ST or 
NGRI decisions) specifically ordered by the 
court to address the question of commitability. 
When a 16b (six month) or 16c (one year following 
16b) commitment is ordered the same question of 
commitability may come up subsequently, when: 
1. Placement in a less restrictive setting or 
discharge is raised by the treatment staff of 
the DMH facility (or Bridgewater), during the 
period of the commitment. 
2. A committed patient applies to superior court 
for discharge (G.L.C. c. 123, s. 9). 
3. The end of the period of commitment is nearing, 
the decision to seek recommitment or to 
discharge must be addressed. 
II. Section 16b commitment: The procedures and standards 
regarding the commitment of 1ST defendants or NGRI 
acquittees are set out in M.G.L. c. 123, s. 16. 
A. For detailed description of the procedures see 
Chapter IV, pages IV-11 to IV-14 (1ST), and 
Chapter VI, pages VI-13 to VI-15 (NGRI). 
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III. 
B. 
ss.ira"L -. 
So“ttat: Pr°Ve "bey°nd a ---able " 
1. 
2. 
the person is mentally ill; 
discharge would create a likelihood of serious 
3. in the case of commitments to Bridgewater, 
the failure to restrain the person in the 
strict security would create a likelihood 
serious harm. 
that 
of 
1 
Lsast_raStriS±ive_alteEnativei The Massachusetts 
/iQ7Q1Cc-C°Vrc S Stan'4aEds_o£_Judiciai_Eracti2e 
(1979, Civil Commitment Standard 1:02) include the 
requirement that it be proven that no less 
restrictive alternative to the commitment is 
available. 
This standard is based on the Massachusetts 
District Court Appellate Division’s decision in 
Gallup v. Alden (1975). 
Mental retardation: Absent a mental illness, 
mentally retarded individuals cannot be 
involuntarily committed under sections 8, 16b or 
16c. 
Is the person mentally ill? 
A. Definition: The DMH definition for the purposes 
of involuntary commitment, the same definition 
offered for determination of criminal 
responsibility, is accepted by Massachusetts 
courts for the purpose of involuntary commitment 
( Andrews petitioner , 1975): 
"A substantial disorder of thought, 
mood, perception, orientation, or 
memory which grossly impairs 
judgment, behavior, or capacity to 
meet the ordinary demands of life, 
but shall not include alcoholism. . . " 
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(104 CMR 3:01). 
B. Taski The clinician's 
current mental status 
task here is to assess 
and functioning. 
1. Regardless of opinions offered previously to 
determine competency to stand trial or 
criminal responsibility, does the person 
presently show evidence of mental illness? 
2. Parameters! The functional definition 
provided above clearly focuses on serious or 
major mental illness (see page VII-12 tn 
VI1-14). 
IV. Would release "create the likelihood of serious 
harm"? 
Once it is established that the individual is 
mentally ill, the next step is to address the 
issue of dangerousness. 
Likeiihood_of_ae£ious_hanmi M.G.L., c. 123, s. 
1 defines "likelihood of serious harm" as: 
1. A substantial risk of physical harm to the 
person himself as manifested by evidence of 
threats of, or attempts at, suicide or 
serious bodily harm; or 
2. A substantial risk of physical harm to other 
persons as manifested by evidence of 
homicidal or other violent behavior or 
evidence that others are placed in 
reasonable fear of violent behavior and 
serious physical harm to them; or 
3. A very substantial risk of physical 
impairment or injury to the person himself 
as manifested by evidence that such person's 
judgment is so affected that he is unable to 
protect himself in the community and that 
reasonable provision for his protection is 
not available in the community. 
C. Restated , the significant features of this 
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definition in include: 
i. 2ubs£antial_riskj_ Moderate to high risk, 
2' HiSh risk ~ very 
Danger to self: 
a. Risk of self-inflicted harm. Evidence 
Current, recent or past suicidal 
seriously self-destructive or 
s©lf—mutilatory behavior. 
b. Risk of physical impairment or injury to 
Evidence: Inability to care for 
seif due to poor judgment, and lack of 
adequate external protection. 
4. Dgoger,to othersi risk of physical harm to 
a* Evidence. Current, recent or past 
violent behavior or information that 
others are placed in "reasonable fear." 
D. Assessing danger to self — suicide 
1* Assessment of suicidality: Here assessment 
of suicidality differs from the more typical 
assessment done in emergency situations in 
three important ways: 
a. The circumstances of assessment are 
focused on the question of release from 
a hospital (or occasionally a jail). 
b. Usually, the clinician has had the 
opportunity to assess the individual over 
time in a contained setting. 
c. Adequate collateral information should be 
available. 
Incidence: The incidence of suicidality 
being the reason for a section 16b petition 
is relatively rare compared to "danger to 
others. 
2. 
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There is an opportunity for treatment for 
depression during inpatient pre-trial 
evaluations. ai 
b. 
The frequency of diagnosed depression is 
low among 1ST defendants (Roesch and 
Golding 1980) and NGRI aoquittees 
asewark, Pantle and Steadman, 1979). 
Predicting suicidality: Clinicians can 
“ ”°£e con£ident in their assessments of 
sk here, than in their assessments of 
danger to others (Halleck, 1980): 
n Who have attempted suicide are 
150 times more likely to complete the 
act than people who have not. 
2) The likelihood in the case of a person 
with diagnosed depression is 50 times 
greater than the average person. 
E. &kili;ky care fnr^p,ifj_ This issue is raised 
in the cases of individuals who have 
demonstrated a serious lack of community 
survival skills and impaired judgment. 
1. These deficits may be chronic, as in the 
cases of institutionalization syndrome, 
organic brain syndrome and regressed 
schizophrenics. 
2. They may be temporary, as in acute 
functional or organic psychoses. 
Panger_to_othersi This is the most difficult to 
assess and therefore the most controversial of the 
three standards for commitment. 
A. The task here is a risk assessment generally 
characterized as a prediction of future dangerous 
behavior. 
B. Prediction studies: Professional commentary has 
focused on five retrospective studies done during 
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the 1970's (Kozol, Boucher and Garofalo 1979. 
Steadman and Cocoz?a 1 QV/i • n * 1972, 
1976; Steadman 1977’ Th ’ Cocozza and Steadman, 
eaaman, 19/7, Thornberry and Jacoby, 1979). 
violpnnpUd^eS■focused on post-release 
dangerous VcUnicaf ^tlf?, t^ho %£***« 
released from institutions by courts 
The subjects were patients in long term 
custodial institutions. 
a. Ihe average ages of the patients in the 
oteadman studies was 55. 
3. Data on post—release 
court, mental health 
records. 
violence was from police, 
clinic and hospital 
4. Follow-up was over a 3-5 year period. 
5. Findings : 
a- Ealse_POsitiva prpHintinn9 _ a civii 
libertarian concern: The incidence no 
post-discharge violence by individuals 
assessed as "dangerous" ranged from 66% to 
86%. 
b. False negative predictions - a public 
protectionist concern: The incidence of 
post-discharge violence by individuals 
assessed as "not dangerous" ranged from 16% 
to 33%. 
c. The study (Kozol et al, 1972) which 
described the most thorough clinical 
assessments had the best results (66% false 
positive; 16% false negative). 
C. Professional commentary: Monahan (1984) 
characterizes two "generations" of commentary in 
the professional literature: 
1. The first generation view focusing on the above 
studies, led to: 
a. claims that clinicians cannot predict future 
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VI. 
dangerous behavi 
than chance); or accurately (any better 
b. 
*^rary commitment 
J- calls for dropping dangerousness from 
commitment standards (Stone, 1975) 
The second generation view suggests that: 
'■ Ihe ^iCti°" research to date does not tell 
the whole picture - there may be a range of 
accuracy dependent on temporal and 
situational factors. 
1) The major 
category: 
custodial 
studies have been limited to one 
former inpatients of long term, 
institutions. 
There is little known, but reason to be 
optimistic, about the accuracy of clinical 
Predicts when the gap between the time 
of the assessment and the time of the 
predicted dangerous behavior is relatively 
short. 
b. Public policy should not be changed based on 
what we know so far — not considering 
dangerousness as a criterion may be less 
acceptable than the current situation. 
The clinical assessment of likelihood of harm: It 
appears that clinicians make minimal use of the known 
correlates to violence and the assessment formats 
recommended in the literature (Mulvey and Lidz, 
1984), relying instead on illusory correlations 
(Shah, 1978). 
A. Correlates of violence: The following list of 
factors to consider in these assessments was 
adapted from a list developed by staff of the 
McLean Hospital/Bridgewater State Hospital 
program. 
1. Using base rates - actuarial predictors: When 
we know, from our own experience or from 
available data, the base rates of violence of 
c
r 
&> 
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groups of people with characteristics similar 
^nHr-HndiridUa1' We Can describe that 
individual s relative risk for future 
violence. Groups may be defined according to: 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g. 
h. 
History of violent behavior 
Age 
Gender 
Socioeconomic status and employment 
stability 
Alcohol and drug abuse 
Level of intellectual functioning 
Residential mobility 
Marital status 
Clinical factors: 
a- Earoily_history_factoi:si 
1) Relationship with parents and siblings 
2) Relationship of parents to one another 
and to family - role models 
3) Family history of mental illness and/or 
violence 
4) History of subject being abused as a 
child 
5) History of subject having physical fights 
with parents 
b. Individual clinical faotnrg: 
1) History of acute psychosis, especially 
paranoid symptoms 
2) History of delusional ideas in which the 
world is inhabited by threatening 
persons, delusions of having special 
powers, of having transmitting/receiving 
devices implanted in one's brain or 
delusions in which the person has a sense 
of mission. 
3) History of auditory hallucinations which 
command the subject to behave in a 
directed fashion 
4) History of organic problems such as 
temporal lobe epilepsy 
5) History of episodes in which the person 
feels separated from his/her actions 
6) Impulsivity - history of accidents, 
automobile violations, bed-wetting, 
fire-setting and/or antisocial behavior 
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7) 
8) 
9) 
10) 
11) 
12) 
13) 
Attitude toward illness and helping 
agencies e 
Wish to return to a hospital 
History of violence; 
History of victimization - both as victim 
and victimizer; vicrim 
Pasten»?ft0 exte^alize and project blame 
resolution °Urrent Style of 
History of suicide attempts 
Environmental_factors 
1) Assessing situations: Predictions of 
dangerous behavior can not be based 
solely on the individual's 
characteristics. Violence is an 
interaction . Clinicians should try to 
answer the questions: 
a) What characteristics describe the 
situation in which the person has been 
violent? 
b) What characteristics describe the 
situations in which the person may 
live if released? 
c) How similar are these two contexts? 
2) Situational correlates: Clinicians 
should consider the following in terms of 
their relative potential for providing 
support and causing stress : 
a) Living environment 
b) Family 
c) Peers 
d) Job 
e) Other environmental factors: I 
availability of likely victims. 
weapons and alcohol 
situations 
in future 
B. Clinical assessment guidelines: See Monahan's 
clinical assessment format (1981) on pages IX-10 
to IX-11. 
VII. Offering opinions on danger to others: 
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VIII. 
indivMuaWS?1^? rSk °f harm P^^nted by 
shouTn K ^ SndantS °r NGRI acquittees 
bafed.°^ a thorough consideration of 
the actuarial, individual clinical and 
harmatl°nal faCtors related to likelihood of 
Clinicians 
favorable 
opinions should integrate both 
and unfavorable findings. 
When situational 
case, clinicians 
about "likelihood 
factors. 
factors are crucial to a given 
should qualify their statements 
with references to these 
1. E.g., "risk would be high if the patient were 
discharged to the following situation. . . " 
Reports: The Massachusetts statute refers to 
likelihood or risk of harm. The task, then is 
to report on the risk of harm rather than to 
provide an absolute prediction. 
1. Opinions should be stated in these relative 
terms to avoid the trap of outright 
predictions of behavior. 
2. Clinical findings and rationales should be 
presented, including a statement of the 
clinician's relative confidence in the 
assessment. 
Least restrictive alternative: With regard to 
section 16b and 16c commitment decisions: 
A. This concept refers to the right to treatment in 
the setting which infringes the "least" on an 
individual's right to liberty. 
B. Practically speaking, the goal of clinical 
assessment here is to determine if a specific 
alternative setting (if there is one) to 
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IX. 
commits to a state hospital or Bridgewater 
■' ETrS? infividual’s treatment needs (e.g , 
for 1ST s, treatment geared toward 
restoration of competency to stand trial). 
!. provide a safe situation relative to the 
assessment of the risk of harm to self or 
others. 
C. Regardless of the clinician's opinion regarding 
potential for harm to self or others, if there 
is a less restrictive treatment setting 
available in which the risk of harm can be 
lowered to an acceptable level or eliminated, 
such an alternative to commitment should be 
seriously considered. 
Need for the strict security of Bridgewater: 
A. As a facility of the Massachusetts Department of 
Correction, Bridgewater State Hospital provides 
more security from escape than do the state 
hospitals of DMH. 
B. Also, if an individual presents a high risk of 
serious physical harm to the patients and staff of 
a DMH facility, and the violent behavior cannot be 
contained at that facility, then commitment to 
Bridgewater State Hospital should be considered. 
C. Assessment of the need for strict security should 
take into account: 
1. the seriousness of the charges; 
2. the risk that the individual would escape from 
a D.M.H. facility; 
3. the likelihood of serious harm to others, 
should the individual escape; 
4. the likelihood of serious harm to others, 
within a D.M.H. facility. 
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QUESTIONS FOR THE CLINICIAN ASSESSING 
SERIOUS HARM 
THE LIKELIHOOD OF 
?MonfhanOV1qfl1w qUestions developed by John Monahan (Monahan 1981) for use m the clinical prediction of 
violent behavior. He begins with a series of four 
which'th! rf?arding Professional and ethical issues about 
which the clinician asks her/himself before proceeding. 
Professional competency in this area 
requires candid introspection, an understanding of the 
iterature on prediction and assessment in general and of 
violent behavior in particular, and a grasp of the 
relevant legal framework within which the prediction will 
be made. 
If, when called upon to assess dangerousness, a clinician 
is confronted with an ethical dilemma, s/he should opt out 
of the task. This may not be possible in some emergency 
situations. 
Is it a prediction of violent behavior that is being 
requested? (There is a tendency to address this 
question when it is not being asked). 
2. Am I professionally competent to offer am estimate of 
the probability of future violence? 
3. Are any issues of personal or professional ethics 
involved in this case? 
4. Given my answers to the above questions, is this case 
an appropriate one in which to offer a prediction? 
5. What events precipitated raising the person's 
potential for violence and in what context did these 
events take place? 
6. What are the person's relevant demographic 
characteristics? 
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7. 
8. 
What is the 
What is the 
this person 
person's history of violent behavior ? 
5at!i!‘e. °LVi°lence People of 
9. What are the sources of stress 
current environment? 
in the person’s 
10. What cognitive and affective 
the person may be predisposed 
violent manner? 
factors indicate that 
to cope with stress in a 
11. What cognitive and affective factors indicate that 
the person may be predisposed to cope with stress in a 
non-violent manner? 
12. How similar are the contexts in which the person has 
used violent coping mechanisms in the past to the 
contexts in which the person likely will function in 
the future? 
In particular, who are the likely victims of the 
person's violent behavior and how available are they? 
14. What means does the person have to commit violence? 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Eages_IXr13_to_ix_25 
MuIvey, E.P. & Lidz, C.W. (1984). Clinical 
men?liep2tilntsin ^9-40, 
?Lk 
zg£i ssra sss 
about01??) the^13 sltu*blon by presenting information 
i1 the factors that empirical research suggests 
should be considered in such assessments and in the 
demonstrated utility of these factors, and (2) the factors 
that appear to be most often considered by clinicians 
assessing the dangerousness of mental patients." (p. 379). 
Eaggs_IX-37 tn_TX-49 
Monahan, J. (1984). The prediction of violent behavior: 
toward a second generation of theory and policy. 
Ameriqari Journal of Psych i at-ry, 141 ; 10-15. 
The 'first generation' of research studies on the 
prediction of violent behavior found such predictions to 
e highly inaccurate. Many social policy changes were 
implemented or recommended on the basis of that research. 
More recently, a second generation of research and theory 
on violence prediction has begun to develop that 
emphasizes the limitations of the existing body of 
research, points to possible improvements in predictive 
technology, and evaluates public policies involving 
violence prediction only in the context of the feasible 
alternatives to those policies." (p. 10) 
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E^£e£_IX-44_tg_IXr65 
H.L-. Boucher, R,J, & Garofalo, RF (1972) tk 
diagnosis and treatment of dangerousness rr)ml2 j Th 
BeiinguericYj. 18 , 371-392. ’ £rjJ3ie_an<i 
nrli?eria °f dan^®rousness and guidelines for its 
prediction were elaborated. No teste; nr' u- 
examinations can dependably predict a probability of° 
dangerous behavior in the absence of an actual hL?L„ * 
potential for 
d^ger^sC^U^.f37°T,the t0 the ^--ly 
Eages_IX-67 to TX-77 
memorandum on the Prediction of dangerous 
Erom pages C-l to C-10 of: 
Schwartz S.J. & Stern, D.K. (1979). A_trial_oianual 
for civil commitments Mental Health Legal Advisors 
Committee, Boston. 
The authors present a model brief describing the 
inadequacies of the prediction of dangerousness by mental 
health professionals. 
REPORT WRITING 
I. General Issues 
A. Uses 
1* Clinical findings bearing on the issue: Reports 
on court ordered assessments in Massachusetts 
inform the trier of fact regarding "the clinical 
findings bearing on the issue..." (M.G.L. c. 
123, s. 15c). 
Record of the assessment: The report should 
provide a record of the clinician’s methods, 
data base, opinions and rationale. 
3. Explanation: The report should explain to the 
reader just how the clinician came to his/her 
stated opinion(s). 
B. Criticism of reports: 
1. Pollack describes this report as the "weakest 
link... in the relationship between mental 
health and the law" (1982, p. 79). 
2. The professional literature is replete with 
criticism of clinician’s reports on pre-trial 
evaluations (Pollack, 1982). Studies by Roesch 
and Golding (1980) and by Rosenberg and McGarry 
(1972) portray the following problems. 
3. Lack of rationale: Reports tend to offer just 
an opinion or just clinical data and an opinion, 
with no explanation of the thinking behind the 
opinion. No rationale. 
"[An opinion] is only as good as the 
investigation, the facts and the 
reasoning that underlie it" (Bazelon, 
1975). 
a. This practice leaves the reader with the 
choice of blindly accepting or rejecting the 
conclusions of the report. 
4. Addressing the wrong issues: Reports containing 
246 
247 
opinions on 
and/or conta 
was raised. 
issues not raised in the referral 
ining no opinion on the issue which 
a. This problem may be due to 
regarding legal standards 
the criteria for criminal 
competency to stand trial) 
confusion 
(&■g., confusing 
responsibility and 
EEQf&ssjLonai—jargoni Reports using abstract 
clinical phraseology or technical professional 
jargon without explanation, only serve to hide 
their message from the reader. 
6. QYerl^beliQgi The reliance on labels rather 
than describing actual behavioral observations 
obscures the basis for the opinion. 
a. E-g-, Describing "inappropriate affect" or 
paranoid ideation" without examples of the 
manifestations of these observations, leaves 
the reader in the dark. 
7. Extraoeous_materialj. Reports to court often 
contain material which does not relate to the 
question raised (e.g., reporting symptoms, 
diagnoses and history with no bearing on the 
psycho-legal question at hand). 
Some guidelines (adapted from Roesch and Golding 
(1980), and the Virginia Forensic Evaluation 
Training Manual) 
1. Focus of the report: In reporting "clinical 
findings bearing on the issue..." the report: 
a. focuses on clinical material that is relevant 
to the legal issue at hand; and 
b. demonstrates the relationship of the clinical 
material to that legal issue. 
1) The reasoning is the paramount 
contribution. 
2. Attribute facts to their source. 
3. Clearly separate clinical facts from opinions. 
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4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Avoid professional jargon If ii- * „ 
to use jargon, be sure®??'eXin. nsCessa^ 
Support inferences and conclusions regarding 
clinical issues with behavioral exilpiL® 
mental^illness51"10" re??rdinS the Presence of 
mental illness, especially in criminal 
r?l???r?he1men?TI1:?’ fr°m the °pinion which relates the ental illness to the legal issue. 
th?ti?eASt?uement °f the rationale or thinking 
that led to the opinion. Relate any signified? 
o^^LSs deficits to the leeal criteria 
8. Two opinions may be offered when: 
a. There are two equally plausible 
interpretations of the data. 
b. There are two possibly valid, competing sets 
or data (e.g. , varying descriptions of the 
defendant s behavior at the time of the 
crime). 
9. Separate_reports_in_Massachusettsi When both 
competency to stand trial and criminal 
responsibility assessments are ordered under 
section 15, two reports should be sent to the 
court. According to Commonwealth v. Rlai^Haii| 
a. The judge must seal, until the appropriate 
point in the trial, any incriminating 
information in the report (see Chapter III). 
1) It is often necessary to include 
privileged, potentially incriminating 
information in the criminal responsibility 
report. 
b. Either party may see non-incriminating 
information. 
1) There is no need to include potentially 
incriminating material in competency to 
stand trial reports. 
D. See report formats for competency to stand trial 
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II. 
and criminal responsibility on the following pages 
Report Format: Competency to stand trial 
The following format is recommended for competency to 
stand trial reports addressing issues raised in 
M.b.L. c. 123, sections 15b and 15c. Section 15a 
reports may require a modified brief format, 
especially when timelines are tight. This format can 
also be applied to reports on 1ST defendants 
committed under section 16 who have become competent 
to stand trial. 
The format integrates features from those used at 
Bridgewater State Hospital, Michigan's Center for 
Forensic Psychiatry, The University of Virginia's 
Forensic Evaluation and Research Center, and The 
University of Southern California's Institute of 
Psychiatry, Law, and. Behavioral Science. 
A. Identifying data: 
1. Demographics! The defendant's name, age, sex, 
race, marital status, date of birth, residence, 
number of previous admissions, hospital 
(clinic) identifying number. 
2. Admission: Legal status (i.e., section of the 
statute governing the commitment); criminal 
charges; date of admission; referring court and 
judge; reason for referral. 
B. Sources of information: 
1. Records and reports 
a. Arrest report. 
b. Section 15a screening report 
c. Hospital, clinic, school, jail and court 
records 
d. Other documentation provided by the defense 
attorney or D.A. (e.g., preliminary hearing 
transcript) 
2. Interviews: Include date and length of 
interviews with the defendant, witnesses, 
family or friends, the police, D.A. or defense 
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attorney, etc. 
Informed consent: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
regarding:1, explanation to the defendant 
Your professional status 
The reason for the assessment 
m^H«fHCt-tha^uthe defendant's statements 
made during the interview may be included in 
a report to the judge, and may be repealed 
by you in court. 
d. The fact that the defendant could refuse to 
answer any question or to even participate 
m the interview. 
2. Record the defendant's response, including 
his/her expressed understanding of his/her 
rights. 
D. Circumstances leading to the commitment: 
1. Description of the charges as described in 
police or other official report. 
2. Any unusual circumstances or behaviors (e.g., 
defendant tried to hang himself in jail; 
received a head injury during the arrest). 
• 
E. Background information: 
1. Psychiatric history 
2. Criminal history, especially prior experience 
as a defendant in court 
3. Prior assessments of competency to stand trial 
4. When malingering is suspected: Recent behavior 
observed by others prior to the commitment 
(i.e., behavior in jail) 
5. History of alcohol or drug abuse 
6. Synopsis of family background and lifestyle 
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F. Course in hospital: 
1. Behavior and interactions observed by 
nursing/ward staff Dy 
2' medications: Current and potential 
effect on competency to stand trial 
3. Response to treatment in general 
G' (<free1oftunevnfXamiSati0n: results 
exa^ unexplained jargon) of the mental status 
H. Understand 
to assist: 
ing of the legal proceedings and abi 1 ity 
lm Segin }*y fully citing the standard in 
Massachusetts for competency to stand trial: 
a. Whether he has sufficient present ability 
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding and whether 
he has a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against 
him" ( Commonwealth v_Vailes , 1971; 
Commonwealth v. Hi)l ,1982). 
2. Cite any other standards relevant to the case 
^ i-e., Coism2av;eajLiti_Y^_Lc>mbar:di , 1979, in 
cases involving amnesia). 
3. Criteria! Address each of the following issues 
using data and examples from the competency 
assessment. 
a. Understanding of roles of courtroom 
personnel. 
b. Understanding of courtroom procedure. 
c. Understanding of charges and potential 
consequences. 
d. Understanding of alternative defense 
strategies. 
e. Capacity to relate to attorney and 
participate in the courtroom process. 
f. Appropriate courtroom demeanor. 
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I. Summary and Conclusions: NOTF • , . 
“=1°" 
s0tlIbKetent t0 Stand <MrG°E.^t123,1B 
1. Opinion on the presence of 
mental defect: 
a mental illness or 
a. If you believe a major mental illness is 
present, a DSM III diagnosis is appropriate 
(see pages VII-12 to VII-14 and VIII-10) 
However, be sure to explain how you came'to 
your conclusion, including the historical 
and assessment data used in your 
formulation. 
2. Opinion regarding competency to stand trial: 
a. Rationale for your opinion (i.e., presence 
°f or lack of features of a mental illness 
which affect competency). 
b. Qualified competency: If your opinion that 
the defendant is competent is a qualified 
opinion, be sure to spell out circumstances 
under which you think the defendant's 
performance in court will be optimal. 
J. Disposition: If the court finds the defendant 
incompetent, the question of disposition is then 
raised. See Chapter XI. 
1. Likelihood of serious harm: The first concern 
here is the question of risk of harm due to 
mental illness if an incompetent defendant is 
released. 
a. See Chapter IX. 
b. Danger to self — suicidality: Note 
situational factors (if released) and 
current and mental status, past attempts, 
substance abuse, and defendant's statements. 
c. Danger to self - poor judgement: Describe 
why you feel that the defendant's judgment 
is so affected by mental illness that s/he 
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is unable to protect her/himself. 
Danger to others: Note high risk versus 
supportive situational factors if released 
Pa^rnsmo?tal StatUS’ hist°r^ °f -oWe! 
Sfth f r®sp°nse to stress, similarity 
with others who have been violent. 
Mention the limits of mental health 
professionais' expertise in assessing the 
likelihood of serious harm. 
2. 
1) If appropriate, balance this with a 
statement of your confidence in your 
assessment in this particular case. 
Treatment recommendations: Section 15c also 
^ks nfMtu'%def?ndant is in need of treatment 
m a D.M.H facility or Bridgewater State 
Hospital. 
a. If you're recommending that the defendant be 
found incompetent, offer: 
1) A treatment plan and prognosis regarding 
the issue of restoring the defendant's 
competency. 
2) A statement regarding the most 
appropriate setting for treatment to take 
place (i.e., outpatient, inpatient, 
Bridgewater). 
b. If you're recommending that the defendant be 
found competent to stand trial, you may 
still address treatment needs when 
appropriate. 
3. Strict security: Finally, if you are 
recommending that the defendant be committed to 
Bridgewater State Hospital, the recommendation 
must include an explanation of the need for 
strict security. 
III. Report Format - Criminal responsibility: The 
following format is recommended for competency to 
stand trial reports addressing issues raised in 
M.G.L. c. 123, s. 15b and 15c. Section 15a reports 
may require a modified brief format, especially when 
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timelines are tight. 
used llrZV°teratr. features from the formats 
Center for P S'tate Hospital, Michigan's 
V?rff?nif? forensic Psychiatry, The University of 
V rTS.F°rensic Eval^ation and Research Center 
'University of Southern California's 
Institute of Psychiatry, Law, and Behavioral 
ocience. 
For sections A, B and C 
trial report format. 
see the competency to stand 
A. Identifying data 
B. Sources of Information 
C. Informed consent 
D. Review of the alleged offense 
1. Official version: The circumstances of the 
alleged offense according to police and court 
documents. 
a. Be sure to include any descriptions of the 
defendant's behavior during and just after 
the incident. 
2. Defendant's version: Use direct quotes 
whenever possible. 
a. Situation leading up to the alleged offense 
b. Behavior and mental state prior to, during 
and after the alleged offense 
c. Other factual information 
3. Accounts from witnesses, victim(s), family and 
friends: 
a. Again, their descriptions of the 
defendant's behavior before, during and 
after the time of the alleged offense. 
E. Background information: Provide a synopsis of 
the defendant's personal background with special 
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attention to history of mental or serious medical 
and"!-?; zssr f°o&rhanisras 
historical information as relevant: 
1. Psychiatric 
2. Criminal 
3. Medical 
4. Drug and Alcohol 
5. Family 
6. Sexual and marital 
7. Vocational and educational 
F. Mental illness or defect at the time of the 
the^n^i ^U“mari2e results (free of jargon) of 
the mental status examination, psychological and 
laboratory tests. 
If the defendant is under a section 15b 
commitment course in hospital should be noted 
here. 
a. Note behavior and interactions observed by 
nursing/ward staff. 
b. Note treatment plan and response. 
Pay special attention to the presence and 
nature of symptoms reported by the defendant 
or others to have been present at the time of 
the offense. 
Consider the possibility of malingering (see 
Chapter VIII). 
Conclusion: If you believe a major mental 
illness is present, a DSM III diagnosis is 
appropriate (see pages VII-12 to VII-14 and 
VIII-10). Regardless, be sure to explain how 
you came to your conclusion, including the 
historical and assessment data used in your 
formulation. Describe which features of the 
diagnosis apply to this defendant. 
G. Criminal responsibility: 
1. Begin by fully citing the McHoul standard for 
determining criminal responsibility in 
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Massachusetts courts: 
a. 
conduot°ifiSs,?°^re^0nSible for cri">inal conduct if at the time of such conduct as 
result of mental disease or defect he 
lacked either the substantial capacity to 
appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) 
his acts or to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of the law " ( 
Cornraonwealth_v__McHgUl , i967> p> 555) 
Cite any other standards relevant to this case 
(e.g., Commonweakth_y\_Sheehan 1978 in 
cases involving drug intoxication). ' 
mlnloiani?Pini0n re^arding the presence of a 
mental illness at the time of the offense. 
i. NOTE: Before offering an opinion on the 
iuSU6i_0f criminal responsibility, the 
hreshold question is addressed here: Was 
the defendant suffering from a serious 
mental disease or defect at the time of the 
offense? 
>• If you believe the defendant was suffering 
from a mental illness at the time of the 
offense: 
1) Identify and explain the disorder, 
especially in terms of its effect on the 
defendant. 
2) Present the basis for your opinion 
(i.e., current mental status correlated 
with psychiatric history, past patterns 
of coping, and the accounts of witnesses 
and the defendant). 
Substantial capacity to appreciate 
criminality: Cognitive capacity. 
a. Address the question of the effect of the 
mental disorder on the defendant's 
cognitive capacity or control (see pages 
VII-16 to VI1-18). 
b. Carefully explain how you arrived at your 
opinion. Tie your statements regarding 
the defendant's mental state to his/her 
behavior at the time of the offense. 
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5. Lack of 
conduct: 
substantiai capacity to conform 
Volitional capacity. 
Address the question of the effect of the 
mental disorder on the defendant's 
behavioral control or volitional capacity 
(see pages VII-16 to VII-18). 
b. Again, carefully explain how you arrived at 
your opinion. Tie your statements 
regarding the defendant's mental state to 
his/her behavior at the time of the 
offense. 
c. In some cases it may be more appropriate to 
address this issue together with the 
cognitive capacity question. 
d. More than one version: If you are faced 
with more than one set of plausible facts, 
consider offering opinions based on 
scenarios reflecting each version. 
7. Confidence/Limits 
a. Offer a statement of your relative 
confidence in your opinion (i.e., relative 
to other criminal responsibility 
assessments you've performed). Explain. 
b. Cite any limitations or special 
circumstances which may have affected your 
results. 
1) NOTE: If the limitations seri ously 
affected your ability to form an 
opinion, you may prefer to simply offer 
your clinical data, omitting any 
opinion. 
H. Disposition: If the court finds the defendant 
Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity, the question of 
disposition is then raised (see Chapter IX). 
1. Dangerousness: The first concern here is the 
question of "likelihood of serious harm" due 
to mental illness if an NGRI acquittee is 
released. 
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a. See competency to stand trial 
above. report format 
2. 
Isks Tf 5 10ns: Section 15c also 
in a BttSf ?“J“n 13 in need of treatment 
Hospt 1 faolllty or at Bridgewater State 
a. If your opinion is that the defendant be 
round not criminally responsible, offer a 
statement regarding the person's assessed 
treatment needs. 
Statements regarding treatment should 
progress from general to specific 
recommendations, including the most 
appropriate setting for treatment to 
take place (i.e., outpatient, inpatient, 
Bridgewater). 
1) 
SAMPLE COVER LETTER: COMPETENCY 
TO STAND TRIAL EVALUATION 
May 12, 1986 
The Honorable James Jures 
Springdale District Court 
Springdale, MA 
Re: M.B. W.M.S.H. #87654 
Dear Judge Jures, 
M.B. was admitted to Western Massachusetts on 5/1/86 
under the provisions of M.G.L. Chapter 123, Section 15b 
Mr B was committed by the Springdale District Court for 
evaluation of his competency to stand trial for the crime 
of Larceny of a Motor Vehicle. 
Mr. B.’s competency to stand trial evaluation is 
completed. . Enclosed please find the 5/12/86 report of 
the evaluation. Below, I have provided a summary of the 
findings. 
SUMMARY_OF_FINDING£ 
PRESENCE OF A MENTAL ILLNESS: Mr. B. suffers from a major 
mental illness, namely Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type, 
Chronic. While Mr. B.’s mental status has improved in the 
short time he’s been here, I expect him to progress beyond 
his current level of functioning. 
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL: While I find Mr. B. to have an 
adequate factual and rational understanding of the 
proceedings against him, I believe that his mental 
illness, as described in my report, would presently impair 
his ability to communicate with his attorney in a rational 
manner, and to make rational decisions regarding his 
defense. Although I view him as currently incompetent to 
stand trial, I anticipate that his competency will be 
restored within a month or two. 
LIKELIHOOD OF SERIOUS HARM: The personal and situational 
factors cited in my report are, in my opinion, highly 
indicative that Mr. B. , if released in his current mental 
state, will present a likelihood of serious harm to 
persons involved with him. 
259 
260 
TREATMENT RECOMMENDATIONS• Mr- n u 
the- fo iu ?.UNbl Mr- B‘ has responded well in 
psychotropic med^catiof arthL^ospitai116^^^^ *** llZTof f Sf • ^ • 1ikfih°0d. °f serious hi™, ^r 
of Mr B under tho* la ? .a Petition for the commitment 
Section 16(bt Pr°vxsxons of M.G.L. Chapter 123, 
Sincerely, 
C.S.T. Eval, Ph.D. 
Qualified Forensic Psychologist 
SAMPLE COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL REPORT 
May 12, 1986 
RE: M. B. 
PATIENT #: 987654 
DOCKET #: 56789 
D.O.B.: April 24, 1932 
RESIDENCE: Springdale, MA 
PREPARED BY: C.S.T. Eval, Ph.D. 
Qualified Forensic Psychologist 
IDENTIFYING DATA AND REFERRAL: This is the fourth Western 
Massachusetts State Hospital referral for Mr. B. a 30 
°id’ male who was born on May 1, 1956 
in Boston. Charged with Larceny of a Motor Vehicle, in 
Springdale District Court, Mr. B. was committed by Judge 
Jures here on May 1, 1986 under M.G.L. c. 123, s. 15b for 
assessment of his competency to stand trial. 
SOURCES OF INFORMATION: This report is based on 
information obtained from interviews with Mr. B. on May 5, 
7 and 8, the records of his previous admissions to this 
hospital; the arrest report; the section 15a competency to 
stand trial report written by Dr. Z. from the Court 
Clinic; and phone conversations with Mr. B.'s attorney, a 
social worker at the county jail, and a counselor at the 
Springdale Mental Health Center. 
INFORMED CONSENT: At the start of the interview, I 
explained to Mr. B. that I am a psychologist, that the 
interview was being performed for the purpose of rendering 
an opinion on his competency to stand trial, that a report 
would be sent to the judge, and that I might be required 
to testify at his competency hearing. I also informed Mr. 
B. that the results of psychological testing might also be 
used as part of the court report and future testimony. 
Finally, I informed him that he did not have to answer 
specific questions or he could refuse to participate at 
all in the interview. 
He indicated his understanding of this explanation and 
agreed to proceed with the interview: "What I say isn't 
between us and you're going to tell the judge. I don't 
have anything to hide. Shoot." 
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CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THIS COMMITMENT: 
cen?erinMrt0BMr; a V* cT>selor at the mental health 
center, Mr. B. bad been becoming increasingly agitated fnr 
M?ySBPri0,i1tH0 arreSt' The -Sh/of^is d f°r 
"ZZf^ Mf: ?■ called the center to complain about 
friends .listening to my thoughts" and his fear that these 
riends would find out that he works for the C.I.A 
According to the Springdale Police report, Mr. B was seen 
driving a car, which had just been reported missing by Mr 
laE£l0r?’ °n M?in St' at about midnight on April 30, 
198f' ^hen he saw the Police he stopped the car and 
waited for them to approach him. He got out of the car 
appeared to have been crying, and told police that he wks 
an agent. 
After his arraignment, he spent three days in the county 
jail prior to being sent here. According to Mr. S.W. the 
jail social worker, Mr. B. was a management problem. He 
was verbally threatening to other inmates who provoked 
him. Mr. S.W. felt that Mr. B. was hallucinating most of 
the time and that his interpersonal difficulties in jail 
stemmed in part from his "paranoid ideas." 
According Mr. B. s attorney, in court Mr. B. appeared to 
be hearing voices and he "made no sense to me at all. " 
He just rambled on about people thinking for him and 
about a social security check." 
According to the section 15a competency to stand trial 
report. Dr. Z. was unable to get Mr. B. to answer his 
questions. He is familiar with Mr. B. and described him 
as being "as psychotic as he ever gets. " Noting that he 
has assessed the issue of Mr. B's competency to stand 
trial once before and found him competent, Dr. Z. stated 
"this time I can't see how this man can assist in his own 
defense. He'd be unable to attend to the proceedings and 
probably be disruptive in court. " Dr. Z. also noted that 
he felt Mr. B.'s condition would deteriorate in jail since 
he refused medications. 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: 
According to our records Mr. B. is the youngest of three 
siblings, raised in an intact family. His mother is a 
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Maternal grandfather committed suicide while in » 
psychiatric hospital at age 4Q 5 !^u f a 
been diagnosed as schtzo^renL. ,ather'S SiSter has 
His parents report that while Mr. B.’s birth was nnrmai 
weeks°oldrandS ™ a car ^°ident when he ,as llo 
weexs old and remained hospitalized for th<=» r,oV-»- +-u 
months. They have always believed that thisthfee 
was harmful to Mr. B. They renort that h seParation 
"different " irrnm 4-U 4. • , report that he was always 
~ 1 ‘ From the time he was very young he was 
painfully shy and unwilling to interact with others 
Pr°blems began in the sixth grade when Mr. b' began 
to get into fights. While he maintained average grades 
unti! he dropped out of high school at age h there vere 
school 1for*dfour years0"001 ^ ~ ln - 
at'aL ^gannUSung drUgS (mariJuana and LSD) and alcohol 
untff h^'w*hlS T? reP°rt he was a heavy drug user 
ntil his first psychiatric hospitalization at age 21 
Since then he has favored alcohol, but has noticed that 
his drinking has diminished gradually over the last few 
years. 
Mr. B. has held three jobs, all between ages 17 and 20, 
none lasting more than two months. He says he could not 
deal with "bosses." 
He has a history of seven prior psychiatric 
hospitalizations, all at this facility. The first 
occurred in 1976. The hospitalizations were all in the 
range of 4 months, except for one which lasted one week. 
He has been consistently diagnosed as suffering from 
schizophrenia, paranoid type, or schizophrenia, 
undifferentiated type. He has been on a variety of 
psychotropic medications, and seems to respond well to 
Navane, an antipsychotic medication, when he is willing to 
take it. 
Six of his prior hospitalizations were prompted by 
volatile behavior, both assaultive (fists) and suicidal 
(one overdose of aspirin and one wrist slashing). In each 
case this behavior has been associated with his paranoid 
delusional ideas. 
At the time of his admission Mr. B. had been living 
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Since his ?Q7fi K ^ aPfrtm^t building for five months. 
h?1has 1 lved with parents only briefly. 
Contact with family is sporadic. He's developed a pattern 
of movmg fr°m this hospital to residences supervised by 
the_Department of Mental Health, then to independent 
living situations where he eventually gets off his 
medications and within weeks ends up in a crisis 
situation. Sometimes the Emergency Service program's 
intervention is adequate to stabilize him. When this does 
not work he ends up re-hospitalized. When he is stable 
and living m the community, Mr. B. spends most of his day 
at a mental health day treatment program. According to 
his counselor, when Mr. B. is regularly talcing his 
medication he does not express any paranoid ideas, is well 
liked, and participates actively in activities and 
treatment programs. 
This is Mr. B.'s first arrest for stealing a car. He has 
a history of three prior arrests: one for resisting arrest 
and assault on a police officer, and two for disturbing 
the peace. The charge of assault, when he was 22, led to 
a hospitalization for assessment of his criminal 
responsibility after he was found competent to stand 
trial. He was found not guilty by reason of insanity. 
COURSE IN HOSPITAL: 
On admission Mr. B. was described as "well dressed and 
groomed, well oriented, hypervigilant, angry, pressured 
speech, delusional (i.e., insisting that he was a 
transsexual C.I.A. agent) experiencing auditory 
hallucinations (i.e., 'the voice of accusation'), poor 
judgment, no insight." 
Mr. B. readily accepted medications, acknowledging their 
effectiveness in making the voices disappear. Within four 
days he was described by ward staff who knew him to be 
"back to his old self" meaning he was endearing himself to 
staff by helping out in chores and being generally 
cooperative. On the other hand, throughout this 
hospitalization Mr. B. has been hounding staff to make 
sure the doors are locked and has attempted to barricade 
the ward doors several times. As in prior 
hospitalizations, Mr. B. has chosen to isolate himself 
from most of the other patients, preferring one 
"confidante." 
Mr. B. is currently receiving Navane 10 mg. twice daily. 
This medication does not appear to sedate him, nor does he 
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suffer from side effects. 
MENTAL STATUS EXAMINATION: 
r. B. is a tall, thin, white male. His hygiene appears 
adequate, he is well groomed and dresses neatly. During 
the interview he was pleasant and cooperative. He’s 
oriented to person, place and time, appears to be of 
normal intelligence, and his memory for recent and remote 
events is intact. Mr. B. gave no indication of feeling 
depressed. He acknowledges past suicidal feelings, but 
explains that "my problem is others trying to hurt me now, 
not myself. His affect during the interviews, even-when 
describing emotionally-loaded issues, was restricted and 
of low emotional tone. This is in contrast to his bursts 
o± anger when provoked by other patients. 
Whiie Mr. B. has no difficulty concentrating and attending 
to others in highly structured conversations, when it is 
his turn to speak, a major communication problem 
reflective of his current disordered thought process 
becomes obvious. There were numerous occasions during the 
interview when the coherence and logical flow of his 
thinking, and subsequently his communication, were 
disrupted by a loosening of associations and strangely 
concrete thinking. For example, when he was asked to 
interpret the proverb: "Don't cry over spilled milk," he 
responded "don't cry over spilled milk, 'cause it might 
have been chocolate. Milk is white, our skin color is 
white. Not being prejudiced you might take it as an 
everyday thing. Don't cry 'cause you might get your face 
slapped." Mr. B.'s thinking and communication problems 
caused this assessment to last much longer than had been 
anticipated. 
In addition to the disordered form of his thinking, Mr. B. 
also experiences paranoid delusions of being controlled by 
other people's thoughts. He reported that there is a gang 
of people, including individuals he grew up with, and 
those he has met in this hospital and jail, who have been 
trying to control his mind and his life. He stated that 
"it’s like the gang that hangs out, I just seem like a 
good underdog, a martyr. I believe they’re trying to set 
me up to act out what their problems are because they 
can’t face up to it. They want to observe me, they want 
the thrill of using their knowledge to see what my 
knowledge is. They have mental problems, problems with 
the law and experimenting with drugs. " He indicated that 
this has been going on for years, dating back to his 
266 
childhood. "When I wont- -t-,-, ^ n , 
started understanding my thoughts8" *hey 
that "they were going to make®me think thf way"th^v^Td 
homosexuality, thievery, drug addiction " * d’ 
^w^eLs^fbfunsure of^Lr'or'not'L^Tc*! 
agent, but remains convinced that hi <3 l i ; , 
thoShtdU8 £° that "they"lhaieftolreId°rahisOW “ 
th?5S»= He fenies hallucinations currently, but sees 
n^nntL "PrSblera,?lnCe he Can not hear «hat "they're 
blocked^* 1 n0t explain why he wants the doors 
assistTANDING °F ™E LEGAL PE0CEEDINGS and ABILITY TO 
This assessment is based on the standard in Massachusetts 
for competency to stand trial: "Whether he has sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he 
has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him" ( Commonwealth v. Vailes 1971- 
Commonwealth v. Hill. 1982). 
Mr. B. was able to provide a reasonable explanation of the 
concept of competency to stand trial, indicating that in 
order to be competent he would have to "understand the 
attorney's terms, how I may help him, what I might be able 
to do in my best behalf. " He also indicated that he would 
have to know "the statue of the crime. " When asked what 
he meant by that he stated, "whether it's a felony or a 
misdemeanor." 
Regarding the charges, Mr. B. explained that he is charged 
with "stealing a car" and that he could be "sent to prison 
for a few years if they find me just guilty." 
He appears to have a basic understanding of the trial 
process, indicating that the purpose of the trial is to 
"find the guilty party. " He was able to correctly state 
that the role of the prosecutor would be to try to prove 
his guilt, while his lawyer would try to show that he was 
not guilty. He indicated that the judge would be "present 
for sentencing, " and that if there were no jury trial the 
verdict would be based on the "knowledge of the judge." 
Although his description of the roles of these various 
courtroom personnel contain peculiar verbalizations (e.g.. 
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that the jury makes the decision "by reason nf , 
choice voting") . , reason or multiple 
Of the proce^^ 
experience5^6111 bef°rS “d a^ears le-n^rom 
Regarding possible defenses and outcomes he explained thnt 
if he pleads and is found not guilty by reason 
insanity, he will probably be sent back to this hospital 
He also indicated that if he pleads not guilty he faces a 
charge^raight01 ead^t^ * ^ pleading g^lty to lesser cnarges might lead to only a few months in jail. 
ni^oOIJfh Mr' B' .demonstrated a basic understanding of the 
proceedings against him, it appears that his ability to 
assist his attorney in a rational manner is currently 
impaired As indicated earlier, this man's ability to 
°°”hVniCatu T 3 coherent< goal-directed fashion is a 
problem. He has great difficulty in sticking to a topic 
of conversation, particularly when stressed. This could 
impair his ability to rationally discuss his case wiShhis 
attorney and to remain focused on the trial proceedings as 
they progress. 
Even more significantly, Mr. B. 's thinking disorder and 
aPPear to significantly impair his judgment and 
anility to make decisions. This was demonstrated when he 
was asked how he would plead in his case. Although he 
seemed to have an understanding of the relative advantages 
of an insanity defense and a plea of guilty to a lesser 
charge, he was unable to balance these advantages against 
each other and to decide which was more advantageous. As 
he attempted to explain his rationale for choosing one 
plea or the other, his thoughts became increasingly 
disorganized. 
For example, when asked how he felt about pleading not 
guilty by reason of insanity, he responded, "I don't feel 
anyone has direct control of my Social Security funds 
except for me and Social Security. If I could make a 
thousand dollars here or get a job and a girlfriend. . . " At 
that point he stated "give me a second so I can get back 
to the subject." He then went on to say that "I would 
feel fine about being here as not guilty by reason of 
insanity, get away from the voices. Maybe six months. I 
know it could be a life commitment." 
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SUMMMY_MD_C0NCLUSI0NS 
PRESENCE OF A MENTAL ILLNESS: 
Based on historical information and the data from the 
mental status assessment, it is my opinion that Mr B 
suffers from a major mental illness, namely Schizophrenia 
Paranoid Type, Chronic. In his case this disorder is 
marked by digressive communication especially when 
stressed, impairment in his ability to think things 
hrough logically, a tendency to be preoccupied with 
persecutory delusions (e.g.,people controlling his mind) 
and auditory hallucinations (currently controlled with 
medications). 
While Mr. B.’s mental status has certainly improved in the 
short time he has been here, our past experience with Mr. 
B. at this hospital and community program records indicate 
that Mr. B. is likely to improve beyond his present level 
of functioning. It appears that while the features of his 
mental illness described here are chronic, the level of 
his impairment varies greatly. For instance, at his best, 
a level I fully expect him to reach within a few months, 
those who know him say that his communication problem is 
comparatively minor. 
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL: 
While it is clear that Mr. B. currently has an adequate 
factual and rational understanding of the proceedings 
against him, it is my clinical opinion that his thought 
disorder, as described in the above section would 
substantially impair his ability to communicate with his 
attorney in a rational manner and to make rational 
decisions regarding his defense. 
While I see Mr. B. as currently incompetent to stand 
trial, I fully expect that his competency will be restored 
within a month or two, based on his progress so far and on 
his past performance. As can be seen from comparison of 
the descriptions in this assessment and the report from 
Dr. Z. , as Mr. B.'s mental status improves he becomes 
increasingly more competent. 
LIKELIHOOD OF SERIOUS HARM: 
Three factors point to the likelihood of serious physical 
harm if Mr. B. is released at this time. First, there is 
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the data regarding his known previous assaultive and self 
destructive behaviors occurring when he was expressing 
US^°t|ial • ideas> as he is now. Second, the very 
nature of his delusions and behavior on the ward 
demonstrate that while he is improving, he is still quite 
delusional, his delusions make him very afraid, and by his 
own statement he feels that people are controlling his 
mind. Third, according to his past history, while he does 
respond to treatment and is usually well enough to be 
released after a few months, he has always made a gradual 
transition back to community living, beginning with the 
support of a supervised living situation. At this time 
there is no such setting available; Mr. B. would have to 
return to independent living. 
While the prediction of dangerous behavior by mental 
health professionals has been criticized as inaccurate in 
the professional literature, the personal and situational 
factors cited in the previous paragraph are, in my 
opinion, highly indicative that Mr. B. , if released in his 
current paranoid state, will likely misinterpret actions 
others directed at him as threats, and subsequently 
present a likelihood of serious harm to persons involved 
with him. 
TREATMENT RECOMMENDATIONS: 
My recommendation is that we let experience be our guide 
in this case. Fortunately Mr. B. has responded well in 
the past to the same combination of secure milieu 
treatment and psychotropic medication at this hospital. 
There is every reason to expect the same outcome this 
time. Therefore a petition for the commitment of Mr. B. 
to this hospital under the provisions of M.G.L. Chapter 
123, Section 16b has been initiated. 
SAMPLE COVER LETTER: CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 
The Honorable John Fair 
Springdale District Court 
Springdale, MA 
Re: Mary M. W.M.S.H. #98765 
Dear Judge Fair, 
Mary M. was returned to Western Massachusetts State 
Hospital on 4/20/86, under the provisions of M.G.L. 
Chapter 123, Section 15b, ordered here by Springdale 
District Court for evaluation of her criminal 
responsibility for the alleged crimes of Assault and 
Battery, Uttering, Publishing Checks, and Fraudulent Use 
of Credit Cards. 
Mrs. M. 's evaluation is completed. Enclosed please find 
the 5/12/86 report on her criminal responsibility 
evaluation. Below, I have provided a summary of the 
findings. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: 
MENTAL ILLNESS AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSES: Mrs. 
M. was suffering from a major mental illness at the time 
of the alleged offenses. She was experiencing an acute 
episode of a chronic condition, Bipolar Disorder, Manic, 
which is a substantial disorder of mood which grossly 
impaired her judgment and behavior. 
•\ 
CAPACITY TO APPRECIATE CRIMINALITY AND TO CONFORM CONDUCT: 
It is my opinion that while Mrs. M. would have been 
capable of appreciating the criminality of the alleged 
assault, she would not have had the capacity to conform 
her conduct, due to the effect of her mental illness. She 
was not able to control herself. 
As to the charges related to the checks and credit cards, 
it is my opinion that Mrs. M. would have been unable to 
appreciate the criminality of her alleged acts, and that 
she therefore would have had no reason to control her 
behavior. 
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™nt™EhLfth0MMEf ATI0NSi /Pledging the limits of 
mental health professionals' assessments of future 
dangerous behavior, I feel confident in this case in mv 
assessment of Mrs. M. as currently presenting a low risk 
for causing serious physical harm. K 
Mrs. M. is sufficiently improved for discharge from this 
hospital. Therefore, should Mrs. M. be found Guilty and 
placed on probation, or Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity 
I recommend that she be allowed to return to her 
apartment. Outpatient treatment and follow-up services 
described m the report are available to her and Mrs M 
agrees to make use of them. 
Should she be found guilty and sentenced to the House of 
Correction I suggest that Mrs. M. would not be able to 
tolerate the jail environment which would likely trigger a 
raP^j decompensation. In that case the recommendation 
would be to consider returning Mrs. M. to this hospital 
under the provisions of Chapter 123, Section 18a. 
Sincerely, 
C. R. Eval, Ph.D. 
Qualified Forensic Psychologist 
SAMPLE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 
May 12, 1986 
RE: 
PATIENT #: 
DOCKET #: 
D.O.B. : 
Mary M. 
987654 
56789 
April 24, 1932 
RESIDENCE: Springdale, MA 
PREPARED BY: C.R. Eval, Ph.D. 
Qualified Forensic Psychologist 
IDENTIFYING DATA: 
Mary M. is a 54 year old unemployed, white woman who is 
currently separated from her third husband. Mrs. M. * s 
current admission to Western Massachusetts State Hospital, 
her fourteenth, began on 1/3/86, when she was committed 
under M.G.L. Chapter 123, Section 15b for assessment of 
her competency to stand trial, by Judge Fair of the 
Springdale District Court. She was charged with the 
crimes of Uttering, Publishing Checks, Fraudulent Use of 
Credit Cards, and Assault and Battery. 
After being found incompetent to stand trial, Mrs. M. was 
committed under M.G.L. Chapter 123, Section 16b. She then 
was assessed to be competent during late March, and 
returned to court for a competency hearing on 4/20/86, 
when she was found competent to stand trial. On that same 
day she was sent back to this hospital, once again on a 
Section 15b commitment, this time for an opinion regarding 
her criminal responsibility. 
SOURCES OF INFORMATION: 
This report is based on interviews with Mrs. M. on 4/29/86 
and 4/30/86 regarding the issue of criminal 
responsibility; on telephone interviews with her husband 
Charles M. (4/24/86) and Officer Peace of the Springdale 
Police Department (4/25/86); and on review of the arrest 
report, the Section 15a criminal responsibility assessment 
by Dr. Forens, and Mrs. M.' s current and past Western 
Massachusetts State Hospital records. Mrs. M. refused to 
consent to release of her private psychiatrist's files on 
her for the purpose of this evaluation. I am unaware of 
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y sources which could provide information regarding Mrs 
Ms behavior or mental state at the time she was 
allegedly writing the checks and using the credit cards. 
Finally, my impressions are based in part on her mental 
status as she presented when I assessed her competency to 
stand trial in January. 
INFORMED CONSENT: 
At the start of our 4/29/86 interview, I explained to Mrs 
M. that I am a psychologist; that the interview was being 
performed to assist me in offering an opinion as to her 
criminal responsibility for the crimes for which she was 
charged; that a report would be sent to the judge, and 
that I could be required to testify at her trial. 
^ly> I informed her that she did not have to answer 
specific questions or she could refuse to participate in 
the interview at all. 
Mrs. M. indicated her understanding of this explanation 
and agreed to proceed with the interview: "Of course I 
know that, young man. I’m trained in law and you aren't. 
You people are afraid of your own shadows. Of course I’ll 
talk with you. So what if you tell them what I say. Just 
don’t twist my words." 
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ALLEGED OFFENSES: 
According to the arrest report written by Officer Peace, 
Charles M. requested police assistance explaining that his 
estranged wife had written checks in the amount of $15,567 
from a closed joint checking account, and was continuing 
to use credits cards from accounts which were also closed, 
charging $8,256 worth of merchandise. Mr. M. had 
presented documentation to the police and explained that 
he had closed the accounts after their separation last 
fall. Mrs. M. had been notified that the accounts were 
closed by certified letters from her husband’s attorney, 
which he noted she had apparently disregarded. Mr. M. 
requested that the police accompany him to her apartment, 
as he wanted to confront her but feared that the situation 
would get out of hand. 
Upon their arrival at her apartment, Mrs. M. offered them 
drinks, and appeared to be intoxicated. She made sexual 
advances to her husband who rebuffed her. She then 
attempted to disarm Officer Peace who quickly got out of 
her reach. Finally, as Mr. M. began to angrily discuss 
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the over $20,000 now owed, Mrs. M. turned suddenly and 
restrSned^Off* witl\ a closed fist. She was 
larg:aoh:nkboutfofCMr.P^ Tl*™ * 
called. By the time they arrived Mrs. M PWas screaming 
throwrng objects and calling the police "keystone cops"' 
and continuing to attempt to assault her husband. Mr M 
sustained a broken nose, scratches, bruises and lost a 
large patch of hair near his right temple. 
Mr2' M- was subsequently arrested and charged with assault 
and battery on her husband. Later, the other charges 
listed above were added after a Springdale bank confirmed 
Mr. M. s statement regarding the checks and credit cards. 
In our phone conversation Officer Peace described Mrs M 
as follows: "She smelled of liquor and that nice apartment 
was a mess. She had tears in her eyes when we arrived. 
Spoke quietly at first, and then became loud and angry 
after we began talking about the money. She really 
surprised me when she went for my handgun. She was very 
strong for a lady for her size. " He also reported his 
observations of her in court the next day. "She called 
the judge by his first name, refused to accept a lawyer 
and said she had been to law school and only had to pass 
the bar exam before she opens her law practice, so she'd 
defend herself. Upon hearing the charges she countered 
with her own: unlawful entry into her house by a 'paid 
police imposter,' sexual assault by her husband, and her 
husband trying to steal her million dollar inheritance. " 
According to Mr. M., he was "sick to death" of his wife's 
extravagance, that she had "again" gone off her medication 
and was "out of control" when he decided to divorce her 
last November (1985). Although he cared about her he 
could no longer support her, but he would give her a "very 
generous allowance." 
Mr. M. went on to explain that "things seemed to be going 
fine" until sometime in September, when they "rapidly fell 
apart." He said that one day she seemed depressed, 
"wouldn't talk," and the next morning she was "out with 
the credit cards. " After he left her and she was notified 
that he had closed the accounts she continued "to spend 
money that wasn't there." He received several complaints 
from the apartment building management that she was 
"trashing the apartment, running water in clogged sinks 
with water dripping into the apartment below hers." He 
had also heard that she had been "wandering around town in 
the rain and snow" without proper protective clothing. 
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£; “■ S^t6d tha\ he would have preferred to 
help another way, but when I called her doctor 
mentd? h t0 h|m’ th® Same with those e tal ealth people. 
"get her 
she 
emergency 
DEFENDANT'S VERSION: 
Two differing interpretations of the events surrounding 
the alleged offenses have been offered by Mrs. M since 
SS1^' The firSt was her description on' 
admission, the second is her current view. 
At the time 
account of 
consistent 
day of her 
charges, "I 
advances of 
would have 
never hurt 
of her initial admission Mrs. M. gave an 
the events surrounding the offenses which was 
with her account presented to Dr. Forens on the 
court appearance. Regarding the assault 
was only defending myself from the sexual 
these men. They didn't attack me but they 
if I hadn't acted, and I'm glad I did." "I 
my husband... I'm sure that he says I did." 
Regarding the charges involving the checks and credit 
cards she explained that her husband had been "brainwashed 
by people who want his money and by a woman who wants to 
be his new wife. Yes, I got those letters about the 
money, but they were forged, or maybe the lawyer was one 
of them. " She explained that she could "break the spell 
of his hypnosis" by ignoring the letters. She stated that 
only through devotion and counter legal actions could she 
convince the perpetrators" that she and her husband were 
as hopelessly in love as the day we were married" and 
that nothing could stop our love from being eternal." 
She said that her spending was necessary so that "Charles 
and I could set up a new love nest with new furnishings. " 
She insisted that her use of the checks and credit cards 
was valid although of course the law won't say so. " 
Mrs. M. went on to explain "You may think I was in a manic 
episode, but I wasn't. I was in good control of myself 
and I knew just what I was doing. " Regarding getting off 
her medication, she explained that she was having side 
effects and did not want to see her psychiatrist, so she 
simply stopped. 
In our interview on 4/29/86 Mrs. M. offered a different 
version. Acknowledging that she had assaulted her husband 
as charged, she described, with some anger, her feelings 
of humiliation and embarrassment when her husband and the 
policeman arrived. "Charles brought that young policeman 
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with Lira. I thought for sure he was bringing his pals 
around to show off his crazy wife. So I figured I'd eivp 
them a show" (referring to her sexual advances! She 
claims she had only one "quick drink when I saw them 
riKe^.StairS’" She d°es n0t under 
Regarding the checks and credit cards, Mrs. M. says 
tearfully that she is "not sure Charles really closed the 
accounts. "Would that bastard do that to me?" However 
S^.ackx}°^le^es receiving the certified letters, "quite' 
°Kfl^1u1' ^-She explains tl?at she now feels desperate 
* er financial situation and so she assumes she felt 
*£H ^Sn‘ ?he..?°es on to state that " 1 always know 
what I am doing. I must have just decided that if the 
checks and cards had Charles' name on them then the bills 
would go to him and he would pay. I must have been 
wrong " However, she also stated that "I can only guess 
what I was thinking back then. Everything was so 
confusing. Thrilling and exciting but also sad and 
desperate." Mrs. M. refuses to discuss her earlier claim 
that her husband was under some sort of "spell," that 
people were imposters and that another woman has designs 
on her husband. 
PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY: 
Mrs. M. has had 18 prior psychiatric hospitalizations 
since age 18. Thirteen have been at this hospital. Her 
record documents a repeating pattern of decompensation 
followed by hospitalization and a usual course of 
treatment. All of her previous admissions here were 
prompted by some extreme disruption at home attributed to 
her, or because of extreme overspending and misuse of 
checks and credit cards. There is no indication of any 
consistent precursors to Mrs. M. decompensations. 
After admission she usually refuses medications until she 
is civilly committed, after which she then usually agrees 
to treatment which over the past seven years has been a 
combination of Haldol and Lithium. Prior to taking 
medications she is described in the record as disruptive, 
hostile at times, delusional, hyperactive, hypersexual and 
oppositional. Once she is stabilized, which takes from 
one to two months, she is discharged. While in the 
community she usually refuses follow-up by community 
mental health programs, but agrees to "visit" one of 
several psychiatrists she has seen over the years. 
Periods of stability appear to last from six months to 
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three years 
Man^o-n S dia^nos®s on previous admissions have included 
Disorde^^nH1^ Psychosi^ Manic Type; Schizo-affective 
Disorder, and more recently, Bipolar Disorder, Manic 
While alcohol intoxication has been documented as a 
feature in her Past manic episodes, a recent 
duringSher*a stable"^ ** ^ ^ 
timed^hUllty °f Ut^ering three times in the past and each 
time she was placed on probation. She also has a record 
of three Driving While Intoxicated arrests and 
convictions, and has lost her driver's license on two 
occasions. 
OVERVIEW OF PERSONAL AND MARITAL HISTORY: 
According to a report from her parents in our records, 
Mrs. M. has been married three times. The first two 
marriages lasted only a few years. Her current husband, 
Charles M., has been married to her for 15 years. She has 
two daughters. One was given up for adoption at birth and 
one was adopted by Mrs. M.'s parents. 
Mrs. M.'s father is a retired physician, her mother 
assisted in her father's office and provided the primary 
parenting for all three children. Her family is 
financially well off and Mrs. M. has a trust fund managed 
by a conservator which allows her $2,500 per month. There 
is no family history of mental illness. 
Mrs. M. was the youngest of three daughters but her 
demanding nature got her a lot of attention from parents 
and extended family. Her parents describe her as always 
showing extreme ranges of emotion and behavior since she 
was very young. She was considered clever, creative, 
talkative and likable, except for her flaring temper. 
Mrs. M. attended several schools including nursing, 
teaching and law, but it is unclear as to whether she 
graduated from any of these programs. She was employed as 
a legal secretary, dental assistant and substitute 
teacher, all when she was in her twenties. 
According to her husband, who owns a travel agency, their 
pending divorce is the culmination of a marriage with a 
"long history of ups and downs." He describes their 
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nightmare when she was ill. Neither Mr M nor his 
to predict ^nHeiinszehivin 
stopping her medication^ S1Bns or warnlngs other than her 
COURSE OF CURRENT HOSPITALIZATION: 
Fn^‘-hh» Jefused medication when she was first admitted 
the first three weeks she remained hostile, loud 
demanding and refused to sit for interviews for more than 
one or two minutes. She paced constantly and rarely 
slept. At that time she appeared to be grandiose and 
delusional, citing her belief that her husband was 
participating in public sex orgies and that she was a 
m^11i?n?^reSS Wh° would soon "buy and sell this place 
and all the rotten doctors." While she denied 
hallucinations, she was observed, just after her 
admission, to be frequently talking angrily and sometimes 
shouting to herself. From her interactions with others 
she appeared to be well oriented to time, person and 
Place. Her speech was rapid and pressured, and she had 
great difficulty attending to any one topic in 
conversation. She showed instantaneous and extreme mood 
swings. One moment she would be crying and insisting the 
hospital was really "my morgue, " and the next she would be 
announcing the "new dawn of American idealism. " 
After she was found incompetent to stand trial and 
committed for treatment, Mrs. M. began to take Lithium and 
Haldol. At a periodic review of her treatment plan on 
March 15, she was described by ward staff as much improved 
although still fairly demanding and showing some outbursts 
of anger. By late March she had improved to the point 
that her competency to stand trial appeared restored. 
When she returned to the hospital after her competency 
hearing on 4/20/86, ward staff reported that she seemed 
relieved to be back on the ward. 
In our 4/29 and 4/30 assessment interviews, Mrs. M. the 
following differences were noted. She no longer seemed 
delusional, although when she became angered, which was 
often, she would make statements such as "Charles is 
having fun with my inheritance." However, it was 
relatively easy to calm her down at which point she would 
acknowledge that she was "exaggerating" and "just angry 
about the whole situation." When the focus of the 
interview moved away from her legal situation, Mrs. M. 
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became more relaxed and pleasant. She showed some 
increased insight when she stated at one point that u 
Wished she would stay on her medication becaCse tuho^h 
She is not mentally ill, her life has been dimcult 
the tranquilizers keep me calm." Her speech has 
down considerably, and most noticeably different, she was 
able to stay in our interviews and stay focused on itc; 
content for a full hour each time. 
CURRENT MENTAL ILLNESS: Our observations of Mrs. M. 's 
behavior, mental status and response to treatment, over 
the course of the last four months and her long documented 
psychiatric history confirm a DSM III diagnosis of Bipolar 
sorder, Manic on Axis I. This is a major mental illness 
characterized in Mrs. M.'s case by an unrelenting, if 
un reated, psychosis in which she experiences periods of 
elevated mood and extreme irritability, decreased need for 
sleep, distractibility, grandiose delusions, pressured 
speech, poor judgment and no insight. She is currently 
responding well to treatment and appears to be in partial 
remission. 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
The issue of criminal responsibility is considered here in 
light of the Massachusetts standard: "A person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of such 
conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he 
lacked either the substantial capacity to appreciate the 
criminality (wrongfulness) of his acts or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law" ( Commonwealth v. 
McHoul. 1967). 
MENTAL ILLNESS AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSES: The 
first question then is whether or not Mrs. M. was mentally 
ill at the times of her alleged offenses. Department of 
Mental Health Regulations (104 CMR 3:01) define mental 
illness for the purpose of criminal responsibility 
evaluations as "A substantial disorder of thought, mood, 
perception, orientation, or memory which grossly impairs 
judgment, behavior, or capacity to meet the ordinary 
demands of life - excluding alcoholism. 
Based on data cited above, from my interviews with Mrs. 
M. , my observations of the current course of her mental 
illness, my interviews with her husband and Officer Peace 
regarding her behavior at the time of her arrest, and 
based on the apparently life-long course of her mental 
illness, it is my opinion that Mrs. M. was mentally ill at 
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the time of the alleged 
suffering from the same 
Bipolar Disorder, Manic. 
assault on her husband, and 
condition identified above, 
??e questlon of her condition at the time she 
allegediy wrote the checks and used the credit cards, 
while we have no witnesses to her behavior or mental 
condition at the specific time, I believe Mrs M’s 
account of feeling confused, thrilled, excited, but also 
sad and desperate. Further, we have Mr. M.’s account of 
her behavior during the period of time covering the 
alleged buying spree. Also, buying sprees themselves are 
a common manifestation of Bipolar Disorder. Finally the 
alleged offenses are out of character for this woman’when 
she is in a stabilized condition. 
CAPACITY TO APPRECIATE CRIMINALITY OR CONFORM CONDUCT: 
With regard to the alleged assault on her husband, based 
on Mrs. M. *s current recollection of her feelings of 
humiliation and embarrassment, and her misperception of an 
exploitative purpose for the visit, I considered two 
theories: (1) that Mrs. M. seriously believed that she 
was in danger and struck out in self-defense; or (2) that 
whether or not she misperceived the purpose of the visit, 
her primary feeling was one of rage at her husband who was 
embarrassing, humiliating and abandoning her. The second 
theory supports the opinion that Mrs. M. , mentally ill and 
enraged though she was, probably did "appreciate" the 
wrongfulness of the act, while the first does not. Based 
on Mrs. M. 's own description of her feelings at the time, 
and her acknowledging that she exaggerates by making false 
statements about the situation when she is angry, it is my 
opinion that if she did assault her husband, she was able 
to appreciate the criminality of the act. 
However, I feel strongly that Mrs. M. would not have been 
able to "conform her conduct." It is clear to me that 
whether she was or was not able to appreciate the 
criminality of the assault, Mrs. M. would not have been 
able to control her aggressive impulse to attack her 
husband. I believe she was already hyper-irritable due to 
her manic condition and overwhelmed by her feelings at the 
moment. Even the presence of a policeman and the 
experience of past arrests was not enough to deter her. 
As to the other alleged offenses, there are also two 
possible scenarios. The first has Mrs. M. misinterpreting 
the notification that the accounts had closed as part of a 
plot to steal her husband away. She believed that she had 
to act as she did to preserve their relationship, thus 
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-SZjipZT'Z*£?'££ S& S2tSi2T£2*‘ 
covering former® ^ 
** *S mp °pi*?ion that neither theory taken alone fits this 
case. Considering that both Mr. and Mrs. M 's accounts 
describe her at the time as being in a manic sta?e 
hadf^hed> elat®d’ desperate, it seems unlikely that she 
husband CaOnCihy ly g° about gating back at her 
usband. On the other hand we cannot take lightly Mrs 
Ms own current view that she gambled and lost. 
1 believe that in her speedy manic confusion Mrs M had 
some sense that her husband did not want her to write 
checks and use the credit cards; but that she could not 
nnn?A-heHSelf+-£° absorb the true message of rejection 
h ncJel certified letters and the separation, and 
so she created a loosely woven, partially believed story 
or delusion (which she may still believe) which justified 
her actions. So, I suggest that she would not have been 
eble to appreciate the criminality of the money related 
offenses, and had no reason therefore, to control her 
behavior. 
In sum it is my professional opinion that Mrs. M. would 
not have been capable of conforming her behavior with 
regard to the alleged assault on her husband, and that she 
would have been unable to appreciate the criminality of 
the alleged illegal use of the checks and credit cards. 
According to the Massachusetts standard, I do not believe 
Mrs. M. could have been criminally responsible for the 
alleged offenses. 
LIKELIHOOD OF SERIOUS HARM: While mental health 
professionals are often inaccurate in their predictions of 
future dangerous behavior, I feel comfortable in this case 
in stating that in her current condition Mrs. M. is not 
likely to cause serious harm to herself or others. I base 
this conclusion on the following. 
Mrs. M. ’s current mental state is comparable to the 
conditions in which she has been discharged in the past 
with favorable outcomes. She has a place to go, her 
apartment. She has accepted, for the first time, a 
referral for follow-up care by a clinic which will 
coordinate her treatment plan in a fashion which may allow 
for successful intervention before things get out of hand. 
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Most importantly, she has nartin^^ j • 
diIlppo!ntmentMrshe' 
therapist together Sterols ^charged661"8 * 
TREATMENT RECOMMENDATIONS: Whether Mr. M < * 
Guilty and placed on probation or Not G,H it \f°nnd t0 be 
Insanity, I recommend tha? once released ^ y ?eason of 
j~ss ES- 
aggressive clinical intervention. episode with 
Shouid a sentence in the House of Correction be imposed I 
suggest that she would not be able to tolerate the jail’ 
environment In that case I suggest that the court 
onsider allowing Mrs. M. to return to this hospital under 
the provisions of M.G.L. Chapter 123, Section 18a. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Pages_Xr:32_to_X^4i 
"Functional Criteria for Competency Determinations" 
Erom pages 82 to 91 of: 
Roesch, R. & Golding, S.L. 
Urbana: University 
(1980). Competency 
of Illinois Press. 
_to Stand 
e authors critique a sample competency to stand trial 
report taken at random from reports collected as part of 
^ nnfStUd'H alS° present a sample of what they view 
as not an ideal, but a realistic, average report. 
EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY 
I. General Issues 
A. Expert witnesses 
1. Lay witnesses: Any person can be a witness. 
a. Witnesses testify to "facts" which they have 
personally observed. 
b. They cannot include their opinions, 
interpretations or beliefs in their 
testimony. 
c. Juries and judges, not witnesses, are 
supposed to draw conclusions on legal 
questions. 
2. When an informed judgment, based on the 
available facts, falls beyond the range of 
knowledge and training of the average person, 
the court calls upon expert witnesses (Keller 
and Green, 1981). 
a. The expert witness should have "specialized 
knowledge or skills which can assist the 
trier of fact" (Federal Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 704). 
3. The expert witness should have the skill based 
on training and experience to draw meaningful 
professional conclusions from the available 
facts. 
a. Restated: The expert witness' task is to 
assist and inform the judge and jury when 
their efforts to address certain legal issues 
are hindered by their lack of the special 
knowledge and skills possessed by the expert. 
b. The expert witness is an exception to the 
rule against witnesses giving opinions. 
4. The mental health expert witness assists and 
informs the court by testifying: 
a. about clinical findings of his/her clinical 
assessment; and 
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B. 
h. about his/her opinion as to how these 
findings apply to the legal questions at 
Mental h6alth expert witness testimony 
V90 g f^?m pre-trial assessments under M. G L 
c. 12J, sections 15 and 16. 
1. After the report is completed: 
a. Clinicians who performed section 15 and/or 16 
assessments on occasion may be called to 
court to testify on: 
1) mental illness 
2) competency to stand trial 
3) criminal responsibility 
4) likelihood of serious harm 
5) treatment recommendations 
b. Other expert witnesses: Clinicians who were 
not involved in court ordered assessments may 
be asked by one of the attorneys to assess 
the defendant and provide expert witness 
testimony. 
c. Testifying for the record: When the findings 
presented in the clinician's report are not 
being contested by either the prosecution or 
the defense, the clinician may still be asked 
to testify "for the record" or to assist the 
court in its decision-making process. 
d. Taking sides: More often, when a clinician 
is called to testify: 
1) it is because the issue is being 
contested; and 
2) s/he is being called by the attorney who 
feels that the testimony will support his 
or her position due to the facts and/or 
conclusions presented in the report. 
C. Taking sides?: Should the expert witness be 
impartial or advocate for a particular position? 
The answer appears to be "both." 
1. Prior to submitting the report the clinician 
2. 
performing the court-ordered assessment is 
clearly in a neutral position. 
Once the clinician comes to a conclusion on the 
clinical question before her/him, s/he is no 
longer perceived as being neutral on the 
question (Diamond, 1959). 
a. Exception: In some case clinicians may offer 
no conclusion at all or more than one 
conclusion. 
While the expert witness is called to testify by 
one side in an adversarial situation, his/her 
remains to assist the court and jury 
(Sadoff, 1975; Halleck, 1980; Bank and 
Poythress, 1982; Gutheil and Appelbaum, 1982). 
Given the nature of the adversary system, the 
expert witness is expected to advocate for 
his/her own opinion (Shapiro, 1984). 
a. The clinician's advocacy should be balanced 
by a flexible and open attitude toward new 
information and alternative explanations. 
5. Prior to testifying then, it is necessary and 
appropriate for the clinician to prepare his/her 
testimony with the attorney; but once on the 
stand the clinician's allegiance is to the 
court. 
The expert witness in the adversarial system: 
1. Gutheil and Appelbaum (1982) describe the 
adversary system as a "foreign country" to the 
clinician. 
2. The adversarial system is based on the 
Anglo-American legal tradition of a judge or 
jury determining the truth by observing the 
attempts of each attorney to prove his/her 
position (e.g., not criminally responsible; 
guilty). 
a. Within the rules of procedure and decorum 
established by statute, legal precedence or 
the judge, attorneys are expected to do what 
they can to: 
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1) prove their side is right 
2) prove the other side is wrong. 
3. When expert witnesses are involved, this "proof 
comes in the form of "persuasion" (Bank and 
Poythress, 1982). 
a. In the direct examination the attorney who 
calls the expert witness questions her/him in 
a manner designed to persuade the jury and 
judge of the validity of the expert witness's 
opinion. 
b. In the cross examination the "opposing" 
attorney's goal is the opposite: to 
invalidate the testimony through questions 
designed toward that end. 
1) Here the expert witness can expect a full 
range of intellectual and emotional 
challenges designed to destroy his/her 
testimony. 
4. "Cultural" differences between the clinician's 
system, mental health, and the adversary system: 
a. The mental health system usually relies on 
consensus to determine "truth." 
b. The mental health system's "case conference", 
is usually a courteous, supportive and 
collaborative setting for the clinician to 
air his/her views. 
1) When these norms are violated the 
clinician may choose from recourses such 
as confrontation, complaint or 
forgiveness. 
c. In the adversary system the clinician 
experiences both supportive collaboration and 
potentially vigorous attack on his/her 
qualifications, competence and professional 
and personal credibility - usually without 
recourse. 
1) When this type of attack (hopefully rare) 
occurs in the expert witness's system (and 
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m the real world) the "offense" 
seriously and personally. 
is taken 
In the adversary system, the attack is 
part of the opposing attorney's strategy 
to discredit or minimize the effect of the 
expert witness's testimony, and not to be 
taken personally. 
d. The case conference encourages the clinician 
to make a full presentation of his/her data, 
rationale and conclusions; whereas the 
adversary system places strict limits on what 
the expert witness can say. 
1) The expert witness must await the lead of 
the attorney or the permission of the 
judge to make a point or give a rationale. 
In the adversary system the expert witness 
must choose his/her words carefully for there 
may be no opportunity to correct unintended 
impressions, whereas the mental health system 
expects a certain amount of "thinking out 
loud" and even ambivalence. 
Each system has its peculiar "jargon." 
1) The expert witness is encouraged to avoid 
mental health jargon" or else must 
interpret it to the court. 
2) On the other hand, the expert witness has 
to become familiar with the courts' 
jargon. 
II. Preparing expert witness testimony: 
A. Prior to conferring with the attorney: 
1. Training in expert witness testimony should be 
commensurate with the level difficulty 
presented by the case. 
a. Expert witness testimony is a skill which is 
developed and refined over time (Rada, 
1981). 
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b. When possible, inexperienced clinicians 
should try to: 
1) Begin with cases which will hopefully 
involve fairly straightforeward, 
non-controversial testimony. 
2) Seek consultation and opportunities for 
practicing before going into court. 
3) Bank and Poythress (1982), citing the 
importance of the expert witness's 
presentation, suggest public speaking 
training, with practice under stress. 
Review clinical data thoroughly: 
a. Review the assessment report, the clinical 
record and any clinical notes. 
b. Become well versed in the clinical findings 
and the rationale for the opinion stated in 
the report. 
c. Identify weaknesses, real and apparent: 
1) Anticipate these being brought out in the 
cross examination. 
2) Develop a rationale which addresses 
weaknesses. 
3) Consider whether your opinion should be 
altered, given the weaknesses. 
3. Prepare a summary of notes and records for use 
during testimony. 
a. Any written materials brought to the witness 
stand may become evidence. 
4. Research and literature: Be as up to date as 
possible regarding the research and literature, 
both supportive and critical of the assessment 
and any other professional issues which are 
likely to be raised. 
B. Meeting with the attorney: This is a mutual 
educational process which should occur at least a 
few days prior to the testimony. The goal is to 
anticipate what will happen in court and plan for 
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effective testimony, 
discussion of: The meeting includes 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
The clinician's qualifications 
“•SSJdlASS.1**1 
The clinical methods used in the assessment 
opinions and rationales developed 
during the assessment 
in’ °r counterarguments to the 
clinician s opinions, and possible responses 
a‘ thS d*cision could be made to bring out 
these counterarguments and the clinician's 
responses to them during the direct 
examination. 
b. When an expert witness raises 
counterarguments to his/her own testimony 
and then disposes of them during the direct 
examination, the effect may be to 
inoculate" the testimony against attack on 
this issue (Bank and Poythress, 1982). 
The weaknesses anticipated in the other side's 
expert witness testimony 
The attorney's theory of the case 
The physical evidence, police and eyewitness 
reports 
What to expect from the judge and the jury 
What to expect from the opposing attorney 
during the cross examination 
a. When possible, the cross-examination should 
be rehearsed. 
12. Incorporating the above, what questions the 
attorney will ask the clinician during the 
direct examination 
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III. 
a. The direct examination should be rehearsed. 
In the Courtroom 
Clinicians involved in court ordered pre-trial 
evaiuations in Massachusetts under sections 15 or 
16 may be called to testify: 
1. before a judge in competency or commitment 
hearings; or 
2. before a judge and jury in trials in which the 
insanity defense has been raised or there is a 
question of diminished responsibility. 
B. Demeanor and presentation: The following 
recommendations are adapted from the following 
sources. Brodsky (1977); Gutheil and Appelbaum 
(1982); Shapiro (1984); and Bank and Poythress 
(1982). 
"The effective dissemination of 
information, at least on a practical 
level, is as important to courtroom 
functioning as having the knowledge" 
(Bank and Poythress, 1982, p. 174). 
1- Dress: conservative. 
2- EersQnal Presentation: The expert witness 
should present as honest, confident, frank, 
energetic, objective and non-defensive. 
3. A narrative, conversational style of testimony 
in response to open-ended questions during the 
direct examination is easier to follow and 
more effective than fragmented testimony. 
4. Take the time to think. 
5. Target of testimony: 
a. Address answers to the jury and/or judge. 
b. Address the jury as a assembly of 
individuals, not as a unified group. 
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c. Make eye contact with jurors and the judge. 
5 ^^id-BfiiaEhorai They may come back to haunt 
6. ^YQid_absoiutesi Never say "never" or 
always". 
V. Avoid_provocative_answers. 
8. Notgs... Refer to notes when necessary, but 
avoid excessive reliance on them. 
9. Close_eQded_auegtiQnai Questions calling for 
yes," "no," or brief answers with no 
opportunity to explain. 
a* If necessary, qualified answers, such as "I 
can give you a qualified yes", may get the 
attorney to ask for an explanation of the 
qualification. 
b. If you cannot answer with a "yes" or "no" 
say that you cannot. 
10. Hypothgtical_nueati2risi These are legitimate 
but tricky. 
a. Be careful. Ask for adequate details 
b. If the question does not fit the clinical 
data, point this out while answering (e.g., 
"If that were true in this case, then..."). 
c. Do not speculate in court as to the 
applicability of "hypothetical facts" to 
the instant case, but offer to re-assess 
the defendant in light of new information. 
e. Ask for more data if necessary. 
11. Objections: Do not answer questions when 
objections have been raised until the judge 
allows the question. 
12. Impossible questions: Inform the court that 
you cannot answer the question "as it is 
presently phrased." 
C. Expert witness's confidence in their findings: 
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1. Standard of proof?: 
are the domain of the 
clinician. 
Legal standards of proof 
jury and judge, not the 
2. Clinicians' confidence in their own opinion 
based on their relative confidence in 
(Diamond, 1985): 
is 
a. Expert witnesses may testify to conclusions 
which are qualified" or contingent" 
relative to 
1) the strengths or limits of the clinical 
data in a given case; and 
2) the strengths or limits of the clinical 
knowledge base. 
Terms such as "reasonable certainty" are 
misleading. 
If a clinician has chosen to draw a 
conclusion this does not mean s/he is 
certain" that the conclusion is "truth" 
(Rada, 1981). 
1) Most clinical conclusions are probable, 
contingent and based on data which are 
subject to alternative interpretations. 
b. "Certainty" or "confidence" here can be 
useful as relative terms: 
1) Being more or less certain of or 
confident in one's opinion than an 
alternative opinion. 
D. Qualifying as sin expert witness: 
1. The trial judge determines who can testify as 
an expert witness. 
a. The judge is concerned with the clinician's 
qualifications and with the probative value 
of his/her testimony. 
b. The decision on this issue is based on the 
clinician's training and experience . 
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2' tworforms:battleS °Ver *UalitNations can take 
a. The opposing attorney may challenge the 
clinician s qualifications as an expert 
witness, making a genuine effort to 
disqualify the witness. 
b. The opposing attorney may stipulate to the 
witness's qualifications, thus attempting 
to prevent the judge and jury from hearing 
about impressive credentials (Gutheil and 
Appelbaum, 1982). 
c. In either case the attorney who called the 
clinician will usually attempt to bring out 
the witness's strong points. 
3. Testimony on qualifications: The following is 
adapted from a list, developed by Keller and 
Green (1981), of issues which may come up 
during this phase of the testimony. 
a. Training: Where, when and how. A resume 
should be brought to court. 
b. Licensing/certification: Have dates and 
numbers, etc... 
1) In Massachusetts, while DMH regulations 
define the qualifications (see pages 1-4 
to 1-6) for psychiatrists and 
psychologists performing court-ordered 
assessments under M.G.L. c. 123, 
sections 15 and 16, these regulations do 
not apply to expert witness testimony. 
c. Relevant honors and special credentials 
d. Relevant employment history 
e. Publications, presentations at scholarly 
meetings, membership in professional 
organizations. 
f. Past professional experience with 
individuals with characteristics similar to 
the defendant's. 
g. The number of court ordered evaluations of 
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the issue at hand (i.e., criminal 
responsibility) the expert witness has 
performed in Massachusetts, elsewhere. 
h. Previous experience as an expert witness. 
i. Assessment procedures used by the 
clinician. 
Countertransference in the courtroom: 
1. Rada (1981) warns of expert witness's 
countertransference reactions which can 
ultimately affect the quality of his/her 
testimony. 
2. Sources: 
a. The adversary system: The newness and 
"cultural" differences. 
b. Friction and distrust between legal and 
mental health professionals may be carried 
into the courtroom where the legal 
professionals are clearly in charge. 
1) Mental health professionals have become 
increasingly affected by the "intrusion" 
of the legal profession into clinical 
matters 
2) These "intrusions" reflect lawyers' 
doubts about the mental health 
professions. 
c. Expert witnesses for the "other side" may 
bring out feelings of competition. 
1) The battle of the experts is unavoidable 
in some cases given the combination of 
a) the adversary system and 
b) the fact that clinical psychology and 
psychiatry are not "exact sciences" 
(Clements and Ciccone, 1984). 
3. Countertransference reactions which can 
seriously affect the persuasiveness of the 
expert witness's testimony include: 
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a. Hostility in reaction to perceived 
hostility of either attorney, and/or as a 
compensation for feeling inadequate in 
court. 
Identification with the aggressor - the 
cross-examining attorney 
Overadvocacy: Asserting one's position to 
the Point of being inflexible and closed to 
new information. 
d. Identification with the defendant: A 
defendant can elicit strong reactions when 
the expert feels his/her testimony may be 
painful or harmful to the defendant. 
e. Excessive humility 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Pages_XIr13_to_XI^16 
Brodsky, S.L. & Robey, A. (1973). On becoming an expert 
Is?U?s °5 “Mentation and effectiveness. 
Professional Psychol ngy, 3^ 173-176. 
The authors offer a conceptualization of expert witnesses 
as courtroom oriented" and "courtroom unfamiliar. " ?hey 
compare these two types of expert witnesses over three 
pre-triai, (2) on the witness stand, and (3) 
eaoh'are'noteJ PreParati0n’ ^titude and performance of 
Eages_XI-18 to XT-4ft 
Bank, S.C. & Poythress, N.G. (1983). The elements of 
persuasion in expert witness testimony. The Journal of 
Psychiatry_and_Law^ Summer. 173-203. 
Much has been written about mental health expert 
testimony, particularly regarding the scientific bases of 
testimony and the ethical questions which arise in the 
context of giving testimony. While the mental health 
expert may be perceived as helping the courts find the 
'truth' in the adversary process, the expert witness's 
impact may depend more on elements of persuasion than on 
the truthfulness of his or her formulations regarding the 
particular case. This article focuses on the elements of 
persuasion in mental health expert testimony, drawing on 
the social sciences literature, legal wisdom, and the 
authors' anecdotal experiences as forensic psychologists. 
Suggestions for increasing persuasiveness in testimony are 
given." (p. 173) 
Pages XI-50 to XT-80 
Poythress, N.G. (1980). Coping on the witness stand: 
Learned responses to "learned treatises". Professional 
Psychology. 139-149. 
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"This article describes the learned treatise tactic 
assaultleandUidta^fVe areaS possibly vulnerable to'such 
f d ld®ntlfles several of the potentially 
reWttins1then?d tre5t?;ses- Finally, recommendations for 
rebutting the learned treatise assault are provided." (p. 
SUGGESTED APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
Pages_Arl_to_A-8 
Outline and Flowchart of a Criminal Case" 
From pp. 1-8 of 
Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education (1983) Criminal 
Erastlcs_and_ECocgduEa_witt1_FoCma^ New England Law 
institute, volume 1. 
This outline first describes the court system in 
Massachusetts; then describes the legal procedures for 
offenses of differing seriousness; and finally it provides 
flowcharts of District Court and Superior Court 
procedures. 
APPENDIX B 
Pages B-l to B-5 
Legal_Qlossaryl Terms common to the courtroom which the 
forensic mental health professional are likely to 
encounter either in court or in the legal/mental health 
literature. 
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THE TRAINING PROGRAM 
General Description 
W9S pensive, eight-day training program, with 52 
i/2 scheduled class hours. While therl Is l grUt deal 
«Ln fent t0 be.absorbed through reading (the Training 
Manual is approximately 680 pages) and didactic 
nart??ati°n (31 bours)> this program emphasizes trainee 
involves^1™' Forty. percent of the program schedule 
trials Ld wees dlscussions- case conferences, mock 
trials and a forensic report-writing workgroup. 
Faculty 
This program focuses on legal issues, clinical 
the interaction of the two. Therefore, it is 
that program faculty include both attorneys and 
clinicians. 
issues and 
essential 
faculty attorneys would be responsible for 
training in legal standards and procedures, and the 
faculty clinicians for the clinical tasks and issues, 
several training sessions would include both faculty 
disciplines, providing trainees with a balanced 
presentation. 
faculty must be approved by the Assistant Commissioner 
for Forensic Mental Health. Faculty attorneys should 
have experience in criminal cases involving questions of 
competency to stand trial, criminal responsibility and 
related commitments, and especially in the direct and 
cross-examination of expert witnesses. 
Faculty clinicians must be Forensic Mental Health 
Supervisors, authorized by the Assistant Commissioner for 
Forensic Mental Health. 
Trainees 
The primary focus of this training program would be on the 
physicians and psychologists, throughout the state, who 
are interested in being designated by the Assistant 
Commissioner as "qualified" to provide evaluations and 
submit reports to courts under the provisions of M.G.L. c. 
123, ss. 15, 16 and 17. 
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However, the same training program could be offered to 
social workers and other mental health professionals who 
provide related forensic mental health services. Also 
involvement of judges and attorneys as trainees should 
also be considered. 
Class size Class size should be kept to a size which 
allows for trainee participation, with a maximum of 15 
participants. 
Please note that this program's focus is on the issue of 
pre-trial evaluations and related commitments. The 
following forensic mental health topics are not addressed 
1. Juvenile justice 
2. Aid to sentencing evaluations (Section 15e). 
3. Transfer of mentally ill prisoners to a D.M.H. 
facility or 
to Bridgewater State Hospital (Section 18a). 
4. The mentally retarded defendant 
5. Treatment issues in forensic settings 
6. Civil and probate court evaluations 
Further Preparation 
The training program described here provides a basic 
course in pre-trial evaluations and related commitments in 
Massachusetts. This program was designed with the 
presumption that its graduates will not be designated as 
"qualified" to perform evaluations and submit reports to 
court under M.G.L. c. 123, ss. 15, 16 and 17, until they 
have met the criteria listed below. 
Aside from the licensing and experience requirements 
described in the regulations, graduates of this course 
should complete the following: 
1. a training visit to Bridgewater State Hospital, a DMH 
inpatient facility, a District Court with DMH forensic 
services and a county jail; 
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a reasonable number of section 15a and 15b 
evaiuations, supervised by a forensic mental health 
Comma's 1^°r' 'l desiSnated by the Assistant 
Commissioner for Forensic Mental Health; and 
an examination given by a forensic mental health 
supervisor, which includes a written test. 
A further presumption 
program are designated 
is that after graduates of this 
as "qualified": 
lm they will participate in continuing forensic mental 
health educational opportunities; 
2. their forensic reports will be subject to review by 
the Division of Forensic Mental Health; and 
3. their forensic mental health work will be reviewed, at 
least yearly, by a forensic mental health supervisor. 
TRAINING CURRICULUM GUIDE 
DAY ONE: MORNING SESSION 
Introductions and Overview 
of Training Program 
TIME: 30 minutes 
PRESENTATION: By training program faculty 
TOPIC: Court-ordered Pre-trial Evaluations in 
Massachusetts: Brief Overview 
TRAINING MANUAL: Chapter I and supplementary material 
UNIT CONTENT: Sources in statutory, administrative and 
case law 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: Didactic - by faculty attorneys 
and clinicians 
TIME: One hour 
TOPIC: The Judicial System in Massachusetts 
TRAINING MANUAL: Appendix A 
UNIT CONTENT: 
A. Overview of the organization of the judicial system 
B. District and Superior Court procedures for criminal 
cases 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: Didactic - by faculty attorneys 
TIME: One hour 
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DAY ONE: AFTERNOON SESSION 
TOPIC: Mental Health Professionals’ 
trial Evaluations 
Participation in 
TRAINING MANUAL: Chapter II and supplementary readings 
UNIT CONTENT: 
A. Forensic evaluation versus traditional treatment 
roles 
B. Arguments for and against mental health 
professionals’ participation 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: 
A. Didactic - by faculty attorneys and clinicians 
B. Group discussion 
TIME: Two hours 
TOPIC: Privileged Communication and Fifth Amendment 
Rights 
TRAINING MANUAL: Chapter III and supplementary materials 
UNIT CONTENT: 
A. Constitutional, statutory and case law 
B. Ethical and legal guidelines 
C. Lamb warnings 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: Didactic - by faculty attorneys and 
clinicians 
TIME: One hour 
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DAY TWO: MORNING SESSION 
TOPIC: Competency to Stand Trial 
Procedural Issues 
Historical, Legal and 
TRAINING MANUAL: CHAPTER IV and supplementary readings 
UNIT CONTENT: 
A. Historical/developmental context 
B. Current legal standards in the United States 
C. Current legal standards in Massachusetts 
D. Procedure under M.G.L. Chapter 123, Sections 15, 16 
and 17 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: Didactic - by faculty attorneys 
and clinicians 
TIME: Three hours 
Day TWO: AFTERNOON SESSION 
TOPIC: Competency to Stand Trial - Clinical Issues I 
TRAINING MANUAL: Chapter V and supplementary readings 
UNIT CONTENT: 
A. The clinical task - an overview of the clinician's 
role and the parameters of the assessment 
B. The nature of competency to stand trial 
C. Barriers to competency to stand trial 
D. Clinical assessment techniques 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: Didactic - by faculty clinicians 
TIME: Three hours 
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DAY THREE: MORNING SESSION 
TOPIC: Competency to stand trial - Clinical Issues II 
TRAINING MANUAL: Chapter V 
UNIT CONTENT: 
A. Competency to stand trial assessment interview 
B. Answering the question 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: 
A. Videotape and/or role-played assessment interview 
B. Case conference 
TIME: Three hours 
DAY THREE: AFTERNOON SESSION 
TOPIC: The Detection of Malingering 
TRAINING MANUAL: Pages VIII—2 to VIII—5, and pages 
VI11-23 to VIII-59 
UNIT CONTENT: 
A. Likely settings 
B. Forms of malingering and differential diagnosis 
C. Detection 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: Didactic - by faculty clinicians 
TIME: Two hours 
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DAY THREE: AFTERNOON SESSION (continued) 
TOPIC: Amnesia 
TRAINING MANUAL: Pages VIII-6 to VIII-9, and pages 
VIII-61 to VIII-84 
UNIT CONTENT: 
A. Amnesia and pre-trial evaluations 
B. Evaluation, diagnosis and prognosis 
C. Treatment of amnesia 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: Didactic - by faculty clinicians 
TIME: Two hours 
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DAY FOUR: MORNING SESSION 
TOPIC: Criminal Responsibility - Historical, Legal and 
Procedural Issues 
TRAINING MANUAL: Chapter VI and supplementary readings 
UNIT CONTENT: 
A. The insanity defense: historical/developmental 
issues 
B. Current legal standards in the United States 
C. Current legal standards in Massachusetts 
D. Procedure under M.G.L. Chapter 123, Sections 15 and 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: Didactic - by faculty attorneys 
and clinicians 
TIME: Three hours 
DAY FOUR: AFTERNOON SESSION 
TOPIC: Criminal Responsibility - Clinical Issues I 
TRAINING MANUAL: Chapter VII and supplementary readings 
UNIT CONTENT: 
A. Overview - the setting, goals, barriers, and 
strategies 
B. Addressing the "threshold question": mental 
illness at the time of the offense 
C. Addressing the "criterion question": 
1. Linking the mental illness to the offense 
2. Applying clinical data to the legal standard 
3. Special assessment issues 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: Didactic - by faculty clinicians 
TIME: Four hours 
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DAY FIVE: MORNING SESSION 
TOPIC: Criminal responsibility - Clinical Issues II 
TRAINING MANUAL: Chapter VII and supplementary readings 
UNIT CONTENT: Clinical data gathering 
A. Sources of data 
B. The comprehensive clinical assessment of criminal 
responsibility 
C. Brief assessment 
D. The interview: structure and strategy 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: Didactic - by faculty clinicians 
TIME: Three hours 
DAY FIVE: AFTERNOON SESSION 
TOPIC: Criminal Responsibility - Clinical Issues III 
TRAINING MANUAL: Chapter VII and supplementary readings 
UNIT CONTENT: Answering the question 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: 
A. Sample case presentation with videotape or 
role-play of criminal responsibility assessment 
interview 
B. Case conference 
TIME: Three hours 
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day six morning session 
TOPIC: Clinical Conditions 
Assessments 
Significant to Forensic 
TRAINING MANUAL: Pages VII-12 to VII-14 
VIII-10 to VI11-22 
VII1-88 to VIII-IH 
UNIT CONTENT: 
A. 
B. 
Definitions of mental illness and DSM III diagnoses 
Relationships between certain 
and the legal questions raised 
evaluations 
clinical conditions 
in pre-trial 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: 
A. Didactic — by faculty clinicians 
B. Discussion 
TIME: Three hours 
DAY SIX: AFTERNOON SESSION 
TOPIC: Commitability of 1ST Defendants and NGRI 
Acquittees 
TRAINING MANUAL: Chapter IX and supplementary readings 
UNIT CONTENT: 
A. Legal standards and procedures 
B. Likelihood of serious harm 
1. Research and professional commentary 
2. Clinical assessment 
3. Offering clinical opinions 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: 
A. Didactic - by faculty attorneys and clinicians 
B. Case presentation and case conference 
TIME: Four hours 
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DAY SEVEN: MORNING SESSION 
TOPIC: Report Writing 
TRAINING MANUAL: Chapter X and supplementary readings 
UNIT CONTENT: 
A. Overview - uses , research and criticisms 
B. Guidelines and 
reports 
formats: Section 15a, 15b and 16a 
C. Report writing skills 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: 
A. Didactic - by faculty clinicians 
B. Small group critiques: Section 
reports written by trainees are 
groups facilitated by faculty. 
15a, 15b and 
critiqued in 
16a 
smal 1 
TIME: Three hours 
DAY SEVEN: AFTERNOON SESSION 
TOPIC: Expert Witness Testimony 
TRAINING MANUAL: Chapter XI and supplementary readings 
UNIT CONTENT: 
A. The mental health expert witness in the adversarial 
system 
B. Preparing expert witness testimony 
C. The expert witness in the courtroom 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: 
A. Didactic - by faculty attorneys and clinicians 
B. Expert witness testimony from a mock competency 
hearing, insanity defense trial and commitment 
hearing, performed by faculty, with critique by 
trainees and faculty. 
TIME: Four hours 
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DAY EIGHT: MORNING AND AFTERNOON SESSION 
TOPIC: Mock Trials 
UNIT CONTENT: 
A. Mock competency to stand trial hearing 
B. Mock insanity defense trial 
C. Mock commitment hearing 
PRESENTATION FORMAT: 
These sessions will involve mock hearings and trials in 
which trainees play the role of expert witnesses 
faculty attorneys provide direct and cross-examination 
Each session will involve multiple mini-hearings and 
rials, with critique and coaching by trainees and 
faculty. 
TIME: Three hours per session 
REVIEW FORM 
The following review form asks for your ratings and 
comments on the proposed training program and manual 
When you have completed this form please return it, in the 
envelope provided, to: 
Howard Lester 
30 Overlook Drive 
Florence, MA 01060 
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review form 
Reviewer 
Eact_I 
Beiow are eleven (11) items which refer to content areas 
of the training manual. Using the guide provided below 
Please rate and comment on hQW_adeauately you feel the 
manual addresses each content area. For each item, please 
CiCela the number on the rating scale which reflects your 
opinion. Then, please comment on the reason for your 
rating. * 
1 2 
INADEQUATELY LESS THAN 
ADEQUATELY 
3 4 5 
ADEQUATELY QUITE THOROUGHLY 
ADEQUATELY 
Please circle: 
1 for INADEQUATELY": The manual does a poor job of 
addressing this issue. 
2 for "LESS THAN ADEQUATELY": The manual attempts to 
address this issue, but falls short; it misses important 
points. 
"3" for "ADEQUATELY": The manual addresses the important 
points pertaining to this issue, but is lacking in depth 
and/or breadth. 
"4" for "QUITE ADEQUATELY": The manual does a good job of 
addressing this issue. 
"5" for "THOROUGHLY": The manual does an excellent job of 
addressing this issue. 
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1- Pre-trial evaluations in Massachusetts: 
case law, and D.M.H. regulations. Statutes, 
1 2 3 4 5 
INADEQUATELY LESS THAN ADEQUATELY QUITE 
ADEQUATELY THOROUGHLY ADEQUATELY 
Please Comment: 
Mental health professionals' participation in 
pre-trial evaluations 
1 2 3 4 5 
INADEQUATELY LESS THAN 
ADEQUATELY 
ADEQUATELY QUITE THOROUGHLY 
ADEQUATELY 
Please Comment: 
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3 Legal concepts and criteria involved 
determination of competency to stand tria 
in 
1 
the 
INADEQUATELY LESS THAN ADEQUATELY QUITF 
ADEQUATELY 
5 
THOROUGHLY 
ADEQUATELY 
Please Comment: 
4. Clinical issues and methods involved in the assessment 
of competency to stand trial 
1 2 3 4 5 
INADEQUATELY LESS THAN 
ADEQUATELY 
ADEQUATELY QUITE THOROUGHLY 
ADEQUATELY 
Please Comment: 
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5. Legal concepts and criteria involved 
determination of criminal responsibility 
in the 
1 2 
INADEQUATELY LESS THAN 
ADEQUATELY 
3 4 
ADEQUATELY QUITE 
5 
THOROUGHLY 
ADEQUATELY 
Please Comment: 
Clinical issues and assessment methods related to 
criminal responsibility 
1 2 3 4 5 
INADEQUATELY LESS THAN 
ADEQUATELY 
ADEQUATELY QUITE THOROUGHLY 
ADEQUATELY 
Please Comment: 
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tc?t h^VS!U6S in^iVed in the involuntary commitment of 1ST defendants and NGRI acquittees T 
1 2 3 4 
INADEQUATELY LESS THAN 
ADEQUATELY 
ADEQUATELY QUITE 
5 
THOROUGHLY 
ADEQUATELY 
Please Comment: 
8. Clinical assessment of "likelihood of serious harm" 
1 2 3 4 5 
INADEQUATELY LESS THAN 
ADEQUATELY 
ADEQUATELY QUITE THOROUGHLY 
ADEQUATELY 
Please Comment: 
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9. Report writing 
INADEQUATELY LESS THAN ADEQUATELY QUITE 
ADEQUATELY 
Please Comment: 
10. Expert witness testimony 
1 2 3 4 
INADEQUATELY LESS THAN ADEQUATELY QUITE 
ADEQUATELY 
5 
THOROUGHLY 
ADEQUATELY 
5 
THOROUGHLY 
ADEQUATELY 
Please Comment: 
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11. Rights of 
process. 
1 
INADEQUATELY 
Please Comment 
defendants in the pre-trial evaluation 
2 
LESS THAN 
ADEQUATELY 
3 4 5 
ADEQUATELY QUITE THOROUGHLY 
ADEQUATELY 
Please use this space and added sheets for further comment 
and recommendations. 
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EART_II 
aspects^of^thpS|X <6) itSmS address st^le “d structural 
aspects of the training program and manual. Please r«t* 
(circle) each item in terms of adeayac^ 6 
Further, please use the spaces provided below each itPm 
(and extra sheets if necessary) to explain what chan 
you would recommend. Please be as specie as pos“Kt 
Format of the training program 
1 2 3 4 5 
INADEQUATE LESS THAN 
ADEQUATE 
ADEQUATE QUITE 
ADEQUATE 
COMPLETELY 
ADEQUATE 
P1ease Comment: 
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2. Time allotted for the training program 
1 2 
inadequate less than 
ADEQUATE 
3 4 5 
ADEQUATE QUITE COMPLETELY 
ADEQUATE ADEQUATE 
Please Comment: 
Training methods described in the curriculum guide 
1 2 3 4 5 
INADEQUATE LESS THAN 
ADEQUATE 
ADEQUATE QUITE 
ADEQUATE 
COMPLETELY 
ADEQUATE 
Please Comment: 
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4. Comprehensiveness of the training manual 
1 2 3 4 
INADEQUATE LESS THAN 
ADEQUATE 
ADEQUATE QUITE 
ADEQUATE 
Please Comment: 
5. Format of the training manual 
1 2 3 4 
INADEQUATE LESS THAN ADEQUATE QUITE 
ADEQUATE ADEQUATE 
5 
COMPLETELY 
ADEQUATE 
5 
COMPLETELY 
ADEQUATE 
Please Comment: 
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6. Materials provided in the training manual 
1 
INADEQUATE LESS THAN ADEQUATE QUITE COMPLETELY 
ADEQUATE ADEQUATE ADEQUATE 
Please Comment: 
Please use this space and added sheets for further comment 
and recommendations. 
CHAPTER V 
STAGE III: REPORT TO PART I 
The Report to P M 
As presented in Chapter III, this project was 
divided into three Stages: Stage I, the development of 
the training materials; Stage II, the evaluation of the 
training materials; and Stage III, which begins here, the 
final report to D.M.H. 
Stage I was described in Chapter III, from the 
development of the training materials, to Dr. Fein's 
review and approval to proceed with the project. The 
products of Stage I, the training manual and curriculum, 
were presented in Chapter IV. 
In this chapter, I begin the "Final Report" by 
discussing and evaluating the methodology of Stage II - 
the process in which "key individuals" (i.e., reviewers) 
evaluated the training materials. I will begin with an 
overview of the process, including a narrative of the 
events and decisions involved in my effort to "elicit 
review and comment from key individuals. Then I will 
report and discuss the results of that effort. 
Next, I will address the purposes of Stage II, as 
described at the end of Chapter I, in Goal 2: 
To elicit review and comment from key individuals 
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in the mental health and judicial systems in 
Massachusetts, for the purpose of: 
a. providing a basis for the Department of 
Mental Health to assess the adequacy and 
acceptability of the proposed training 
program. 
b. providing a basis for revision or redesign 
of the training program. 
In light of these purposes, I will discuss my 
methodology for having the reviewers report their "review 
and comment" - the review form. This will be followed by 
a consideration of the limitations of the data produced in 
their review. Finally I offer my conclusions as to 
whether or not Stage II can be expected to provide "a 
basis" for D.M.H. decision making and revision. 
In Chapters VI and VII, I present and discuss the 
data produced in Stage II. These two chapters report and 
discuss the reviewers' ratings and comments on the 
training manual and curriculum, respectively. Conclusions 
and recommendations are discussed. 
Finally Chapter VIII begins by addressing the 
question prompted by Goal 1, can the training materials 
"serve as a basis for training practicing mental health 
professionals to perform forensic evaluations..." (see p. 
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12)? Then I address the 
the training program, 
projects. Finally, I 
dissertation. 
next steps" - implementation of 
and implications for further 
end with a summary of the 
Stage II 
The_EvaluatiQn_Qf_The_Training_Materials 
After Dr. Fein reviewed the training materials and 
agreed to move to Stage II, his next task was to provide 
the names of individuals, whose review and comment he 
would value. In "Stage II" review and comments would be 
®licited in a fashion that would describe reviewers 
reactions to the two major pieces, the manual and 
curriculum, overall, and to their content and design. It 
was anticipated that, at the end of the project, Dr. Fein 
would have a solid basis on which to make decisions 
regarding adoption and/or modification of the training 
package. 
Events and Decisions 
As Stage II unfolded, political realities had begun 
to come into play. As Dr. Fein began to create his list 
(see Appendix B), he found it necessary to include 
individuals who, while their opinions regarding the 
training package were valued, would be unlikely to 
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complete the review. These individuals, seven (7) judges 
and the four (4) D.M.H. attorneys, were included, 
nonetheless, as a "courtesy", in consideration of their 
relationship with the Division of Forensic Services. Dr. 
Fein’s assessment was accurate. Of the ten professional 
subgroups of reviewers, the judges and the D.M.H. 
attorneys had the lowest rate of response, 30* and 25%, 
respectively (see Table 5). 
A second, important "political" factor, was the 
decision not to ask the reviewers specifically for their 
"ultimate conclusions" as to whether or not the training 
proposal should be adopted. D.M.H. could not be put in 
the position of ignoring" the advice of key people, on 
this major issue. The reviewers' overall assessment could 
be easily gleaned from their ratings and comments. 
A third decision, more strategic than political, was 
to send out the packages, along with Dr. Fein's letter, to 
all potential reviewers; rather than to make preliminary 
contacts regarding reviewers' willingness to participate. 
We felt that this approach would produce a higher rate of 
return, especially since the package was being sent out in 
early summer. Having the packages in hand, the reviewers 
might be more willing to participate. Follow-up phone 
calls would be made, to answer questions and encourage 
participation. 
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On June 30, 1986, copies of Efrtelal EvaiuM,^ 
mi-Rslatgd__£oBaitmSnta__ii3_Maaaaeb.usettS: a Tr-a^^r 
EroEosal were sent to fifty-three (63) reviewers. The 
reviewers' packages included the training manual, the 
curriculum, and the review form. These materials were 
covered with a letter from Dr. Fein, requesting the 
potential reviewer's participation in this project (see 
Appendix A), and an introductory letter from me (see 
Chapter IV), which explained the proposal and the 
reviewer's task. The whole package was presented in a 
looseleaf binder, with separators. 
Shortly after these packages were sent out, the 
reviewers received follow-up phone calls or letters, to 
offer further explanation and establish their willingness 
to participate in the task. Thirty-five (35) reviewers 
who were reached by phone or returned letters, confirmed 
their willingness to participate. The remaining sixteen 
(16) did not respond to phone messages or letters. Only 
one reviewer, a judge, stated that he would not be willing 
to review the proposal, due to the time that he felt a 
useful review would require. 
After the initial follow-up contacts were made, it 
was estimated that the bulk of the reviews would be 
completed within two months. However, only eight (8) 
reviews were received by August 30, 1986, two months after 
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the packages were sent out. Earlier that month, 
discussion with Dr. Fein and my dissertation committee had 
led to a decision to establish a September 15, 1986 
deadline. A second series of phone calls and letters 
notified the reviewers, who had not yet returned reviews, 
of this cut-off date. It appears that setting a deadline 
was an effective strategy. 
(However, data from reviews received after that 
date, but prior to the completion of the dissertation, 
have been included. Further, it i^ anticipated that any 
reviews received beyond that point, might still be useful 
to Dr. Fein for decision making and modification of the 
manual and/or curriculum.) 
Response._Ratesj_ Results and Discussion 
Of the fifty-three (53) individuals who received 
requests to review the training proposal, thirty-two (32) 
responded. Table 5 presents a breakdown, by professional 
category and specific discipline, of the reviewers who 
responded in any form. 
Of the remaining twenty-one (21) reviewers who did 
not respond, seven (7) indicated progress on their reviews 
and intentions to complete them, but could not commit 
themselves to a deadline. Four (4) others had not begun 
their reviews due to busy schedules, but intended to 
complete their reviews in the future; one (1) declined to 
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participate; and nine (9) have not responded at all. 
Table 6 shows the status, by professional category of the 
reviews not received. 
Table 7 presents a further breakdown, by 
professional category, of reviewers' responses. Of the 
thirty-two (32) reviews received, twenty (20) reviewers 
had completed the review form; five (5) gave telephoned 
responses, of which two (2) were from people who had 
mailed review forms which were never received; the 
remaining seven (7) chose to respond by letter. Five of 
these letters were detailed reviews. Finally, one 
rev^®wer, the only D.M.H. attorney to respond, returned 
not only a review form, but also corrected pages from the 
training manual. 
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Table 5 
Responding Reviewers 
Pr°f®?sional Categories Number of Reviewers 
and Disciplines 
Original Responding Rate of 
Sample Reviewers Response 
Legal 25 11 40% 
Judges 10 3 30% 
D.M.H. Attorneys 4 1 25% 
District Attorneys 4 3 75% 
Defense Attorneys 7 4 57% 
Forensic Mental Health 20 16 80% 
Psychologists 11 8 73% 
Psychiatrists 7 6 86% 
M.S.W. Social Workers 2 2 100% 
Prospective Trainees 8 5 63% 
Psychologists 3 2 66% 
Psychiatrists 3 1 33% 
M.S.W. Social Workers 2 2 100% 
Total 53 32 60% 
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T ab1e 6 
Reviews Not Returned 
Professional Category Status of Reviews Not Returned 
In 
Progress 
Not Yet 
Begun 
No 
Response 
Declined 
Legal 3 2 8 1 
Forensic 
Mental Health 
1 2 1 
- 
Prospective 
Trainee 
3 - 
- 
- 
Total 7 4 9 1 
Table 7 
Reviewers' Responses 
Professional Number and Form of Reviewers' Responses 
Category 
Review Letter Phone 
Form Response 
Legal 5 
Forensic 10 
Mental Health 
Prospective 5 
Trainee 
5 
2 
1 
4 
Total 20 7 5 
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From the fifty-three (53) individuals who received 
reviews we expected 35 responses (66%). This was based on 
our assessment of each reviewer's ■■likeiihood of 
response. Further, while the emphasis of this project 
was on the responses of the reviewers as individuals, 
rather than as a group, we decided that it would be 
impractical to tie the completion of the project to the 
responsiveness of specific people. Therefore Dr. Fein 
agreed that the following breakdown of responses received 
would be adequate for his decision-making purposes: ten 
(10) legal professionals; ten (10) forensic mental health 
professionals; and five (5) prospective trainees. 
These goals were attained. Eleven (11) legal 
professionals, sixteen (16) forensic mental health 
professionals, and five (5) prospective trainees responded 
(see table 5). However, these results combine review 
forms, letters and phone responses. Optimally, all 
responses would have been on the review form. 
The actual return rate was 60%, slightly below our 
expectation of 66%. When the eleven (11) "courtesy 
reviewers" are dropped from the total, the expected return 
rate becomes 83%, and the actual return rate was 76%. 
Also, of the twenty-one (21) reviewers who did not 
respond, eleven (11) stated that they intended to complete 
their reviews, which were either in progress (7) or that 
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they had not yet begun (4). This could lead to an 
eventual rate of return of 79*. were all of these 
reviewers to come through. 
The forensic mental health professionals had the 
highest rate of response, 80% (see Table 5). This was 
expected for two reasons. First, the proposal dealt with 
tasks with which most members of this sub-group are 
intimately involved, on an almost daily basis. Second, 
several members of this group have been involved with Dr. 
Fein over the last year in developing the regulations for 
"qualified forensic psychologists," a task which has 
involved them in the issue of how to address the training 
needs of prospective forensic evaluators. 
The low rate of response from judges, as mentioned 
above was also expected. However, while we expected and 
received responses from three judges, the three we 
received were unexpected, coming from "courtesy 
reviewers. " Of the three we had expected to hear from, 
one judge still plans to complete his review, and two have 
not responded to letters and phone messages. As reported, 
another judge declined to participate. although he 
promised to be available for consultation on specific 
issues. 
The group of prospective trainees (8) were 
individuals who had expressed interest, to Dr. Fein or me. 
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m receiving training in forensic assessment. While five 
(5) returned reviews, the other three have all stated 
their intention to complete them. 
Finally, at this point one can only speculate about 
the nine (9) reviewers who never responded to follow-up 
letters and phone messages. It is possible that the 
strategy of not asking first backfired, in at least some 
of these oases. Also, some of the design problems 
described below, may well have played a part in this 
groups' non-response. 
Ea£tora_Which. May_Have Impeded Responding 
Stage II> from the point that the reviewers' 
packages were mailed, until the thirty-second response was 
received, took much longer than anticipated; and eleven 
(11) reviewers who intended to finish them, have not as 
yet. Why did the majority of the reviews take so long? 
What factors, other than those cited above, might have 
resulted in the lack of any response at all from nine (9) 
reviewers? Although the response totals were adequate and 
met our expectations, as noted above the definition of 
"adequate" was expanded to include not just review forms, 
but letters and phone responses, also. What factors led 
to this mix of responses? 
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First of all, the reviewers' task itself was lengthy 
and time consuming. They received over two hundred pages 
of material to review, much of which was new to the legal 
professionals and the prospective trainees. As Dr. Fein 
noted in his letter (see Appendix A), the reviewers were 
all busy professionals. Several stated during follow-up 
calls that they needed to be "pushed" to complete the 
task, which they felt would be valuable and interesting 
once they began - but a burden subject to procrastination, 
nonetheless. It seems reasonable to assume that other 
reviewers might have viewed the task less favorably. 
The difficulty of the task was probably compounded 
by timing. The packages were sent out at the end of June. 
Thus the review task had to compete with summer vacations 
and the lure of nice weather during free time. Three 
reviewers mentioned in the first follow-up that they 
intended to read the material "on the beach." Needless to 
say they did not. Further, for those who put their 
reviews off, the chance that they would forget, or that 
the task would go to the "bottom of the pile" probably 
increased. 
Another "timing" issue which may have affected 
several reviewers was an organizational change which 
occurred at Bridgewater State Hospital on July 1, 1986. 
At the time the list of reviewers was developed, ten (10) 
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of the forensic mental health professional reviewers held 
positions at Bridgewater. The changes led seven (7) of 
these reviewers to leave their jobs at Bridgewater, and 
begin in new positions - just at the time they were 
receiving the review materials. Three (3) other reviewers 
who stayed at Bridgewater found themselves immersed in the 
organizational transition throughout the summer. 
Finally, politics again became a factor in the 
follow-up contacts with the judges and district attorneys. 
Aggressive follow-up through repeated phone calls was 
simply not possible with this group. The D.M.H.’s need to 
maintain a good working relationship with judges and 
district attorneys was an overriding concern for me. 
Therefore, non-responders in this group received one 
follow-up phone call and one letter. Consequently, of the 
nine (9) reviewers who never responded in any way to this 
project, there were five (5) judges and one (1) district 
attorney. 
Did the Methodology Work? 
The following discussion will focus on the question 
of whether or not Stage II accomplished its objectives, as 
presented in Goal 2 in the beginning of this chapter - to 
elicit review and comment which can provide a basis for 
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D.M.H. decision making and revision of the training 
program. 
I have already pointed out that the review process 
in Stage II produced slightly less responses than we had 
expected (i.e., a 60% response rate, as compared with the 
expected rate of 66%). However, I also noted that it did 
attain the breakdown of responses, which Dr. Fein had 
agreed would be adequate for his decision-making purposes. 
The fact that twelve (12) of these responses were by 
letter or phone, while less than ideal because of the lack 
of ratings, had its advantages. These twelve reviewers, 
not limited by the structure of the review form, addressed 
issues and provided depth of comment, not seen on the 
review forms. 
To the extent that the response rate fell between 
these minimally acceptable standards and the level we had 
expected, I am satisfied that the review process in Stage 
II accomplished the first part of its goal - it elicited 
adequate review and comment. 
But, did the data elicited in the review process, 
"provide a basis" for the decisions to be made by D.M.H.? 
My focus now turns to the issue of the usefulness of the 
data collected - the ratings and comments received via the 
review forms, letters and phone interviews. I begin by 
addressing the review form's design problems, followed by 
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a discussion of the limitations of the ratings it 
produced. 
Ih£_Review Form 
It appears that the review form had design problems, 
which may have affected the quantity and the timeliness of 
the responses, and the precision of the ratings. The 
question of the resultant harm done to the ratings will be 
addressed momentarily. 
The review form can be found in full in Chapter IV, 
at the end of the training materials, just as it was 
located in the package sent to the reviewers. The form 
contained seventeen (17) items divided into two parts, 
presented earlier in Tables 3 and 4, which are presented 
again here for the reader's convenience. 
Reviewers were asked to provide both ratings and 
comments on each item. They were asked to rate the eleven 
(11) content areas of the manual in Part I of the form, 
and the six (6) items in Part II, which addressed "style 
and structural" aspects of the manual and curriculum. The 
ratings were according to a five point "adequacy" scale 
described in Table 2 (also repeated here for the reader's 
convenience). Also, at the end of both parts of the 
review form, they were asked to use extra space provided, 
for added comments and recommendations. 
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T ab1e 2 
Reviewers * Rating Scale 
Please_Circle_L 
"1" for INADEQUATELY": The manual does 
addressing this issue. 
a poor job of 
"2" for "LESS THAN ADEQUATELY": The manual attempts to 
address this issue, but falls short; it misses 
important points. 
3 for ADEQUATELY": The manual addresses the important 
points pertaining to this issue, but is lacking in 
depth and/or breadth. 
4 for "QUITE ADEQUATELY": The manual does a good job of 
addressing this issue. 
"5" for "THOROUGHLY": The manual does an excellent job of 
addressing this issue. 
While reviewers were not asked to comment on the 
review process itself, four (4) offered general comments 
on the design of the review form. Two (2) prospective 
trainees complained about the placement of the form at the 
end of the text. Both suggested that it would have been 
easier for them to respond to the items in Part I of the 
form, if the individual items had been presented on rating 
sheets placed at the end of each chapter. "It was 
difficult to remember my reactions to the first few 
sections. 
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Table 3 
Rating Form: Part I 
1. 
2. 
Pre-trial 
case law. 
evaluations in Massachusetts: statutes 
and Department of Mental Health regulations 
Mental health professionals' participation in 
pre-trial evaluations 
Legal concepts and criteria involved in the 
determination of competency to stand trial 
4. Clinical issues and methods involved in the 
of competency to stand trial assessment 
Legal concepts and criteria involved in the 
determination of criminal responsibility 
Clinical issues and assessment methods related to 
criminal responsibility 
V. Legal issues involved in involuntary commitment 
8. Clinical assessment of “likelihood of serious harm" 
9. Report writing 
10. Expert witness testimony 
11. Rights of defendants in the pre-trial evaluation 
process. 
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T ab1e 4 
Rating Form: Part II 
1. Format of the training program (curriculum) 
2. Time allotted for the training program 
3. Training methods described in the training program 
4. Comprehensiveness of the training manual 
5. Format of the training manual 
6. Materials provided in the training manual. 
This issue was followed up by a second, related 
criticism, raised by a prospective trainee and a forensic 
psychologist. Both stated that the items in Part I should 
have directly corresponded to the chapters in the manual. 
They should have simply been asked to rate and comment on 
each chapter. Some items were worded so that they related 
to more than one chapter; this was confusing. 
One reviewer noted that Item "11" seemed to be 
"mis-numbered". Three (3) others provided no ratings or 
comments, except for a question mark. 
Another forensic psychologist who sent a letter 
stated: "Unfortunately, I find that I cannot complete the 
rating sheets; the task is outlined with some imprecision, 
and this leaves me reluctant to participate in the 
'measurable' portion of the readers' responses. 
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Discuss ionj. The review form may have been designed with 
too little attention paid to how the reviewers might 
experience it. The form's deficiencies might have been 
averted through the use of trial runs. 
Designing the items in Part I of the form to 
correspond to "content" or subject areas, rather than 
simply to the individual chapters of the manual, was 
probably an error. Fortunately, in most cases the subject 
matter to which the individual items referred, was limited 
to specific chapters. This seemed clear to the reviewers, 
in all but Item "11". Also, Items "7" and "8" showed some 
overlap in comments; both referred to Chapter IX of the 
manual. 
Part I, Item "11" presented a good deal of 
confusion. Here, reviewers were asked to rate and comment 
on the "rights of defendants in the pre-trial evaluation 
process." Several seemed to be misled both by the wording 
of this item, and by its relative placement on the form. 
Since the subject matter was raised in six of the 
manual's chapters, I placed Item "11" at the end of "Part 
I". However, the manual's Chapter III, "Privileged 
Communication and Protection Against Self-Incrimination , 
was completely devoted to this topic, whereas the other 
five chapters dealt with defendants rights only 
incidentally. As noted by the reviewer who thought the 
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item was "mis-numbered", it logically should have been the 
third item, corresponding with the manual's Chapter III. 
However, while the wording of eight (8) of the eleven (11) 
items in Part I approximated, or matched the wording of 
the titles of specific chapters, this was not the case 
with Item "11". Thus the reviewers who thought that each 
item was meant to correspond to a specific chapter were 
probably thrown off by this item. 
I agree that the placement of "Part I" of the review 
form at the end of the review materials was also a 
problem. As two reviewers pointed out, it would probably 
have made the reviewer's task easier if the specific items 
not only corresponded to individual chapters, but if they 
had been presented on individual sheets at the end of each 
chapter. 
A related factor which may have caused some 
reviewers to ignore the review form, was the initial 
instructions, which may have inadequately directed 
reviewers to the form. An introductory "Note to the 
Reviewer" (see Chapter IV) was placed after the title page 
of the looseleaf binder containing the material to be 
reviewed. The second paragraph of this "note" tells the 
reviewer that the package contains the training manual, 
training program, and "a review form for your ratings and 
comments. " No further mention was made of the review form 
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m this note. From their comments it appears that three 
(3) of the reviewers who sent letters had completely 
missed the review form. 
Finally, given these weaknesses of the review form, 
information on the methods reviewers used in their reviews 
should be helpful in assessing the usefulness of the 
ratings. For instance, did reviewers wait until they 
reviewed all the materials to fill out the form? Did they 
then go back and review the chapters? Had they taken 
notes? 
An informal follow-up on this issue with ten (10) 
reviewers found that five (5) took notes and filled in the 
form later, while the others moved back and forth between 
the manual and the form. All ten agreed that the form 
could have been improved, by placing the questions at the 
end of the chapters. From this "informal follow-up" and 
from reviewers' comments on specific items, it appears 
that most of the twenty (20) raters who completed the 
forms transcended any confusion caused by the form. 
Limitations of the data 
Despite the review form's design problems, I believe 
the results will be useful for D.M.H.'s purposes; my 
reasons are presented in the next section. However, 
certainly any use of the review data should be tempered 
with an understanding of certain limitations, especially 
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with regard to the ratings. 
First of all, the ratings, while useful in certain 
respects (described below), cannot be used to develop 
meaningful statistical inferences. The sample sizes 
involved were quite small. They were too small, for 
instance, to determine the statistical significance of the 
differences among subgroup means, or among means on the 
review form's items. 
Next, the results (especially the ratings) from Item 
"11" of Part I, need to be carefully considered, due to 
this item's problems with placement and wording. 
A third concern is with the subjectivity of the 
ratings. While the rating task was not designed in order 
to obtain an "objective measure" of reviewers' opinions, 
it was hoped that the ratings would reflect their 
assessment of the "adequacy" of the manual or curriculum. 
In some cases, it appears that this did not happen. 
For instance, while a court clinic social worker 
gave a rating of "2" (less than adequate) all items on 
Part I, her comments on at least one item indicated that 
her rating was based not on how well the manual addressed 
the subject matter, but on the fact that the manual was 
too narrow in its focus, a more general concern which she 
states repeatedly (see Chapter VI). On the other hand, 
one forensic psychiatrist gave every item on the training 
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manual a rating of ”5" and offered almost no comment. 
These two examples, while not typical, raise the question 
of whether some ratings may have been based more on other 
unknown factors, than on the reviewers' response to the 
item at hand. 
Finally, it was noted above that there was overlap 
on items 7 and 8 of Part I, which addressed the legal 
and clinical issues, respectively, presented in one of the 
manual’s chapters (IX). This problem can be seen in 
reviewers’ comments on Item "8", some of which seemed to 
apply to Item "7". However, this overlap, does not appear 
to have had an adverse effect. The content of the 
comments was clear and easily applied to the correct item; 
the mean ratings, for the whole group and for each 
subgroup, showed virtually no differences on these two 
items (see Chapter VI). 
Conclusions 
I have already concluded that the methodology in 
Stage II was adequate, insofar as it elicited response 
from an adequate number of reviewers. In Chapter VIII, 
after my presentation and analysis of the review data, I 
address the question of whether or not the training 
materials themselves can "serve as a basis for training." 
My purpose here is to offer conclusions regarding the 
question: Given these limitations, could the data 
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produced by the review in Stage II have provided a basis 
for D.M.H.'s decision making? Put another way, was the 
methodology in Stage II adequate, given the purposes of 
this project? If the methodology was adequate, it should 
have produced ratings and comments that D.M.H. can be 
confident will accurately reflect the reviewers' opinions. 
First of all, with regard to the usefulness of the 
ratings, it is important to note that this was not an 
effort to determine what/any/group of similar reviewers 
might think of the training package; the effort was aimed 
at this specific group of individuals. 
The rating task was provided to assure that the 
reviewers would address "adequacy"; it was not intended to 
produce objective measures from which statistical 
inferences could be drawn, and on which final decisions 
would be made. While measures of central tendency were 
calculated to provide a "quick fix" on the whole group's 
opinions regarding "adequacy", the emphasis was always on 
obtaining specific ratings and comments from individuals 
whose opinions Dr. Fein would value. This was done. 
Thus, I would characterize the consequences of the 
methodology's deficits as "missed opportunities", and 
"questionable objectivity and precision", at worst. 
The following is an example of the value of the 
individual ratings in understanding the opinions of 
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individual reviewers. One forensic psychologist whose 
review form was filled with constructive criticism, gave 
ratings consistently in the "quite adequate" range. While 
his comments are useful as recommendations for 
modification, without his ratings, there would be no way 
to determine his opinion of the adequacy of the manual, on 
certain items. 
If the questionable objectivity and precision of the 
ratings remain a worry, the consistency of the mean scores 
and the quality of the comments should overcome any doubt 
about how this group of reviewers felt about the 
materials. As will be seen in the next two chapters, the 
rating averages were consistently close to, or more often, 
within the "quite adequate" range. Further, the comments 
were critical and constructive, and, as will be discussed 
momentarily, they certainly provide a useful basis for 
modification. Finally, Dr. Fein, who has followed the 
responses as they’ve come in, while reserving judgment 
until he receives this report, has described the 
reviewers’ comments to be most interesting, 
"thoughtful," and helpful. 
My conclusions then, on the usefulness of the 
methodology: The review form elicited a great deal of 
useful data, which was supplemented by the comments from 
letters and phone interviews. For the most part, the 
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reviewers "transcended" the form's problems. The comments 
and ratings presented in Chapters VI and VII, coming from 
individuals whose opinions Dr. Fein values, clearly should 
provide D.M.H. with a solid basis for deciding whether to 
accept or reject this proposal. 
One final question: Did Stage II's methodology 
provide a useful basis for revision or redesign of the 
proposed training model? 
As can be seen in the discussion and conclusion 
sections of the next two chapters, the review process in 
Stage II was quite fruitful in terms of stimulating 
constructive criticism and providing useful, applicable, 
suggestions. While a better review form design might have 
brought out even more ideas, should the proposal be 
accepted, the data produced should provide D.M.H. with a 
solid basis for revision. The issue of further 
development of the manual and curriculum, and implications 
of the methodology used in this project are addressed in 
the Chapter VIII. 
One last point with regard to the methodology of 
Stage II. In Chapter VIII, I also address implementation 
strategies. One of my major concerns with regard to 
implementation of the training program is the involvement 
of key members of the legal community in the programs's 
development. Without involvement by members of the bar. 
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from the very beginnings of this project, it is likely to 
encounter a great deal of resistance, as it brings changes 
to the daily interactions of mental health professionals 
and the courts. The methodology used in Stage II has 
addressed this concern by actively involving legal 
professionals from the very start. Even the judges and 
attorneys who never responded, were in a sense, involved. 
CHAPTER VI 
STAGE III: REPORT TO PART II 
THE TRAINING MANUAL: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In the last chapter, I began the "Report to D.M.H.", 
by describing the decisions and events involved in Stage 
II, the review of the training materials by thirty-two 
(32) key individuals". Then I addressed my methodology, 
concluding that, while the review form had certain design 
problems, overall the goals of Stage II were met. The 
methodology successfully elicited ratings and comment, on 
which D.M.H. can rely with confidence; and the ratings and 
comments can provide a basis for D.M.H. to make decisions 
about the acceptability and further revision of the 
training program. 
In this chapter I begin the presentation and 
analysis of the reviewers' responses, by focusing on their 
ratings and comments regarding the training manual. This 
presentation continues in the next chapter, in which I 
consider reviewers' responses to the curriculum for the 
training program. 
This chapter is organized as follows. After 
presenting reviewers' responses to the manual as a whole, 
I present their ratings and comments on each of the 
fourteen (14) items on the review form, which address the 
training manual. Then the responses to each item are 
353 
354 
analyzed, using a discussion/conclusion format. In the 
next chapter I follow the same procedure with the 
curriculum. 
Ratings are reported in terms of averages. Note 
that, while all thirty-two (32) reviewers provided 
comments, only twenty (20) provided ratings. Therefore, 
the term "reviewers" refers here to the set of thirty-two 
(32) responders, while the term "raters" refers to the 
sub-set of twenty (20) responders who completed review 
forms. 
For each item addressed, results are presented as 
follows: 
1. The mean ratings for all raters combined 
2. The ratings for each category of rater (i.e., legal 
professional, forensic mental health professional, 
and prospective trainee), which are presented in 
tables along with frequency distributions, range, 
median, modes, and mean ratings. 
3. Reviewers' comments. 
Finally, for the reader's convenience, Table 2, 
"Reviewers' Rating Scale", is re-presented here. 
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Table 2 
Reviewers * Rating Scale 
Please Cir<7l<=>: 
"1" for "INADEQUATELY": The manual does 
addressing this issue. 
a poor job of 
"2" for "LESS THAN ADEQUATELY": 
address this issue, but fall 
important points. 
The manual attempts to 
s short; it misses 
3 for "ADEQUATELY": The manual addresses the 
important points pertaining to this issue, but is 
lacking in depth and/or breadth. 
4 for QUITE ADEQUATELY": The manual does a good job 
of addressing this issue. 
5 for THOROUGHLY : The manual does an excellent job 
of addressing this issue. 
The Training Manual: 
Overall Assessment._Comprehensiveness and Format 
All Raters 
How did the raters, as a group. view the training 
manual, as a whole? The response by all raters, taken 
together. to the training manual as a whole, is 
represented by the combination of: 
1. Combined "content" means: The combined mean 
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ratings for items "1" through "11" of Part I, and 
Item "6" of Part II, on the rating form (see Table 
3), which refer to the content of the training 
manual; 
2. The mean ratings for all raters for item "4" from 
Part II (see Table 3), which addresses the manual's 
"comprehensiveness"; and 
3. the mean ratings for all raters for item "5" from 
Part II (see Table 3), which addresses the manual's 
"format". 
The combined content rating was 4.24. As a group 
then, the raters felt that the manual, taken as a whole, 
addressed its content quite adequately"; or, according to 
the definitions offered in the instructions to raters (see 
Table 2), "the manual does a good job." 
In addressing the manual's "comprehensiveness," the 
raters gave an average rating of 4.42, which is 
approximately halfway on the rating scale between "quite 
adequate" and "thorough." Ratings on the manual's 
"format" averaged 4.32, again "quite adequate." 
Professional Sub-categories 
How did each of the three categories of reviewers 
view the training manual as a whole? The views of the 
three groups, legal professionals, forensic mental health 
professionals, and prospective trainees, are represented 
357 
by: 
1. The combined content mean for each group. The 
combined mean ratings for items "l" through •'ll" in 
Part I, and Item "6" of Part II of the review form; 
2. the mean ratings on comprehensiveness and format 
for each group from Part II, items "4'' and "5"; and 
3. comments from the review form, letters and phone 
calls, referring to comprehensiveness, format, and 
the manual as a whole. 
Table 8 presents the combined content means, and the 
mean ratings on manual's comprehensiveness and format, for 
all raters and for each professional group. 
Table 8 
The Manual's Content, Comprehensiveness and Format’ 
Overall Ratings 
Professional 
Categories 
Combined 
Content Mean 
Comprehensiveness 
Mean 
Format 
Mean 
All Raters 4. 24 4. 42 4. 32 
Legal 4. 54 4. 75 4. 75 
Forensic 
Mental Health 
3.98 4. 20 4. 20 
Prospective 
Trainee 
4. 41 4. 00 4. 66 
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Lseai-Professionals! The five (5) legal 
professionals who provided ratings, averaged 4.54 on the 
combined content items. Only four (4) ratings on the 
issues of comprehensiveness and format were provided by 
this group, both averaged 4.75. This small number of 
raters then, hardly representative of even the small 
sample of legal professionals involved in this project, 
rated the manual as "quite adequate." 
This groups ' comments were positive and supportive 
when directed at the manual as a whole. Comments ranged 
from “overall adequate," to "quite good," and "a 
tremendous contribution to the education of judges and 
clinicians." A judge described the manual as "quite 
adequately reflecting the state if the law in 
Massachusetts," and "thoroughly addressing clinical 
issues, " while a district attorney viewed it as "good from 
a legal standpoint," but inadequate in assisting 
clinicians in presenting their opinions in court. 
There were only four comments directed to the issue 
of the manual's comprehensiveness by the legal 
professionals. A judge felt that the manual touches "on 
all issues of concern to the District Court." One 
district attorney felt that the manual presented a 
"comprehensive, but somewhat fractured discussion of 
competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility, " 
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unfortunately without elaborating. Constructive criticism 
came from another district attorney, who suggested that "a 
more complete precis" of each precedent-setting case be 
added, in order to "make the holdings more meaningful to 
the trainees.“ 
Regarding the manual's format, only one comment was 
provided by the legal professionals: a judge was pleased 
that the manual “covers difficult material in a concise 
outline fashion.“ 
FQrgna.iQ—Mental_Health Professional^: The ten (10) 
forensic mental health professionals, who provided 
ratings, averaged 3.98 for the combined content items, 
placing this groups' rating of the manual's overall 
content just below quite adequate. “ This average rating 
represents nine (9) raters who had individual average 
ratings ranging from 3.5 to 5.0, and one, a social worker 
from a court clinic, who provided a consistent rating of 
2, "less than adequate" (see Table 8). 
Most comments by this group were quite positive. 
Sample comments included "terrific" "excellent, thorough," 
"first rate job," "makes a real contribution," "very high 
quality, " "on the whole, a great piece of work. " Two 
forensic psychologists noted that they "learned a lot." 
One said that it "helped me clarify my thinking on various 
issues. " The one exception was from the court clinic 
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social worker mentioned above, whose criticism of the 
scope of the manual (see below) pervaded her review. 
This group’s ratings on comprehensiveness and format 
describe the manual as "quite adequate" on both measures, 
with twin average ratings of 4.20. 
Six (6) of the forensic experts commented on the 
manual’s comprehensiveness. Three (3) saw the manual as 
comprehensive: "A wealth of material presented in a 
comprehensive manner.“ Since the manual addresses the 
related issues of assessment of dangerousness and 
commitment to Bridgewater State Hospital, one psychologist 
suggested that the transfer of violent men from D.M.H. 
inpatient units to Bridgewater be included. 
Two forensic mental health professionals who work in 
court clinics were looking for more from the manual; their 
comments appeared to apply to the curriculum as well. A 
psychologist argued that the whole proposal seemed slanted 
toward hospital-based forensic evaluations. He pointed 
out that mental health professionals working in his court 
clinic spend forty percent of their time performing 
"aid-to-sentencing" evaluations for the courts (Section 
18a), yet this issue is not addressed. Further, the 
manual does not address the sensitive issue of the court 
clinician's day-to-day relationships with court personnel, 
especially judges. He notes that insensitivity to a 
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judge's philosophy with regard to pre-trial evaluations 
can have implications for the court clinician's 
effectiveness. He adds that the manual should also 
include juvenile justice issues. 
The court clinic social worker mentioned above 
stated that the manual "needs to be more inclusive than 
exclusive." Arguing that pre-trial evaluations 
constitute a minimum" of the evaluations mental health 
professionals are asked to provide for the court, she 
suggested including all evaluations clinicians might 
provide to the criminal, civil, probate courts. 
Nine (9) forensic mental health professionals 
commented on the manual’s format. It was described as 
readable, and the outline format and frequent use of 
references as most helpful." There were several comments 
concerning poor grammatical structure of the outline. One 
reviewer was frustrated by the pagination; another was 
annoyed by the use of "his/her" and "her/his." 
A forensic psychologist felt that there was "a fair 
amount of redundancy" in the citing of statutes. He also 
suggested using more of the actual text of laws and 
regulations, and less paraphrasing. Finally he felt that 
the issues needed to be addressed in a more consistent 
fashion. 
Prospective_Trainees: The five (5) prospective 
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trainees providing ratings (see Table 8) averaged 4.41 for 
the combined content items, viewing the manual as "quite 
adequately addressing its content, overall. Ratings on 
the issues of the manual’s comprehensiveness and format 
were in the same range, averaging 4.0 and 4.66, 
respectively (see Table 8). 
Comments from this group with regard to the manual 
as a whole, were all positive: "very thorough, 11 "very 
useful as a resource," "excellent reference text," 
"thoughtful." A psychologist in this group felt that 
beyond its training function, the manual could serve as a 
standard by which professional practice could be measured. 
The only comment offered with regard to comprehensiveness 
was that when completed the manual would be "unwieldy." 
This group offered several comments on the manual's 
format. One reviewer felt that the "2 X 2" organization 
of clinical and legal issues across competency to stand 
trial and criminal responsibility was "helpful to the 
reader in making essential distinctions." Another liked 
the "digests of historical trends" and mentioned that the 
outline style "makes organization and retrieval of 
material simpler than when reading text." The "flow 
charts" and "common outcomes" in the legal procedure 
sections were seen as helpful. 
Suggestions included: a cross-reference index; pre- 
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and post tests for each chapter; schematic diagrams and 
summary sheets; and more case examples for legal 
procedures. 
One reviewer pointed out that the writing style was 
uneven, swinging from a "studied formality" to informal 
language. Another complained about the repetition of 
similar legal procedures. Finally, several provided 
grammatical and spelling corrections. 
Discussion and Cnnnlj 
Table 8 and Figure 1 portray the overall picture 
with regard to ratings of the manual as a whole. Keeping 
in mind the limitations of the ratings, cited in Chapter 
V, it still seems quite reasonable to state that whether 
as a total group or within their respective subgroups, the 
reviewers' overall assessment of the manual was that it is 
"quite adequate" (i.e., that "the manual does a good 
job"). 
The relative mean ratings of the three subgroups - 
prospective trainees, legal, and forensic mental health 
professionals - are portrayed in Figure 1. The legal 
professionals, with one exception, consistently rated the 
manual higher than the other two subgroups. The forensic 
mental health professionals consistently gave the lower 
ratings (although still "quite adequate"), again with one 
exception. In both cases the exception was on Item "6" 
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MEAN RATINGS 
' ’All Raters 
Legal 
Forensic Mental Health 
Prospective Trainee 
5 
Thorough 
Quite 
4 
Adequate 
3 
Adequate 
123456789 10 11 456 
Part I Part II 
TRAINING MANUAL ITEMS 
Figure 1. Comparison of Means: Training Manual 
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which will be discussed later in this chapter. The 
reasons for this this pattern, legal professionals high, 
forensic mental health professionals low (comparatively), 
are not entirely clear. But there are some 
characteristics of each group which probably play a part 
and are worth noting here. 
This training manual addresses the "bread and 
butter issues of the forensic clinician's daily work. 
These clinicians practice at the interface of two 
professions — mental health and law - where they must 
develop not only expertise in the clinical issues 
addressed in the manual, but also a working knowledge of 
mental health law in Massachusetts. Thus from their high 
rate of response (80%), and the depth and breadth of their 
comments, it appears that this group was the most 
knowledgeable, and the most concerned about this project, 
and therefore the most critical. 
On the other hand, judges and attorneys are rarely 
confronted with issues that require them to develop "a 
working knowledge" of the forensic clinician's field. As 
reviewers they were assisting D.M.H., with much less 
personal "stake" than the forensic clinicians. The 
development of a training program might eventually affect 
some of their own cases (e.g., greater availability of 
qualified forensic clinicians); but, of the three 
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subgroups, the legal professionals were clearly the 
"outsiders". Their "distance" then may have resulted in 
their viewing the manual less critically. 
A comment from a judge who reports that he is about 
"half-way through", is quite telling: "A lot of this 
material is beyond me, but I’m pleased as punch that 
someone is finally tackling this issue, and so 
competently!" This judge went on to express some 
irritation with "your long drawn out review process, " 
insisting that I have delayed the implementation of a 
program that "is clearly superior." 
While reviewers were not asked to specifically 
address the issue of the overall adequacy of the manual, 
twenty (20) of the thirty-two (32) reviewers commented. 
Statements regarding the manual, as a whole, from all 
groups were quite positive. With one clear exception all 
the reviewers offered supportive comments, most strongly 
supportive, which can reasonably be taken together as a 
strong endorsement of the training manual. This strong 
support will be discussed in Chapter VIII, within the 
context of my conclusions regarding the complete training 
package. However, taken out of that context, the question 
arises as to how the manual might be used on its own - 
separate from a training program. 
Several reviewers commented on the manual’s 
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potential 
clinicians 
both for 
a "reference manual". Two forensic 
noted that they already are using the manual 
its factual information, and to help clarify 
issues. 
□sing the manual as a reference text would not mean 
a digression from its intended use. In fact the manual 
could have easily been labeled: "training manual and 
reference." One reason for my deciding to write a 
completely new manual, rather than to simply recommend the 
adoption of the Virginia version, was the need for a 
Massachusetts-specific" manual. While the need for 
training has always been the focus for this project, an 
apparent by-product is that for the first time, a text has 
been written which addresses the specifics of pre-trial 
evaluations in Massachusetts. Thus the manual is 
apparently useful to practicing forensic clinicians. 
The issue of the manual's comprehensiveness, while 
raising little comment from most reviewers, was apparently 
a major problem for two forensic mental health 
professionals, a psychologist and a social worker, who 
work in court clinics. They raise two issues. 
First, with regard to the "slant" of the manual, the 
psychologist did a good job in educating me through his 
comments about the manual's "hospital-based slant." This 
is made abundantly clear in his comments on report 
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writi-n6> which will be addressed later in this chapter. 
The manual was not intentionally designed for hospital 
based clinicians; rather, I omitted issues which are 
crucial to the court clinic professional - out of 
ignorance. 
While the manual addresses the clinician in court, 
it does so only within the context of the expert witness. 
As this psychologist points out, the clinician who plans 
to make the court his/her workplace needs to be sensitized 
to the pressures and politics of the court-house, which 
become factors that may affect their forensic evaluations, 
reports and recommendations to the court. The manual does 
not take the special circumstances of the court clinician 
into account. 
The second, related issue raised by the two court 
clinicians, and stressed by the social worker, is the fact 
that the manual (indeed, the whole training program) is 
limited in its focus to pre-trial evaluations and related 
commitments. The psychologist argues that 
"aid-to-sentencing" evaluations represent 40% of his work, 
and along with juvenile justice issues, should be added to 
the manual. The social worker argues that the manual 
should address "all the forensic evaluations" which are 
performed by clinicians. She notes that pre-trial 
evaluations "comprise, statistically, the minority of all 
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mental health evaluations" provided to the court. She 
suggests adding every evaluation addressed by the mental 
health statute, and others requested by the court, to make 
the manual complete. This clinician cites as the basis 
for her criticism, Dr. Fein's letter (see Appendix A), in 
which he mentions that the training proposal may become 
"the foundation of didactic forensic mental health 
training.” 
My sense of this issue is that the points are 
important, but that they are perhaps misdirected. Indeed, 
all forms of forensic assessment should be addressed, 
perhaps together in one training package. But this 
project was intentionally narrowly focused from the start. 
It was born out of a specific need - a training program 
for practicing mental health professionals to perform 
pre-trial evaluations - and it responds to that need only. 
The need for more comprehensive training should be 
directed to Dr. Fein. I used the term “perhaps 
misdirected" above, because it occurs to me that this 
review process may have functioned, at least in this case, 
as a forum for raising these issues with Dr. Fein. 
There were several helpful comments regarding the 
manual's format. The reviewers appeared to like the 
outline format, the descriptions of the flow of the legal 
processes, the assessment protocols, and the frequent use 
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Of legal citations and references. Recommendations for 
improving the format are addressed in my "conclusions", 
below. 
The repetition of some of the legal procedures in 
the manual's Chapters I, IV, VI and IX bothered two 
reviewers. However, their complaint is balanced by 
support for this "redundancyM by others. Actually, while 
there are similarities in these procedures, there was very 
little actual repetition. The manual's Chapter I offers a 
brief overview (some reviewers wanted more here) of 
procedures described later in the manual. Its Chapters IV 
an<^ describe the legal procedures involved in 
determining competency to stand trial and criminal 
responsibility and related commitments, respectively. 
These procedures are similar, but contain important 
differences. Finally, in its Chapter IX, th manual does 
repeat the commitment procedures described earlier, but 
only for the reader's convenience. 
Conclusions: The manual, overall, was viewed quite 
favorably by the reviewers. Given the modifications which 
are recommended in this chapter, it should be acceptable 
to D.M.H. (see my discussion atthe beginning of Chapter 
VIII: "Should the Proposal be Accepted?"). Further, 
beyond its training function, its use as a "reference 
manual," has been raised. This possibility should be 
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discussed further with Dr. Fein. 
The manual clearly needs to be modified to address 
the lot of the court clinic clinician in the pre-trial 
evaluation process. I will discuss this issue with regard 
to specific sections of the manual, later in this chapter. 
Several of the reviewers recommendations regarding 
the manual s format should be addressed. More of the 
actual text of the statutes and detailed summaries of 
court decisions should be included. Schematic diagrams 
depicting legal procedures, and summary sheets of each 
chapter s content should be included with supplementary 
materials. More use of case examples, a suggestion which 
comes up repeatedly throughout the review forms, should be 
provided. Finally, the prospective trainee's suggestion 
that "pre and post-tests" be provided for each chapter, 
should be considered as a learning aid. 
Training Manual: Individual Content Items 
The next section of this chapter deals with 
reviewers' responses to each of items "1" through "11" of 
Part I of the review form, and Item "6" (supplementary 
materials) of Part II. These are the twelve (12) review 
form items which address the training manual's content. 
Please note that while most of the items from the review 
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form correspond directly to en individual chapter from the 
manual, this is not always the case (e.g., clinical 
aspects of criminal responsibility assessments are 
presented in two chapters, VII and VIII). 
For each review form item, I present an overall 
average rating, representing results from all raters 
combined. Then I provide a table which summarizes the 
results, per professional group. Next, I present the 
comments from the rating forms, letters and phone calls, 
which relate to the item. 
At the end of this chapter, I present Figure 1, 
which compares the mean ratings for the items pertaining 
to the training manual as follows: 1) for all raters 
combined; 2) for the legal professionals; 3) for the 
forensic mental health professionals; and 4) for the 
prospective trainees. 
While the character of comments on the whole manual 
tended to be general and positive, the reviewers were much 
more focused when asked to comment on the manual’s 
content. Because most of the content of reviewers' 
comments deal with details, ranging from spelling and 
grammatical mistakes, through suggestions for rewording, 
to incorrect statements of fact, I report only summaries 
of these detailed comments, and more general suggestions. 
Finally, after presenting this data, I discuss it 
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offsr conclusions for each item. 
Part-L-Item-:ili "Pre-trial evaluations in 
Massachusetts: Statutes, Case Law, and D.M.H. 
regulations." 
This item addresses Chapter I, the overview, or 
introductory chapter. The mean rating for all raters 
(19), taken together, on Item “l" was 3.84, at the high 
end of the "adequate" range. A frequency distribution, 
and the means, modes and ranges of the ratings for each 
professional category, are presented in Table 9. 
Table 9 
Summary of Ratings - Part I, Item "1" 
Frequency of Ratings Per Professional Category 
Rating Legal Forensic Prospective 
Mental Health Trainee 
(n=5) (n=10) (n=4) 
1 
2 - 1 - 
3 2 2 1 
4 1 6 2 
5 2 1 1 
Range 3-5 2-5 3-5 
Median 4 4 4 
Mode(s) 3, 5 4 4 
Mean 4. 0 3.70 4.0 
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Comments from forensic mental health and legal 
professionals were almost all detailed corrections of 
errors in Chapter I. There were a few general themes 
which came up. Several commented on the simplicity and 
brevity of the chapter. Some comments were positive 
(e.g., "good. Simple"), while in others the reviewers 
seemed to be uncomfortable, but understanding (e.g., "no 
depth, but I understand the purpose"). 
Four reviewers criticized the sub-section, "Judicial 
Decisions." As written this section was seen as creating 
undo confusion regarding the jurisdiction and effect of 
federal court decisions. More depth was requested. 
The issue of leaving the responsibility for 
ultimate decisions to the court, was raised by a 
district court judge. He felt this should be raised and 
stressed in the first chapter. 
Several reviewers also felt that Chapter I needed 
more emphasis and elaboration on the two related issues of 
clinical opinions on the "need for treatment" provided 
under Section 15c, and commitability. 
The five prospective trainees were more general in 
their comments. They described the opening chapter as a 
"good introduction," "useful reference," and "very clear." 
One psychologist asked for more differentiation among 
administrative, statutory and case law. A social worker, 
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noting several references to D.M.H. regulations and 
definitions, which are not explained in the chapter, 
complained about "overemphasis on what is undefined." 
Piscussij3n__and Conclusions: 
This item, which addresses the manual's Chapter I, 
the overview chapter, received the lowest combined mean 
rating, 3.84, of all seventeen (17) items on the review 
form, placing it at the high end of the "adequate" range. 
Before discussing the internal factors which led to 
these comparatively low ratings, I think that it is worth 
noting here that three (3) out of the four (4) lowest 
combined mean ratings were on items covering the first 
three chapters of the manual. These three chapters are, 
in a sense, "accouterments" to the main offering of the 
manual, which come in chapters IV through XI. They were 
also the last to be written. These are commonalities; 
whether or not they were factors, is unclear. 
Aside from a few positive comments from prospective 
trainees, this chapter seemed to bother a number of 
reviewers. While there were a few concrete suggestions 
for improvements and clarifications, which will be 
addressed below, in my conclusions, the general complaint 
about Chapter I was its lack of depth. One reviewer's 
comment "no depth, but I understand the purpose", supports 
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this view. 
My intention was to write a chapter which introduces 
the trainee to the content of the manual, and to some of 
the concepts and issues which s/he will have to grasp 
(e.g., case law versus statutory law). Perhaps I should 
have been clearer about my purpose, although the word 
"overview" is prominent in the title. The requests for 
more detail and depth seem inappropriate to me for an 
introductory chapter, especially since I do eventually 
address all the issues raised by those who were 
uncomfortable with it. I suspect that several reviewers 
were not sure that the depth would come. 
CGOSlusisnsj. I disagree with the suggestions that 
this chapter, as a whole, be expanded. However, I do 
think a preface, or introductory statement which clarifies 
the nature and purpose of the chapter should be added. 
The sub-section on "Judicial Decisions," criticized 
by four reviewers, does need expansion and clarification. 
This is especially true with regard to the effect and 
jurisdiction of federal court decisions. Clarification is 
also needed on the relationships among statutory, 
administrative and case law. 
Item_"2" ,_Part_Xl "Mental health professionals' 
participation in pre-trial evaluations. 
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This item addresses the issues raised in the 
manual's Chapter II, "Mental Health Professionals' 
Participation in Pre-trial Evaluations. " The mean rating 
on Item "2", for all raters (20) taken together, was 4.05, 
in the "quite adequate" range. A frequency distribution, 
and the means, modes and ranges of the ratings for each 
professional category, are presented in Table 10. 
Table 10 
Summary of Ratings - Part I, Item "2" 
Frequency of Ratings Per Professional Category 
Rating Legal 
(n=5) 
Forensic 
Mental Health 
(n=10) 
Prospective 
Trainee 
(n=5) 
1 
2 - 1 1 
3 2 2 _ 
4 - 4 1 
5 3 3 3 
Range 3-5 2-5 2-5 
Median 5 4 5 
Mode(s) 5 4 5 
Mean 4. 20 4. 0 4. 20 
In contrast with the previous item, the 
philosophical and ethical focus of Chapter II elicited 
mostly issue-focused comments. General comments about 
Chapter II were mostly positive. A district attorney 
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described it as "an especially fine treatment of the 
inherent incongruities" between the legal and mental 
health professions. Another district attorney stated: "an 
excellent explication of the ethical problems faced by 
clinicians, and the courts' unrealistic expectations of 
the clinicians." A court clinician complained that the 
chapter was too philosophical, and got away from the 
manual’s "how to" format. 
The opening discussion of the differences between 
"traditional" clinical assessments done in therapeutic 
settings, and forensic assessment, drew mixed comments. A 
prospective trainee felt the manual was "good on the 
differences"; and a forensic psychologist said the 
differences were clearly indicated." A judge suggested 
stressing that "the clinician’s responsibility is to 
assist the court." 
Three forensic mental health professionals were 
critical of the presentation of this issue. A 
psychiatrist felt the discussion presented a "false 
dichotomy": "One can serve the client, while formally 
working for the court. " A psychologist felt the 
discussion "understated" the traditional clinician’s role, 
and "overstated" that of the forensic clinician. Finally, 
another psychologist felt that the discussion was marked 
by redundancy, and suggested deletions. 
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The discussion of the controversy - to participate 
in pre-trial evaluations or not - drew mixed comments. A 
prospective trainee felt the manual offered "a good 
presentation on both sides of the issue." "Trainees will 
benefit from thinking about these ethical and 
philosophical issues. " A forensic psychologist commented 
similarly. A judge noted that he particularly liked the 
discussion of the "proponents' position." 
Two reviewers, a prospective trainee and a forensic 
psychologist, both felt that this discussion "needs more": 
"I want to feel the controversy. " "The content here needs 
to be expanded in order to provide more of a flavor of the 
controversy, and to capture the students' interest." The 
prospective trainee suggested adding excerpts from famous 
cases. Another forensic psychologist felt the discussion 
of the "proponents’ position" was "quite murky." 
Finally, a forensic psychiatrist who has written 
extensively on this controversy, and two of his 
colleagues, a psychiatrist and a defense attorney, 
discussed the manual's treatment of the issue of mental 
health professionals offering opinions on "ultimate 
issues. " They were displeased with what they described as 
the manual’s "support of clinicians offering ultimate 
conclusions." They stated that "it is never appropriate 
for mental health professionals to offer opinions on the 
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ultimate issue in the case of criminal responsibility; and 
it is only sometimes appropriate in the case of competency 
"to stand trial. 
Other issues included complaints from a forensic 
psychologist and a defense attorney, that the manual 
describes criminal responsibility as a "legal and moral- 
issue, but competency to stand trial as a "legal" issue 
only. A psychiatrist noted that the "clinical 
investigation strategy is appropriate to criminal 
responsibility assessments, but not competency to stand 
trial assessments. Another psychiatrist commented on the 
"inappropriate use of the term "transference." Finally, a 
psychologist suggested including an excerpt form Morse's 
article (1978) on the issue of clinician's participation, 
in the supplementary materials. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
While the combined mean score for all raters on this 
item, 4.05, indicates that the raters felt Chapter II 
addressed its focus, mental health professionals' 
participation, "quite adequately", this score ranks among 
the lowest of the 17 items on the review form. 
Chapter II produced a great deal of comment. Much 
of which seemed to have been stimulated less by the 
manual, than by the controversial issues it presents. 
The only criticism of the chapter overall, was that 
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it was “too philosophical," and got away form the manual's 
"how to" format. I see this chapter as a necessary 
diversion from the "how to" format. In my experience, 
when the issues of role definition and role 
differentiation are not raised, clinicians can quickly 
find themselves and their clients in a morass of false or 
unattainable expectations. This is especially true for 
clinicians working at the interface of law and clinical 
practice. It seems to me that omitting these discussions 
from the manual (and the training program), would 
essentially leave them unprepared. 
The discussion of role differentiation - the 
traditional" versus the forensic clinician - while 
appreciated by the legal professionals, struck the 
forensic clinicians who commented as being overstated. 
From their descriptions of my presentation of this issue 
as creating a "false dichotomy," "overstating" the 
forensic role, and "marked by redundancy," it appears that 
I may have overdone the whole issue. In my attempt to 
emphasize the differences, I may have created an 
unrealistic impression of the forensic clinician's role as 
rigid and detached from the role of "helper". 
However, two of the comments illustrate why role 
differentiation must be addressed. In response to the 
discussion of the issue of the forensic clinician's 
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agency", a district court judge feels that manual should 
stress that "the clinician’s responsibility is to assist 
the court." Whereas, a psychiatrist states "one can serve 
the client, while formally working for the court." While 
these views are not mutually exclusive, they are probably 
based in differing attitudes about the role of the 
forensic clinician. 
The controversy regarding whether or not mental 
health professionals should offer "ultimate conclusions" 
on pre-trial legal questions fascinates me; and from the 
demands for more, and the manner in which reviewers came 
down on both sides of the issue, it appears that I’m not 
alone. For example, the strong reaction from the 
psychiatrist—author and his colleagues who were 
"displeased’ with the manual’s "support" for the position 
of offering these opinions, was predictably balanced by 
the judge who liked the discussion of the proponents’ 
position on this issue. 
Melton et al (1985) describe their experiences in 
dealing with the issue of clinicians offering ultimate 
conclusions (e.g., "In my opinion the defendant is 
criminally responsible"). Early in their program they 
adopted the stance generally taken by the higher courts, 
both federal and state, that clinicians should simply 
report their findings on mental status, and on the 
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capacities" described in the legal criteria for 
competency to stand trial and/or criminal responsibility. 
They stressed that the "ultimate" decisions on these 
issues were up to the judge or jury who could draw their 
conclusions from he clinician's data. The traditional 
pattern of judges abdicating their authority and 
clinicians accepting it, needed to be reversed. 
But, when they informed a group of Virginia's lower 
court judges that their trainees were being instructed to 
simply provide clinical data, with no conclusions, they 
incurred judicial ire. Ultimately, a compromise was 
reached in which clinicians would offer conclusions on the 
issue of competency to stand trial, but not on criminal 
responsibility. (For more on this issue see Chapter 
VIII). 
While I admire and support the "no ultimate 
conclusions" argument, from my own hard experiences, I’ve 
learned that the forensic clinician must be willing to 
compromise on this issue, quite often, if s/he expects to 
be consulted on pre-trial questions at all. In the last 
year I've been called into court four times by judges who 
demanded, as one judge put it, that I "stop beating around 
the bush and spit out what you think, or you can damn well 
stand there all day and think about it." 
On the other hand, a colleague was recently chided 
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by a judge who felt he had overstepped his role in 
offering an opinion on criminal responsibility. Melton et 
al (1985) suggest that this issue is best addressed by 
ongoing discussions outside of the courtroom, with judges, 
who perhaps should have input into policy decisions on 
this issue (again, see Chapter VIII). 
Other issues. Apparently, my labeling criminal 
responsibility as a "legal and moral issue", while 
describing competency to stand trial as only a "legal 
issue" only, confused two reviewers, who insisted that the 
latter is a "moral issue", also. I agree that both 
concepts have both moral and legal justifications, but I 
was referring to outcomes in specific cases, not the 
justification for considering the issue in the first 
place. We determine competency to stand trial because our 
society sees it as immoral to try a defendant who can not 
aid in his/her own defense (Roesch and Golding, 1980). 
However, in specific cases the actual decision as to 
whether a defendant is or is not competent, appears to me 
to be strictly a legal issue. The distinction is less 
clear in the case of criminal responsibility in which a 
judge or jury decides whether or not a defendant should be 
considered "blameworthy." 
Conclusions ■ This chapter is off to a good start. 
For the most part, it seems to be sufficiently 
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comprehensive, but probably needs more depth and clarity. 
This is especially true of the "ultimate conclusion- 
issue, which could use some case examples. However, the 
discussion of role differentiation needs to be pared and 
toned down. 
EaJZfr.,, 11—Item—3_!_L "Legal concepts and criteria involved 
in the determination of competency to stand trial." 
Table 11 
Summary of Ratings - Part I, Item 3 
Frequency of Ratings Per Professional Category 
Rating Legal Forensic Prospective 
Mental Health Trainee 
(n=5) (n=10) (n=5) 
1 
2 - 1 — 
3 - 1 — 
4 1 2 3 
5 4 6 2 
Range 4-5 2-5 4-5 
Median 5 5 4 
Mode(s) 5 5 4 
Mean 4. 8 4. 30 4. 40 
This item addresses the issues raised in the 
manual's Chapter IV, "Competency to Stand Trial: Legal 
Aspects." The mean rating on Item 3, for all raters (20) 
taken together, was 4.45, at the middle of the quite 
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adequate" range. A frequency distribution, and the means, 
modes and ranges of the ratings for each professional 
category, are presented in Table 11. 
Comments from prospective trainees indicated that 
Chapter IV cleared up ambiguities, leaving them with a 
clearer understanding of commonly confused issues such as 
the difference between competency to stand trial and 
criminal responsibility. 
Forensic mental health professionals offered little 
comment. One psychologist raised the question of what 
happens in the case of defendants who do not suffer from a 
mental illness or defect, but who are ignorant of the 
legal process, (e.g., culturally estranged defendants). 
Another, felt that the presentation was "disjointed" and 
"lacked continuity." A third suggested adding the 
following insight to the opening historical perspective on 
competency to stand trial: 
"If the defendant remained silent, his property 
was not forfeit. If he pleaded guilty, or was 
found guilty, his property was forfeit. Thus, 
the brave felon who wished to save his family 
from poverty was crushed to death in their 
interest. This is not a ritual whose meaning is 
purely symbolic." 
The legal professionals had much to offer on Chapter 
IV, especially in the area of clarifying the legal 
authority and citations for many of the issues raised in 
387 
the chapter. 
A judge, a defense attorney, and a district attorney 
all objected to the use of percentages to explain the 
concept of standard of proof (e.g., "beyond a reasonable 
doubt"). The district attorney noted that this approach 
has been ruled invalid in Massachusetts courts; the judge 
suggested citing case law definitions of the standards; 
and the defense attorney offered his own definition. 
The discussion of "alternative motivations" for 
seeking court-ordered commitments for competency to stand 
trial evaluations, irked a prosecutor and a defense 
attorney. The district attorney objected to the 
suggestion that prosecutors might seek such commitment in 
order to "stall for time" while gathering evidence. The 
defense attorney felt that the description of defense 
attorneys using the competency to stand trial evaluation 
process as a means of helping their clients "beat a rap, " 
was an "unfortunate characterization. " 
The issue of "least restrictive alternative" in 
commitment hearings was raised by a DMH attorney and a 
defense attorney. While both felt that the manual's legal 
citations on this issue were dated, unfortunately each 
provided different citations as the "controlling case. 
Finally, a defense attorney and a district attorney both 
felt that Chapter IV stressed "mental illness" at the 
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expense of mentally retarded or brain damaged defendants. 
Siscussion_and_Concjusinng 
Chapter IV is the first chapter in the manual which 
deals directly with the object of this training model - 
pre-trial evaluation. In comparison with the 
comparatively "low" combined means seen in the first three 
chapters, this item produced the highest mean score on the 
review, 4.45. The individual ratings on this item were 
fairly consistently high - only two (2) out of twenty (20) 
ratings fell below "quite adequate. " 
As expected, this legal issues" chapter prompted 
comment from forensic clinicians or prospective 
trainees. Their comments were all supportive and general, 
with the exception of the clarification on the historical 
foundations of competency to stand trial, and a comment 
from a psychologist who felt that the format was 
"disjointed." 
Aside from the objections to the "alternative 
motivations" discussion, the comment from the legal 
professionals involved straightforeward corrections, noted 
in the conclusions, below. 
The use of court-ordered competency to stand trial 
commitments for "alternative purposes" such as getting an 
otherwise "uncoramittable" mentally ill person "off the 
streets", is a concern raised in virtually all the texts 
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dealing with court-ordered assessments. It was included 
in the manual, not as a cynical observation, but rather to 
sensitize the reader to the possibilities. If the 
forensic clinician becomes aware that an "alternative 
motivation" may have prompted a commitment, a conversation 
with the judge, or attorney who initiated the commitment 
may help clarify the situation. In my experience, such 
clarifications can lead to more appropriate dispositions, 
and relieve the clinician of an ethical burden. 
However, the objecting attorneys appear to have made 
good points. The defense attorney complained about the 
characterization of defendants pleading incompetency to 
beat a rap" - to avoid prosecution. The use of 
competency to stand trial evaluations to "beat a rap" by 
defendants and their attorneys is probably a myth, except 
in capital crimes, according to a study by Steadman 
(1979). The popular belief is that guilty defendants will 
avoid prosecution by feigning incompetence. In his 
follow-up study of defendants found incompetent, Steadman 
found that this strategy was generally not employed, and 
that given the consequences of being found incompetent, 
defendants were usually better off going to trial. 
The district attorneys' objection was to the 
suggestion that prosecutors, seeking more time to collect 
evidence, would delay trial by seeking a competency 
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assessment. In a subsequent phone conversation, she 
clarified that the prosecutor has a variety of available 
stalling devices, and that the suggestion of the 
"competency ploy" makes little sense, given the more 
efficient, and ethical alternatives. 
The fact that I stressed the issue of "mental 
illness , but hardly mentioned "mental defect" was raised 
as a criticism of this chapter, and is brought up again in 
items "5" and "6". This was partly due to the lack of 
differentiation between the mentally ill defendant and the 
mentally retarded or brain damaged defendant in the 
professional literature and in Massachusetts case law. 
However, I’ve since learned that in the past year the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has identified 
special issues with regard to mentally retarded 
defendants. Mostly though, this was due to my own lack of 
awareness of the special forensic issues which might arise 
in the case of the mentally retarded defendant. 
Conclusions: It appears that the manual did a good 
job of clarifying the development of the policy, and the 
legal procedures involved in competency to stand trial 
assessments, and the commitment of defendants found 
incompetent. It requires little in the way of revision 
beyond expansion on the issue of the mentally retarded 
defendant, and correcting a few specifics. These include 
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a number of incorrect legal citations, and finding a 
better method for explaining the concept of "standard of 
proof", than the use of percentages. I would also delete 
the two "alternative motivations" for competency to stand 
trial commitments, mentioned above, 
—!_■——14—i. Clinical issues and methods involved in 
the assessment of competency to stand trial." 
This item addresses the issues raised mainly in the 
manual's Chapter V, "Competency to Stand Trial: Clinical 
Issues, " and also in Chapter VIII, "Special Issues in 
Pre-trial Assessment." The mean rating on Item "4", for 
all raters (19) taken together, was 4.32, again in the 
"quite adequate" range. A frequency distribution, and the 
means, modes and ranges of the ratings for each 
professional category, are presented in Table 12. 
Comments on this item were generally positive and 
constructive. Four (4) reviewers (i.e., two forensic 
experts, a judge, and a prospective trainee) described the 
"suggested questions" and "guidelines" as "especially 
valuable," "helpful," "useful." A forensic psychologist 
described Chapter V as "a powerful section because of the 
clinical technique and treatment sections." 
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Table 12 
Summary of Ratings - Part I, Item "4" 
Frequency of Ratings Per Professional Category 
Rating Legal Forensic Prospective 
Mental Health Trainee (n-5) 05
 
II
 
c
 
1
 
1
 
(n=5) 
1 
2 - 2 
3 - _ 
4 2 2 3 
5 3 5 2 
Range 4 - 5 2-5 4-5 
Mediam 5 5 4 
Mode(s) 5 5 4 
Mean 4.60 4.11 4. 40 
The two lowest ratings, both "less than adequate", 
were accompanied with the following comments. A forensic 
psychologist, who developed the "Competency Screening 
Tool" and participated in the development of the 
"Competency Assessment Instrument," complained about the 
lack of attention paid to these classic techniques in 
Chapter V. Unfortunately, he did not provide further, 
concrete suggestions for improving this content area. 
The court clinic social worker, mentioned above for 
her criticism of the narrow focus of the manual, described 
Chapter V as "inadequate" because it only focused on 
to stand trial. She went on to state that as competency 
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far as the treatment of the clinical issues regarding 
competency went, the chapter was "very good." 
The issue of self-defeating motivation, " raised in 
Chapter V and in the assessment tools for evaluating 
competency to stand trial, drew comment from two forensic 
psychologists and a district attorney. The two 
psychologists noted that this discussion should include 
more on the effect a major depression might have on 
competency to stand trial. The district attorney pointed 
out that motivation to be found guilty might be explained 
by "an integrated and healthy moral system (e.g., does not 
want to make a child victim testify)." 
A forensic psychologist, who directs a court clinic, 
noted that the suggestion that the evaluating clinician 
review arrest reports and contact defense attorneys, is 
impractical for the court clinician who is under pressure 
to complete a Section 15a report. He pointed out that 
often the police have not completed paperwork, and that in 
his experience defense attorneys often fail to return 
phone calls for several days. 
The same psychologist added that it is not uncommon, 
especially in district courts, for bar advocates to be 
temporarily assigned to represent defendants during 
arraignment. This means that the attorney who will 
represent the defendant after the competency to stand 
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trial evaluation, may not meet the defendant until s/he 
returns to court, after the assessment (i.e.. Sections 15a 
and 15b). 
On the other hand, a forensic psychiatrist, who also 
works in a court clinic, suggests that attorneys should be 
present during the competency assessment, or else the 
defendant should waive the "right." Along these lines, a 
defense attorney notes the importance of contacting the 
attorney: "it has always seemed to me that a defendant's 
lawyer's ability to work with a mentally handicapped 
person affects competency to stand trial." 
Another forensic psychologist raised concern 
regarding the statement that defendants "can be competent 
for some trials and not for others" (p. V-2). While 
agreeing with this statement, he warns that clinicians 
should "be wary" of talking such a position, and if they 
do, they should "describe specific abilities. “ 
The section in Chapter V concerning treatment of 
incompetency, was the focus of a prospective trainee's 
concern regarding the hospital clinician's priorities in 
the case of the committed incompetent patient. The 
manual. amd the law, stress that treatment should be 
focused on the issue of competency to stand trial. How 
this fits with the mandate to provide "comprehensive 
treatment" to hospitalized patients was left unclear. 
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The assessment of alcohol/drug related problems and 
their relationship to competency to stand trial, needed 
more attention in both Chapter V and Chapter VIII, 
according to a forensic social worker, and a prospective 
trainee, also a social worker. 
Finally, a forensic psychologist suggests that case 
vignettes be used in Chapter V, to help trainees visualize 
the clinical issues. 
Diaeus§lQn_arid_SQnelusioQs 
Of the the nineteen (19) raters on this item, only 
two gave ratings below "4" ("quite adequate"), one of whom 
was the court clinic social worker who stated that the 
coverage on clinical assessment of competency was "very 
good." 
As pointed out by the forensic psychologist who 
developed one of the earliest assessment tools for 
competency evaluations, I paid very little attention to 
the "Competency Screening Test" (CST, Lipsitt, 1971) and 
the "Competency Assessment Instrument" (CAI, McGarry et 
al, 1973). Both are classics which were the mainstays of 
competency to stand trial assessments for a decade. The 
assessment tools I described in Chapter V, and my 
adaptation of the recently developed "Fitness Interview 
Test" (Roesch et al, 1984), at the end of the that 
chapter, evolved from the CAI. These newer tools have 
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added mental status related questions, 
of the legal questions. Certainly, an 
s, and fine tuned some 
an historical overview 
of the assessment of competency to stand trial should 
include more discussion on the development of the CST and 
CAI by a group of forensic experts at the Harvard 
Laboratory of Community Psychiatry in the late 1960’s. 
One of the interview items originally included in 
the CAI, which has survived the evolutionary process, is 
the issue of "self-defeating motivation." The purpose for 
including this question is to avoid sending to trial 
who intend to make no effort to defend 
themselves, or purposely undercut their attorneys’ efforts 
to defend them, because of severe depression or 
self-defeating behavior believed to be based in a mental 
illness. This is a perplexing issue, which raised 
understandable concern from a district attorney. She 
noted that "self-defeating motivation" may not be based in 
mental illness. This is true. It is the clinicians’ job 
to somehow determine if mental illness plays a part. 
Two psychologists noted that there was no mention in 
Chapter V of the role of depression in "self-defeating 
motivation" (p. V-15). This was simply an oversight which 
should be corrected. 
The training manual’s lack of consideration for the 
plight of the court clinician is once again exemplified in 
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the comment of a psychologist who pointed out the 
impracticality of the special section in Chapter V - 
"Steps in the Assessment of Competency to Stand Trial 
Under Section 15b" (p. V-9) - when applied to the court 
house assessments done under Section 15a - there were no 
steps for Section 15a screening" assessments. 
One of the suggestions under the "Steps" section was 
that the forensic clinician contact the defendant's lawyer 
before and after the assessment. The basis for this 
suggestion is that talking with the defendant's lawyer 
often helps to clarify the defendant's ability to assist 
in his/her own defense, one of the legal criteria for 
competency. Inclusion of this step was supported by a 
defense attorney, and by a court clinic psychiatrist who 
added that the attorney should be present during the 
interview. However, this argument for clinician contact 
with the defendant's attorney is confounded by the reality 
that often defendants' attorneys are not appointed until 
after the competency to stand trial evaluation is 
completed. 
Early in Chapter V, while outlining the "nature of 
competency", I present Roesch and Golding's (1980) point 
that defendants "can be competent for some trials and not 
for others" (p. V-2). For instance, a defendant's 
delusion, that, if he sits in the witness stand it will 
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become an electric chair, is only a barrier to competency 
if the defendant needs to take the stand. Another court 
clinic director, while agreeing with this concept, warns 
that clinicians should be careful on this issue. Another 
personal example: I recently suggested to a judge that a 
woman would be competent to stand trial, if the judge 
allowed for frequent recesses. Otherwise, her anxiety 
would become intolerable for her, and she would be unable 
to concentrate on the proceedings. The judge 
sarcastically noted that he would find her competent only 
after I convinced the chief justice to supply more judges, 
"so our trials can go on for weeks at a time. " The 
forensic clinician needs to be situationally attuned as 
well as theoretically sharp. 
Conclusions: Chapter V requires no major revisions. 
However some additions are needed. First of all, in 
keeping with the format of the preceding chapter, Chapter 
V probably should begin with an historical overview of the 
clinical assessment of competency to stand trial. Such a 
section would, of course, include a discussion of the CST 
and CAI, about which all forensic clinicians should be 
aware. 
Secondly, an additional section, on the steps 
involved in competency to stand trial screening 
assessments Section 15a should be provided. This section 
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should take into account the special pressures and limited 
resources with which the court clinician must contend. 
A few other modifications are indicated. The 
discussion of self-defeating motivation" should be 
corrected to include the role of depression. The section 
referring to the flexible nature of competency should 
include a warning that clinicians need to be wary of 
introducing this notion in court. The discussion in 
Chapter VIII of the role of drugs and/or alcohol on 
competency to stand trial, should be expanded. 
Eaxt _Item "5": "Legal concepts and criteria involved in 
the determination of criminal responsibility. " 
This item addresses the issues raised in the manual's 
Chapter VI, "Criminal Responsibility: Legal Issues." The 
mean rating on Item "5", for all raters (20) taken 
together, was 4.45, at the middle of the "quite adequate" 
range. A frequency distribution, and the means, modes and 
ranges of the ratings for each professional category, are 
presented in Table 13. 
Comment from legal professionals on this "legal issues" 
chapter was sparse. One district attorney stated that 
presentation was "very good, very clear." A judge offered 
a minor clarification: that some minor crimes do not 
require "intent." A DMH attorney suggested eliminating 
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the discussion regarding specific diagnoses, since a 
generic definition of '•mental illness" provided by DMH 
regulations should suffice, and specific diagnoses were 
therefore "irrelevant." 
Table 13 
Summary of Ratings - Part I, Item "5" 
Frequency of Ratings Per Professional Category 
Rating Legal Forensic Prospective 
Mental Health Trainee 
(n=5) (n=10) (n=5) 
1 
2 - 1 — 
3 - 1 — 
4 1 3 2 
5 4 4 3 
Range 4-5 2-5 4-5 
Median 5 4 5 
Mode(s) 5 5 5 
Mean 4. 80 4. 20 4. 60 
Prospective trainees liked the overview and 
historical perspective provided by this chapter. One 
trainee raised the question of what happens to NGRI 
acquittees who are not committed. 
Two forensic mental health professionals commented 
that the chapter was "a very balanced section, " and "very 
readable. " However, a third felt that the explanation of 
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criminal responsibility provided at the beginning of the 
chapter offered "an awkward expression of criminal 
responsibility." He suggested simply stating: "it is 
assumed that one is responsible, unless they offer an 
'affirmative' defense." 
The pro/con controversy regarding the insanity 
defense was raised by a trainee and a forensic 
psychologist. The trainee suggested adding Samenow's 
(1976) view that no one is psychotic at the time of an 
offense, and thus the insanity defense is unnecessary. 
The psychologist felt that the manual did not explain the 
proponents view adequately. 
Another psychologist suggested clarifying that the 
recent emphasis on "capacity to conform behavior, " rather 
than "irresistible impulse," changes the focus to a 
"control variable" rather than the "intensity of an 
impulse." 
Finally, a forensic mental health professional 
pointed out an error in the discussion of "automatisms. " 
By her interpretation of Commonwealth v._Genius. the 
Supreme Judicial Court chose not to address the issue of 
automatisms directly. 
Discus^iqh find Conclusions 
Again the mean ratings placed this chapter solidly 
in the "quite adequate range" with an overall mean rating 
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of 4.45, matching the "legal issues" chapter on competency 
to stand trial. However, unlike the previous "legal 
issues chapter, the comment from legal professionals was 
sparse. 
There were no substantive issues raised on this 
legal issues chapter by the reviewers. I disagree with 
the suggestion that the proponents1 position with regard 
to the validity of the insanity defense needs expansion. 
The pro/con discussion on insanity defense was included to 
introduce the trainee to this controversy, which is 
related, but not central to the clinician's role in 
determining criminal responsibility. I attempted to 
provide a balanced view, but purposely chose not to be 
thorough. The issue could be expanded upon in the 
Training Program. 
Conclusions : The legal issues regarding criminal 
responsibility were presented in Chapter VI, as one 
reviewer stated, in a "very balanced" and "very readable" 
fashion. The reader was provided with an accurate (with a 
few exceptions) and useful description of the purpose, 
legal procedures and the clinician's role in the 
determination of criminal responsibility. 
Along with a few corrections and clarifications of 
legal citations, the explanation of the legal meaning of 
"criminal responsibility" (p. VI-1) needs to be reworked. 
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Also, as recommended, more clarification is needed 
regarding the impact of the change in the second legal 
criterion for criminal responsibility, which changed the 
focus of the clinician's assessment from an "intensity 
variable" (i.e., "irresistible impulse"), to a "control 
variable" (i.e., "capacity to conform behavior"). 
Rart. I,—Item—6J.j_ "Clinical issues and assessment methods 
related to criminal responsibility". 
This item addresses the issues raised in the 
manual's Chapter VII, Criminal Responsibility: Clinical 
Assessment, and Chapter VIII, Special Issues in Pre-trial 
Assessments. The mean rating on Item "6", for all raters 
(20) taken together, was 4.40, at the middle of the "quite 
adequate" range. A frequency distribution, and the means, 
modes and ranges of the ratings for each professional 
category, are presented in Table 14. 
Comment from this item focused on Chapter VII was 
varied and in some cases intense. Three forensic 
psychologists stated respectively: "well presented"; "good 
work on a difficult topic"; "excellent coverage." A judge 
described it as "thorough and well organized" adding that 
judges might benefit from a reading of the chapter. A 
district attorney particularly liked the application of 
clinical data to the legal standard for criminal 
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responsibility. A prospective trainee felt that this was 
the manual's "strongest section." 
Table 14 
Summary of Ratings - Part I, Item "6" 
Frequency of Ratings Per Professional Category 
Rating Legal 
(n=5) 
Forensic 
Mental Health 
(n=10) 
Prospective 
Trainee 
(n=5) 
1 . 
2 1 1 
3 - — _ 
4 - 2 4 
5 4 7 1 
Range 2-5 2-5 4-5 
Median 5 5 4 
Mode(s) 5 5 4 
Mean 4. 40 4. 50 4. 20 
On the other hand the discussion of the clinician's 
limits and dilemmas in performing assessments on criminal 
responsibility apparently irritated a defense attorney: 
"There seems to be a cry-baby attitude about the 
responsibility involved. Mental health 
professionals complain about retrospective 
problems when asked about "insanity", and then 
complain about having to predict the future when 
asked about commitability. If they won't face 
up to the task, then step aside." 
Two forensic psychiatrists questioned the statement 
that the criminal responsibility assessment need go no 
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further, if the finding on the "threshold question" of 
mental illness is negative. They insist that the 
clinician should still address the question of the 
defendant's cognitive and behavioral control at the time 
of the offense, as the judge or jury may disagree on the 
issue of mental illness. 
On the issue of cognitive and behavioral control, a 
forensic psychologist stated that after fully discussing 
the former, the manual "skirts" the latter. He suggests 
adding "indices of control" (e.g., planfulness) and "lack 
of control" (e.g., wildly agitated, manic state). 
The difference between appreciating "wrongfulness" 
and "criminality, " both used in the legal standard for 
criminal responsibility, should be discussed, according to 
one forensic psychiatrist. A forensic social worker and a 
prospective trainee wanted more discussion of the effects 
of alcohol/drug use and abuse on criminal responsibility. 
The D.M.H. attorney objected to the manual's advice 
that the clinician contact the district attorney or 
defense attorney, when faced with legal system barriers to 
obtaining information. He would direct the clinician to 
the judge. He also pointed out that the two chapters 
dealing with clinical aspects of criminal responsibility 
repeatedly omit the term "mental defect, " which he notes 
must be considered. 
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Chapter VIII, addresses malingering, 
diagnostic issues, which are special con concerns in both 
amnesia, and 
competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility 
Thus comments on this chapter were recorded assessments. 
in both Item 4, earlier, and Item "6". 
Most critical was the court clinic social worker, 
who noted that since the training proposal is directed at 
experienced mental health professionals, the "Special 
Issues chapter should be redone in a manner more 
clinically sophisticated in form and content. " She also 
recommended dropping the sections on malingering and 
amnesia, because she "they rarely come up. " Finally, she 
wanted more discussion of dual-diagnosis, including the 
combinations of mental retardation and mental illness, and 
alcohol/drug abuse and mental illness. 
Several corrective comments were made with regard to 
the section on diagnoses. Two forensic experts complained 
about the inclusion of "battered spouse syndrome"and 
"pre-menstrual syndrome" as "significant clinical 
conditions" in criminal responsibility assessments. 
A prospective trainee psychologist suggested further 
clarification on the "automatism defense. " As presented 
the manual appeared to contradict itself. He also noted 
that the reference to command hallucinations, in the 
malingering, was misleading, by noting that section on 
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most people successfully resist the commands. He views 
command hallucinations as "projected intent," and suggests 
the individual’ s "competing controls. " 
Another prospective trainee and a district attorney 
described the "Special Issues" section as "excellent" and 
fascinating, respectively. Finally, a prospective 
trainee, a neuropsychologist, suggests the issues of 
memory and amnesia are "too complex" to be covered in the 
manual, and "probably should be deleted." 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Of the three "clinical assessment" items (i.e., 
items 4 , 6 and "8' ), Item "6", which covers the 
manual’s chapters VII and VIII, received the highest 
combined mean rating, 4.40, and also the highest rating in 
the review by the forensic mental health professional 
sub-group, 4.50. 
Interestingly, this item also produced the lowest 
rating on clinical assessment issues, by the legal 
professionals, 4.40. This appears to be due to effect of 
the "less than adequate" rating by the defense attorney, 
quoted in Chapter V, who was frustrated by the "cry baby 
attitude" regarding my concern over the retrospective 
nature of criminal responsibility assessments. 
While overall, the reviewers seemed pleased with the 
coverage of criminal responsibility assessment, they 
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offered a good deal of constructive criticism and 
corrections. 
On page VII-12 of the manual, I suggest that if the 
answer to the "threshold question" for criminal 
responsibility is negative - Is the defendant mentally 
ill, brain damaged, or retarded? - then there is no need 
to proceed with the assessment of the defendants' mental 
status at the time of the offense, since the defendant can 
not be found "not criminally responsible." As two 
forensic clinicians pointed out, I was wrong. My logic 
applies to the trial itself, in which, if a judge or jury 
agrees that the defendant is not mentally ill (or 
"defective"), then the issue of lack of criminal 
responsibility is moot. But, the clinician can not second 
guess the judge or jury, regarding the "threshold 
question", therefore they must complete the assessment, 
regardless of their diagnosis. 
I agree with the forensic psychologist who noted 
that I thoroughly discussed the issue of "cognitive 
control" (i.e., the first criterion for determining 
criminal responsibility), but that I skirted its sister 
issue, "behavioral control" (i.e., the second criterion). 
However, he goes on to suggest that I provide indices of 
control and "lack of control". There are no such 
"indices" established for use in criminal responsibility 
409 
assessments. Developing a set of indices is an intriguing 
research implication, but it goes beyond the scope of a 
training manual. 
The effects of substance abuse on criminal 
responsibility is limited to a brief discussion of alcohol 
or drug related psychoses (p. VIII-16) in the training 
manual. Defendants who commit crimes while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs are not exculpable in 
Massachusetts. This fact is spelled out in the chapter on 
the legal aspects of criminal responsibility. But the law 
(i.e. , —Commonwealth_v_Sheehan, 1978), also wants to know 
about the contribution of alcoholism and drug addiction to 
mental illness, and about such subtle issues as whether 
alcohol or drug induced psychoses were intentionally 
induced. The manual should address these issues. 
The manual's treatment of the issue of diagnoses in 
Chapter VIII needs some attention. First of all, the 
section on diagnoses was designed to give the trainee a 
sense of how particular diagnoses relate to the pre-trial 
evaluation issues. The call for redoing the section with 
"more sophisticated form and content", as suggested by a 
forensic clinician, does not fit. This section helps 
clarify issues and refers the reader to other sources, 
which seems adequate for its purposes. 
Given the recent controversy in the media regarding 
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the inclusion of disorders associated with women such as 
"pre-menstrual syndrome" in the DSM III, it seems prudent 
to eliminate the discussion of PMS and "battered spouse 
syndrome" from the manual. 
The deletion of the section on memory and amnesia, 
was suggested by a neuropsychologist, who makes the point 
that the topic is too complex to be covered in the manual. 
Further discussion with him on this point brought out his 
feeling that the section is too brief, and needs much more 
detail. The purpose of this section was to make the 
trainee aware of the key issues involved in the problem of 
amnesia in criminal cases. I assume that if this issue 
comes up. a neuropsychological assessment will be 
arranged. Lack of comment on this section by other 
clinicians makes this suggestion difficult to gauge. 
Conclusions: While there was a good deal of 
constructive criticism of the manual’s chapters VII and 
VIII, as a prospective trainee put it, this appears to be 
the manual's "strongest section." 
Clarification needs to be provided on the issue of 
"behavioral control", and on the issue of completing the 
full criminal responsibility assessment, regardless of the 
initial finding regarding mental illness or "defect". A 
section on the effect of substance abuse on criminal 
responsibility needs to be added. The discussion of 
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battered spouse syndrome and PMS should be omitted. 
Finally, there is the question of the section on amnesia. 
Should it be deleted, modified? I need to look further 
into this issue. 
Part_I, Items.. "7" and “8": "Legal issues in the 
involuntary commitment of 1ST defendants and NGRI 
acquittees" and "Clinical assessment of likelihood of 
serious harm." 
These two items are covered together, because they 
both focus on information presented primarily in Chapter 
IX. I begin by presenting the results separately, and 
then combine my discussion and conclusions. 
Item "7" addresses the legal issues raised in the 
first few pages of the manual's Chapter IX, "Commitabi1 ity 
of 1ST defendants and NGRI acquittees. " The mean rating 
on Item "7", for all raters (20) taken together, was 4.15, 
again in the "quite adequate" range. A frequency 
distribution, and the means, modes and ranges of the 
ratings for each professional category, are presented in 
Table 15. 
Aside from noting minor factual inaccuracies and 
grammatical corrections, this item drew little substantive 
comment. While the five legal professional raters gave 
the highest rating of the three groups, 4.80, they offered 
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no substantive comment at all. 
Table 15: Summary of Ratings - Part I, Item "7" 
Frequency of Ratings Per Professional Category 
Rating Legal Forensic Prospective 
Mental Health Trainee 
(n=5) (n=10) (n=5) 
1 
2 - 1 1 
3 - 2 _ 
4 1 4 2 
5 4 3 3 
Range 4-5 2-5 2-5 
Med i an 5 4 4 
Mode(s) 5 4 4, 5 
Mean 4.80 3.90 4. 0 
A psychologist, a prospective trainee who rated this 
item "less than adequate," felt that it added little and 
was redundant, since the legal aspects of these 
commitments had been reviewed in Chapters IV and VI. 
Two forensic psychologists lamented that mentally 
retarded individuals who are found NGRI, cannot be 
committed unless they are also mentally ill. They both 
note that there seems to be no alternative to outright 
release for a mentally retarded individual who is found 
NGRI, due to "mental defect," and is not mentally ill. 
When the crime is a particularly violent one, outright 
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release seems ill-advised, but unavoidable for this group. 
One of these psychologists noted that Section 16a 
allows for a brief (i.e., 40 days) commitment, without the 
requirement that the person be mentally ill. The purpose 
of Section 16a commitments is to determine if the person 
is mentally ill (and dangerousness). This psychologist 
suggested that Chapter IX focus more on the purpose and 
use of Section 16a. 
A third forensic psychologist suggested mentioning 
the conflict with privileged communications and 
confidentiality which can occur when a clinician becomes 
involved in involuntary commitment. 
Item "8" addresses the clinical assessment of 
“likelihood of serious harm", or dangerousness, raised in 
Chapter IX. The mean rating on Item "8", for all raters 
(19) taken together, was 4.0, “quite adequate." A 
frequency distribution, and the means, modes and ranges of 
the ratings for each professional category, are presented 
in Table 16. 
Again the manual's Chapter IX seems to sit best with 
the legal professionals, who saw the chapter as "thorough" 
with regard to the clinical assessment of risk of harm. 
Note that the forensic mental health professionals showed 
a good deal of variability (e.g., modes of 2 and 5), and 
their mean rating for this item of 3.50, while still in 
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the middle of the “adequate" range, is the lowest of all 
ratings reported in this chapter. 
A district attorney and three of the prospective 
trainees cited the description of correlates to violence, 
especially the role of situational variables, and the 
inclusion of Monahan's (1981) questions for clinicians 
were cited as being helpful. 
Table 16 
Summary of Ratings - Part I, Item "8" 
Frequency of Ratings Per Professional Category 
Rating Legal Forensic Prospective 
Mental Health Trainee 
n
 
c
 
(n=10) (n=5) 
1 
2 - 3 1 
3 - 2 - 
4 - 2 1 
5 4 3 3 
Range 5 2-5 2-5 
Median 5 3 5 
Mode(s) 5 2, 5 5 
Mean 5.0 3.50 4. 20 
good 
dealt 
the 
rhe forensic mental health professionals provided a 
leal of comment. The section of Chapter IX which 
specifically with assessment of danger to others was 
focus of much criticism. Several clinicians. 
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including two prospective trainees, pointed out that while 
the use of base rates is mentioned, there were no base 
rates provided. Further, the inclusion of the list of 
correlates developed at Bridgewater State Hospital was 
criticized repeatedly. The validity of some of the items 
being listed as correlates of violence was questioned. 
One forensic psychologist characterized the this section 
as "extremely murky." 
The discussion of danger to self" was seen as too 
brief by two psychologists. In contrast to the complaint 
above about the omission of base rates for violence to 
others. one suggested eliminating the base rate figures 
offered on suicidality, because it only gives a "quick 
fix" on a complex clinical issue Another psychologist 
complained that, while it discusses suicide, the manual 
did not actually address the clinical assessment of 
suicidality. Along the same line, a forensic psychiatrist 
pointed out that the manual does not discuss the 
assessment of danger to self by reason of poor judgment, a 
common assessment performed by mental health 
professionals. 
Finally, there were several requests for more 
vignettes and behavioral checklists. 
Piscu?sion and ConclusljLqqs 
The combined means for items "7" and "8", 
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respectively, were 4.15 and 4.00. While these means place 
Chapter IX in the "quite adequate" range, it is important 
to note that once again we see a large variation between 
the legal professionals’ ratings on these two items, 4.80 
and 5.00, and the forensic clinicians' respective ratings 
of 3.90 on the legal issues and 3.50 on the clinical 
(comparatively low, but still "adequate"). 
The manual's treatment of involuntary commitment in 
this chapter raised just two suggestions. A court 
clinician's suggestion that the purpose of Section 16a be 
elaborated upon, makes sense. The purpose of of Section 
16a is not explained in the law, which simply calls for a 
period of observation" at a state hospital. However, the 
commitment order form explains that the purpose is to 
obtain an assessment of the defendant's "commitability" 
(i.e., dangerousness). 
The second suggestion, by a prospective trainee, was 
to eliminate the discussion of commitment procedure, 
because it is repetitive. I agree that it is repetitive, 
but I see the repetition as necessary. Given the constant 
reference to the commitment procedure in this chapter, a 
re-presentation at this point makes sense to me. 
The section of Chapter IX which deals with the 
clinical assessment of likelihood of serious harm (i.e., 
dangerousness), was, in the words of one forensic 
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psychologist "extremely murky." Beyond the specific 
criticisms offered by reviewers, it now seems to me that 
this chapter makes short shrift of an issue which is 
central to the theme of this training proposal, and 
crucial in terms of the safety of defendants and potential 
victims. Much more is needed to assist the trainee in 
grappling with this sometimes incongruous responsibility - 
assessing risk of harm. I interpret the positive response 
by the legal professionals and several prospective 
trainees to the concrete guidelines that I did provide, as 
evidence of how hungry professionals are for solid 
information and guidance on this anxiety producing topic. 
Aside from this lack of depth, there appear to be 
two specific problems with the section on danger to 
others. First of all, I failed to include base rate data 
on violence, after stressing the value of such data. 
While there is actually little in the way of useful base 
rate data available, I could have included what there is. 
Further, and more important, I should have discussed how 
clinicians can develop base rate data on groups within 
their own geographical areas, and from there own 
experiences. While such data may be empirically 
deficient, it is likely to be more useful than the 
available base rates, which are mostly dated, and based on 
nationwide statistics which do not allow for local 
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variance. 
The second problem noted was ray decision to include 
the list of "correlates of violence" developed by 
clinicians at Bridgewater State Hospital. The validity of 
these correlates was questioned. In reviewing this list 
I ve found that all but three (3) of the eighteen (18) 
items on this list have been empirically validated, as 
reported by Monahan (1981). These three include history 
of dissociation, wish to return to a psychiatric hospital, 
and attitude toward illness. These three, while not 
empirically validated in any published studies, are well 
known "clinical observations" on which many seasoned 
clinicians rely (another intriguing research possibility). 
The section on danger to self also lacked depth. 
While I discussed the issue of suicide assessment, I 
provided very little on the techniques of assessing the 
risk of suicidality. Ironically, base rate figures were 
provided, but were not accepted readily by a forensic 
psychologist who felt uncomfortable with the "quick fix" 
provided by such figures. This clinician presents the 
dilemma for the clinician who considers using base rates 
in clinical decision-making. It is difficult to accept 
the notion of making decisions which affect others' lives, 
based on their membership in a group. Base rate data 
should be considered only as one element in such vital 
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decisions. 
Finally, while in my own experience, the issue of 
danger to self by reason of poor judgment" comes up quite 
frequently in commitment hearings, again I give relatively 
little space to this topic. While the technique of 
assessment in this case is generally straightforeward, 
involving more common sense than clinical skills, case 
vignettes would probably be helpful here. 
Conclusions! Chapter IX needs to be rewritten. The 
first section on involuntary commitment needs an expanded 
explanation of Section 16a commitments. Otherwise this 
section is fine. But the rest of the chapter, dealing 
with the clinical assessment of risk of harm to self or 
others, needs much more, as described above. Aside from 
specific enhancements with more on the use and development 
of base rates, more actual base rate data, more on the 
assessment of suicidality and more case vignettes, the 
chapter also needs more in-depth treatment of the issues, 
pitfalls, and techniques involved in these assessments. 
Also, it would probably be helpful to provide the trainee 
with an historical perspective on the issues of commitment 
and prediction of dangerousness, by using the format 
followed in chapters IV and VI. 
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Part Ij—Xtem_‘‘9"j. "Report writing" 
This item addresses the issues raised in the 
manual's Chapter X, "Report writing. " The mean rating on 
Item 9 , for all raters (20) taken together, was 4.40, at 
the middle of the quite adequate" range. A frequency 
distribution, and the means, modes and ranges of the 
ratings for each professional category, are presented in 
Table 17. 
Table 17 
Summary of Ratings - Part I, Item "9" 
Frequency of Ratings Per Professional Category 
Rating Legal Forensic Prospective 
Mental Health Trainee 
(n=5) (n=10) (n=5) 
1 
2 
- 
1 
- 
3 1 1 - 
4 — 3 2 
5 4 5 3 
Range 3-5 2-5 4-5 
Median 5 4 5 
Mode(s) 5 5 5 
Mean 4.60 4. 20 4. 60 
Chapter X was highly rated and highly controversial. 
The length of the sample reports, and the cover letters 
were the focus of most of the comment. 
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One prospective trainee and four forensic mental 
health professionals complained that the reports were too 
lengthy. Two pointed to the "thoroughnessM and length as 
being appropriate only in academia. One felt that 
©fficisncy and effectiveness were sacrificed. 
A forensic psychologist, who directs a court clinic 
was very clear about the problems with long reports. 
Paraphrasing him. in the real world there is no time to 
write such extensive reports, not enough secretarial time 
to type them, and most important, the judges do not want 
to read them. Given all this, he questions the time spent 
and cost for an unnecessary endeavor. 
Another forensic psychologist, who also directs a 
court clinic, suggested the competency to stand trial 
report was "too extensive," and suggested condensing the 
background section, and eliminating police reports. 
However, he noted that police reports and extensive 
background information should be included in criminal 
responsibility reports. 
The court clinic social worker who rated the 
treatment of report writing as "less than adequate," 
nevertheless stated: "good sample reports. Another 
forensic psychologist stated that he learned from this 
section." 
The legal professionals, who are the recipient's of 
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these reports, did not mention the length of the reports 
at all. A district court judge described the sample 
letters as "an invaluable guide.“ Two of the district 
attorneys were enthusiastic. One said, "the samples are 
excellent," but wondered if the format would be followed. 
The other district attorney described the letters as "a 
superb linkage between the traditional focus of the 
clinician, and the lawyer's need for an opinion which is 
usable in court. . . " 
The summaries provided in the sample cover letters 
bothered three forensic psychologists, who felt that 
judges, provided with this summary, would not bother to 
read the reports. On the other hand, another forensic 
psychologist and a prospective trainee liked the cover 
letters. 
Other issues. A forensic psychiatrist felt that the 
sample criminal responsibility report was too definite in 
offering an opinion, in light of the controversy over 
answering the "ultimate question." 
A forensic psychologist suggested that the manual's 
brief review of the criticism in the literature of 
forensic reports which do not address the questions raised 
by the court, should also mention that sometimes the court 
is not specific in its request, leaving it to the 
clinician to determine which assessments are appropriate. 
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Finally, a prospective trainee and the DMH attorney 
both pointed out that, while in Chapters VII and VIII the 
reader is warned about the pitfalls of using specific 
diagnoses, the sample reports ignore that advice - they 
diagnose. The attorney suggested that the definition 
provided by DMH regulations be cited and used instead. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Compared with the previous two items, there was 
little variability among the sub-groups on Item "9". The 
consistently high ratings on this item belie the amount of 
controversy it provoked. 
The written report to court is the culmination of 
the pre-trial evaluation, in most cases. According to 
Pollack (1982), no more than 10% of court reports are 
followed up with expert witness testimony. Thus, the 
quality of these reports appears to be of central 
importance in the mental health professional's 
participation in the pre-trial evaluation process. While 
there was much discussion in the review about how much to 
include in the report to court, with reviewers taking both 
sides, there was no disagreement regarding the need to 
present a clear rationale, supported by clinical data. 
The argument remains as to how this is best done. 
The criticism of the lengthy sample reports came 
from mental health professionals, both forensic and 
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prospective trainees, while comment from the legal 
professionals was uniformly supportive of, and in some 
cases, enthusiastic about these reports. Given the fact 
that forensic clinicians write these reports for judges 
and attorneys, the legal professionals' opinion certainly 
carries weight. However, those forensic mental health 
professionals who argued for curtailed reports, are 
experienced report writers; their arguments bear careful 
consideration. 
The critics of my sample reports argue from a 
pragmatic viewpoint. Their major point is that busy lower 
court judges have no time to read more than a few 
paragraphs. Long reports may tempt judges to simply 
search for the conclusions, never benefiting from the 
clinician's thoroughness and hard work. Thus the 
“academic" thoroughness that leads to lengthy reports may 
sacrifice effectiveness. On the other hand, crisper, more 
efficient versions, may give the judge enough information 
and understanding to make an informed decision, albeit not 
as informed as the clinician might wish. 
The argument in favor of writing thorough, 
"inclusive" reports, which are as lengthy as necessary, is 
based in the stance taken by most authors on the subject 
(Bazelon, 1975; Pollack, 1982; Roesch & Golding, 1980; 
Shapiro, 1984): the report should thoroughly explain the 
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ifrici&n s rationale for his/her clinical opinions, and 
support it with clinical findings. Without the benefit of 
the clinical data, and the clinician's interpretation of 
that data, the "finder of fact" (i.e., the judge or jury) 
is put in the position of blindly accepting or rejecting 
the clinician’s opinions or recommendations. 
A further justification, discussed by Shapiro 
(1984), is that writing a report which thoroughly 
documents the basis for, and thinking behind its 
conclusions, is the best preparation for eventual expert 
witness testimony. The report is written at the time of 
the assessment; whereas, the clinician often is not made 
aware that s/he will be testifying, until weeks or months 
after the assessment. Thus, a thoroughly written report 
can save the clinician hours of reviewing old notes, end 
trying to grasp what, months later, may seem like an 
obscure rationale. Also, the more the clinician 
anticipates, and addresses in the report, questions which 
may be raised in court, the less likely s/he will be to be 
called into court. Given the long hours one can spend 
waiting to testify, the extra time spent on a report can 
pay off. 
Which way to go? Compromise with the "reality of 
the busy judge? Forge ahead with the time-consuming 
approach (it takes me and average of three hours to write 
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a thorough, inclusive report), which may seem like 
overkill at first, but may pay off in time saved, and more 
effective testimony if the clinician is called into court? 
Model reports provided in Virginia's "Forensic 
Evaluation Training Manual", and in the guidelines for 
report writing at Michigan's Center for Forensic 
Psychiatry, are roughly equivalent to my sample reports in 
depth, inclusiveness, and length. Dr. Fein, and several 
court clinic and hospital based clinicians, support the 
longer versions. A recent study of judges' views of 
competency evaluations (Owens, Rosner & Harmon, 1985), 
found that, contrary to the authors' expectations, the 
judges expressed a desire for more complete information. 
This study stated that judges explained that at times they 
simply adopt the clinician's conclusion, because "the body 
of the report often does not provide a basis for any 
contrary conclusion" (p. 394). 
Are the clinician's who fear that judges will not 
read long reports wrong? Not necessarily. My own 
experiences lead me to believe that the issue needs 
reframing. The concern should not be about how "thorough" 
or long the report is, but about how skillfully it is 
written. As to the concern about judges who do not like 
to read long reports, in my experience, some do and some 
do not! It probably behooves the clinician, who is 
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concerned about this issue, to find out about the judge to 
whom they are addressing his/her reports, and write them 
accordingly. 
My decision to provide cover letters which summarize 
the report's findings, was an attempt to deal with this 
issue. The judge is given the clinician's conclusions or 
opinions, and referred to the body of the report for the 
rationale and supportive data. This may represent the 
best compromise for the clinician who wishes to write the 
longer version, as I do, anticipating having to present 
his/her thinking in court, someday. 
But, the use of summary cover letters was criticized 
by a forensic psychologist who writes lengthy reports. He 
felt that judges should simply receive the full report, 
otherwise they might just read the summary, and ignore the 
rest. 
Finally, there are some cases which clearly do not 
call for the clinician to provide a great deal of effort, 
either in assessment of pre-trial issues, or in report 
writing. These are cases, mostly Section 15b commitments, 
in which the clinician is made aware from the start, that 
the court's only interest is in treatment. Often in these 
"alternative motivation" cases, judges or prosecutors 
intend to drop charges once the defendant returns to 
court. Such cases should prompt the clinician to try to 
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negotiate a more appropriate disposition, or else to 
return the defendant to court as soon as possible, with 
the briefest of reports. 
Conelusiorisi I'm convinced that two models are 
needed. The model of report writing presented in Chapter 
X of the manual is suggested for the clinician who can 
make the time. If this clinician is aware that the 
referring judge prefers brief synopses, then this should 
be provided, along with the full report. 
A second model needs to be added; this one for the 
busy clinician, who may be preparing several reports each 
week (e.g., clinicians working at forensic hospitals or in 
court clinics). This model would retain the core of the 
good report: opinions supported by clear rationales, and 
selected clinical data. These reports could differ from 
the lengthier version mainly by limiting the amount of 
clinical data it provides. For instance, the fact that a 
"Lamb Warning" was given could be mentioned, but not 
documented in detail, as in the fuller version, unless the 
defendant's response was problematic. Background data, 
supportive of a particular opinion, could be referenced, 
but not presented. 
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—!•>—-Ii§03—iQ—i. Expert witness testimony" 
Table 18 
Summary of Ratings - Part I, Item "10" 
Frequency of Ratings Per Professional Category 
Rating Legal 
(n=5) 
Forensic Prospective 
Mental Health Trainee 
(n=9) (n=5) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Range 
Median 
Mode(s) 
Mean 
This item addresses the issues raised in the 
manual's final section, Chapter XI, "Expert witness 
testimony." The mean rating on Item "10", for all raters 
(19) taken together, was 4.42, again at the middle of the 
"quite adequate" range. A frequency distribution, and the 
means, modes and ranges of the ratings for each 
professional category, are presented in Table 18. 
Comment was varied on the coverage of expert witness 
testimony. The most general comments came from the three 
district attorneys. Two liked the distinction offered 
1 
1 
1 4 1 
4 3 4 
4- 5 2-5 4-5 
5 4 5 
5 4 5 
4.80 4.0 4.80 
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between the lawyer's and clinician's perspectives and 
decision-making processes. One went on to suggest that 
Chapter XI "should be required reading for all expert 
witnesses." 
The third district attorney disagreed. He stated 
that the manual fails to discuss sufficiently, the 
professional's role in defending or projecting his or her 
opinion in front of a judge. " He offered no suggestions 
for improving the manual in this area, but did suggest the 
use of mock trials and courtroom observation as part of 
the training program. 
A forensic psychologist complained about the 
inclusion of the section on courtroom demeanor: "I think 
it is inappropriate in this context to be giving tips on 
'how to look good.' This manual... should focus on 
learning concepts and performing clinical tasks, not on 
how to win friends and influence people." 
Another forensic psychologist suggested that the 
discussion on the issue of "allegiance" to the court, was 
"idealistically correct" but not practical for the 
clinician who is being paid for his/her testimony. He 
also suggested adding a discussion of signals between an 
expert witness and the attorney who calls her/him to the 
stand. When the expert witness gets stuck, "bail out" 
methods, such as requesting a recess, can be used to buy 
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the clinician time. 
A forensic psychiatrist requested more discussion on 
the issue of 1 level of confidence in opinion, and how to 
handle that question in court." A prospective trainee 
suggested including transcripts of expert witness 
testimony, perhaps as supplementary materials. 
Finally, a forensic psychologist stated that there 
was "room for expansion, " but noted that this topic 
actually requires its own volume. He made no suggestions 
as to where it needed expansion. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Item "10", addressing the last chapter in the 
manual, "Expert Witness Testimony", received a combined 
mean score of 4.42. The prospective trainee sub-group 
gave this chapter its highest rating, 4.80, which was 
matched by the legal professionals. The forensic mental 
health professionals rated this item somewhat lower, at 
4.00. 
It is not surprising that this chapter received the 
prospective trainees’ highest rating. In my experience, 
most clinicians, inexperienced in playing the expert 
witness role, are terrified of the prospect of testifying 
(Brodsky & Robey, 1973). Expert witnesses often find that 
their professional competence is publicly attacked by 
cross-examining attorneys. In Chapter XI, the manual 
-exa i  
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provides the trainee with concrete suggestions about how 
to prepare for expert witness testimony, and what to 
expect from the direct and cross examination. This 
chapter's heavy emphasis on "how to", may well have played 
an anxiety reducing role, for this group. 
I recently attended a conference at which a panel of 
prosecutors and defense attorneys expressed their 
frustration with expert witnesses who show up in court, 
unprepared for the adversarial nature of the courtroom. 
From the comments by the legal professionals, it appears 
that, with one exception, they were pleased to see that 
the training package would address this topic, and quite 
satisfied with this chapter. 
The comments from the district attorney who said the 
manual "fails" to address expert witness testimony 
sufficiently, were confusing. I contacted this 
prosecutor, in hopes of learning just where he felt the 
chapter fell short. However, he did not wish to 
elaborate, beyond suggesting that "an attorney, not a 
psychologist, should have written that section." 
While the forensic mental health professionals rated 
the chapter as quite adequately addressing the issue of 
expert witness testimony, from their comments it appears 
that some were uncomfortable with the chapter. Once 
opposing styles came through. One forensic 
again. 
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psychologist felt it was inappropriate to include 
"courtroom demeanor" in this chapter, and that the manual 
should focus on "learning concepts and performing clinical 
tasks. However, this view was balanced by another 
psychologist who suggested adding a section with tips on 
how the expert witness can get out of sticky situations in 
court. He also criticized as "idealistically correct", 
the suggestion that the clinician should remain neutral. 
There appears to be an ongoing ethical concern on 
the part of some forensic clinicians (Gutheil & Appelbaum, 
1982), that other forensic clinicians may look too much 
like charlatans, ready to offer the right opinion for pay, 
prepared to come into court and charm the judge or jury 
with their finely honed skills in expert witness 
testimony. This is certainly the picture painted by 
attorneys (Brodsky & Robey, 1973), who are cross-examining 
expert witnesses hired by the other side. 
It seems to me that, within the ethical guidelines 
of their respective professional organizations (Monahan, 
1980), forensic psychologists and psychiatrists who have 
formed a professional opinion after assessing a defendant, 
should do their utmost to prepare themselves to 
"persuasively" (Bank & Poythress, 1983) defend that 
opinion in court. It seems reasonable that judges, 
and defendants would expect clinicians who are 
attorneys. 
434 
willing to become involved in pre-trial evaluations, to 
come to court prepared to cope with their role. 
Cone lug ionsi. At this point I would make only one 
addition to this chapter. As suggested by a forensic 
psychiatrist, there needs to be more discussion in the 
manual regarding the issue of how expert witnesses should 
handle the difficult question of the clinician's 
confidence in his/her opinion - "Now, just how sure are 
you?" 
A few of the comments from forensic clinicians 
hinted that the chapter needs more, but there was very 
little elaboration. Aside from more "hints" and "tips", I 
do not see that my treatment of this topic really needs 
expansion. Rather, the matter of expert witness testimony 
lends itself more to training and practice, than to 
independent reading. 
Item "11",_Part I: "Rights of defendants in the pre-trial 
evaluation process." 
This item addresses the issues raised in the 
manual's Chapter III, "Privileged Communication and 
Protection Against Self-incrimination in Court Ordered 
Evaluations"; it also addresses the coverage of 
defendant's rights in the chapters on the legal aspects of 
to stand trial and criminal responsibility, competency 
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Chapters IV and VI. The mean rating on Item ”11", for all 
raters (17) taken together, was 3.94, the high end of the 
adequate range. A frequency distribution, and the 
means, modes and ranges of the ratings for each 
professional category, are presented in Table 19. 
Note that of the twenty (20) raters only seventeen 
(17) rated this item. Further, seven (7) reviewers 
commented on the the item itself. Six (6) were unsure of 
the section of the manual to which it referred. One (1) 
reviewer, identifying Chapter III as the focus of this 
item, complained that the item was mis-numbered, and 
should have been placed earlier on the review form. 
Table 19 
Frequency of Ratings Per Professional Category 
Rating Legal Forensic Prospective 
Mental Health Trainee 
(n=4) (n=9) (n=4) 
Range 
Median 
Mode(s) 
Mean 
5 
5 
5 
5.0 
2-5 
4 
4 
3.55 
2-5 
4 
4 
3.75 
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Comments focused on the structure of the manual's 
Chapter II, with no mention of the issues related to 
defendants' rights raised in Chapters IV and VI. The 
broadest comment came from a district court judge, who 
suggested that Chapter III be completely restructured with 
more detail and breadth. First he suggests that the 
format used in Chapters IV and VI, in which the subject 
matter is introduced by an historical perspective, be 
adopted. He then offers an overview of how he would 
structure the content of the chapter. Finally, he 
stresses the need to provide case law definitions of the 
concepts introduced in this chapter, and provides the 
legal citations. 
One district attorney liked the treatment of 
Blaisdell_v,_Commonwealth. He suggested that judges, 
clerks of court, and clinicians should be obliged to 
review it. He also suggested that the sample Lamb Warning 
suggested by Gutheil and Appelbaum ( 1982), went too far in 
"advising" the defendant." He felt the warning should be 
limited to a statement of the defendant's rights. 
Three forensic experts and one defense attorney took 
issue with the statement in Chapter III (IV. A. 2. a.) 
that clinicians should not proceed with competency to 
stand trial evaluations when defendants do not seem to 
understand the "Lamb Warning. " One psychologist pointed 
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out that the resultant delay could be harmful to the 
defendant (continued commitment), and that the judge, not 
the clinician should determine if the lack of 
understanding is a barrier to proceeding. If so the 
evaluation can be disregarded. A psychiatrist and a 
defense attorney added that it is probable that a 
defendant who cannot understand the warning, is 
incompetent to stand trial. A psychologist added that, 
unlike competency to stand trial assessments, in the case 
of criminal responsibility assessments the interview 
should not proceed unless the defendant appears to 
understand the warning. 
The same defense attorney suggested stressing that 
the "privilege" belongs to the defendant, not the 
clinician. Therefore, when the defendant waives the 
privilege, the clinician cannot refuse to testify based on 
privilege. This attorney also suggested adding a 
statement to the Lamb Warning to the effect that the 
information gained in the pre-trial evaluation may be used 
against the defendant. 
Other suggested additions included discussion of the 
issue of mandated outpatient treatment, and of the right 
to have an attorney present during pre-trial evaluation. 
Finally, two reviewers corrected the inclusion of 
social workers under "psychotherapist privilege." They 
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note that social workers are 
included under another law. 
DiscussiQn_and_Cpnclusions 
The problems associated with the placement and 
wording of Item "11", noted above, have already been 
addressed, in Chapter V. Although "defendants' rights" 
are covered throughout the manual, it is clear from their 
comments that reviewers associated this item with Chapter 
III - "Privileged Communication and Protection Against 
Self-Incrimination." The relative effects of the specific 
content of this chapter vis-a-vis the placement and 
wording problems associated with Item "11" are unclear; 
although it seems reasonable to assume that where 
confusion was a factor, the effect was lower ratings. 
Regardless, the ratings were striking in their variance. 
The combined mean rating for this item, 3.94, was 
the second lowest, but still just below the "quite 
adequate" range. However, examination of the sub-group 
averages reveals that the forensic mental health 
professional and the prospective trainee sub-groups each 
produced their lowest mean ratings, 3.55 and 3.75, 
respectively. But the legal professionals produced their 
highest rating, a perfect 5.00! Further, the ratings of 
the nine (9) forensic mental health professional raters on 
this item, were fairly evenly spread out (see Table 19) 
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over the range of possible ratings. 
Item "11" is strictly a legal issue. While the 
manual’s Chapter III describes the clinician’s conduct 
vis-a-vis defendants’ rights, these rights, and the 
clinician’s conduct are both determined by constitutional 
interpretations argued by attorneys and decided by judges. 
Thus the legal professionals opinions should carry more 
weight, relative to the other sub-groups. Certainly, from 
their comments it is clear that the legal raters were 
highly supportive and pleased with Chapter III. The 
chapter's strengths clearly impressed the district 
attorney who suggested that judges, clerks of courts, and 
clinicians should be obliged to review it. However, keep 
in mind that there were only four (4) legal professional 
raters on this item. 
On the other hand, a judge who did not fill out the 
review form, sent a letter which offered general praise 
for the whole package, and then launched into a scholarly 
three paged restructuring of the whole chapter. In it, 
this judge provides an expansion on the issues of 
privileged communication, supported by case law, some of 
which was not cited in Chapter III. The letter provides a 
solid basis for a revision of this chapter. 
Aside from this judge's comprehensive treatment of 
Chapter III, two issues stood out in the other reviewers' 
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comments. First of all, the sample "Lamb Warnings" 
presented at the end of the chapter, brought out opposing 
views from a prosecutor and a defense attorney. They 
responded within role. The district attorney felt that 
these warnings to defendants, regarding their rights, 
should be limited to the a simple statement of fact, and 
should avoid giving advice. But, the defense attorney 
wanted to expand the warnings to include the possibility 
that the information obtained in the pre-trial evaluation 
might be used against the defendant. 
Which way does the clinician go? This quandary is a 
familiar one for clinicians working within the public 
sector. There are many "legal" constraints and 
requirements placed on clinicians, which vary in 
definition and degree, depending on the legal expert 
involved. Unless a statute, regulation or legal 
precedent, is stated in explicit language, it is subject 
to a variety of interpretations. Mental health statutes, 
at least in Massachusetts, are notoriously vague. 
This question of how to proceed with a "Lamb 
Warning" is a good example. The requirement to offer the 
warning, and the specific rights, are clearly stated in 
case law. However, judges always stop short of telling 
clinicians what to say. In my experience I’ve found it 
best to provide the facts regarding rights, and then to 
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offer very limited "advice", as the situation warrants. I 
clarify that 1 am not an attorney, and assist the 
ambivalent defendant in seeking legal advice on the issue 
of whether or not to proceed. I carefully document this 
interaction. I assume that if my procedure is considered 
to be faulty. I'll be corrected. 
A second, related issue, which disturbed several 
reviewers was the statement in Chapter III that clinicians 
should not proceed with pre-trial evaluations when the 
defendant does not appear to understand the warning. 
Their comments clearly point out the folly of this advice, 
which in retrospect I believe was a product of my own 
misunderstanding of what was "required". I've learned 
from their comments that I was partially correct. My 
advice does apply, but only to criminal responsibility 
assessments. 
In the case of competency to stand trial evaluations 
there is simply no valid reason for not proceeding, as 
long as the defendant is willing. This is because the 
chances of the defendant's actually incriminating 
him/herself during a competency assessment are quite slim, 
since the competency report or testimony does not involve 
the defendant's statements regarding her/his culpability. 
Also, as these reviewers point out - if defendants do not 
understand the warning, they are not likely to be 
making this 
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competent. Delays 
potentially harmful 
clinician's time. 
in 
to the defendant, 
assessment are 
and wasteful of the 
Conclusions! This chapter should be revised, 
probably along the lines suggested in the judge's letter. 
However, a chapter covering clinicians' conduct with 
regard to defendant's rights in Massachusetts, probably 
should not be written by a clinician alone (note that the 
Training Program provides an attorney as the trainer on 
this issue). Ideally, this chapter should be rewritten 
with consultation from judges, district attorneys and 
defense attorneys. 
The revision should clarify that clinicians cam 
proceed with competency to stand trial assessments, even 
if the defendant does not understand the "Lamb Warning. " 
As suggested by two reviewers, the issues of mandated 
outpatient treatment and the right to have an attorney 
present during a pre-trial evaluation, should be added to 
the chapter. Finally, the issue of social workers and 
privileged communication should be clarified. 
Part II._Ttem "6": "Materials provided in the training 
manual." 
This item addresses the supplementary materials 
the end of each chapter in the training provided at 
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manual. The mean rating on Part II, Item "6", for all 
raters (19) taken together, was 4.32, "quite adequate." A 
frequency distribution, and the means, modes and ranges of 
the ratings for each professional category, are presented 
in Table 20. 
Table 20 
Summary of Ratings - Part II, Item "6" 
Frequency of Ratings Per Professional Category 
Rating Legal Forensic Prospective 
Mental Health Trainee 
ii
 
c
 
N
w
*
 
(n=10) (n=5) 
1 
2 - 1 - 
3 - - 1 
4 1 6 1 
5 3 3 3 
Range 4-5 2-5 3-5 
Median 5 4 5 
Mode(s) 5 4 5 
Mean 4. 75 4. 10 4. 40 
There were few general comments on the supplementary 
materials section. Comments and recommendations regarding 
specific materials have already been reported above. 
A forensic psychiatrist suggested that trainees 
should not be given such a heavy reading load. He also 
that he felt several of the recommended articles 
stated 
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were "not the best choice. " He did not offer 
substitutions, but did offer to consult on this section at 
a later date. 
A prospective trainee, a psychiatrist, felt that 
summary sheets of each chapter, and schematics of the flow 
of the legal processes should be included in the 
supplementary materials sections after each chapter. 
Finally, a forensic psychologist felt that if the 
recommended articles were added to each chapter, the 
manual would weigh 50 pounds. 
Discussion and Conclsuions 
Of the nineteen (19) raters, only two rated this 
item less than "4". I have no idea why so many raters 
thought that the selection of materials was "quite 
adequate". There was really very little comment on the 
supplementary materials. 
My aim, in these sections, was to provide trainees 
with materials which would offer them a balanced view of 
controversial issues, and to provide additional resource 
materials to assist them. I had expected that the 
forensic clinicians, being familiar with the relevant 
clinical and legal literature and materials (e.g., 
assessment guides, checklists, summaries of laws, and 
crucial case law decisions), would offer critical comment 
regarding my choices. This sub-group offered a few 
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suggested additions, and the comment that trainees should 
not be given too heavy a reading load. Otherwise, the 
only critical comment, positive or negative, from this 
group was from the psychiatrist who stated that there were 
better alternatives to the articles I had chosen, in some 
cases, but offered no concrete suggestions. 
I had expected that the legal professionals would be 
most helpful with suggestions regarding just which 
statutory laws and case law decisions should be included. 
Again, I was disappointed with the lack of comment. This 
group provided two suggestions: replace the "proposed" 
regulations for designation of "qualified psychologists" 
with the now officially implemented regulations; and 
include more case law summaries. 
From the sub-group of prospective trainees, I had 
hoped to receive comment about whether they felt the 
proposed materials would be helpful to them, and about 
what else they wanted in the supplementary sections. 
While they did not comment at all on the proposed 
articles, they did suggest that summary sheets on the 
content of each chapter, and "flow charts" describing 
legal procedures, would be helpful. 
This item was placed at the end of Part II of the 
review form, and it referred to material placed at the end 
Also, the supplementary materials are 
of each chapter. 
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only briefly mentioned in the instructions. Further, I 
never gave the reviewers instructions, regarding these 
materials, in line with my expectations. This low 
priority placement appears to have struck the reviewers as 
a "low priority", if it struck them at all. Also, in the 
case of the prospective trainees, the fact that I only 
provided brief summaries of the proposed articles, rather 
than complete copies, may have made it difficult for them 
to make any reasonable judgments. However, while in other 
areas the reviewers provided criticism of "design" 
problems with the manual or review form, there was no such 
criticism provided here. 
Conclusions: I think that the suggestion for 
summary sheets is a good idea. Gutheil and Appelbaum 
(1982) provide "Action Guides" at the end of each of their 
chapters on forensic assessment. I have seen copies of 
these on the desks and walls of forensic clinicians. 
While the whole training manual will need ongoing 
editing, given the dynamic nature of the law and the 
innovations in clinical assessment, this seems especially 
true for the "Supplementary Materials" sections. New and 
better articles and materials are constantly being 
produced, and will have to be considered as additions or 
replacements. 
CHAPTER VII 
STAGE III: REPORT TO D.M.H., PART III 
THE TRAINING PROGRAM CURRICULUM: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter continues the format used in Chapter VI 
— item by item presentation of ratings and comments. 
However, for the curriculum, I depart from the procedure 
somewhat. Instead of responding to the results on each 
item with discussion and conclusions, as I did for the 
training manual in the last chapter, here I provide one 
issue-oriented discussion/conclusions section, which 
follows my presentation of the results. 
The Curriculum:_Overall Assessment. Format, and Methods 
Part II - Items "1", "2", and "3" - of the review 
form asked reviewers to rate and comment on 1) format, 2) 
time allotted, and 3) methods used in the curriculum or 
"training program." Eighteen (18) reviewers provided 
ratings, for a combined mean rating of 4.27, quite 
adequate," on these three items. 
The mean rating for each professional group, on the 
three combined items, were as follows. Legal 
professionals: 4.75; forensic mental health professionals: 
3.76; prospective trainees: 4.0. 
Below, each of the three items relating to the 
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Training Program are addressed individually, in the same 
format as the items relating to the Training Manual, 
above. Figure 2 presents a comparison of the mean 
ratings, per item, in four groupings: 1) all raters; 2) 
legal professionals; 3) forensic mental health 
professionals; and 4) prospective trainees. 
Part IJLt—Item—111 "Format of the training program. " 
The mean rating on Part II, Item "l", for all raters 
(18) taken together, was 4.0, "quite adequate." A 
frequency distribution, and the means, modes and ranges of 
the ratings for each professional category, are presented 
in Table 21. 
The forensic mental health professionals offered a 
good deal of constructive comment regarding the training 
program-’s format. Some of the more general comment 
reflected differing views on the length of the program 
(see Part II, Item "2", below). For instance, one 
forensic psychiatrist who has written extensively on 
forensic issues, felt that the program was "too intensive 
to attract most clinicians." He suggested that the 
program be "condensed," integrating "the most salient 
clinical and legal information." 
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Table 21 
Summary of Ratings - Part II, Item "1" 
Frequency of Ratings Per Professional Category 
Rating Legal Forensic Prospective 
D II 
1 
Mental Health Trainee 
(n=10) (n=4) 
1 _ 
2 - 1 _ 
3 - 2 _ 
4 1 6 4 
5 3 1 
- 
Range 4 - 5 2-5 4 
Median 5 4 4 
Mode(s) 5 4 4 
Mean 4.75 3.70 4. 0 
On the other hand, a forensic psychologist, with 
many years of experience in training, described the 
curriculum as "basically excellent, " but suggested adding 
more on legal issues, and more on the "nuts and bolts of 
practice." He also suggested that these extras could be 
elaborated upon by experienced presenters. 
Many practical pointers were offered. A 
psychologist, who has experience in training expert 
witnesses through the use of "mock trials, suggested that 
students receive the manual ahead of time. He also felt 
that the definitions of "mental illness and defect" should 
be presented early in the program, rather than in the 
sixth day. He then offered to consult on the issue of 
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expert witness testimony. 
Another psychologist with teaching experience, 
noting the length and amounts of material presented in the 
second and fourth days, suggested breaking up the didactic 
presentation with vignettes and questions prompting 
trainee participation. He also suggested that, for the 
purposes of the experiential portions of the program, the 
maximum size group should be eight to ten, rather than 15. 
He added this creative alternative for a larger group in 
sessions covering assessment, report writing, and expert 
witness testimony: divide into two groups, each taking 
opposite sides on questions of criminal responsibility, 
competency to stand trial, or commitment. He also 
suggested adding a two to three day follow-up training 
after six months or one year. 
The same psychologist also raised the issue of 
presenters' qualifications. He questioned the wisdom of 
requiring that all clinical faculty be "qualified forensic 
supervisors. " He pointed out that the requirements for 
this status would eliminate many excellent presenters, 
such as social workers, and psychologists who did not yet 
qualify. 
Another forensic psychologist suggested dropping the 
sessions on expert witness testimony from this program, 
and increasing the attention paid to report writing. He 
451 
suggested that graduation from the program might be made 
contingent upon completion of two reports. 
The court clinic social worker who viewed the manual 
as less than adequate because it fails to address the full 
range of forensic evaluations, again made this point with 
regard to the training program. With regard to format, 
she suggested adding a session on "special concerns" to 
which trainees bring their own special questions, not 
answered in previous sessions. 
Three prospective trainees commented. The format 
was described as "well organized" and "thorough." "Seems 
like a sound teaching approach." One noted that the 
manual corresponds well with the curriculum. Difficulty 
with evaluating the curriculum's format, without going 
through the program, was noted twice. Two psychologists 
pointed out that, ultimately, the program would "stand or 
fall on the teaching ability" of the presenters. Finally, 
the psychologist who earlier criticized the manual's 
presentation on amnesia as being too cursory, suggested 
eliminating this topic from the curriculum. 
Only one legal professional, a judge, commented on 
the format of the training program, and only to note that 
he had no experience on which to base a judgment. 
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———ii->—Item—2—i. Time allotted for the training 
program" 
The mean rating on Part II, Item "2", for all raters 
(18) taken together, was 3.94, at the high end of the 
"adequate" range. A frequency distribution, and the 
means, modes and ranges of the ratings for each 
professional category, are presented in Table 22. 
Table 22 
Summary of Ratings - Part II, Item "2" 
Frequency of Ratings Per Professional Category 
Rating Legal Forensic Prospective 
Mental Health Trainee 
(n=4) (n=9) (n=5) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Range 
Median 
Mode(s) 
Mean 
1 
3 
4-5 
5 
5 
4. 75 
1 
2 
5 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2-5 
4 
4 
3.66 
3-5 
4 
3, 4 
3.80 
Comments on this item centered mostly around the 
length of the program. Four forensic mental health 
professionals, the D.M.H. attorney, and one prospective 
trainee felt that eight days was "too long, " "far too much 
time," "impractical,” "excessive" and "too extensive. " 
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They expressed two major concerns. 
First, opponents of such a lengthy program felt that 
it would be difficult to attract trainees. They raised 
the question of incentive for trainees to give up so much 
trme out of their practices. A forensic psychiatrist 
noted the preparation course for the American Board of 
Forensic Psychiatry’s board exam is more extensive, and 
yet presented in less time. 
The second, related concern, was with the 
time-intensity of the program. This concern was shared by 
reviewers who supported the eight day program. The number 
of hours of training in each day, especially long didactic 
sessions in the afternoon, were cited s problems. Several 
reviewers asked about the "spread11 of the sessions. A 
forensic psychologist suggested one day per week for two 
months. 
Three forensic psychologists supported the length of 
the program, assuming the sessions are not packed into 
consecutive days. One psychologist stated "actually I can 
see a much longer program," but noted that rather than 
make this program longer, sections could be broken off 
into separate training programs (e.g., expert witness 
testimony). 
Finally, in contrast with the psychologist who felt 
that the offering on amnesia was inadequate, the court 
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clinic social worker felt that four hours was too much 
time for this topic. 
Part—IXj—IteiQ—3_^_ Training methods described in the 
curriculum guide" 
The mean rating on Part II, Item "3", for all raters 
(18) taken together, was 4.16, "quite adequate." A 
frequency distribution, and the means, modes and ranges of 
the ratings for each professional category, are presented 
in Table 23. 
Table 23 
Summary of Ratings - Part II, Item "3" 
Frequency of Ratings Per Professional Category 
Rating Legal Forensic Prospective 
Mental Health Trainee 
(n=4) (n=9) (n=4) 
1 
2 
- - - 
3 — 2 - 
4 1 7 3 
5 3 1 1 
Range 4 - 5 3-5 4-5 
Median 5 4 4 
Mode(s) 5 4 4 
Mean 4.75 3.90 3.80 
Comments on the training methods presented in the 
training program centered around the issue of trainee 
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participation. Several reviewers felt that the program 
needed a higher proportion of exercises and role plays in 
which trainees could be active. 
A prospective trainee felt that the training manual 
was quite adequate, by itself, as a vehicle for presenting 
information to trainees. He viewed experiential training 
as an adjunct to the manual. 
Another prospective trainee and a district attorney 
felt that trainees should observe actual contested 
hearings. Two district attorneys emphasized the 
importance of trainees participating in mock hearings. 
One suggested that each trainee should have the experience 
of trying to defend a mediocre report under simulated 
direct and cross-examination. 
A forensic psychologist pointed out that since most 
trainees will have "bits and pieces" of information, a 
"seminar" format might be more effective than formal 
lectures. Another suggested using live assessment 
interviews. 
Finally, a district attorney suggested adding a 
video-taped interview with an experienced judge, 
discussing what judges see as critical issues with regard 
to reports and expert witness testimony. 
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DiscussjQn_and Conclu^jgnF-; 
"This is an intensive, eight-day training 
program, with 52 1/2 scheduled class hours. 
While there is a great deal of content to be 
absorbed through reading (the Training Manual 
would be approximately 680 pages) and didactic 
presentation (31 hours), this program 
emphasizes trainee participation. Forty 
percent of the program schedule involves 
trainees in discussions, case conferences, 
mock trials and a forensic report—writing 
workgroup" (Chapter IV, "The Training 
Program", p. i). 
First, a point about the relative emphasis placed on 
the training manual and the curriculum. Within the 
proposed training model, the manual functions to introduce 
the trainee to critical issues and procedures, as 
"background reading", and as a reference. Its chapters 
were written to correspond with the training units 
presented in the curriculum. The curriculum was designed 
to elaborate on the content of the manual, and to provide 
a setting in which the trainee can interact with the 
material through observation, discussion, and simulation. 
Both pieces are essential to the program. 
Yet, it appears the the manual has been emphasized, 
both by me and by the reviewers. I have found that in 
conversations subsequent their review, reviewers would 
characterize the project as "the manual" rather than the 
training program." This is easy to understand. 
The training manual took four (4) months to write; 
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ths curriculum took two days. For me, the manual was a 
painstaking creative endeavor, whereas the curriculum was 
a comparatively straightforeward task, and not 
particularly challenging. 
For the reviewers, the curriculum clearly only 
required a fraction of the time it took to go through the 
complete manual. The manual is over two hundred (200) 
pages long; the curriculum takes up thirteen (13) pages. 
Finally, critique of the manual is a concrete task - 
the manual is in hand; whereas the curriculum is a plan, 
an idea. The reviewers were able to look at the manual, 
and report what they saw; they looked at the curriculum, 
and imagined what the implemented program would look like. 
Naturally, there is more to say about the manual, at this 
point. If, and when, the curriculum is put through a 
trial run, the data collected should create a good deal 
more discussion regarding the curriculum. 
Reviewers '_Ratings: The pattern observed earlier, 
with regard to the legal professionals' ratings being 
consistently higher than the other two sub-groups, becomes 
even more pronounced (see Figure 2) on the three items on 
which the curriculum was rated: Item ”1 , format; Item 
"2", time allotted; Item "3", training methods. 
The one (1) judge and three (3) attorneys, who 
provided ratings on these items, came up with a consistent 
458 
4.75 mean rating on each item. In comparison, the 
combined mean for all three sub-groups on these items was, 
3.99, with mean scores for the forensic clinicians and 
prospective trainees of 3.75 and 3.87, respectively (see 
Table 24). Of course, as noted earlier, the sample of 
legal professional raters (and of prospective trainees) 
was extremely small, and thus their ratings are not useful 
in drawing any meaningful conclusions, beyond noting this 
pattern. 
The reason for the legal professionals' combination 
of very high ratings and paucity of comment, can, I think, 
be summed up in the comment from a district court judge - 
that he had no experience on which to base a judgment. 
The training task here is to prepare mental health 
professionals to perform forensic assessments. While some 
of the curriculum does involve legal professionals as 
trainers, and some of the content is purely legal, it 
seems unlikely that the eleven (11) legal professionals 
who participated in this review would have had much prior 
experience in training clinicians. However, the few 
comments which this sub-group did provide were helpful, in 
that they described what these reviewers wanted the 
trainees to hear. 
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Table 24 
Comparison of Sub-Group Means 
Professional 
Sub-group 
Mean Ratings 
Manual Curriculum 
Legal 4. 64 4. 75 
Forensic Mental Health 3.99 3.75 
Prospective Trainee 4.29 3.89 
Combined 4.22 3. 99 
The sub-group of prospective trainees were 
surprisingly silent. I had hoped to learn from them about 
how they would feel about going through such a training 
program. Two (2) of this small sub-group of five (5) 
reviewers noted that they needed to try out the training 
program, first, before making a judgment. 
On the other hand, the forensic mental health 
professionals were quite forthcoming with comment. 
Continuing their pattern of coming down on both sides of 
controversial issues, they were very active in providing 
constructive criticism. 
General Format 
There was general support for the notion of a 
training program, coordinated with the training manual, 
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which utilizes a mixed faculty of legal and mental health 
professionals. Further, the only comments with regard to 
the topics included in the curriculum, were the suggestion 
from one forensic psychologist that the training on expert 
witness testimony might best be separated into separate 
program, and the suggestions that I delete or cut back on 
the time set aside for "memory and amnesia. " 
A common theme among the comments was the feeling 
that the sessions needed to be more experiential, less 
didactic. Along with the many excellent suggestions for 
actively involving trainees in the sessions, there was the 
suggestion from a forensic psychologists that a "seminar" 
format might work better. 
Finally, Melton et al (1985) report that they found 
"lectures were probably necessary to lay the 
groundwork..." but, "...involvement of the trainees in 
performing and critiquing evaluations was extremely 
effective" (p. 93). 
Conclusion: The layout of the topics for the 
training program, as described in the curriculum, is fine, 
as is. However, of the 52 1/2 hours scheduled, 31 hours 
involve didactic presentation, with the other 21 1/2 
involving trainee participation or observation. I like 
the suggestions that the balance needs to be shifted to 
more experiential activities, and that a seminar format 
461 
should be used, when possible. The former will be 
necessary in order to implement some of the suggestions 
discussed below, and the latter provides an opportunity 
for combining the formal presentation with trainee 
participation. It is also more respectful of the 
trainees, who as professionals, are likely to have a lot 
to offer the process themselves. 
Faculty 
Three reviewers noted that the pedagogic skills and 
knowledge of the trainers would be crucial to the success 
of the training program. Clearly, no matter how well 
designed the program, ultimately, its ability to prepare 
mental health professionals to perform these assessments 
will depend on the skills of its trainers. Thus the 
forensic psychologist, who complained about the 
requirement that the mental health professional faculty 
would have to be designated as "Qualified Forensic 
Supervisors” per the new regulations for psychologists, 
certainly made a good point. As noted earlier such a 
requirement would, undoubtedly, eliminate many highly 
qualified trainers. 
Conclusion: This requirement should be dropped. 
Emphasis should be placed on identifying informed, skilled 
trainers. 
462 
Class_Size 
Conclusion: Only one reviewer brought up the issue 
of class size, but he makes a good point about keeping the 
class size below ten (10), for purposes of the 
experiential sessions. Should a class size greater than 
ten (10) be unavoidable, he offers a solution which should 
be adopted as a training tool regardless of class size: 
When the content of the exercise allows, break up the 
class into groups with opposing viewpoints. This should 
be easily implemented in the assessment sessions in which 
case presentations are analyzed. 
Time_Ailotted 
The issue of the “time allotted" for the training 
program was controversial. First of all, several 
reviewers raised the issue of the "time intensity " of the 
program, as described in the curriculum. A few of them 
suggested that: 1) the sessions should be spread cut, over 
a period of weeks or months; and 2) the lengthy, half day 
didactic sessions needed to be either broken up with 
experiential exercises, or else curtailed. 
- overall length of the training 
The issue of the overaix 
program, eight days, 
were three views. 1) 
attract trainees; 2) 
created a lot of discussion. There 
the program would be too long to 
the training can be accomplished in 
less time; 
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and 3) the time allotted is adequate, or should be 
expanded by adding more on expert witness testimony, and 
by adding follow-up sessions, six months to a year later. 
The first view, the practical view, was a concern 
expressed by Dr. Fein in his review of the curriculum. 
How could busy clinicians justify taking so much time out 
of their practices? What would be the incentive? This 
concern differed from the second view, that eight days are 
unnecessary. For instance, in a phone interview, a 
psychiatrist expressed this same concern, while 
acknowledging that he saw a lengthy program as ideal. 
The view that less time is needed, was expressed by 
a clinician who noted that other programs are more 
comprehensive, yet take less time. The training program 
provided by Virginia's Forensic Evaluation Training and 
Research Center originally provided an eight day program, 
which was also more comprehensive than this program. 
f 
After two years the program was cut back to six days. In 
a phone interview, the current director of the Virginia 
program, stated that as the trainers became more skilled 
in their presentations, less time was needed. 
Conclusions: When I designed this curriculum, I was 
aware of the concern that an eight-day program might be 
seen as unrealistic. I decided to let the reviewers 
and instead, I strove to develop a handle that issue. 
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"thorough" program, which would take "enough” time to 
disseminate information and help people develop forensic 
evaluation skills. I am still committed to that 
approach, although I would not wish to offer a program 
which went unattended. 
I think that the "spread" of the program will 
require experimentation. Whether the sessions are spread 
over weeks or months, seems less important to me than 
beginning with two or three consecutive days, so that the 
trainers and trainees can establish working relationships. 
Further, to the extent that this modification, and others 
such as providing more trainee participation, might make 
the program more attractive, they become even more 
important. 
Finally, in Chapter VII, I will discuss 
implementation strategies used in Virginia which address 
the issue of "incentive" for clinicians to attend. 
Assessment Technjque_Sgssiang. 
There were four recommendations made with regard to 
the content of the assessment technique sessions: 1) drop 
the two hours on amnesia; 2) add more nuts and bo 
practice; 3) add a session for trainees to bring in their 
. ... j 4) include live assessment 
own "special issues ; and 
interviews. 
esnslusiaasi The suggestion that the assessment of 
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amnesia be dropped from the curriculum was made by the 
neuropsychologist who feels that the subject matter is too 
complex to be adequately handled in two hours. By 
including a section on amnesia, I hoped to sensitize 
clinicians to the forensic context, in which amnesia 
becomes a special assessment problem. As the court clinic 
social worker pointed out, two hours is more than this 
task requires. However, I felt that the added time could 
be used to update the trainees, who, as clinicians, should 
already have at least a working knowledge of amnesia. 
Thus I would leave the two our block as it is. However, I 
would add that this topic should be addressed by a 
forensic clinician with neuropsychological training. 
As to adding more "nuts and bolts of practice", my 
expectation is that this issue will be addressed by the 
individual trainers. The curriculum is a guide. The 
sessions, hopefully will include more than a rehashing of 
the content of the training manual. This went unstated in 
the curriculum, and should be added. 
I hesitate to add a special session to the 
curriculum in which trainees would bring in their own 
special issues. I would hope that each session would 
allow for trainees to have their special issues addressed. 
Finally, I think the use of live assessment 
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interviews would be inappropriate for this program. Live 
interviews are excellent training aids in long term 
training programs (e.g., a practicum or internship). 
However, this is a relatively brief program focused on 
many topics. The value of using taped or simulated 
interviews in this program is that tapes can be edited, or 
simulations planned, to provide exposure to key interview 
problems or techniques. Observation of and supervised 
participation in live interviews should be available as 
part of the supervisory process, subsequent to the 
training program. 
Report Writing and Expert Witness Testimony 
As noted earlier the written report is the most 
likely endpoint of the forensic evaluation, with no more 
than 10% of these reports leading to actual in-court 
testimony. However, the only content area of the training 
program which drew attention from the reviewers was the 
issue of expert witness testimony. 
Conclusions: I disagree with the forensic clinician 
who raised the possibility that expert witness testimony 
be deleted altogether from this program, with a special 
program being developed just on this topic. Expert 
witness testimony is an integral part of this program. 
Given the level of anxiety created by the 
prospect of 
having to testify, leaving this “prize" out 
would leave 
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the trainees with an incomplete training experience. 
While this clinician is not specific about what more he 
wants to see provided, I suspect that it is practice, 
practice, and more practice in mock trials and simulated 
hearings. 
The following three suggestions from two district 
attorneys should be implemented. One suggested that the 
trainees observe actual court hearings related to 
pre-trial evaluations and commitments. The other brought 
up an interesting practical exercise: have each trainee, 
playing the role of expert witness, defend a "mediocre 
report under cross-examination. Finally, the first 
district attorney offered the intriguing idea of taped 
interviews with judges on the issues which they see as 
crucial with regard to reports and expert witness 
testimony. 
This completes my presentation and analysis of the 
reviewers’ ratings and comments on the materials which 
make up this training proposal. In light of these results 
and discussions, I begin the next chapter by addressing 
the question "should the proposal be accepted"? 
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Figure 2. Comparison of Mean; Training Program 
CHAPTER VIII 
STAGE III: REPORT TO D.M.H., PART IV 
NEXT STEPS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE PROJECTS 
The Project 
This dissertation has chronicled the development of 
a program for training practicing mental health 
professionals to perform pre-trial evaluations in 
Massachusetts. 
In Chapter I, after introducing the topic of 
pre-trial evaluations, I described the forensic mental 
health "scene" in Massachusetts, and the need for 
training, both nationally and in this state. A new law, 
new regulations, a new Division of Forensic Mental Health 
Services within D.M.H., and a new Assistant Commissioner 
of Mental Health responsible for forensic services, who is 
committed to "revamping" these services, have all combined 
to create a situation "ripe" for the introduction of a 
training program. Chapter I ended with a statement of the 
goals of this project, which introduced the reader, 
briefly, to the methodology to be employed. 
1. To develop a draft training program which could 
serve as a basis for training practicing mental 
health professionals to perform forensic 
469 
evaluations as described in M.G.L. Chapter 123, 
Sections 15 and 16. 
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2. To elicit and analyze review and comment from key 
individuals in the mental health and judicial 
systems in Massachusetts, for the purpose of: 
a. providing a basis for the Department of 
Mental Health to assess the adequacy and 
acceptability of the proposed training 
model. 
b. providing a basis for revision or redesign 
of the model. 
After presenting a history and review of training in 
forensic evaluation, in Chapter II, I presented the full 
methodology for this project, in Chapter III. Here I 
described the project as proceeding in three "stages. " 
Stage I, the process of developing the training program's 
materials, a training manual and curriculum, was recounted 
in that chapter. Stage II would be the evaluation of the 
materials by three groups of reviewers, legal 
professionals, forensic mental health experts, and 
prospective trainees. The training materials, along with 
a review form calling for ratings and comments, would be 
sent to the reviewers. Stage III, would be the 
development of a report to D.M.H., which would report. 
471 
discuss and offer conclusions regarding the results of the 
review. 
In Chapter IV, I presented the product of Stage I, 
the training materials. This included a lengthy training 
manual, modeled after the manual used in Virginia's 
training program, and a curriculum, which described the 
training program. The manual was divided into eleven (11) 
chapters, each followed by a "supplementary materials" 
section, which briefly described professional articles, 
case law summaries, and copies of statutes, which I 
recommended for inclusion at the end of each of the 
manual's chapters. The curriculum described an eight-day 
training program. It was divided into sessions which 
corresponded with the material in the training manual. 
Chapters V through the current Chapter VIII, 
together make up the "Report to D.M.H." In Chapter V, I 
addressed Stage II. I began by describing the decisions 
and events involved in sending the training package out to 
the reviewers, and my efforts to get timely responses. 
Then I presented and discussed the results of this effort. 
Thirty-two (32), or sixty percent (60%) of fifty-three 
(53) individuals who received the package have responded, 
to date, although only twenty (20) filled out review 
forms. Forensic mental health professionals responded at 
the highest rate (80%), while judges and D.M.H. attorneys 
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had the lowest, 30% and 25%, respectively. 
Possible factors affecting the response rates were 
discussed. These included the difficulty of the review 
task, and "political factors" which led me to include 
individuals who were unlikely to respond, and which 
created less than aggressive follow-up, in some cases. 
"Timing" factors may have also played a part: the review 
was sent out at the beginning of the summer, and just as 
several reviewers were going through job changes. 
Problems in the design of the review form were described. 
These problems including instructions, wording and 
placement, may have caused some confusion, and may explain 
why several of the responding reviewers did not fill out 
forms. 
At the end of Chapter V, I raised the question of 
the usefulness of the review as a basis on which D.M.H. 
could make decisions regarding the proposed training 
program. After discussing its limitations, I concluded 
that the review data should prove to be very useful, based 
on the amount of constructive critique provided by the 
reviewers. 
In Chapters VI and VII, I presented and discussed 
the ratings and comments made by the reviewers on the 
manual and the training program's curriculum, 
The ratings were reported in terms of 
respectively. 
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averages for each group of reviewers. Rating averages 
reported in both chapters were consistently at or above 
4.0 (i.e., "more than adequate"). Comments were both 
supportive and constructively critical. 
Finally, in this concluding chapter, I begin by 
addressing the question of whether or not the proposed 
training program should be accepted by D.M.H. This is 
followed by a discussion of "next steps", assuming that 
D.M.H. decides to go forward with the program - further 
modification based on the input of the reviewers, 
implementation strategies, and implications for future 
projects. 
Next Steps 
The Proposal be Accepted 
In this project I set out to develop a training 
program, which I would propose to D.M.H., as a "draft" 
which "could serve as a basis for training practicing 
mental health professionals to perform forensic 
evaluations as described in M.G.L. Chapter 123, Sections 
15 and 16" (Goal 1 - see Chapter I, p. 22). 
My plan was to deliver a draft program, along with 
the review and comment of "key individuals". to the 
for Forensic Services, Robert Fein. Assistant Commissioner 
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This "review and comment" would serve the dual purposes of 
providing bases on which D.M.H. could: 1) decide whether 
or not to accept this proposal; and 2) revise or redesign 
the training program. My proposal to Dr. Fein then, would 
be that D.M.H. consider utilizing this package as a 
"foundation", upon which they could build a training 
program. 
In Chapter V, I concluded that the methodology, used 
in Stage II of this project, succeeded in producing data 
which D.M.H. could confidently use as a basis, or guide in 
their decision making and revisions. As seen in Chapters 
VI and VII, this data can be readily applied for 
modifications or revisions. However, the question 
remains: What should D.M.H. 's decision be? Can my draft 
training program serve as a basis for the training, which, 
as I demonstrated in Chapter I, is needed? 
Following my own suggestion, I base my answer on the 
results of the review process. The findings presented and 
analyzed in Chapters VI and VII clearly indicated to me 
that the reviewers, the "key individuals", consistently 
viewed this training proposal as "quite adequately" 
addressing its content, and "quite adequate" in its 
comprehensiveness, its format, and its training methods. 
Py j*the r, the general comments made by the reviewers 
regarding the manual and curriculum, were, with rare 
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exception, supportive, and in some cases enthusiastic. 
Given the consistently high ratings, and the degree 
of support expressed by the reviewers for the training 
materials overall, I conclude that my training program, 
modified and implemented as I propose in this chapter, can 
serve as a basis for training mental health professionals 
to perform forensic evaluations in Massachusetts. 
The following, then, are my recommendations for the 
"next steps" in this process. I will address: 1) further 
development and modification of the training materials; 2) 
implementation issues and strategies; and (3) issues 
beyond implementation - program evaluation, continuing 
education, training of legal professionals, and finally, 
the development of a comprehensive forensic evaluation 
training program. 
Further Development and Modifications 
My intent here is to focus, not on the content of 
further development and modifications, which I have 
already addressed in Chapters VI and VII, but on the 
process by which D.M.H. will move toward implementing this 
project. 
To this point, the project has been characterized 
primarily by individual effort, with reaction and input 
from others. The project has now matured to the point 
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that it is ready for committee work. The process of 
individual creativity and synthesis has gone about as far 
as is advisable, practically and politically. 
My practical concern is that I believe decisions 
which go into the revision process should be based on a 
wide range of perspectives, and receive the benefit of 
discussion and debate. Politically, I'm concerned that 
this project would affect not only future trainees (and 
ultimately, the defendants they assess), but also the 
legal and forensic mental health professionals who are 
likely to become directly involved with the training 
program, or the reports and testimony of its graduates. A 
developmental process which omits the active input of 
legal and forensic clinicians, beyond the role of 
"reviewer", is not likely to be readily accepted. 
Recommendaiioni Therefore, I recommend that Dr. 
Fein appoint a committee which would be charged with the 
revision task. I suggest that the committee be a small 
group of forensic clinicians, and at least one attorney. 
They should be selected from the group of reviewers - 
individuals who have already participated in this project, 
and are familiar with the materials. 
With regard to the training manual, I see the 
committee focusing on form and content. The "conclusions 
sections in Chapter VI should be useful as a guide or set 
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of recommendations for the committee's consideration. 
As to the curriculum, and the training program 
overall, I view the committee's task as focusing on 
format, training methods, and content. Further, the 
committee would have to tackle the timing issues. How 
much time should be allotted to the whole training 
program? Over what period should the sessions be spread 
out; or, should it be presented in consecutive days? 
Again, the committee may find the "conclusions" sections 
in Chapter VII useful in guiding their discussion. 
Also, the committee probably should consider 
alternatives to the curriculum. The curriculum describes 
a formal training program requiring a great deal of 
organization, and a fair amount of cost and time, to which 
it might be difficult to attract trainees. The committee 
might consider as one alternative, an individualized 
approach, which could consist of intensive supervision, 
the training manual, and a weekly seminar in forensic 
issues. Should D.M.H. ultimately decide to go with a 
version of the training program described in the 
curriculum, rather than an alternative, the issue of 
attracting trainees will have to be addressed. I will 
discuss this further, momentarily. 
Finally, the committee should address program 
-^carefully evaluated trial runs 
evaluation. A series 
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might be planned, followed by a strategy for ongoing 
program evaluation. Possible strategies for program 
evaluation will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Implementation 
Previously, I have discussed the value of involving 
key individuals in the review of the training program as 
a method of assisting D.M.H. in answering the question: 
should the proposal be accepted? In considering 
strategies of implementation for the training program, 
another asset of this methodology arises - its value as an 
implementation intervention. 
The major theme of this chapter, as I discuss 
modification and implementation, is collaboration. The 
challenge of this project has been, and remains, the 
successful development and implementation of an 
educational program which focuses on the interface of two 
professions, mental health and law, which differ 
substantially in their philosophical foundations and 
societal functions. From the very start, this project has 
been a collaborative effort, which has brought together 
what should be the necessary ingredients to meet this 
challenge - the co-participation of academia, law, 
psychiatry, psychology, and social work. The reader will 
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note throughout this chapter, the continued use of this 
model of collaboration and involvement as a recommended 
intervention for overcoming potential barriers. 
The following discussion addresses strategies for 
implementing the forensic training program as described in 
the curriculum (or a revised version). In order to 
understand the purpose for these strategies it is 
important to grasp the context to which they would be 
applied. 
I began Chapter III by stating that "...the time is 
ripe in Massachusetts for the implementation of a training 
program in forensic evaluation." I noted that D.M.H. has 
announced its intention to "revamp" forensic mental health 
services in the state, that the Division of Forensic 
Mental Health Services is working to upgrade the 
qualifications required of professionals who perform 
forensic evaluations, and that the Division has 
acknowledged the need for training, to help practicing 
mental health professionals meet the new requirements. 
Just since this project began in early 1986, many 
changes have occurred. In March, D.M.H. introduced its 
draft regulations (presented in the training manual, p. 
I_6), which described the requirements for designation of 
"qualified psychologists" to perform pre-trial 
The "draft" was formally promulgated in evaluations. 
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August. Further, the Division is now considering new 
legislation and regulations which will address 
psychiatrists similarly. 
Prior to July, most of the forensic psychologists in 
Massachusetts who met these qualifications held positions 
at the state's forensic mental health hospital, 
Bridgewater State Hospital. This was due in part to the 
fact that, before this year, Bridgewater was the only 
setting in which psychologists could perform pre-trial 
evaluations. As noted in Chapter V, several of these 
people left Bridgewater following organizational changes 
there. These psychologists have now all taken leadership 
positions in court clinics and state hospitals throughout 
Massachusetts. They, along with other newly hired 
forensic clinicians are taking a very active role in 
addressing the qualifications of professionals who are 
performing pre-trial evaluations, and the quality of their 
work. 
Another change, related to the exodus from 
Bridgewater, is that the courts are being asked to avoid 
"unnecessary" commitments for pre-trial evaluations to 
that setting, which is run by the Massachusetts Department 
of Corrections. Department of Mental Health run state 
hospitals and court clinics are subsequently beginning to 
experience an increase in referrals and commitments for 
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pre-trial evaluation. 
So the "scene" is changing. While many major 
changes have occurred in the last year, for the most part 
these changes can be characterized as moves which "set the 
stage" for the "major revamping". Actual changes in the 
form and quality of forensic services, statewide, will 
likely be a gradual process. The system is just beginning 
its transition. 
In my experience, transition within a large state 
agency such as the Department of Mental Health, comes 
slowly. with much resistance to changes in the "status 
quo" . Any "major revamping" of forensic mental health 
services involves two large state "agencies" - D.M.H. and 
the judicial system. The agents of change are certainly 
faced with a challenge. 
It is within this context - a system in the early 
stages of transition - that I will raise three major 
concerns. 
First, will the program have the support of the 
legal profession? Every effort should be made to avoid 
creating confusion and frustration, with the likely 
outcome of alienated judges and attorneys. An effective 
training program would almost certainly create a change in 
the "status quo". The legal profession in Massachusetts 
would be faced with new faces, new methods, and new report 
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formats. Assuming that the training program is sponsored 
by D.M.H., its graduates are likely to be encouraged to 
follow D.M.H.’s lead on controversial issues such as 
offering "ultimate conclusions" on the issues of criminal 
responsibility or competency to stand trial. Regardless 
of the nature of the stance taken on controversial issues, 
a certain amount of rancor is likely. Ultimately, while 
D.M.H. may initiate changes, their effects will be 
manifested in the courtroom. 
Melton et al (1985) share the Virginia training 
program's early experiences with the judiciary. After an 
initial series of training sessions, designers of this 
program initiated meetings with judges and attorneys 
throughout the state, to explain their program. Judges 
and lawyers raised a number of issues. The authors soon 
found that "attempting to establish a workable program and 
at the same time to introduce novel and unappealing 
concepts to many members of the bar created considerable 
difficulties" (Melton et al, P- 96). A major difficulty 
was that "legal professionals are socialized to think m 
terms of deference to precedent" (p. 97), and any reform 
in the legal system is subject to being viewed with 
suspicion. 
The most common 
complaint was that the training 
to avoid using "ultimate 
program was teaching trainees 
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issue language" - expressing an opinion on the legal 
question at hand. They were instructed to describe 
defendants' mental states and capacities, and to allow 
judges and juries to determine if this "clinical data" met 
the specific legal criteria being applied. The legal 
professionals were accustomed to receiving very brief - 
often one paragraph - letters, which gave simple, 
straightforeward answers, usually with no elaboration. 
The authors go on to describe ensuing debates, which often 
ended in impasse. The "academic idealism" of the trainers 
was being confronted by the "practical reality" of the 
courtroom. 
Other areas of disagreement included: the 
interpretation of defendants' fifth amendment rights; the 
use of lengthy, detailed reports which some judges felt 
were confusing; and the use of psychologists and social 
workers to perform pre-trial evaluations, where previously 
only psychiatrists performed this function. 
After five months of such meetings the authors 
reported that these issues had created a good deal of 
unresolved tension. Finally, an "advisory committee , 
made up of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, was 
established. Whil© one major issue continued to go 
unresolved, the use of "ultimate issue language", the 
authors conclude that much of the controversy surrounding 
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their program would have been avoided, had this committee 
been set up at an earlier point. Subsequently, the 
committee provided a forum for the non-defensive 
presentation of arguments, and became supportive to the 
program, on most of the issues which had previously 
separated the two professions. 
Recommend ation: An initial step in the 
implementation of the training program should include the 
development of strategies which allow for maximal input 
from the legal community, with D.M.H. retaining ultimate 
control. Such strategies probably should include an 
advisory committee of legal professionals, similar to 
Virginia’s. 
This project has provided a useful first step, by 
involving members of the bar. We have already involved a 
group of eleven (11) legal professionals, several of whom 
would be likely members of an advisory committee. Such a 
committee could provide an important service by offering 
opinions on controversial issues, such as whether or not 
clinicians should provide "ultimate conclusions" in their 
reports and testimony. While a committee’s opinions would 
not be binding in court, most clinicians would be happy to 
have authoritative opinions to guide their practice. 
My second major concern is how trainees will be 
attracted to the training program. This issue was raised 
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by several reviewers, who were concerned about the 
incentive for people to attend a lengthy program. 
Actually I see two questions here: 1) What is the 
incentive for individual clinicians? 2) What is the 
incentive for court clinics and hospitals to send their 
employees? A correlate to the latter question is: How can 
they afford it? 
Recommendation^ With regard to the issue of 
incentive", I begin with the assumption that, after a 
reasonable startup period, the program will sell itself, 
or else it will have to be restructured or discontinued. 
The value of this project's involvement of so many 
key people in the review of the training program, should 
not be overlooked as an enticement to mental health 
professionals. Clearly the training manual, and any 
written materials introducing the training program, should 
acknowledge by name, the individuals who participated in 
the review. Trainees will find that leading figures in 
their professions in Massachusetts, have participated in 
the development of this program. 
However, allowing for individual and agency 
motivation and desire for the training, I recognize that 
cost factors, including both time and income, are serious 
concerns for both individual clinicians and agencies, 
especially when they are considering a new program. 
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Therefore, my overall strategy in addressing both 
individual and agency incentive is that D.M.H. should 
require the training. 
The Department of Mental Health could accomplish 
this by: 
1. making the training program a criterion for the 
designation of "qualified psychologists" (and 
eventually, "qualified psychiatrists") to perform 
court-ordered pre-trial evaluations; 
2. writing this requirement (and expenses) into the 
contracts of D.M.H. funded court clinics, and 
forensic programs; and by, 
3. requiring D.M.H. employees who perform pre-trial 
evaluations within state hospitals to attend. 
Of course, this strategy leaves out the private 
practitioners who perform pre-trial evaluations. However, 
an important distinction can be made here. The D.M.H. 
regulations regarding designation of professionals to 
perform these evaluations deals specifically with 
court-ordered evaluations, the focus of the training 
package. Yet, non-court-ordered assessments also occur 
quite often. Defense attorneys frequently hire 
"independent experts" to assess competency to stand trial 
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or criminal responsibility; to a lesser extent this 
practice is also followed by prosecuting attorneys. 
Nowhere, to my knowledge, are there specific 
requirements or criteria qualifying these practitioners, 
usually operating out of private practices, to provide 
these evaluations; at least not until they get into court, 
where they must be qualified as an expert witness by the 
judge, who has great latitude in such decisions. 
Therefore, it seems that these clinicians, who are 
independent of D.M.H., cannot be included in this 
strategy. On the other hand, it is clear to me that 
clinicians working within the publicly funded mental 
health system must be the first priority for training, 
since they will perform the court-ordered assessments. 
Finally, my third concern is with regard to 
pessimism and resistance among D.M.H. administrators to 
the notion of implementing such a "thorough" training 
program. At this point, my recommendation above that 
D.M.H. "require" the training, will not sit too well with 
several people whose support would be central to the 
implementation of the program. My sense of the current 
situation is that while the training manual is likely to 
be eagerly accepted, many administrators remain skeptical 
with regard to the length and depth of the proposed 
training program. If these people are going to "stick 
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their necks out to support a program which is so very- 
time intensive and. content laden, they are likely to need 
more than the results of this review. 
The validity of the program is not the only issue of 
concern to these administrators. As I have noted 
repeatedly here, collaboration among legal and mental 
health professionals would be essential to successful 
implementation. But there is a concern among D.M.H. 
planners that available time, interest, and willingness, 
on the part of these busy professionals, will be lacking. 
In response to this concern, I note the responsiveness of 
the reviewers in this project. The interest and 
willingness to participate on the part of so many busy 
professionals in academia, law and mental health, has 
already been demonstrated. From the nature of reviewers' 
responses, and from recent informal contacts regarding the 
project, I can vouch for the fact that many of these key 
people are eager to get this program off the ground. I 
believe there is reason for optimism. 
Recommendation: An experimental "pilot project 
tied to the program evaluation strategy described below, 
might be a reasonable first step, aimed at providing more 
data to these administrators and to the implementation 
"advisory committee." One or two sites could be 
identified in which the training program, after 
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modification, would be presented and evaluated. After one 
or more "trail runs" and further modification, a final 
decision could be made about full implementation. 
Beyond Implementation 
EUQSEaffi_Evaluation: As I discussed earlier, unlike 
their review of the training manual, which was in hand, 
the reviewers in this project had only a descriptive 
outline on which to base their judgments regarding the 
curriculum, and the training program as a whole. Clearly, 
program evaluation will have to be addressed from the 
start. 
Once again the Virginia program provides guidance. 
Melton et al (1985) describe their evaluation techniques, 
which I recommend adopting in Massachusetts. They focused 
on two dimensions of their training program: 1) the impact 
of the program on trainee's knowledge of forensic issues; 
and 2) the quality of the written reports. Further, 
according to the current director of Virginia's Forensic 
Evaluation Training and Research Center, a follow-up study 
of the level of satisfaction of the users of forensic 
mental health services is now being done, through the use 
of questionnaires and interviews. 
The impact of their training program on trainee s 
measured through the use of an eighty (80) knowledge was 
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item written examination given at the end of training. 
This test covered federal and state legal issues and 
clinical issues. Trainees' scores on the test were 
compared with the results of three other groups: their 
non-trainee colleagues, judges, and nationally recognized 
experts - diplomates of the American Board of Forensic 
Psychology. 
The quality of their reports was measured through 
the use of an adaptation of a tool developed by Petrella 
and Poythress (1983). The adapted tool involved two 
nine-item rating and comment forms, one designed for 
competency to stand trial reports, the other for criminal 
responsibility reports. A panel of legal professionals 
participated in this part of the evaluation, which 
compared the ratings of trainees' reports with ratings of 
reports written by clinicians who had not been through the 
training program. 
Continuing_Education! The new D.M.H. regulations 
for the designation of "qualified psychologists" describe 
provisions for maintaining this "designated" status. One 
of the provisions is the requirement for yearly 
participation in training programs approved or conducted 
by the Assistant Commissioner for Forensic Services, Dr. 
Fein. 
A natural outgrowth of the program being proposed 
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here, would be a "continuing forensic education" program, 
which would attend to the ongoing educational needs of 
forensic mental health professionals. Such a program 
would most likely best fit into a seminar format, in which 
forensic clinicians could continue to learn from each 
other. Also, borrowing again from Virginia's program, a 
monthly newsletter, updating clinicians on new 
developments in case law and in forensic services in 
general, might be considered. 
Training_Legal_Professionals : As stated in the 
introduction to the curriculum for the training program, 
while the program has been designed for mental health 
professionals, once the training program is established, 
members of the bar could be regularly included. Joint 
training of clinicians and legal professionals certainly 
should increase mutual understanding. 
A_Comprehensive_Training_Program: As noted in 
Chapter VI, one reviewer in this project, a court clinic 
social worker, took a firm stand repeated in most of her 
comments, that this training program is inadequate in its 
lack of attention to other important forensic mental 
health issues. While no apologies are offered, I believe 
that she is quite correct - more is needed, and should be 
developed. Forensic mental health topics not raised 
include: 
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1. Juvenile justice 
2. Aid to sentencing evaluations (Section 15e) 
3. Transfer of mentally ill prisoners to D.M.H. 
facilities 
4. The mentally retarded defendant 
5. Treatment issues in forensic settings 
6. Civil, family and probate court evaluations 
7. Assessment of sexually dangerous persons 
Implications for Other Projects 
Having earlier addressed the assets and liabilities 
of the methodology employed in this project (see Chapter 
V), the question of its application in similar projects, 
and in other settings, arises. The following reflections 
are offered with the caution that they are simply that - 
reflections - until this program is implemented and 
evaluated. Further, important data regarding the current 
project should be sought, prior to re-applying these 
methods. Specifically, participants in this project 
should be asked what they thought of their involvement, 
and the method of involving them. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that, should the 
q£ program evaluation indicate that we have a 
outcome 
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viable training program, whose graduates are accepted by 
the legal community as evaluators, report writers and 
expert witnesses, then much will be owed to the 
methodology employed in developing the program, for its 
success. 
Given my assessment that the design problems 
associated with this project are readily correctable, I 
believe that this methodology could be useful in similar 
projects, in which there are substantive concerns about 
the issue or product being considered (e.g., the adequacy 
of a proposal), as well as political/organizational 
concerns (e.g., support for a proposal). This methodology 
addressed both concerns by: 
1. finding out what key individuals and experts in 
the field thought of the proposal in general as 
well as in detail; and 
2. from its very beginnings involving individuals in 
the training program, whose support later would be 
essential to the successful implementation of 
program. 
Actually, with respect to similar projects within 
the narrow field of forensic mental health issues in 
Massachusetts, it appears that D.M.H. has committed itself 
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to continuing with this methodology, at least for now. 
Certainly the opinions of the same "key individuals", 
whose opinions were valued in this project, would be 
valued in similar projects, such as the development of a 
comprehensive training program. Further, it seems 
reasonable that these judges, attorneys, and forensic 
clinicians would expect to be included. 
After a period of program evaluation, the 
methodology employed here could be considered as a model 
for development and implementation of forensic training 
programs in other states. Certainly the strengths of this 
methodology can apply to any state in which the guidance 
and support of "key individuals is essential. As of 
1985, only Virginia, Florida, Tennessee, and Ohio had, or 
were developing formal forensic training programs aimed at 
practicing mental health professionals (Melton et al, 
1985). 
Finally, The American Psychological Association is 
now considering a proposed project which would create a 
comprehensive forensic evaluation manual, which would be 
tailored to each state. The similarities between the 
present project and that proposal cannot be denied. The 
methods used here would appear to fit easily into such a 
project. 
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A_Personal_Note 
In a sense, this project began in 1969, when I began 
work as a mental health professional at an overcrowded 
state hospital. 
My first task as an assistant psychologist, was to 
administer the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI), in a classroom setting, to a group of fifteen (15) 
men, who had all been committed to our hospital for 
assessment of their competency to stand trial and criminal 
responsibility. Each of these men remained in the 
hospital for thirty-five days (under the provisions of a 
now defunct statute), after which they returned to court. 
Their pre-trial evaluations consisted of one formal 
fifteen minute interview by a group of clinicians, which 
focused completely on diagnosis, and on the MMPI. 
When their commitments were up, they returned to 
court, accompanied by a one paragraph form letter, which 
stated that they were, or were not, psychotic. The 
letters of those who were found psychotic, also stated 
that they were not competent to stand trial, and not 
criminally responsible; the non-psychotics, of course, had 
the opposite findings. I do not remember whether or not 
the psychotic defendants returned to the hospital under 
lengthy commitments, but I assume they did. I do remember 
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that, aside from one sexual assault, the most serious 
crime among the remaining fourteen was shoplifting. 
I do not remember being particularly concerned about 
this process, back then. At the time my major concern was 
in somehow getting these men to complete their MMPI's. I 
think it took several sessions. 
In 1982 I returned to work at the same state 
hospital. I was now a supervisor of other clinicians, and 
responsible for coordinating clinical functions on a 
psychiatric unit. These clinical tasks included pre-trial 
evaluations of defendants committed under Section 15b. 
While it was my job to somehow see to it that this task 
was performed by our "clinical team", it was the team's 
psychiatrist who had the responsibility for writing the 
report to court. 
In 1982 our assessment process in pre-trial 
evaluations included one thirty minute interview, and in 
rare cases, psychological testing. The pressure to 
deinstitutionalize the hospital had brought about a policy 
which required us to return defendants to court as soon as 
our assessment was complete. Therefore, as soon as we 
were done with our interviews, the psychiatrist wrote a 
one paragraph letter, including one sentence regarding 
diagnosis, and one sentence per legal question. 
This time I was concerned. When, soon after I began 
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this new job, I learned that our psychiatrist insisted 
that competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility 
were equivalent legal issues, I began to look at reports 
written by other psychiatrists. The forensic expertise at 
our hospital appeared to be consistently absent on all 
units. 
After characteristically writing a series of memos 
of concern to my superiors regarding my findings, I was 
invited, quite informally, to train the psychiatrists. As 
I had neither the forensic expertise, nor a clue as to how 
I might proceed with training uninterested, and probably 
unwilling psychiatrists, I respectfully declined, and 
quieted down. 
Over the past four years, I have been developing 
that expertise in the "ad lib" fashion characterized by 
Rosner (1983), as being typical of practicing mental 
health professionals. In the last two years, I have 
conducted pre-trial evaluations, and written reports to 
court (co-signed by a psychiatrist), for several 
defendants. 
Thus, I was delighted when, in early 1986, my need 
for a dissertation topic coincided with the opportunity to 
develop this project. 
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Now that I have reached an ending, I wish to close 
with these optimistic observations. First, while it was 
not the original purpose of this project, this endeavor 
has clearly demonstrated that, in its quest to improve its 
forensic services, D.M.H. can rely on constructive 
feedback and input from the key mental health 
professionals and legal professionals in this state. 
These people are willing to participate, if asked. 
Second, and finally, I want to end by noting the 
central role of academia in this project, and the 
implication for future collaboration between academia and 
state agencies. I have already acknowledged and thanked 
Dr. John Wideman, chairman of my dissertation committee 
for his contribution to this project. While such 
acknowledgements generally belong elsewhere, I raise this 
point here because it demonstrates the important role 
academia, especially a state university, can play in the 
work of a state agency such as D.M.H. This project was 
Dr. Wideman"s inspiration. My job was implementation and 
writing. Throughout, Dr. Wideman has provided guidance 
and the common sense perspective of the consultant. As a 
practicing mental health professional I appreciate the 
value and the promise of this type of involvement. 
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EDWARD M. MURPHY 
Commissioner 
^ornsn^iw4>aJj/v cfl ^/cb^SacAtcuUl^ 
(Dxeculive Ofice c/luman ^Services 
^ e/iCL+JrrvesiJ afl dlen&U ^HecU/Zv 
160 isVasU/i ^1/a.jJungUoJb S/}t*e<e2 
StosS/asi, d/cLStSCbcAtbSiUlx 0211A 
asia coot («»ri 
727-5760 
I write to enlist your aid and participation in a 
substantially forensic mental health assessments 
project that may improve 
in Massachusetts. 
IsereinoSi0^0f/°rrSi? °f the De?artme"t of Mental Health 
is responsible for developing and operating the system of psychologists 
and psychiatrists who are designated as "qualified" to conduct Chapter 123 
Courtyordered examinations. As part of our efforts to carry out our respon- 
mentalT5;*6 ar* developing materials to be used in training forensic 
mental health professionals in Massachusetts. 
Howard Lester, a DMH psychologist from Northampton State Hospital has 
developed a training manual focused on pre-trial evaluations and related 
commitments, (as part of his doctoral thesis). We are considering using 
Mr. Lester's manual, with associated training materials, as the foundation 
of didactic forensic mental health training. 
In order to help us develop the best quality training materials possible 
may I ask you to review Mr. Lester's manual and the attached materials. 
I would be most grateful for your candid ratings and comments. 
I know how difficult it is to take time from a busy schedule to review 
materials like these. I think you will find Mr. Lester's work both informa¬ 
tive and useful. In advance, please accept my thanks for your time and 
thoughts. 
Sincerely, 
Robert A. Fein, Ph.D. 
Assistant Commissioner for 
Forensic Mental Health 
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APPENDIX B 
LIST OF REVIEWERS 
Judges 
01 District Court Justice, 
Hears commitment cases at Bridgewater State Hospital 
02 District Court Justice 
03 Administrative Law Court Justice 
Attorneys 
04 Department of Mental Health Legal Office Attorney 
Helped draft D.M.H. regualtions for "qualified 
psychologists" 
05 First Assistant District Attorney - Springield 
Prosecutes criminal cases in Superior Court 
06 District Attorney - Worcester 
Prosecutes criminal cases in Superior Court 
07 Assistant District Attorney - Pittsfield 
Prosecutes criminal cases in Superior Court 
08 Defense Attorney and former District Attorney 
Represents mentally ill defendants 
09 Defense Attorney, 
Legal advocate for the mentally ill 
10 Defense Attorney, 
Legal advocate for the mentally ill 
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11 Defense Attorney 
Teaches forensic issues in medical school 
Psychologists 
12 State hospital Director of Psychological and Services 
Former forensic psychologist at Bridgewater 
Trained forensic psychology interns 
13 Former forensic psychologist at Bridgewater 
Currently in private practice. 
14 Court clinic psychologist. 
Former forensic psychologist at Bridgewater. 
15 Court clinic psychologist. 
Author of competency to stand trial assessment 
instrument. 
President of the American Board of Forensic 
Psychology. 
16 Director of court clinic. 
Former college professor of psychology. 
17 Director of court clinic 
Author - pre-trial evaluation 
Designated Forensic Mental Health Supervisor 
18 Court clinic psychologist 
Former director of Bridgewater s pre-trial 
evaluation team 
Coordinator of state hospital forensic services 19 
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Psychiatrists 
20 Director of court clinic 
21 Director of psychiatry at a state hospital 
Former forensic psychiatrist at Bridgewater 
22 Major author on forensic mental health issues 
Medical school chair of psychiatry 
23 Private practice psychiatrist 
Former Director of Legal Medicine for D.M.H. 
24 Head of pre-trial evaluation team 
at Bridgewater 
25 Professor of forensic psychiatry at medical school 
Social Workers 
26 Court clinic social worker 
27 Director of court clinic 
Former D.M.H. Director of Forensic Services 
Prospective Trainees 
28 State hospital clinical psychologist 
29 State Hospital clinical psychologist 
30 State Hospital psychiatrist 
31 D.M.H. social worker 
32 D.M.H. social worker 

